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ABSTRACT 
BruneI University, Uxbridge 
Department of Politics, American Studies & History 
Alan David Bacon 
The Conservative Party policy on the form of the National 
Health Service, 1964-1979 
2002 
PhD 
This thesis focuses on the development of the Conservative 
Party's policy in respect of the form of the National 
Health Service in England between the general elections of 
1964 and 1979. By form is meant the basic principles of the 
Service and the organisational arrangements (structure, 
management processes and financing) made to give effect to 
those principles. 
After an account of the form of the NHS in 1964, the thesis 
documents the development of Conservative Party policy on 
those aspects of form to which attention was given between 
1964 and 1979. In doing so, it draws extensively on primary 
material, much of which (especially that relating to the 
Party's periods in Opposi tion) has not, as far as the 
author can discover, been brought together previously in 
an historical study. By examining this material in its 
appropriate context, it is hoped that the thesis makes 
intelligible a passage of history quite tightly 
circumscribed both in terms of subject and period. 
Insofar as an overall theme might be said to emerge, it is 
of a Party committed to the idea of a comprehensive health 
service, uncomfortable with the consequences of aspects of 
the form enacted in 1946 but, conscious of the popularity 
of the NHS, cautious about making radical changes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Introduction has two broad aims. First, to set out the 
scope of the study and the approach used in its preparation 
(sections 1 and 2). Second, to provide a point of 
historical departure for the substanti ve chapters (sections 
3 and 4). 
1. THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study is an historical account of policy consideration 
by the Conservative Party on the form of the National 
Health Service (NHS) in England (described in section 3 
below), between the general elections of 1964 and 1979. 
1.1. The Conservative Party 
By 1964, the Conservative Party had been in office (on its 
own or in coalition) for nearly two thirds of the previous 
hundred years. Over that period the Party had developed 
into a complex organisation, with a formal structure of 
roles and committees (1). 
Much of the organisation was concerned with matters such 
as raising resources to fund Party activities, the 
recruitment of members, and the selection and support of 
candidates for parliamentary elections, which are outside 
the scope of this study. However, the development of policy 
had long been a major aspect of Party activity and is the 
focus of this study. 
( 1 ) Seldon A and Ball S (eds.), Conservative Century, 
1994, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 69/311. 
1 
In respect of policy development, whether the Party is in 
government or opposition, the role of the Leader is 
central. The Leader has the responsibility of appointing 
the Party's spokesmen on the various policy areas and a 
significant, probably often decisive, influence in what 
becomes Party policy as expressed, for example, in policy 
statements such as general election manifestos. 
The formally appointed frontbench spokesmen (whether 
ministers or Opposition spokesmen) also have key roles in 
policy consideration, individually in respect of their 
areas of responsibility, and collectively as the cabinet 
or shadow cabinet (or the Leader's Consultative Committee 
(LCC) as the latter is formally titled). They in turn may 
be assisted in their policy considerations by parliamentary 
colleagues (some formally appointed as junior ministers or 
Opposition spokesmen); officials (Party officers or civil 
servants in opposition and government respectively) and 
various standing or specially convened committees. 
Further, the Party has a mass membership who may also from 
time to time contribute to the formation of policy, 
particularly perhaps at the annual Party Conference. 
The aim in this study has been to research how policies on 
the form of the NHS were considered wi thin this set of 
potential contributors. In addition, the research has 
sought to identify individuals and organisations not part 
of the Party structure who may nevertheless have had a 
significant impact on policy consideration. 
2 
1.2. The policy focus 
The policy area focused upon in this study is the NHS, 
established following the NHS Act 1946, covering England 
and Wales, and the NHS (Scotland) Act 1947. Despite much 
similarity, there are differences between the services in 
the three countries, for example in their structures. This 
study is solely concerned with the NHS in England. 
By form (henceforth without italics) the author means the 
basic principles of the NHS (its scope, who has the right 
to use it, and on what terms) and the organisational 
arrangements 
matters and 
(structure, 
financing) 
management processes, 
made to give effect 
practical 
to those 
principles, an account of which is given in section 3. 
1.3. The period covered by the study 
The NHS was enacted and implemented under the Labour 
Government elected in 1945, but from 1951 to 1964 
successive Conservative Governments had been responsible 
for the Service and (it will argued in section 4) had made 
no significant change to its form. Following loss of office 
at the 1964 general election, however, the Party leadership 
instituted the first major review of policies since that 
after the election defeat in 1945, wi th "modernisation" 
(discussed in Chapter 2) as a major objective. A further, 
equally wide-ranging review was instituted after Mrs 
Margaret Thatcher became Party Leader and largely completed 
by the end of 1978. The Party's policies on the NHS were 
explicitly included in both reviews. 
Given that it included these two wide-ranging policy 
reviews, the period 1964 to 1979 seemed to the author to 
be likely to be one rich in reflection about the form of 
the NHS, and as such well worth researching. 
3 
2. THE HISTORICAL APPROACH TAKEN 
In addition to their differences in subject, historical 
studies differ due to what might be called the personal 
(and particularly the political) values of their authors, 
and the methodologies adopted. In this section these 
aspects of approach are discussed. 
2.1 Personal values 
It is probable that few historians would totally dissent 
from Hobsbawm IS proposi tion that "purely objecti ve and 
value-free" social science (including history) is not 
possible (2), though there are exceptions (3). 
In the case of some historians, part at least of their 
personal values is, explicitly, public knowledge (4). For 
others, this is not the case and, while their personal 
values may perhaps in part be deduced from their work, in 
a formal sense they are unknown. The author does not regard 
himself as having any personal values likely to result in 
bias in the way he has approached his subject. He is 
therefore content to adopt the posi tion of the second 
category of historians referred to above. 
(2) Hobsbawm E, On History, 1998, London, Abacus, p. 164. 
(3) for example Hillgruber, quoted in Kershaw I, The Nazi 
Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives of 
Interpretation, 2nd ed., 1989, London, Edward Arnold, 
p. 9. 
(4) for example, because of their public roles (such as 
Lord Jenkins of Hillhead and the late Alan Clark, 
both at one time government ministers). 
4 
2.2 Methodology 
This section sets out the approach taken in this study by 
reference to different levels of discussion about 
methodological issues. 
At the highest, or at least most general level, there is 
considerable debate as to whether the contemporary era is 
appropriately thought of as "modern" or "postmodern", in 
the sense in which those terms have been employed by, for 
example, Lyotard (5), and about the implications of this 
for the study of history (6). 
Jenkins has defined postmodernists as "people who recognise 
that we are finite creatures in an unintelligible, 
existential condi tion" (7), and thus usefully distinguishes 
them from those who take the view that both the past and 
present are potentially intelligible in terms other than 
those of the individual's own subjective consciousness. The 
author takes the latter view, and has thus undertaken this 
study as an essay in what Himmelfarb has referred to as 
""modernist" history, familiarly known as "traditional" 
history" (8), in the belief that Evans is broadly correct 
when writing that history "really happened, and we really 
can, if we are very scrupulous and careful and sel f-
critical, find out how it happened" (9). 
(5) Lyotard J, The Postmodern Condition, 1984, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press. 
(6) as explored by, for example, Jenkins K, in Re-
Thinking History, 1991, London, Routledge, and Evans 
R, In Defence of History, 1997, London, Granta. 
(7) Jenkins K, Why History, 1999, London, Routledge, p. 
204. 
(8) Himmelfarb G, "Telling it as you like it: Postmodern 
History and the Flight from Fact", in Jenkins K (ed.) 
The Postmodern History Reader, 1997, London, 
Routledge. 
(9) Evans, 1997, p. 253. 
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Within the "modern" frame of reference, there is a further 
level of discussion about the conceptual framework within 
which it is appropriate to try to understand change. In his 
study of the NHS, for example, Mohan distinguished three 
broad frameworks which, respectively, emphasised 
"developmentalism and determinism", "political theory" and 
"political economy". In the first, change is explained 
predominantly in terms of such forces as international 
trends or technical progress. In the second, change is 
explained from assumptions about the nature of the 
poli tical context, encapsulated in such terms as 
"pluralism", "Marxism" and "the New Right". In the third, 
change is explained through ideas drawn from the field of 
political economy, as such as the shift from "Fordism" to 
"post-Fordism" (10). 
Mohan's categorisation was, like others, nei ther defini ti ve 
nor unproblematic (for example the term Marxism is commonly 
used to connote something much wider than an interpretation 
of the political context). However, in the author's view 
it offers a reasonable taxonomy of a wide range of 
differing frameworks, one within which this study can be 
located. 
The author's approach is primarily rooted in what Mohan 
referred to as the "poli tical theory" conceptual framework, 
and more particularly in that of "pluralism": the belief 
that "political power is widely distributed and that no one 
group is dominant; consequently each can exercise some 
influence" (11) 
(10) Mohan J, A National Health Service?, 1995, London, 
Macmillan, pp. 25/6. 
(11) ibid., p. 29. Mohan's use of the term is similar to 
others', eg Ham C and Hill M, The Policy Process in 
the Modern Capitalist Society, 2nd ed., 1993, Hemel 
Hempstead, Harvester, pp. 26/31 and Vincent A, 
Theories of the State, 1987, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 
183. 
6 
In his taxonomy, Mohan employed the notion of pluralism in 
what Vincent has described as its "descriptive" rather than 
"normati ve" sense (12). In identi fying his approach as 
pluralistic, therefore, the author is not expressing a 
moral preference: simply his belief that changes in policy 
can best be understood as the outcome of considerations in 
which there are potentially many contributors. 
How is this belief to be justified? Mohan gave two examples 
of studies of the NHS that he regarded as written from a 
pluralist approach, by Pater and Rivett (13), both of whom 
had been senior ci vil servants wi thin the Ministry of 
Health and its successors, and much involved in the 
formulation of poliCies for the NHS (14). It is perhaps 
reasonable to infer that the pluralist approach taken in 
their historical studies reflected their sense that its 
core notion - many potential contributors to policy making 
- accurately reflected their practical experience, even if 
the occasion for policy re-consideration arose from, for 
example, technical progress or changing economic 
circumstances. 
Like Pater and Ri vett, the author was for many years a 
civil servant within the Health Department, and a 
contributor to numerous policy considerations (15). Whether 
or not the inference made above is correct as regards Pater 
and Rivett, a pluralist 
understanding policy change 
frame 
in the 
of reference 
context of the 
accords with his practical experience. 
(12) Vincent, 1987, p. 183. 
for 
NHS 
(13) Mohan, 1995, p. 29. (Pater J, The Making of the NHS, 
1981, and Rivett G, The Development of the London 
Hospital System, 1986, both London, Kings Fund.) 
(14) Pater from 1933 to 1973, retiring as an Under 
Secretary; Rivett from 1972 to 1992, retiring as a 
Senior Principal Medical Officer. 
(15) from 1970 to 1999, retiring at grade 4. For example, 
the policy flowing from the consultation paper 
Patients First, 1979, London, HMSO, announced in July 
1980. 
7 
Within the context of modernist or "traditional" history, 
and a primarily pluralist conceptual framework, there is 
a further level of methodological issue - the use, if any, 
to be made of theory. 
Some historians ' work is based on their personal, and often 
unarticulated, assumptions about the meaning of the events 
of which they are offering accounts; others seek to explain 
the meaning of such events by drawing upon theories of 
various kinds. In relation to the NHS, these two broad 
approaches are exemplified in recent studies by Webster, 
and by Harrison. 
The two volumes of Webster's The Health Services Since the 
War (16) were the product of a publicly-funded commission 
lito write an account of the British health service from the 
inception of planning for a comprehensive health service 
to 1979" (17). They were based on extensive study of 
official documents, and concentrated on what the author 
regarded as "central issues of policy" (18). 
Nowhere in the nearly 1,200 pages of text in the two 
volumes is there reference to, or evidence of, the use of 
theories or theoretical models drawn from other disciplines 
(19). Rather, the volumes contain what is, in essence, the 
author's interpretation of (mainly written) evidence 
relating to the genesis, enactment, implementation and 
first thirty years of a public service, understood on his 
own assumptions about meaning and presented in his own 
terms. 
(16) Webster C, The Health Services Since the War, Vols. 
I, 1988, London, HMSO; and II, 1996, London, The 
Stationery Office. 
(17) ibid., 1996, p. xi. 
(18) ibid., p. xii. 
(19) specifically confirmed by Webster in personal 
communication to the author, 17/12/01. 
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By contrast, in National Health Service Management in the 
7 980s, "a study of the poli tical history of NHS 
management 1979 to 1992" (20), Harrison sought to 
"describe and explain what happened" (21), both by offering 
a chronological and evidence-based account of events and 
by considering "several plausible accounts" (22) cast in 
terms of theories, consciously on the lines of Allison's 
work in relation to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 (23). 
The theories Harrison drew upon included 
"rational/ideological", "individual personality", and 
several about "what determines government policy agendas" 
( 24) . 
Allison believed that his "several plausible accounts" 
approach had enabled him to "probe more deeply into the 
event, uncovering additional insights" and to "demonstrate 
how alternative conceptual lenses lead one to see, 
emphasize, and worry about qui te different aspects of 
events like the missile crisis" (25). It can reasonably be 
inferred that Harrison took the view that the theoretical 
approaches he used might illuminate the events with which 
he was concerned more fully than had he relied solely upon 
his own, perhaps less fully articulated, personal 
assumptions. 
While studies of the kinds exemplified by Webster and 
Harrison's are both within the broad church of historical 
scholarship, is there any sense in which one approach is 
intrinsically better than the other? 
(20) Harrison S, National Health Service Management in the 
7980s, 1994, Aldershot, Avebury. 
(21) ibid., p. 2. Emphasis in original. 
(22) ibid., pp. 4/5. Emphasis in original. 
(23) ibid., p. 4. 
(24) ibid., pp. 128/133. 
(25) Allison G, Essence of Decision, 1971, Boston USA, 
Little, Brown and Company, p. v. 
9 
Both depend on the assumptions (and imagination) of the 
individual in deciding the research programme, carrying it 
through and bringing what is judged to be the appropriate 
evidence together into a coherent account. 
The approach exemplified by Webster's work is the 
historian's personal, critical interpretation of relevant 
evidence, and subject to personal bias, whether disclosed 
or not. 
However, it is not self-evident that the use of one or more 
of what Harrison has referred to as "a near infinity of 
theoretical approaches" (26) makes an historical study any 
less idiosyncratic or free from personal bias. The choice, 
from this "near infinity", is necessarily the personal one 
of the historian concerned. And there is an addi tional 
consideration. While the use of theories may lead the 
historian to insights he or she would otherwise not have 
found, it is also possible that they may serve as limits 
on the historian's imagination. 
Perhaps recognising that neither broad approach was 
intrinsically superior, Marwick has suggested that 
differences among historians on this matter are primarily 
explicable in terms of "individual predilection" (27). 
The author's predilection is the approach exemplified by 
Webster, on the ground that, while any historical study is 
inevitably personal, those undertaken without the 
constraint imposed by the use of theories are likely to be 
more open to the creative individuality of the historian, 
and may therefore be ultimately richer. Accordingly, within 
the "modern", pluralistic frame of reference discussed 
above, that is the approach adopted for this study. 
(26) Harrison, 1994, p. 127. 
(27) Marwick A, The Nature of History, 3rd ed. 1989, 
London, Macmillan, p. 142. 
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2.3. The evidence 
Apart from the examination of appropriate poli tical memoirs 
and academic publications, this study is based on the 
results of extensive archival research, the object of which 
has been to discover primary evidence relevant to its 
focus. 
The research programme flowed from the nature of the 
Conservative Party's formal arrangements for policy review 
summarised in section 1.1 above. The formally-appointed 
Party spokesmen on the NHS were identified and efforts made 
to research how they approached the issue of policy 
consideration, what seemed to be the influences on them, 
and the results in terms of policy change. This 
necessitated exploration of the contributions of all those 
elements of the Party referred to section 1.1; the 
government departments who advised Conservative ministers 
(during the period 1970 to 1974); and individuals and 
organisations outside the Party (and government 
departments) who seemed to have been influential. 
This last point needs particular mention. There was during 
the period under study (as there remains) a wide range of 
indi viduals, professional bodies, policy-based pressure 
groups and commercial organisations acti vely concerned wi th 
the NHS, any of whom, in principle, might have contributed 
to Conservative Party policy thinking, even if just by 
publishing something which a minister or shadow minister 
regarded as illuminating an issue under consideration. 
Where any evidence has been identified in Party or public 
records suggesting such a contribution, efforts were made 
to examine the records of the individual or organisation 
concerned. It was not, however, practicable systematically 
to seek to examine the records of all those who might in 
principle have contributed in this way, but for which no 
reference was found in Party or public records. 
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As with any historical study, there is an element of the 
fortuitous about the evidence that survives, and there were 
some notable gaps (referred to in the following chapters). 
Nevertheless, the author believes he has been able to 
identify sufficient evidence to create a reasonably 
coherent account of the main areas of policy consideration, 
and policy change, within his chosen remit. 
As regards the criteria for selecting material as evidence 
for inclusion as part of the overall account, the author 
has had two criteria in mind - authenticity and relevance. 
Most of the primary evidence referred to in this study is 
in written form and "official" in character, forming part 
of formal Party or public archives. Whilst the 
interpretation is to be placed on any particular document 
is a matter of judgement, the authenticity of the material 
was rarely in doubt. However, in some cases the author 
sought to supplement archival evidence by interviewing 
those who had been involved in the policy deliberations 
under study. Here it quickly became apparent that memories 
(of events typically twenty five years earlier) were 
patchy, and at times quite inaccurate. The use made of such 
evidence is discussed in the concluding chapter. 
As regards the second criterion, relevance, the questions 
constantly in the author's mind have been whether the 
material under study was itself evidence of the development 
of Party policy (for example the statements of ministers 
and shadow ministers, and published policy documents such 
as general election manifestos), or whether it could be 
viewed as contributing to the thinking of those who played 
a part in Party policy consideration. Inevitably, the 
judgement in particular cases is a subjective one, in that 
other historians may disagree - either regarding evidence 
deployed in the study as irrelevant, or noting the omission 
of evidence they regard as relevant. 
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3. THE FORM OF THE NHS 
As noted in section 1.2 above, by form is meant the basic 
principles of the NHS (its scope, who has the right to use 
it, and on what terms) and the organisational arrangements 
(structure, management processes, practical matters and 
financing) made to give effect to those principles 
3.1 Basic principles 
The 1946 Act placed a duty on the Minister of Health to 
promote the establishment of a "comprehensive health 
service" (28). This comprised three main types of health 
service: the general medical, dental, pharmaceutical and 
ophthalmic services (hereafter referred to collectively as 
the family practitioner services (FPS»; the local 
authority health services (such as midwifery, health 
visiting and ambulances); and the hospital and specialist 
services. 
In terms of current expenditure, in 1949/50 the hospital 
service was the largest element, accounting for 
approximately 51% of the total. The FPS accounted for about 
36%, and the local authority health services 7% (29). (The 
remaining 6% was in respect of the school health services 
and central government expenditure.) 
(28) NHS Act 1946, s. 1 (1). 
(29) Royal Commission on the National Health Service, 
Report, Cmnd 7615, 1979, London, HMSO, p. 434. 
(Percentages calculated from the NHS data, ie 
excluding the personal social services (PSS) data.) 
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The Act imposed no limitations on availability: everyone 
resident in Britain had the right to use all three types 
of service. At the same time, individuals were free to make 
private arrangements for part or all of their health care 
needs (with doctors who worked in private practice, or 
partly for the NHS and partly privately). 
Services provided under the Act were free to the individual 
at the time of use, except for charges for certain local 
health authority services and appliances supplied by the 
FPS (3D), the revenue from which initially amounted to less 
than 1% of annual NHS expenditure 
additional charges 
(31). Subsequent 
to be made for legislation enabled 
prescriptions, spectacles, dentures and dental treatment 
(32), increasing the revenue from charges to just over 5% 
of annual NHS expenditure by 1964 (33). The Service 
remained, however, largely free to the individual at the 
time of use. 
(30) 
( 31 ) 
(32) 
(33) 
NHS Act 1946, ss. 1(2), 22(2), 28(2), 29(2) and 44. 
Cmnd 7615, 1979, p. 436. 
under the NHS (Amendment) 
charges); the NHS Act 1951 
and den t ures ) and the NHS 
dental treatment). 
Cmnd 7615, 1979, p. 436. 
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Act 1949 (prescription 
(charges for spectacles 
Act 1952 (charges for 
The basis on which individuals could seek medical advice 
and treatment under the NHS had two characteristics. First, 
patients were to have free choice of senior doctors 
(general medical practitioners (GPs), specialists and 
consul tants) employed by or contracted to the Service, 
though qualified by the equally free choice of doctors as 
to whether to accept an individual as a patient. Second, 
when offering advice or treatment, the doctor did so as a 
principal, in the sense that he or she had the right to 
exercise his or her personal clinical judgement and not be 
subject to instructions from other doctors or 
administrators (34). This organisational form of medical 
practice, characterised by the mutual choice of patient and 
clinically autonomous doctor, has been termed "personal 
doctoring" (35). 
In summary, the basic principles of the NHS, both at its 
inception and by the time of the 1964 general election, can 
be said to have been its comprehensive nature; its 
availability to all those resident in Britain (individuals 
also retaining the right to make private arrangements); the 
provision of services largely free of charge at the time 
of use; and the provision of medical advice and treatment 
by doctors able also to practice privately, on the basis 
of "personal doctoring". 
(34) wi th regard to free choice, in respect of GPs this 
was included in statute (NHS Act 1946, s. 33(2)(b)). 
In respect of consul tants it was not so included. 
Rather, it was assumed as practice, eg the Handbook 
for General Practitioners, 1955, London, HMSO, p. 32. 
With regard to doctors' clinical autonomy, this too 
was not included in legislation, but was stated as 
the intended practice by the then Minister of Health, 
Aneurin Bevan, eg during the Third Reading of the NHS 
Bill (Commons Hansard, 26/7/46, vol. 426, col. 474) 
and, in more detail, in his reply to "The [Bri tish 
Medical Association's] Negotiating Committee's Case", 
published in the supplement to the Bri tish Medical 
Journal (BMJ), 20/12/47, p. 155. 
(35) Bacon A, Doctors, Patients and the NHS, 1996, SSP 
Books, pp. 3/7. 
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3.2 Organisational arrangements 
As noted above, the NHS as enacted in 1946 comprised three 
main services the FPS, the local authority health 
services (or personal health services as they were 
sometimes called), and the hospital and specialist 
services. 
In respect of 
councils (ECs), 
accountable to 
the FPS, new public bodies, executive 
were created under the Act and were fully 
the Minister of Health. The ECs were 
responsible for making arrangements for the provision of 
services with those GPs in their areas who wished to work 
full or part-time wi thin the NHS, on terms negotia ted 
nationally, and then for administering those arrangements. 
The ECs had broadly similar responsibilities in respect of 
dental, ophthalmic and pharmaceutical services. 
The hospital and specialist services were created by the 
nationalisation of hospitals previously managed by local 
authorities and voluntary bodies, and placing them under 
the management of new public bodies. These were hospital 
management committees (HMCs) and, for teaching hospitals, 
boards of governors (BGs), both fully accountable to the 
Minister, in the case of HMC hospi tals through regional 
hospital boards (RHBs). 
The BGs and RHBs were responsible for employing specialists 
and consultants, who had the right to undertake private 
practice if they wished. The 1946 Act enabled provision to 
be made for hospital doctors to see their private patients 
in what became commonly referred to as "pay beds" within 
NHS hospitals (36). This arrangement was enacted because 
the Labour Government saw it as necessary in order to 
attract doctors to the Service (37). 
(36) NHS Act 1946, s. 5(2). 
(37) Commons Hansard, 30/4/46, vol. 422, col. 57. 
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The local health authority services were provided by the 
county and county borough councils. Unlike the executive 
councils and the public bodies responsible for hospitals, 
the local authorities were not the Minister of Health's 
agents, and were accountable to the Minister only in 
respect of those matters specified in the 1946 Act, 
principally the approval of their plans for services. 
Arrangements for financing the Service were consistent with 
decisions about basic principles and structure. The 
services that were the direct and full responsibility of 
the Minister of Health, the FPS and hospital service, were 
funded "by moneys provided by Parliament" (38), in practice 
principally from general taxation, with a contribution from 
the national insurance fund (often referred to as the NHS 
Contribution). The services provided by local authorities 
were funded from local taxes (rates) and central government 
grant. 
No significant changes were made in the main organisational 
arrangements of the Service between 1946 and 1964, except 
for the enactment of additional powers to extend the range 
of charges that could be imposed, referred to above. 
In summary, the main organisational arrangements enacted 
in 1946, and extant in 1964 consisted of separate 
administra ti ve arrangements for each of the three main 
categories of health service (collectively often referred 
to as the tripartite structure), two within central 
government and fully accountable to the Minister of Health, 
the third part of local government and accountable to the 
Minister only so far as provided by statute. The Service 
was funded largely through taxation, both national and 
local. 
(38) NHS Act 1946, s. 52(1). 
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4. CONSERVATIVE POLICY ON THE FORM OF THE NHS TO 1964 
4.1 The Party in Opposition, 1945-1951 
The basic principles of the NHS proposed by the Labour 
Government in 1946 were essentially those set out in the 
wartime coalition Government's 1944 White Paper (39), and 
carried forward by the 1945 caretaker Conservative 
Government into its own unpublished Whi te Paper (40). 
Conservative frontbench spokesmen were thus able to support 
the basic purpose of the NHS Bill 1946 (41). 
On organisational arrangements, however, there were "two 
fundamental principles" (42) which led the Conservatives 
to vote against the Bill on Second and Third Readings (43). 
The first such principle was concern that the Labour 
Government's proposals for remunerating GPs would introduce 
a salaried GP service, which the Conservatives believed 
would undermine the traditional doctor/patient 
relationship. The second was in respect of the 
organisational arrangements proposed for the hospital and 
specialist services, namely the nationalisation of the 
local authority and voluntary hospitals and their 
incorporation under public bodies fully accountable to the 
Minister of Health. The reasons for opposition were what 
was seen as the adverse impact on "voluntary effort and 
association" and local government, and the extent of 
authority and patronage (through appointments to the new 
public bodies) given to the Minister (44). 
(39) A National Health Service, Cmd. 6502, 1944, London, 
HMSO, p. 47. 
(40) Progress wi th the Proposals for a Na tional Heal th 
Service, Public Records Office (PRO) CAB 66/66. 
(41) for example, Second Reading speeches by Richard Law, 
Henry Willink and JSC Reid, all in Commons Hansard 
vol. 422, cols. 66/7, 224 and 385 respectively. 
(42) Commons Hansard, vol. 422, col. 69. 
(43) ibid., vol. 422, col. 408, and vol. 426, col. 476. 
(44) Commons Hansard, vol. 426, col. 400. 
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Despi te sustained Conservati ve opposi tion, the size of 
Labour's parliamentary majority meant that the Bill could 
be enacted and the controversial arrangements for the 
hospital service implemented. 
During the period from the enactment of the Bill to the 
1950 general election, however, the Conservatives came to 
accept not just the basic principles of the NHS, but the 
organisational arrangements as enacted in 1946. 
This was partly because concern about the first 
"fundamental principle" was largely met by the NHS 
(Amendment) Act 1949, which provided that a salaried GP 
service could not be introduced by regulation, but only 
through new primary legislation (45). 
There was, however, no parallel amending legislation 
addressing the Party's concerns on the second "fundamental 
principle", the organisation of the hospi tal and specialist 
services. Here, the Party had to decide whether to accept 
the position enacted in 1946 or commit itself to change. 
A Conservative Research Department (CRD) memorandum 
prepared in March 1949 by rain Macleod (46) and drawn upon 
in the preparation of the Party's statement of overall 
policy, The Right Road for Britain, issued in July 1949, 
referred to the need to "decide whether we intend to return 
any, and if so which, hospitals to voluntary effort". The 
memorandum contained no reference to the possibility of 
returning to local authorities responsibility for the 
hospitals they had managed (47). 
(45) NHS (Amendment) Act, s. 10. 
(46) Macleod went on to become a Conservative MP and hold 
a range of ministerial appointments, including that 
of Minister of Health from May 1952 to December 1955 
(Webster, 1996, p. 778). 
(47) statement of Social Services Policy, Conservative 
Party Archive (CPA) CRD 2/29/2. 
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As Harriet Jones has evidenced, there were those on what 
she has referred to as "the liberal wing" of the 
Conservative Party who favoured denationalisation (48). 
However, The Right Road for Britain included a commitment 
only to reconsider the cases of voluntary hospitals 
nationalised against their wishes. Like the CRD memorandum, 
The Right Road for Britain made no reference to 
denationalising the former local authority hospitals (49). 
The commitment in respect of the voluntary hospitals was 
not, however, carried into the 1950 general election 
manifesto (50). 
Early in 1951 an enquiry into the NHS was undertaken for 
the Party's parliamentary Health Policy Committee. The 
majority view was that "a further major reorganisation 
could not be justified now", and that only when local 
government was reorganised would there be "a sui table 
opportunity to review the present administrative structure 
of the Hospital Service" (51). 
(48) Jones H, The Conservati ve Party and the Welfare 
state, PhD thesis, 1992, London University, pp. 
159/60, especially footnote 274. 
(49) reprinted in Conservatism 7945-50, 1950, London, 
Conservative Political Centre, p. 209. 
(50) Craig F, British General Election Manifestos 7900-
7974, 1975, London, Macmillan, p. 148. 
(51) paper ACP/51/10, CPA CRD 4/7/19. 
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The majority view commended itself to the ACP (52) which, 
at its meeting on 18 April 1951, agreed that "the whole re-
organisation of the Hospital Service was dependent on its 
being incorporated into the local government structure, but 
this in turn was dependent on the long-overdue reform of 
local government boundaries and functions" (53). Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the 1951 general election 
manifesto, like that for 1950, implicitly accepted the form 
of the NHS enacted in 1946. 
How is this acceptance to be understood? One possibility 
would be to see it as part of an overall shift resulting 
from the Party's policy reviews of the period 1947-50, 
particularly associated with RA Butler in his capacity as 
Chairman both of the CRD and the ACP. 
(52) The ACP had been established in 1950, and included 
the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Party, 
representatives of the Lords, Commons and Executive 
Committee of the National Union, the Director of the 
CRD, and co-opted members. As its name implies, the 
ACP was "not a policy-making body", but rather a high 
level forum where the leadership could explore issues 
with people from all the key elements of the Party, 
Barnes J and Cockett R, "The Making of Party Policy", 
in Seldon A and Ball S, 1994, p. 366. 
(53) ACP(51 )7th meeting minutes, CPA ACP 2/1. 
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Some have 'seen these reviews (especially that resulting in 
the Industrial Charter (54», as having led to substantial 
change from the Party's policy stance in 1945. This change 
is said, for example, to have "placed the Conservati ve 
Party back on the middle course in politics, away from the 
poli tical fringe where it had seemed to be since Beveridge" 
(55) and provided the basis for "modern "One Nation" 
Conservatism" (56). More specifically, Butler in leading 
the reviews and securing the Party's acceptance of their 
products is said to have "cut the Party afloat from its 
1930s unemployment moorings [and] had brought it to 
accept the concept of the Welfare State" (57). 
From this perspective the virtual acceptance of the NHS as 
enacted in 1946 in The Right Road for Bri tain; the not 
carrying through to the 1950 general election manifesto of 
the possibility of denationalising some of the former 
voluntary hospitals; the view of the ACP on the 1951 
enquiry report; and the lack of any reference to changing 
the NHS's structure or financial arrangements in the 1951 
general election manifesto, could all be seen as of a 
piece, reflecting a new, middle ground Conservative Party. 
However, this interpretation turns on whether there was 
indeed a significant shift in overall policy stance as a 
result of the policy reviews, marked by the publication of 
documents such as the Industrial Charter and The Right Road 
for Britain. 
(54) 1947, London, Conservative Central Office. 
(55) Ramsden J, The Making of Conservative Party Policy, 
1980, London, Longman, p. 111. 
(56) Heath E, The Course of My Life, 1998, London, Hodder 
and Stoughton, p. 128. 
(57) Howard A, RAB, 1987, London, Cape, p. 176. 
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While regarding the new policy documents as significant 
("comparable politically to the Crystal Palace and 
Manchester speeches of Disraeli in 1872" (58)), Blake and 
others have taken the view that the major shift in the 
Party's policy orientation came during the Second World 
War, expressed formally in, for example, the 1944 coalition 
White Papers on Employment Policy, Social Insurance and A 
National Health Service (59). 
For these White Papers seemingly committed the major 
political parties to a substantial extension of the role 
of government after the war. And an examination of the 
Conservative manifesto for the 1945 general election, with 
its word-for-word inclusion of the wartime coalition 
Government's commitment to accept, after the war, as one 
of its "primary aims and responsibilities the maintenance 
of a high and stable level of employment" (60); its 
undertaking" to pass into law and bring into action as 
soon as we can a nation-wide and compulsory scheme of 
National Insurance based on the plan announced ... in 1944" 
(61 ) ; and its commitment to the creation of a 
"comprehensive health service" (62), suggests that the 
Party leadership indeed intended to accept a substantial 
increase in the role of government. 
(58) Blake R, The Conservative Party from Peel to 
Thatcher, 1985, London, Fontana, p. 259 
(59) Employment Policy, Cmd. 6527, 1944; Social Insurance, 
Parts I and II, Cmds. 6550 and 6551; and Cmd. 6502, 
all 1944, London, HMSO. 
(60) Cmd. 6527, p. 3 cf. the manifesto, Craig, 1975, p. 
11 5 . 
(61) the manifesto, Craig, 1975, p. 117. 
(62) ibid., p. 118. 
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Blake has suggested that the Party's defeat in the 1945 
general election was due not to its policies but to lack 
of credibility: "people did not believe that the 
Conservatives meant what they said" (63), and indeed there 
have been suggestions of ambivalence among Conservatives 
(64). If, in the aftermath of electoral defeat, the Party 
leadership had itself reached the view Blake was later to 
express, the policy reviews could be seen more as attempts 
to build credibili ty rather than develop new policies, 
which in turn could make understandable the continuities 
that, for example, Lindsay and Harrington and Ramsden have 
noted between the 1944 White Papers and the 1945 manifesto, 
and subsequent policy documents (65). 
Wi thin the CRD there was certainl y concern, as late as 
1949, that the Party was not yet credible on the NHS. In 
his March 1949 memorandum referred to above, Macleod 
commented that "no single accusation is doing us more harm 
at the moment than that we are against the health service", 
presumably in part because of the votes against the Second 
and Third Readings of the NHS Bill more than two and a half 
years earlier. He repeated this view in a memorandum to the 
Director of the CRD, David Clarke, in the Autumn (66). 
(63) Blake, 1985, p. 254. 
(64) for example, Lowe has noted that during the general 
election the Party "temporarily played down" their 
commi tment to the maintenance of full employment, 
perhaps because of "an undercurrent of feeling within 
the Party that the threat, or even the reality, of 
unemployment was necessary to ensure industrial 
discipline and wage restraint". Lowe R, The Welfare 
state in Britain since 7945, 2nd ed., 1999, London, 
Macmillan, p. 109. 
(65) Lindsay T and Harrington M, The Conservati ve Party 
7978-7970, 1974, London, Macmillan, pp. 154 and 156; 
Ramsden J, The Age of Churchill and Eden, 7940-7957, 
1995, London, Longman, p. 152. 
(66) CPA CRD 2/29/2, p. 11 (the March memorandum); 
Shepherd R, Iain Macleod, 1995, London, Pimlico, p. 
51 (the Autumn memorandum). 
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If Macleod's judgement was right, in a context where the 
Party was seeking to establish credibility in respect of 
its commitment to the policies it had included in its 1945 
general election manifesto, placing before the electorate 
proposals that could have been construed as dismantling 
aspects of the now established NHS could well have seemed 
potentially counter-productive. 
Probably, therefore, within the broad context of trying to 
secure credibility for what has been referred to as "the 
postwar settlement" (67), and in part because of the re-
assurance it found in the passage of the NHS Amendment Act 
1949, "the two fundamental principles which ... divide us" 
seemed of markedly less concern within the Party in 1950 
than they had in 1946. To avoid providing any further basis 
for public belief that the Conservatives were "against the 
heal th service", the Party leadership decided to accept the 
structure and financing arrangements enacted in 1946. 
(67) for example by Shepherd, 1995, p. 79. 
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4.2. The Party in Government, 1951 to 1964 
As noted above, in the 1944 Whi te Papers and its 1945 
general election manifesto, the Conserva t i ve Party 
committed itself to significant extensions of the role of 
government. These commitments were carried through into the 
1950 general election manifesto, in which the Party stated 
that it regarded "the maintenance of full employment as the 
first aim of a Conservative Government", and undertook to 
"gi ve a solid base of social securi ty below which none 
shall fall [and] to maintain and improve the Health 
Service" (68). The commitments seem to have been carried 
through from the 1950 manifesto to the much shorter one for 
the 1951 general election, though the references there were 
very brief (69). 
The enthusiasm wi th which indi vidual Conservati ves embraced 
these commitments varied, and some within the Party opposed 
the extension of the role of government that they implied 
(70). It remained to be seen how strongly, and for how 
long, future Conserva ti ve Governments would remain at tached 
to the commitments. The Labour Party regarded it as worth 
raising doubts about these matters at the 1950 and 1951 
general elections (71). 
(68) Craig, 1975, pp. 142, 146 and 148. 
(69) ibid., p. 170. 
(70) for example, Richard Law, whose Return from Utopia, 
published in 1950 (London, Faber and Faber), has been 
described as "the gospel of post-war liberal [ie 
anti-interventionist] Conservatism" (Cockett R, 
Thinking the Unthinkable, 1994, London, 
HarperCollins, p. 98). 
(71) Craig, 1975, pp. 154 and 158 (1950 general election 
manifesto) and pp. 174 and 176 (1951 manifesto). 
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In the event, it is clear that the commi tment to the 
maintenance of full employment was, in broad terms, 
sustained by successive Conservative Governments over 
thirteen years from 1951 (72). Similarly, although "major 
changes to social security" were made, "their net result 
was to extend rather than contract the role of government" 
(73). The Conservative leadership regarded such changes as 
"important improvements in the ... social security system 
... framed twenty years ago" (74). 
As regards the NHS, Jones has commented that "it would be 
misleading to speak of a Conservative "consensus" in favour 
of the NHS" between 1951 and 1954 (75), reflecting the 
range of views among Conservative MPs noted above. However, 
this lack of consensus was not much in evidence in the 
actions of the Conservative Government. According to 
Seldon, in 1951 "senior officials at the ... Ministry of 
Heal th did not as a whole feel that the incoming 
[Conservative] Government would make major changes" (76). 
If this was the official view, it proved to be correct, not 
just in the lifetime of the Government elected in 1951, but 
throughout the period to 1964. 
(72) full employment as a policy objective featured in the 
Party's 1955, 1959 and 1964 general election 
manifestos (Craig, 1975, pp. 191 (1955), 215 (1959) 
and 242 (1964». As to successive Governments' 
willingness to intervene to prevent unemployment 
rising see, for example, Brittan S, Steering the 
Economy, 1971, London, Penguin, pp. 187/290, where 
several interventions are noted. 
(73) Lowe R, "The Replanning of the Welfare State, 1957-
1964", in Francis M and Zweiniger-Bargielowska I 
(eds.), The Conservatives and British Society 1880-
1990", 1996, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, p. 
259. 
(74) Craig, 1975, p. 250. 
(75) Jones, 1992, p. 331. 
(76) Seldon A, Churchill's Indian Summer, 1981, London, 
Hodder and Stoughton, p. 262. 
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After the 1951 general election Henry Crookshank was 
appointed Minister of Health, but was replaced by Macleod 
in a ministerial reshuffle after barely six months in the 
post. In Shepherd's view, Macleod "concentrated on the 
overriding political objective ... [of] enlightened Toryism 
- namely ensuring that the Conservative Party continued to 
be committed to the postwar settlement" (77). Specifically, 
this meant "trying to consolidate the NHS", rather than 
modify it in any substantial way (78). Macleod's five 
Conservative successors to 1964 (79) in practice adopted 
much the same approach. 
From 1952 to 1964 expenditure on the NHS increased in real 
terms every year (80). Several ini tia t i ves to improve 
aspects of the Service were announced, which received broad 
support both politically and among NHS staff (81). It is 
evident from successive general election manifestos that 
the Conservative leadership saw advantage in highlighting 
growth within the NHS (particularly new hospital building), 
and plans for further improvements (82). 
(77) Shepherd, 1995, p. 79. 
(78) ibid., p. 80. 
(79) Robert Turton, Dennis Vosper, Derek Walker-Smi th, 
Enoch Powell and Anthony Barber (Webster, 1996, p. 
778) 
( 80) Cmnd 761 5, 1 979, pp. 432/3. 
(81) for example, the policy of a shift to community-based 
care for the mentally ill announced in 1959 (Mental 
Health Services, HM(59)46, London, Ministry of 
Health); and the hospital building programme 
announced in 1962 (The Hospital Plan for England and 
Wales, Cmnd. 1604, London, HMSO). 
(82) Craig, 1975, pp. 198 (1955 manifesto); 219 (1959); 
and 252 (1964). 
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In terms of the form of the NHS, while proposals were 
considered that would have modified two of the basic 
principles of the Service (83), they were not implemented. 
Nor were any significant changes made in organisational 
arrangements, despite the fact that some within the Party 
continued to take the view that the hospitals should be 
placed under local government (84). 
Overall, despite regular examinations of the Service, 
incl uding one as part of what has been descr ibed as "a 
comprehensive reappraisal of welfare policy" undertaken in 
the early 1960s (85), and ample opportunity to seek to make 
changes, Conservative Governments sustained the NHS 
essentially in the same form as it had been enacted. The 
manifesto for the 1964 general election referred to 
"continuously expanding health services", indicated how 
further improvements would be achieved, and made no 
reference to changing the form of the Service (86). 
(83) the abolition of the dental service (Webster, 1996, 
p. 48), and the right of overseas visitors to free 
use (Webster, 1988, pp. 189 and 213). The former, if 
enacted, would have reduced the NHS's 
comprehensiveness, while the latter would have 
modified the principle that the Service was available 
to all British residents. 
(84) for example, discussion at the ACP meeting on 12/2/54 
(ACP(54)17th, CPA ACP 2/1) and at the Party 
Chairman's Policy Study Group on 24/6/58 (minutes of 
eighteenth meeting, CPA CRD 2/53/28). 
(85) Lowe R, in Francis and Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 1996, 
p. 264. 
(86) Craig, 1975, p. 252. 
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Quite apart from any general wish to demonstrate continuing 
commitment to the postwar settlement, two particular 
factors seem likely to be relevant to understanding this 
lack of change in the form of the Service to 1964, or 
proposals for change in the 1964 general election 
manifesto. 
First, from the outset some Conservatives suspected that 
the NHS was inefficient. For example, enquiries set up by 
the Party's parliamentary Health Policy Committee in 1950 
and 1952 both had as part of their terms of reference to 
"consider what changes ... should be made with a view to 
increasing the efficiency of the Service" (87). In both 
cases, however, little potential for real improvement in 
efficiency was identified (89). 
These backbench enquiries were followed by one established 
by the Conservative Government in 1953 to examine the cost 
and efficiency of the NHS. This enquiry, by a Committee 
chaired by Claude Guillebaud, an economist, reported in 
January 1956 that in its view, "the Service's record of 
performance since [1948] has been one of real achievement" 
and that "any charge that there has been widespread 
extravagance ... is not borne out by our evidence" (89). 
(87) The National Health Service, ACP/51/10 and National 
Health Service, PMC(53)8, reports of enquiries 
established in 1950 and 1952, both CPA, CRD 4/7/19. 
(88) the 1950 enquiry identified a possible £0.75m saving 
by placing the ambulance service under the hospital 
service (ACP/51/10, 1951, para. 89 ("Plan 1"). The 
1952 report included additional recommendations, such 
as that hospital authorities should to invite 
competitive tenders for the supply of goods, without 
quantifying the savings expected as a result 
(PMC(53)8, 1953. The reference to competitive 
tendering is in para. 26.) 
(89) Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Cost of 
the National Health Service, [the Guillebaud 
Committee], Cmd. 9663, 1956, London, HMSO, p. 269. 
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Al though the report came in for some cri ticism wi thin 
Conservative and official circles (90), its verdict on the 
NHS, following the two Health Policy Committee enquiries, 
provided no obvious basis for making any significant change 
in its organisational arrangements. 
Second, Conservative politicians were clear that the NHS 
was popular. As early as December 1948 wi thin the CRD 
Macleod was advising that "there can be little doubt that 
the [NHS] scheme on the whole is immensely popular with the 
majority of patients" (91). This belief in the Service's 
populari ty was sustained. Shortly after the Party lost 
office in 1964 this popularity was judged by Enoch Powell 
(92) to be such that" the very con templa t ion of 
denationalising it [in his view the only change worth 
making] is enough to daunt the stoutest political heart" 
(93). Any proposal to make significant change to the NHS 
was thus regarded as having potential electoral risk. 
4.3 The position in 1964 
The starting position for this thesis is thus that 
throughout the period in office 1951 to 1964, the 
Conservative Party remained committed to the main 
objectives of the 1944 White Papers. With regard to the NHS 
specifically, the Party's position remained what it had 
been from 1950 - acceptance both of the basic principles 
and organisational arrangements enacted in 1946. 
(90) 
(91 ) 
(92) 
(93) 
for some contemporary reactions, see Webster, 1988, 
pp. 210/1, and Jones, 1992, pp. 328/9. The CRD 
regarded the report as having "some serious gaps", 
The Guillebaud Report on the National Health Service, 
14/2/56, PMC(56)1, CPA CRD 4/7/19. 
13/12/48, CPA CRD 2/27/10. 
Powell was Minister of Health from July 1960 to 
October 1963 (Webster, 1996, p. 778), and in 1966 
published A New Look at Medicine and Politics 
(London, Pitman Medical). 
Powe 11, 1 966 , p. 67. 
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CHAPTER 1 - THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN OPPOSITION, 1964-66 
1. THE 1964 GENERAL ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
At the general election on 15 October 1964 the 
Conservatives won 304 seats in the new House of Commons, 
compared with Labour's 317 and overall majority of four 
(1). Thus, five years after achieving an overall majority 
of one hundred, the Party had lost office. 
This reversal of political fortune had not been a surprise 
to the Conservative leadership, some of whom drew 
consolation from the narrow margin of defeat (2), but it 
was naturally followed by reflection and, in time, some 
expression of dissatisfaction (3). 
Some leading Conservatives took the view that the fact that 
the Party had been in office for thirteen years was itself 
an explanation of the defeat. For example, Douglas-Home 
apparently believed that "thirteen years were too much of 
a drag" (4), while Edward Heath, the newly appointed 
Chairman of the ACP, told members that "after 13 years in 
office time is not on your side (5). 
(1) Butler D and King A, The British General Election of 
7964, 1965, London, Macmillan, p. 289. 
(2) for example, Douglas-Home/Dame Barbara Brooke, quoted 
in Ramsden J, The Winds of Change, 1996, London, 
Longman, p. 230, and Edward Heath at ACP meeting 
2/12/64, ACP(64)61st, CPA ACP 2/2. 
(3) for examples of the "broad dissatisfaction" at 
constituency level see Ramsden, 1996, p. 231. 
(4) quoted ibid., p. 230. 
(5) ACP(64)61st, CPA ACP 2/2. 
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Within these rather imprecise views seems to have been the 
a sense that, despite what Heath was later to refer to as 
"the few modernising reforms ... carried through in recent 
years" (6), insufficient attention had been given to 
bringing other aspects of Party policy up to date. 
To address this concern, a fortnight after losing office 
Douglas-Home announced that Heath would take charge of 
reviewing policy (7). Heath had been the Secretary of State 
for Industry, Trade and Regional Development prior to the 
general election, and responsible for initiating the 
legislation which abolished resale price maintenance, one 
of the "few modernising reforms" that had been implemented 
( 8 ) . 
1.1 The review of Party policy 
On 2 December 1964, at the ACP's first meeting since the 
general election and his first as its Chairman, Heath spoke 
of the need to "tackle the problems of policy which had 
emerged", and he identified five as requiring "urgent 
attention". These were "our future economic policy in the 
broadest sense", "the place of Britain in the world", "the 
future of the National Insurance Scheme", "the availabili ty 
and price of land" and "the place of the trade unions in 
our economy and society" (9). Heath proposed that "some 20 
policy groups" be established to carry out the policy 
reviews (10). 
( 6 ) 
( 7 ) 
(8 ) 
(9 ) 
( 1 0 ) 
Heath, 1998, p. 267. 
Times, 29/10/64, p. 12, col. f. 
on the abolition of resale price maintenance see, for 
example, Heath, 1998, pp. 258/264. 
ACP(64)61st, CPA ACP 2/2. 
ibid. 
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Wi th Labour's small parliamentary majori ty, Heath 
emphasised the urgency of the policy review work at the 
next ACP meeting on 3 February 1965. It was hoped that the 
various groups would produce interim conclusions by the end 
of June, so they would be available for an Autumn general 
election (11). 
At this stage the NHS was not seen as requiring policy 
a t ten t ion. Thi s may have been because, as noted in the 
Introduction, in government the Conservatives had seen no 
need for changes in its form, re-enforced by the fact that 
the NHS seems not to have been a significant issue during 
the election campaign (12). 
At its meeting on 4 March, however, the ACP discussed a 
paper by Lord Chelmer, Chairman of the Party's National 
Executive Committee, which (among many other issues) 
questioned whether the NHS should remain a scheme available 
without regard to the individual's ability to pay for the 
services received. Responding to discussion, Heath said 
that, although it had not originally been intended to have 
a group on the NHS, he had arranged for a sub-group of the 
National Insurance Policy Group to be established, to "look 
at the whole of the health service" (13). Thus the NHS 
became part of the programme of policy reviews. 
(11) ACP(65)62nd, CPA ACP 2/2. 
(12) an analysis of the "issues" of the 1964 election 
campaign has noted some discussion over Labour's 
proposal to abol ish prescription charges, wi thout 
suggesting it was a significant issue. Butler and 
King, 1965, pp. 128/145. 
(13) ACP(65)62nd, CPA ACP 2/2. 
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1.2 The Health Policy Group 
After the general election Sir Keith Joseph, who had been 
Minister of Housing and Local Government from 1962, was 
appointed to the Leader's Consultative Committee (LCC), 
often referred to as the Shadow Cabinet, with 
responsibility for policy on labour and social services 
matters, assisted on health matters by Richard Wood (14). 
In this capacity, Joseph was appointed to chair the 
National Insurance Policy Group, and later its Heal th 
Policy Sub-group (generally referred to as the Heal th 
Policy Group (HPG).) 
Heath personally oversaw the composition of policy groups, 
and in April Joseph secured his agreement to the HPG' s 
membership (15). 
In addition to Joseph and Wood, the HPG initially included 
nine MPs, including two former Ministers of Health (Anthony 
Barber, 1963/4 and Robert Turton, 1955/7), and two junior 
health ministers (Bernard Braine, 1962/4 and Sir John 
Vaughan-Morgan, 1957). The others were Lord Balniel, Paul 
Dean, Geoffrey Howe, David Mitchell, and Margaret Thatcher 
(16). The HPG also included four non-parliamentarians: two 
academics, Professor Jack Wiseman and Mrs Barbara 
Shenfield; GAC Hamilton, a management consultant, and Dr 
Lawrence Payne, a specialist in applying automation to 
medicine (17). Initially, therefore, the HPG did not 
include a member of any of the health professions. 
( 1 4 ) 
( 1 5 ) 
( 1 6 ) 
( 1 7 ) 
Times, 29/10/64, p. 12, col. f. 
Joseph/Heath 13/4/65, Heath/Joseph 26/4/65, CPA CRD 
4/7/16. 
Balniel and Howe 
social services. 
in Thatcher's 
subsequently. 
CPA CRD 4/7/16. 
subsequently became LCC spokesmen on 
All five achieved ministerial, and 
case prime ministerial, status 
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As noted in the Introduction, financing the Service had 
been a regular concern to successive Conservative 
Governments from 1951, though no major changes were made 
to the arrangements established by the 1946 Act. Given the 
continuing nature of the concern, however, it was 
understandable that financing, and the related issue of the 
balance between public and private provision, were key 
elements in both the papers considered at the first meeting 
of the HPG on 1 June 1965. The first, a position paper by 
the CRD, also focused on the structure of the NHS (18). The 
second, by Wiseman, an economist, suggested how some NHS 
services might be provided on an insurance basis (19). 
After a "wide ranging discussion" it was agreed that sub-
committees should be set up to examine the relationship 
between public and private provision, and the Service's 
structure, to be chaired by Joseph and Wood respectively 
( 20 ) . 
As noted earlier, Heath was looking for material from the 
policy groups for inclusion in the manifesto for a possible 
Autumn election. Despite the HPG's late start compared with 
other policy groups, draft manifesto items on NHS finance 
and structure had been prepared by the first week of July 
(21). Their intended purpose was, however, overtaken in the 
short term by broader political events. 
(18) The National Health Service, PG/13a/65/1, CPA CRD 
4/7/15. 
(19) PG/13a/65/4, CPA CRD 4/7/15. The paper was given 
originally to an Acton Society Trust (AST) colloquium 
and published in Buying Better Heal th, 1962, AST, 
London. (The AST was an independent body concerned 
with "social research ... [with] one unifying theme -
the relationship of the individual to the impersonal 
forces of modern society, The Acton Society Trust, 
1965, London, AST, p. 1.) 
(20) minutes, PG/13a/65/5, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
(21) papers Health Service Finance, PG/13a/65/8, and 
Organisation and Structure of the Heal th Service, 
PG/13a/65/7, both CPA, CRD 4/7/15. 
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1.3 The change of Party leadership 
Douglas-Home's appointment to succeed Harold Macmillan as 
Prime Minister in October 1963 had been controversial 
within the Party (22), and shortly after the 1964 general 
election Douglas-Home had announced a review of the 
arrangements by which future Party leaders would be 
selected (23). This resulted in the adoption of a scheme 
of election by Conservative MPs (24). 
Given the Labour Government's small overall majority in the 
Commons, an Autumn 1965 general election had been thought 
possible. The likelihood was, however, greatly diminished 
by Prime Minister Harold Wilson's "categorical assurance" 
on 26 June that he did not intend to seek a dissolution in 
1965 (25). 
Since the general election there had been some discontent 
among Conservative MPs with Douglas-Home's performance as 
Leader. Wilson's announcement made it possible for those 
who were discontented to consider challenging Douglas-
Home's position, relatively safe from concern that a 
general election might be called while the Party was in the 
midst of a leadership election. In the light of continuing 
discontent and speculation about the leadership, on 22 July 
Douglas-Home announced that he was resigning (26) and so 
triggered the first election under the new procedure. 
( 22) see, for example, the account in Ramsden, 1996, pp. 
196/214. 
( 23) Times, 7/11/64, p. 6 . , col. a. 
( 24 ) Times, 26/2/65, p. 1 2 . , col. a. 
( 25) Times, 28/6/65, p. 6, col. f . 
(26) Times, 23/7/65, p. 1 2, col. a. 
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There were two main candidates: Heath who had been 
appointed shadow Chancellor in a re-shuffle in February 
(27), in addition to his role in respect of future policy, 
and Reginald Maudling, the shadow Foreign Secretary. Enoch 
Powell also stood. 
Heath secured an overall majority of the votes cast in the 
first ballot on 27 July, though not the 15% lead required 
by the new procedure. However, Maudling withdrew rather 
than exercise his right to contest a second ballot, later 
writing that "the Party had spoken" (28). 
Commentators have suggested that Heath's success against 
a man of wider ministerial experience may have been due to 
admiration among backbenchers at the way he lead the 
opposi tion to the Government's Finance Bill, and to a 
perception that he was the more wholly-heartedly committed 
to poli tics. (After the 1964 election Maudling had taken 
on a number of directorships of private sector companies, 
which may have caused some to question the extent of his 
continuing commitment to politics (29).) 
As far as future Party policy was concerned, the effect of 
the leadership change, and Heath's retention of the 
chairmanship of the ACP, was to strengthen the drive for 
new policies through the approach he had initiated in the 
previous December. And there was no diminution in the 
urgency of the work for, despite the fact that there seemed 
no longer to be a need to prepare a manifesto for an Autumn 
election, Heath made it clear that he intended to publish 
a substantial policy statement before the next Party 
conference in October. 
( 27 ) 
(28) 
(29) 
Times, 17/2/65, p. 12, 
Maudling R, Memoirs, 
Jackson, p. 136. 
Ramsden, 1996, p. 237; 
col, e. 
1 978, London, Sidgwick & 
Blake, 1985, p. 298. 
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2. HEALTH POLICY DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO THE 1966 GENERAL 
ELECTION 
Discussion within the HPG during 1965 covered a wide range 
of issues outside the scope of this thesis, including 
health screening, the handling of complaints against 
hospitals, waiting lists, rehabilitation and the future of 
general practice, some of which were included in a draft 
Health Working Paper by Joseph, dated 19 November (30). 
The matters given most attention (as judged from the 
meeting minutes) were, however, financing and structure, 
(31), both central to the form of the NHS as discussed in 
the Introduction. The following sections trace policy 
discussions of these issues through to the 1966 general 
election. 
2.1 Financing the NHS 
As noted in the Introduction, the financing of the NHS was 
a continual source of concern to Conservative Governments 
from 1951 . During thirteen years in office, however, 
despite having considered more radical options, the Party 
had only widened the range of charges, the path for which 
had been paved politically by the previous Labour 
Governments' 
prescription 
dentures and 
acceptance 
charges and 
spectacles. 
of legislation 
introduction of 
permitting 
charges for 
(30) PG/13a/65/10, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
(31) PG/13a/65/12, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
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The CRD posi tion paper considered at the HPG' s first 
meeting on 1 June 1965 posed three questions. Should the 
Party adopt a policy of re-instating prescription charges, 
abolished by the Labour Government wi th effect from 1 
February 1965? Should the NHS Contribution be increased? 
And, the most radical, should the family doctor service "be 
taken right out of the NHS altogether and placed on an 
insurance basis"? (32), an issue that had been considered 
by a high level officer committee, the Policy Committee on 
the Future of the Social Services (PCFSS), in its interim 
report in April 1961, without any major proposal for change 
resulting (33). 
Also available was the paper by Wiseman referred to above, 
which suggested how aspects of the NHS could be moved to 
an insurance basis, with compulsory minimum provision 
arranged ei ther through an actuarially sound government 
scheme or private insurers, at the individual's preference 
(34). 
The minutes of the HPG meeting indicate that there was some 
support for a strategy to expand the private sector from 
5% to 15% of total health provision, and for considering 
putting the family doctor service on an insurance basis. 
Concerns were, however, expressed about the development of 
two standards of service, with better services available 
to those able to pay more. A sub-committee under Joseph was 
charged with considering the relationship between public 
and private provision (35). 
(32) PG/13a/65/1, CPA CRD 4/7/15, pp. 6/9. 
(33) The PCFSS was chaired by Sir Michael Fraser, then CRD 
Director, and included two future Directors (Brendon 
Sewill and James Douglas). It met 65 times over three 
years. A copy of its interim report, PCFSS/61/86, is 
in the CPA, ACP 3/8. 
(34) PG/13a/65/4, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
(35) PG/13a/65/5, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
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It proved impracticable for Joseph's sub-committee to meet. 
Instead, he circulated a paper on finance solely in his 
name that he described as "deliberately provocative". In 
it he was sceptical about radical change (36). 
In respect of the hospi tal service, Joseph regarded a 
charge on in-patients for board, considered but rejected 
by the Party when in office, as likely to be "bitterly 
unpopular" and "net relatively little". Voluntary 
insurance, as a way of establishing a substantial private 
hospi tal sector, "hasn't a chance", even if government 
offered a tax concession on premiums. If, however, the 
Party "move[d] back ... slightly" from the plan for general 
hospitals announced by Powell as Minister of Health in 1962 
(37), and retained local hospi tals, Joseph thought that 
both capital and revenue for them could be raised locally, 
including by insurance, leaving the taxpayer to finance a 
somewhat reduced general hospital programme. 
Joseph regarded "a free GP service [as] so hallowed that 
we cannot move", though he did see "a full-bloodied 
insurance scheme" as a possible answer if the GPs resigned 
from the NHS over their remuneration. He favoured the re-
introduction of prescription charges, though wi th new 
exemptions ("pensioners, children, pregnant mothers and 
chronic sick") in addition to those than had applied until 
the charges had been abolished (war pensioners and those 
in need, defined operationally as receiving National 
Assistance). He did not support a long standing policy 
aspiration of many within the Party, that drugs should be 
made available to private patients on the same basis as NHS 
patients, because this carried "the serious risk of a net 
loss of doctors' time for the public service." 
(36) PG/13a/65/8, 5/7/65, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
( 37) Cmnd. 1 604 . 
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Joseph's proposal to restore prescription charges wi th 
wider exemptions was not included in the policy document 
Putting Bri tain Right Ahead published in October (38), 
though briefing produced for its launch suggested that it 
had been accepted. (This referred to the £30m a year 
foregone by the abolition of charges, and the plans being 
developed by the last Conservative Government to reduce the 
burden on those who were not in receipt of National 
Assistance but nevertheless found charges a strain on their 
resources (39).) 
Although Joseph had described his July paper on NHS finance 
as "deliberately provocative", as noted above it proposed 
little change, and his caution was evident in 
correspondence with Arthur Seldon, Editorial Director of 
the lEA. 
The TEA had been established in 1955 as a non-party 
poli tical research and educational trust "to propagate 
sound economic thought" (40). Its basic premise was that 
most matters should be left to the free play of market 
forces, a view often referred to as economic liberalism. 
Joseph made contact wi th the Insti tute after the 1964 
election and" leaned heavily on it for intellectual support 
and economic data as he developed his own philosophy of 
economic liberalism during the 1960s" (41). 
(38) 1965, London, Conservative Party. 
(39) briefing dated 4/10/65, CPA CRD 3/24/2. 
(40) Cockett, 1994, pp. 131/2. 
( 41) i bid., pp. 1 67 /8. 
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In a letter to Seldon in November 1965, Joseph expressed 
interest in opening up health care provision to the market 
"to a limi ted extent", but saw substantial impediments. 
Increasing private sector demand would, in the short term 
"be bound ... to reduce the amount of medical attention to 
the public" and thus be open to the charge of "robbing the 
large pre-dominantly less well-off public clientele of 
irreplaceable doctor and medical man hours in favour of 
private and generally better-off clientele". The 
implication was clear. Unless a way could be found of 
avoiding "political difficulty", Joseph saw it as 
unrealistic to pursue such a policy (42) 
Joseph carried forward his thinking about NHS financing 
into the draft working paper of 19 November, which served 
as the agenda for a HPG meeting on 24 November. He 
suggested that "there may be a case for tempting more 
people to cover themselves by insurance for private 
hospital treatment", without setting out the pros and cons. 
He repeated his view that prescription charges should be 
re-introduced, with the wider exemptions referred to above, 
but posed the questions "Is this practicable? Will the 
doctors co-operate?" (43). 
The HPG's membership had been augmented in the Autumn by 
the inclusion of three recently appointed junior Opposition 
spokesmen (Charles Longbottom, Arthur Tiley and William van 
Straubenzee) and Dr Hugh Freeman, a consultant 
psychiatrist. Despite having its first medical member, the 
HPG still lacked the expertise to address Joseph's 
questions about the practicability of the exemptions he 
proposed, and this seems to have been left over for 
discussion at a meeting planned with a number of GPs. 
(42) Joseph/Seldon, 6/11/65, Hoover Institution (HI), lEA 
papers, box 333, folder 5. 
(43) PG/13a/65/10, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
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The HPG did, however, address other issues relating to 
finance. It judged that expenditure on health should have 
a higher priority than it had been accorded in the 
Government's recently published National Plan (44), and 
commissioned work on ways in which the expenditure 
necessary for this priority might be found. Specifically, 
enquiries were instigated into "hotel" charges for hospi tal 
patients; the potential receipts from state lotteries; and 
schemes under which patients paid doctors for their 
treatment but were re-imbursed in whole or part by the 
government, of the kind the HPG believed to be in operation 
in New Zealand (45). 
The practicali ty of the prescription charge exemptions 
proposed by Joseph was discussed at the first of two 
meetings with the GPs referred to above (46). The GPs seem 
to have been approached indi vidually because they were 
known to members of the HPG and regarded as "good 
opinions". They were generally "sympathetic to the idea of 
some sort of fee payable by the patient" and saw "no 
particular difficulties" with the type of exemption 
proposed (47). 
(44) 
(45 ) 
(46) 
( 47) 
The National Plan, Cmnd. 2764, 1965, London, HMSO, p. 
179. The Government's proposals provided for an 
increase of 23.5% in the five year period 1965/6 to 
1969/70, a rate of growth slightly below the 25% 
growth target for national output (Cmnd. 2764, 1965, 
pp. 1 and 1 79) . 
PG/13a/65/12, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
MacAuslan, A 
Conservative 
was Joseph's 
the fact that 
NHS matters 
Drs DL Crombie, J Hunt, GS Little, A 
Smi th and G Swi ft. They were not all 
supporters. Dr MacAuslan, for example, 
GP, and remembers being invited despite 
Joseph knew that they disagreed on 
(personal communication, 5 May 2000). 
note of meeting 19/1/66, Howe papers, white box 24, 
file 3. 
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In addition to the meetings with the GPs, there was 
extensi ve action to follow up the HPG meeting on 24 
November. Papers were circulated on "hotel" charges, the 
French National Lottery, the situation in New Zealand, and 
the British United Provident Association (BUPA), a major 
provider of health insurance and private health care 
facilities (48). 
There seems no evidence that these papers were discussed 
within the HPG prior to the March general election. It is 
therefore impossible to assess the Group's reactions to 
them. However, Wood raised one of the ideas in them, re-
imbursement of fees (examined in relation to health care 
arrangements in New Zealand) in a Common's debate. 
Specifically, he proposed that some family doctors should 
be "allowed to charge a fee for service, which subsequently 
could be wholly or partly reclaimed" (49). Kenneth 
Robinson, the Minister of Health, responded that this was 
"wholly alien to the whole concept of the National Health 
Service as we see it" (50). 
If the papers circulated following the meeting on 24 
November were discussed before the general election, they 
did not lead to any positive conclusions reflected in the 
manifesto. The only reference it contained to matters of 
NHS finance was in respect of prescription charges (51). 
(48) PG/13a/65/13 (hotel charges), PG/13a/66/16 (French 
lot tery), PG/1 3a/ 66/1 4, 18 and 19 (New Zealand) and 
PG/13a/66/15 (BUPA), all CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
(49) 3/2/66, Commons Hansard, vol. 723, col. 1387. 
(50) ibid., col. 1426. 
( 51) Cr a i g, 1 975, p. 287. 
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On prescription charges, the response of the GPs consulted 
on 22 December could only have partially re-assured Joseph 
that his proposal for wider exemptions was practicable. For 
during a debate in the Commons on 9 February 1966, he 
anticipated a future Conservati ve Government seeing whether 
it could "evol ve practicable methods of exempting all those 
who could be hurt or deterred" by a re-introduced charge 
(52). 
Joseph noted that removing charges from those able to pay 
meant less finance for the NHS, and therefore less 
services, a point to which Heath returned during a debate 
on social policy a fortnight later. In Heath's view, when 
faced with a choice between free prescriptions for all, or 
better services and special arrangements for those who 
could not afford charges, people would choose the latter 
(53). 
In the event, Joseph quickly put aside his caution about 
the practicability of introducing wider exemptions. When 
proposing items for the election manifesto, he wrote that 
"those who cannot afford [charges] - pensioners, children, 
expectant and nursing mothers, the disabled, the chronic 
sick, the low wage earner and his wife - will be exempt", 
with no caveat about practicability (54). The essence of 
this definite statement, without qualification about the 
practicability of the exemptions, was included in the 
manifesto (55). 
( 52) Commons Hansard, vol. 724, cols. 470/2. 
(53) Commons Hansard, vol. 725, col. 439. 
( 54) CPA CRD 3/9/33. 
( 55) Craig, 1975, p. 287. 
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2.2 The structure of the NHS 
As noted in the Introduction, the NHS had three main 
elements family practitioner, local authority and 
hospital services each wi th its own structure. The 
Conservatives had opposed aspects of this at the outset 
but, despite pressure from some within the Party to 
transfer the hospi tal service to local government, and 
increasing concerns about the effectiveness of the 
tripartite structure, had made no changes during thirteen 
years in office. 
The tripartite structure meant that, at local level, the 
effective delivery of services to patients often required 
co-operation and co-ordination by professionals working in 
each of the three elements. For example, follow-up 
treatment of an elderly person discharged from hospital 
(managed by an HMC or BG) often required co-ordination with 
the family doctor (an independent practitioner in contract 
with an EC) and the after-care and domestic help services 
(the responsibility of the local health authority). 
The difficulty of achieving effective co-ordination at 
local level within the tripartite structure had been 
regularly noted, not least by Conservatives (56). It was 
again drawn to attention in the report of a Committee 
established by the British Medical Association (BMA), the 
Royal Colleges and other medical organisations to inquire 
into public medical services in the light of ten years' 
experience of the NHS (57). 
(56) for examples, see Webster, 1996, pp. 322/3 and 330/1. 
Conserva ti ve concerns about co-ordina tion included 
the 1954 report of the Parliamentary Heal th sub-
committee, CPA CRD 2/30/10, and Joseph K, The Health 
Serv ices The Second Decade, 1 958, London, 
Conservative Political Centre, pp. 8/9. 
(57) A Review of the Medical Services in Great Bri tain, 
1962, London, Social Assay, p. 1. 
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The Committee was chaired by Sir Arthur Porritt, who had 
been a founding member of the Fellowship for Freedom in 
Medicine, set up in 1948 to campaign against State control 
of the medical profession following the establishment the 
NHS. As a senior member of the profession (58) with this 
background, he could be expected to lead an inquiry that 
would be questioning, and command respect among doctors. 
The Committee concluded that "basically, the concept of a 
comprehens i ve na t ional heal th serv i ce is sound" ( 5 9 ) , 
though the triparti te structure was one of "the major 
stumbling blocks to a properly co-ordinated service" and 
could lead to "a loss of economy and efficiency" (60). It 
recommended the establishment of new statutory bodies, area 
health boards, to take responsibility for administering all 
heal th services in a gi ven area, including the personal 
health services currently the responsibility of local 
authori ties, but saw "no reason" to transfer to it the 
local authority welfare services (61). 
Powell, Minister of Health when the report was published, 
wrote to congratulate Porritt, and subsequently met him 
(62). The evidence suggests, however, that at least as 
regards the establishment of area health boards, Powell did 
not find the Committee's recommendations persuasive. For 
in March 1963, one of his Parliamentary Secretaries, Lord 
Newton, responding to a House of Lords deba te on the 
Porritt report, and raised a series of questions about the 
Committee's "central recommendation" for structural change 
that suggested the Government remained far from convinced 
that such change was necessary (63). 
(58) Porritt was, simultaneously, President of the BMA and 
the Royal College of Surgeons in the early 1960s. 
(59) A Review of the Medical Services in Great Bri tain, 
1962, p. 14. 
(60) ibid., pp. 18/9. 
(61) ibid., pp. 22/4. 
(62) Webster, 1996, p. 326. 
(63) Lords Hansard, 7/3/63, vol. 247, cols. 606/7. 
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When Anthony Barber succeeded Powell in October 1963 he 
seemed no more sympathetic to the Porritt recommendations 
(64). It was therefore not surprising that the Party's 1964 
general election manifesto contained no reference to change 
in the structure of the NHS. Nor indeed did the Labour 
Party's manifesto (65). 
However, within the Conservative Party not everyone shared 
the views of Powell and Barber. In 1958 the CRD had 
referred to the main problems of the NHS in the future 
being "not its structure but first its priori ties and 
second its financing" (66). By 1963, however, the Director 
of the CRD and his senior colleagues (meeting as the PCFSS) 
had concluded that the existing structure had given rise 
to difficulties, though only "poor communication between 
the arms of the Service" was specified. To put these right, 
the PCFSS favoured the alignment of HMC, EC and local 
health authority boundaries, with a view first to 
increasing the opportunities for liaison and then to "a 
gradual unification of the ... structure over the years". 
The Porri tt Commi ttee recommendations were noted as an 
"imprecise" alternative (67). 
Gi ven the high level nature of the PCFSS, it is not 
surprising that its conclusion that some change was needed 
to deal with the problem of co-ordination created by the 
tripartite structure was drawn upon by Charles Bellairs, 
the CRD officer charged wi th the task of preparing a 
position paper for the meeting of the HPG on 1 June 1965. 
(64 ) 
(65 ) 
( 66 ) 
(67) 
Barber wrote to Butler as chairman of the CRD 
criticising the Porritt recommendations. The letter 
is missing from the CPA file, though there is a 
summary of its content, CPA CRD 2/29/10. 
Craig, 1975, pp. 251/2 (Conservative), p. 266 
(Labour) . 
Health, 22/1/58, CPA CRD 2/53/27. 
Report of the PCFSS, August 1963, CPA CRD 2/29/10, 
pp. 37/8 and 51/2. 
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Bellairs' paper took the Porritt report as its starting 
point (and the meeting itself followed one earlier in the 
day that some HPG members had had with Porritt (68)). The 
paper included variations on the Porritt proposals, for 
example giving the proposed area health councils (AHCs), 
(Porritt had called them boards), responsibility for the 
local authority welfare services (such as home helps and 
meals on wheels) as well as the personal health services. 
It also included an alternative approach: the transfer of 
smaller hospitals to the management of those local 
authorities with personal health responsibilities, and the 
alignment of their boundaries with those of the ECs (69). 
As noted above, a sub-committee chaired by Wood had been 
established on issues of structure, which reported on 2 
July. In its judgement, the NHS had become "increasingly 
top heavy and over-centralised", with consequent 
frustration to doctors and patients and waste of time and 
money. The sub-committee was clear that reorganisation was 
necessary. Following examination of the possibilities 
identified in the CRD paper, members agreed that there 
should be pilot schemes on Porritt lines, but "failed to 
agree on the scope and functions of the AHCs" and suggested 
there might be experiments with different variations within 
the pilot schemes (70). 
(68) manuscript note of meeting in CPA CRD 4/7/19. 
(69) The National Health Service, paper PG/13a/65/1, CPA 
CRD 4/7/15. 
(70) PG/13a/65/7, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
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These ideas a top heavy and over centralised 
administrative structure, the consequent need for 
reorganisation, and the proposal for pilot studies to find 
a way forward - were largely incorporated into the fourth 
draft of Heath's proposed statement of Party policy on 21 
September (71), and were carried through to the published 
version, Putting Britain Right Ahead (72). However, 
briefing prepared for use on publication made it clear that 
the pilots would only include the family practitioner and 
hospital services. Consideration of merging these with the 
local authority health (and possibly welfare) services was 
to await the report of the inquiry into the welfare 
services, which the Government was known to be planning 
(73). 
Within the HPG, there remained doubts about a policy of 
reorganisation on Porritt lines. In the draft working paper 
Joseph prepared for discussion at the third meeting of the 
Group on 24 November, he posed the question "Porritt Worth 
Pursuing?", without offering an answer (74). 
(71) Policy Document 1965 putting Britain Right, 
LCC(65)44, CPA CRD 3/24/3. 
( 72) 1 965, pp. 1 4/5 . 
(73) brief dated 4/10/65, CPA CRD 3/24/2. In the event, 
the inquiry, chaired by Frederic Seebohm, was 
announced on 20/1 2/65, Commons Hansard, vol. 722, 
col. 373. 
(74) PG/13a/65/10, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
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HPG members' responses were equally inconclusi ve. "The 
majority of members felt that we should go some way towards 
the Porritt model", and professional opinion was reported 
to be favourable, but members had concerns about the 
feasibility of experimentation, the difficulties such an 
approach would cause local government, and the upheaval 
that would result from such a reorganisation. It was agreed 
that the matter would be considered further, after 
consultation with "medical opinion" (75), in practice this 
probably meant the group of six GPs referred to above. 
In general, the GPs thought that the Porritt approach was 
the right one and "should be the long-term aim with the way 
paved by pilot schemes" (76). Following a second meeting 
with them on 19 January 1966, Joseph prepared a paper on 
structure for discussion by the HPG, in which he proposed 
a two stage strategy (77). First, the ECs and bodies 
responsible for hospitals should be merged into new boards. 
A requirement would be placed on these new boards to work 
closely with the local authority health services to 
"produce and administer a community health plan". Second, 
as effective co-operation between the new boards and the 
local health authorities developed, and reform of local 
government boundaries allowed, the boards and the local 
heal th authori ties would be amalgamated into new local 
health boards. (It was not clear whether the local health 
boards would be bodies like the ECs and HMCs, appointed 
under the NHS Act and agents of the Minister of Health, or 
part of local government.) 
(75) PG/13a/65/12, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
(76) note of meeting, 22/12/65, Howe papers, white box 24, 
file 3. 
(77) Health Service, 26/1/66, Howe papers, white box 24, 
file 3. 
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There is no evidence that any further meetings of the HPG 
were held, and therefore it is likely that Joseph's 
proposed strategy was not discussed by the Group, though 
he may have received comments on it from members 
individually. 
Whether or not as a result of colleagues' comments on his 
proposed strategy, in response to a request for a manifesto 
contribution Joseph offered a two page note which, on 
structure, was less specific than his January paper. It 
proposed bringing the different sectors of the heal th 
service "more closely together" and the decentralisation 
of management wi thin the hospi tal service, wi thout offering 
any details as to means (78). 
Those wi thin the CRD seem to have had experience of 
Joseph's contributions. A note by the recently appointed 
Director, Brendon Sewill, early in February had recorded 
that Joseph had promised a draft "but no doubt will want 
to revise it at least a dozen times" (79). Perhaps in the 
expecta tion of further versions, or because there was 
insufficient time to edi t Joseph's contribution to the 
length needed, the first draft of the manifesto circulated 
after his note included only one short point on the NHS. 
This was a commi tment to improve the Heal th Service by 
giving family doctors "closer contact with hospitals and 
local health and welfare services" (80). 
Joseph sought to remedy this on 22 February, by sending 
Sewill six additional points in brief, "bullet" style, for 
inclusion with the existing item referred to above. These 
included the decentralisation of hospital management (81). 
(78) draft dated 12/2/66, CPA CRD 3/9/33. 
(79) 4/2/66, CPA CRD 3/9/32. 
(80) 3rd draft, 18/2/66, CPA CRD 3/9/34. 
(81) CPA CRD 3/9/34. 
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Possibly to support Joseph in securing a place in the 
manifesto for these points, on the same day Wood sent 
Sewill what was essentially a shortened version of Joseph's 
note of 12 February, stating that it had been "discussed 
and agreed by the "Heal th and Social Securi ty" 
frontbenchers and represents what we should like to see in 
the Manifesto" (82). 
The fourth draft of the manifesto, circulated on 23 
February, included all six of Joseph's "bullet" points, and 
was sent for comment to him and Macleod, a former Minister 
of Health. Macleod thought the reference to giving family 
doctors closer contact wi th the other elements of the 
Service was "meaningless" (83), but at the galley stage of 
the production of the manifesto that point was retained 
while all Joseph's "bullet" points were removed. The only 
other reference to the NHS in the manifesto, published on 
6 March (84) was in respect of prescription charges 
(discussed above). 
It is uncertain why Joseph's "bullet" points, including 
decentralisation of hospital management, were dropped at 
galley stage. It is known that, while Heath wanted to show 
that the Conservatives had lots of ideas and were not open 
to the charge of "running out of steam" after the thirteen 
years in office, some of his senior colleagues were 
concerned that there were far too many commitments in the 
draft manifesto (85). Probably Joseph's points were lost 
in an effort to balance these two views rather than because 
of any very considered judgement as to their merits. 
(82) 
(83) 
(84) 
(85 ) 
CPA CRD 3/9/34. 
CPA CRD 3/9/36. 
ibid. (copy embargoed until 00.01 on 6/3/66). 
note of meeting with Heath on 25/2/66 to discuss 
draft manifesto, CPA CRD 3/9/35. 
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3. THE SITUATION BY THE 1966 GENERAL ELECTION 
3.1 Policy development 
Apart from the aboli tion of prescription charges, the 
Labour Government from October 1964 had proposed no change 
to the form of the NHS to which the Conservatives had to 
respond. However, as noted above, the NHS came explicitly 
into the Party's formal policy review programme. 
In terms of policy consideration, there had been some 
interest in actively encouraging the private sector, and 
in the possibility of putting the family doctor service on 
an insurance basis, either of which could have led to a 
major change in the form of the NHS. There had, however, 
been insufficient time to develop these ideas before the 
1966 general election was called, and in any case Joseph, 
the key frontbench spokesman, was clearly sceptical about 
the political viability of such change. The only manifesto 
commitment on finance, the re-imposition of prescription 
charges with wider exemptions, was essentially a return to 
the Party's position when in office. 
On the structure of the Service, there was some support for 
change within the HPG, and in particular interest in the 
Porritt Committee's proposals. This interest seemed to mark 
something of a shift in the Party's stance from when it had 
been in government. In part this may have been attributable 
to the shift in thinking within the CRD, almost certainly 
more influential when the Party was in Opposi tion and 
shadow ministers lacked advice from civil servants. In part 
it probably also reflected sensitivity to what seems to 
have been a growing sense in what might be described as the 
wider Health Service world that the tripartite structure 
needed to be unified (86). 
(86) Webster, 1996, p. 330. 
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Whether the commitment to give family doctors closer 
contact with the hospital and local authority health 
services was a marker to provide a manifesto basis for a 
possible policy of structural change, or simply an 
aspirational statement without any substance (as it seemed 
to have been regarded by Macleod), is uncertain. 
3.2 The arrangements for policy review 
Up to the 1966 general election, the evidence suggests that 
the review was concentrated within the HPG. Members drew 
on a range of written material (including the Porritt 
report and descriptions of aspects of arrangements in 
France and New Zealand), but had little direct contact with 
individuals and organisations knowledgeable about the NHS. 
Porritt himself, the group of six GPs and Seldon of the lEA 
were the exceptions. There is no evidence of substantive 
contact with professional bodies such as the BMA or Royal 
College of Nursing. 
There is little evidence that the HPG's emerging thinking 
was shared more widely within the Party. Some HPG members 
were also members of the Party's Parliamentary Health and 
Social Security Committee (PHSSC), and might be assumed to 
have kept the Committee informed. Beyond that, there is no 
clear evidence that the issues the HPG were discussing were 
put in any way formally to the wider Party - in Parliament 
or outside. For example, the NHS was barely touched upon 
at the Party's 1965 Annual Conference. 
Overall, therefore, policy review prior to the 1966 general 
election seems essentially to have involved relatively few 
within the Party and even fewer "outsiders". In part, at 
least, this may have been because of the relatively short 
timescale available due to the parliamentary situation 
after the 1964 general election. 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN OPPOSITION, 1966-70 
1. THE 1966 GENERAL ELECTION 
The Labour Government elected in 1964 had only a small 
overall majority, widely expected to prove insufficient for 
a full parliament. From September 1965, Labour had a 5% or 
more lead over the Conservatives in public opinion polls, 
and this seemed to be supported by the result of a by-
election in Hull North (1). Against this background Harold 
Wilson successfully sought a dissolution for a general 
election to be held on 31 March 1966. 
The campaign, in which the NHS does not appear to have 
featured, seems to have made little difference to the 
parties' levels of support. Labour secured the support of 
5.8% more of the electorate than the Conserva ti ves and 
increased its overall majority to 96 (2). Commentators seem 
to agree that Labour's success was due to a widely held 
sense that it had inherited difficulties, especially in 
respect of the deficit on the balance of payments, and had 
had insufficient opportunity to prove its worth in 
addressing them (3). 
(1) Butler D and King A, The British General Election of 
7966, 1966, London, Macmillan, pp. 3 and 22. 
(2) ibid., p. 260. 
(3) for example, Ramsden, 1996, pp. 263/4; Blake, 1985, 
p. 306; Campbell J, Edward Heath, 1993, London, Cape, 
p. 208; Fisher N, Iain Macleod, 1973, London, 
Deutsch, p. 282. 
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1.1 Heath's position 
Labour's majori ty meant that the new Government could 
expect a full term, which in turn meant that, if it had so 
chosen, the Conservative Party could have elected a new 
leader with time to establish his or her position. However, 
although never very popular among his parliamentary 
colleagues or the electorate prior to the 1970 election 
(4), Heath's position was not formally challenged, and he 
thus had a whole parliament to lead the Party in the 
direction he favoured. 
What was that direction? Shortly after Bri tain' s first 
application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) 
had been vetoed in January 1963, Heath made a speech which, 
in the view of his biographer, Campbell, might have "served 
as his personal manifesto for the next seven years" (5). 
The theme was the need for Britain to change if it was to 
prosper, and among the examples Heath gave were for 
industry to adopt more efficient practices, and for better 
industrial relations. 
This theme - the need for modernisation - was reflected in 
further speeches and articles (6). Indeed, Campbell has 
suggested that, by October 1964, for Heath ""modernisation" 
had become the supreme goal of politics" (7). 
(4) Ramsden, 1996, pp. 245/6; Campbell, 1993, pp. 189, 
199/200 and 216 (parliamentary colleagues); Butler 0 
and Pinto-Duschinsky M, The British General Election 
of 7970, 1971, London, Macmillan, p. 64 (electorate). 
(5) Campbell, 1993, p. 134. 
(6) for example, in his first Commons speech as President 
of the Board of Trade (14/11/63), during the Second 
Reading debate on the bill to end resale price 
maintenance (10/2/64) and in a Daily Mirror article 
(9/10/64), all quoted in Campbell, 1993, pp. 150, 152 
and 162. 
( 7 ) Campbe 11, 1 993, p. 1 63. 
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Heath's advocacy of modernisation may well have been the 
key consideration in Horne's decision to appoint him to 
oversee the review of policy after the election, an 
appointment that provided an opportuni ty to develop a 
"modernisation" agenda. 
When briefing the chairmen of the various policy groups, 
Heath said that the need was to find "new Conservati ve 
solutions to the problems that the electorate are worried 
about" (8). This emphasis on the new seems to have been 
reflected in the policy groups' reports. Sewill noted in 
March 1966 that "efficiency and competi tion" was one of two 
themes emerging, and in April he identified several areas 
where "we could also break our links wi th the past and 
build a new framework of policies" (9). 
Heath's emphasis on modernisation had been reflected in the 
1966 general election manifesto, with its action-oriented 
style and frequent usage of words such as "reform", 
"remodel", "new", and "change" (10). It remained a key 
theme, both in the years in opposition to 1970, and in 
government. 
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
While Heath regarded much of the modernisation agenda as 
having been completed by the time of the 1966 general 
election, there remained important policy gaps. All the 
pre-election policy groups were wound up, but some were 
reconstituted - "starting afresh" in Heath's words (11) -
to fill those gaps. 
(8 ) 
(9 ) 
( 1 0 ) 
( 1 1 ) 
Ramsden, 1980, p. 241. 
Ramsden J, 1996, p. 257. 
Craig, 1975, pp. 282/91. 
Heath/Miss Mervyn Pike, 13/5/66, 
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CPA CRD 4/7/16. 
Economic policy was seen as the major gap, and Hea th 
reported to the first ACP meeting after the election that 
he would be chairing "a high level Economic Policy Group" 
(12). Health policy was another gap. It was palpable that 
the HPG, established later than most policy groups, had not 
had time to complete its deliberations, and there was some 
post-election concern about the adequacy of social services 
policy as a whole and aspects of health policy in 
particular. (At the ACP meeting referred to above, for 
example, the view was expressed that "there was still a 
great deal more work to be done on the whole of our social 
service policy, and on prescription charges in particular" 
(13).) 
2.1 Responsibilities for reviewing health policy 
Prior to the election Joseph had been the principal 
frontbench spokesman on labour and social services. 
Afterwards the two portfolios were separated. Joseph was 
given 
social 
responsibility for 
services ( 1 4 ) . 
labour, Miss Mervyn Pike 
This probably reflected 
for 
the 
importance of policies in both areas to Heath's strategy -
reforming the trade unions and remodelling the welfare 
state had been two of the five manifesto objectives. 
(12) ACP(66)74th, CPA ACP 2/2. 
(13) ibid. 
(14) Times, 20/4/66, p. 12, col. b. Pike had been a MP 
since 1956 and a Home Office minister prior to the 
1964 election. 
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Pike remained social services spokesman for eighteen 
months, until she "asked to be relieved of her duties for 
personal and heal th reasons", and was succeeded by Lord 
Balniel in October 1967 (15). Later that month Maurice 
Macmillan was appointed to assist Balniel as spokesman on 
health matters (16). Both retained their responsibilities 
until the 1970 general election. 
Heath wrote to Pike on 13 May 1966 to invite her to chair 
a reconstituted HPG. She was requested to discuss the 
Group's membership with Sir Edward Boyle, vice Chairman of 
the ACP, whom Heath had asked to appoint policy group 
members on his behalf and "generally to co-ordinate and 
supervise the central administration of all policy groups" 
( 1 7 ) . 
Heath made it clear that Pike was not limi ted to the 
membership of the pre-election HPG, though he did advise 
that Joseph wished to remain a member. He also emphasised 
the importance he attached to policy groups including 
officers of relevant Party committees, to ensure proper co-
ordination between the committees and the groups (18). 
On 25 July Boyle invited prospective members to join the 
reconstituted HPG, stating that the remit was "to consider 
the National Health Service in all its aspects and to make 
recommendations as to the lines of its future development" 
( 1 9 ) • 
(15) Times, 11/10/67, p. 2, col. c. Balniel had been a MP 
since 1955 and had an interest in mental health 
services, being Chairman of the National Association 
for Mental Health. 
(16) Times, 31/10/67, p. 4, col. b. 
(17) Heath/Pike, 13/5/66, CPA CRD 4/7/16. 
( 1 8) ibid. 
(19) Boyle/prospective members, 25/7/66, CPA CRD 4/7/16. 
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By mid August the Group had been established. In addition 
to Pike, the HPG included ten poli ticians, six of whom 
(Dean, Howe, Joseph, Longbottom, Thatcher and Turton) had 
been members of the pre-election HPG. To these were added 
Miss Harvie Anderson, Macmillan, Lord Windlesham and Marcus 
Worsley. Two of the fi ve expert advisers continued 
Freeman and Shenfield. They were joined by John Cambrook, 
a lecturer in dental surgery, and Alderman Mrs Wood who had 
many years experience as an EC and HMC member, and later 
still, by David Skidmore, a surgeon (20) 
The HPG met periodically while Pike was its Chairman, 
though Barney Hayhoe, a CRD officer (and later a MP and 
minister) regarded it as one of the more disappointing 
groups, due to "the recurrent illness of the Chairman ... 
which has meant that the impetus of the Group has been 
lost" (21). Thereafter, although nominally extant, the HPG 
seems never to have met again. According to Hayhoe, Balniel 
"was reluctant to hold formal meetings of the Group, and 
in fact it has never met since he became Chairman". 
However, the HPG's members "are consulted from time to time 
as appropriate both by the Front Bench spokesmen and by the 
Research Department" (22). 
In practice, therefore, policy thinking on heal th was 
carried forward through the reconstituted HPG for the first 
year or so after the 1966 election, but was then taken 
forward by Balniel and Macmillan, the frontbench spokesmen, 
without formal reference to the HPG. 
(20) 
( 21 ) 
(22) 
CRD memorandum 24/10/66, CPA CRD 4/7/15 - initial 
appointments; membership as at 1/12/67, attached to 
Hayhoe's memorandum to Fraser, 11/3/69, CPA CRD 
4/7/16 Skidmore. (There seems to be no extant 
written evidence as to why two of the expert advisers 
continued while three (including Wiseman) did not.) 
Hayhoe/Fraser, 11/3/69, CPA CRD 4/7/16. 
ibid. 
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2.2 The context for the development of health policy 
Part of the context for reviewing Party policy on health 
matters was Heath's modernisation theme, and one of the 
issues examined during the first year was efficiency, on 
which the HPG sought advice from Ernest Marples, a former 
minister invited by Heath to consider ways of modernising 
the public services (23). 
Arguably, however, policies in two other areas contributed 
more to the context, namely those on public expenditure, 
being developed by the Economic Policy Group (EPG), and on 
what was often referred to as selectivity in the social 
services, a set of issues reviewed by the Working Group on 
Social Priorities (WGSP). Before describing the development 
of Party thinking on those aspects of health policy 
relevant to the form of the NHS, therefore, emerging 
policies in these two context-setting areas will be 
considered. 
2.3 Policy on public expenditure 
As part of its consideration of economic policy the EPG 
examined public expenditure, which a CRD paper suggested 
was "already too large relative to private spending with 
the result that taxation is excessively onerous and demand 
management is extremely difficult" (24). 
(23) Times, 17/3/67, p. 1, col. b. Marples established a 
small unit, the Public Sector Research Unit (PSRU), 
"separate from the Conservative Research Department 
and report[ing] direct. to Mr Heath and members of 
the Shadow Cabinet" (ACP(69)58, CPA ACP 3/18), which 
co-ordinated a range of research projects into ways 
of improving the performance of the public services, 
and was instrumental in forging relationships with a 
number of senior businessmen, several of whom acted 
as advisers in the first two years of the Heath 
Government (see chapter 3). 
(24) EPG/67/27, p. 2, CPA CRD 3/7/6/2. 
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This conclusion led to the proposition that overall public 
expenditure needed to be reduced by "the order of £1,000 
million" (25), included in a discussion paper the EPG 
prepared for a weekend meeting of senior Conservatives at 
Swinton in September 1967, attended by two members of the 
HPG, Joseph and Macmillan (26). 
The paper suggested that new policies for agriculture and 
the nationalised industries could be expected to make a 
substantial contribution to such a reduction. To achieve 
the rest there needed to be "a major elimination of waste 
in the public services", and an examination of expenditure 
asking "whether the service is one which the State alone 
[or] can best provide and whether [ it] needs to be 
provided for all or only for the exceptional cases of need" 
( 27 ) . Effectively, therefore, the EPG was inviting all 
those responsible for policy areas to consider the 
government's role in the provision of services, and ways 
in which services were managed. Both featured in policy 
thinking on the NHS. 
2.4 Selectivity in the social services 
As noted above, one of the five main objectives set out in 
the 1966 manifesto was to remodel the welfare state. More 
specifically, remodelling meant "recognising the overriding 
claims of those most in need" (28), that is, by adopting 
a more selective approach. The WGSP was established "to 
clarify the arguments [for selectivity] and to see if we 
could find a theme valid for all the social services" (29). 
(25) Discussion Document by the Economic Policy Group, 
August 1967, CPA CRD 3/32/1, p. 18. 
(26) attendance list on CPA CRD 3/32/1. 
(27) ibid., pp. 18/9. 
(28) Craig, 1975, p. 282. 
(29) Social Priorities, ACP(67)38, CPA ACP 3/14, p. 2. 
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The WGSP was chaired by Sewill, and comprised Pike, Dean 
and Macmillan (all members of the HPG) and Bellairs and 
Norman Lamont from the CRD. Boyle, Joseph and Tha tcher 
sometimes attended, and commented on the draft report (30). 
The Group examined the arguments on selectivity and the 
related issue of private provision, and concluded that a 
selecti ve approach was the appropriate policy for the 
Party. It was "in keeping wi th our basic philosophy of 
limi ting the role of the state" and essential if "any 
improvements are to be made in the social field without 
imposing an insufferable burden of taxation". The Party 
should facilitate private provision, by tax relief on 
contractual savings that would include savings towards 
insurance for private health, education and pensions (31). 
The WGSP distinguished between "the allocation of future 
resources and changes in existing services". Selectivity 
should apply to the former, but "there is a grave danger 
that we may lose many votes" if present benefi ts were 
reduced. The Party should be very careful before committing 
itself to imposing new charges for existing services (32). 
On the NHS, the WGSP envisaged the restoration of 
prescription charges, as proposed in the 1966 manifesto, 
though pointed out that giving exemptions to groups such 
as expectant mothers was selecti ve only up to a point, 
because such a policy had no regard to the individual's 
means. There was a case for the introduction of charges for 
visits to GPs, as they could act as a deterrent against 
abuse, but less of a case for charges for hospital 
treatment, where there was little abuse (33). 
(30) ibid., preface. 
(31) i bid., pp. 30/1. 
(32) ibid., p. 30. 
(33) ibid., pp. 15/7. 
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As regards private health provision, the WGSP's preference 
was to facili tate it through the general tax relief on 
contractual savings referred to above, which would include 
payments for health insurance. If such a general tax relief 
was implemented, there would be no case for letting private 
patients have prescribed medicines free (a proposi tion 
often made by Conservatives and others, including the BMA) 
or for subsidising private beds in NHS hospitals (33). 
The WGSP's report was discussed by the ACP on 27 July 1967. 
The principle of selecti vi ty and the encouragement of 
pri vate provision were supported, though the poli tical 
difficulties were noted. Heath's summing up suggested that 
he was particularly concerned about the political 
difficulties. While intimating that the various arguments 
for selectivity and private provision might usefully be 
deployed by frontbench speakers at the next Party 
conference, he thought that at this stage it would be 
better not to be "too specific" about policy (34). 
In parallel with helping prepare the WGSP's report, Lamont 
had collaborated with Howe (an HPG member despite losing 
his parliamentary seat at the 1966 election) in producing 
a Bow Group paper published in August 1967 (35). This 
translated aspects of the WGSP's report into two "golden 
rules" that it was argued should govern policy in the 
social field, namely that future improvements in benefits 
should be granted on a selective basis and that people able 
to pay towards the cost of welfare services should be 
charged for the services they received. 
(33) ibid., pp. 18/9. 
(34) ACP(67)83rd, CPA ACP 2/2. 
(35) Howe G and Lamont N, Policies for Poverty, 1967, 
London, Bow Group, p. 2 . The Bow Group had been 
founded in 1950 by former university students as a 
group concerned with "constructive thought and 
research", a Conservative equivalent of the Fabian 
Society (Ramsden, 1996, p. 53). 
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The issues of selectivity and private provision were 
discussed at the same Swinton conference as the EPG' s 
discussion paper on economic policy. The CRD's report on 
the conference noted that those present "in effect started 
from the principle of selecti vi ty as opposed to 
uni versali ty" and its author, James Douglas, was encouraged 
that "tax and social policy, contributions and benefits, 
[were] beginning to coalesce into a whole system whose 
impact could be assessed and rationalised instead of, as 
in the past, a motley collection of disparate policies each 
considered on its own merits and in relative isolation" 
(37). Boyle reported to the ACP on 1 November that at the 
conference "selectivity in the social services was widely 
accepted", but added that the scope for its application 
"emerged as narrower than many had appreciated" (38). 
Following the discussion at the ACP in July and such 
reports as he received of the Swinton conference, Heath 
fel t able to refer to seeing "future resources in the 
social services used for those who have the greatest need" 
in his speech to the Party Conference in October (39). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that both the poli tical and 
practical problems of selectivity remained of concern. 
Early in 1968 a Steering Committee, chaired by Heath and 
comprising Maudling, Macleod, Barber, Boyle, William 
Whitelaw, Lord Carrington and Fraser, was established 
against the contingency of an early general election (40). 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
Swinton Policy Weekend 1967 Report, 26/9/67, CPA CRD 
3/21/1. 
ACP(67)th, CPA ACP 2/2. 
Conservative Conference Report, 
National Union of Conservative 
Associations, (NUCUA), p. 134. 
SC/68/1, CPA SC 5. 
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London, 
Unionist 
At its second meeting on 18 March, (which Joseph and 
Balniel attended by invitation), the Committee considered 
a CRD paper setting out several key issues on which policy 
decisions would be required. One was social policy, and the 
Committee was invited to consider whether, given the 
political and practical difficulties, to continue to 
emphasise selectivity and private provision. The 
alternative was to "shift the emphasis and concentrate on 
policies designed to improve the existing services". The 
paper noted that the electorate seemed generally satisfied 
wi th the education and heal th serv ices, and would be 
"suspicious, perhaps hostile" to policies which seemed to 
threaten their existence (41). 
Without abandoning the ideas that help should be 
concentrated on those who most needed it, and that there 
should be selective rather than universal increases in 
benefits, it was clear that the Steering Committee, and 
Balniel, regarded the word "selectivity" as unhelpful and 
had considerable doubts about setting out too much detail 
in advance of gaining office. As to encouraging private 
provision, although Macleod was in favour of tax relief for 
contractual savings, Maudling, a former Chancellor, was 
concerned that it could be used as a means of evading tax 
( 42 ) . 
The Steering Committee's caution was reflected three months 
later in an ACP discussion. Heath commented that many of 
the means of achieving selectivity, such as charges, means 
tests and income related family allowances, "all tended to 
penalize the middle income groups who were largely our own 
supporters" (43). 
(41) SC/68/3, CPA sc 5. 
(42) SC/68/4, CPA SC 5. 
(43) ACP(68)90th, CPA ACP 2/2. 
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As a result of these deliberations, the policy document 
Make Life Better published just before the 1968 Party 
Conference contained only a brief reference to selecti vi ty, 
promising that a future Conservative Government "will 
concentrate addi tional available resources on those who 
need them most" (44). The 1970 election manifesto had a 
similarly brief reference to giving "priority to those most 
in need", though it did identify particular categories 
("the over-80s without pensions, the elderly, the disabled, 
the chronic sick, the children in families below the 
poverty line"), and some policies to implement this aim 
( 45) . 
For those concerned with the NHS, policy on selectivity 
provided an ambiguous context. It would be safe to assume 
that proposals for new charges would be carefully 
scrutinised for their political impact (though the WGSP's 
report specifically recommended that charges for visiting 
GPs should be examined by the HPG). It was more difficult 
to know how policy to encourage private provision would 
develop, and in particular whether tax relief on 
contractual savings would be offered. For any policy 
depending on an increase in the number of people insuring 
themselves for private medical care, this was potentially 
a very material consideration. Uncertainty here seems to 
have remained up to, and arguably beyond, the publication 
of the 1970 election manifesto. For while this included a 
commi tment to introduce a "more imaginati ve contractual 
savings scheme", there was little detail and no assurance 
that it would cover savings in the form of contributions 
to health insurance schemes (46). 
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
1968, London, Conservative Central Office, p. 22. 
Craig, 1975, p. 328 (the policy aim) and, pp. 337/8 
(policies such as pensions for the over-80s and "a 
scheme based on negative income tax" to give effect 
to the aim). 
ibid., pp. 330 (contractual savings) and 339 (private 
provision in health). 
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3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF HEALTH POLICY UNDER PIKE 
Pike was the LCC spokesman on social services until October 
1967, and responsible for leading the development of health 
policy during this period. 
The principal vehicle for reviewing policy was the HPG, 
which first met in its reconstituted form on 25 October 
1966, wi th both sub-commi ttee and Group meetings until 
August 1967 (47). The author has found no evidence that the 
HPG met after August and, as noted above, it seems clear 
that the Group did not meet after Balniel had succeeded 
Pike as its Chairman. 
It was noted in Chapter 1 that a number of papers had been 
prepared by members of the original HPG late in 1965 and 
early in 1966, but the timing of the general election seems 
to have precluded their discussion at a Group meeting. 
Despite the continuity of membership, and agreement at the 
first meeting that the previous papers would be available 
to members, they do appear not to have been explici tly 
considered. Rather, the reconstituted HPG seems to have 
begun work afresh. 
Discussion at the first meeting led to agreement that the 
HPG would "consider the problems of the financing of the 
heal th services", for which a paper was commissioned (48). 
(47) 
(48) 
the CPA contains the minutes of the first meeting, 
and a Progress Report dated 24/8/67 which implies 
that the HPG had recently met to discuss papers 
circulated in July. On files CRD 4/7/15 and 16 
respectively. 
a note of the meeting, PG13a/66/21, is on CPA CRD 
4/7/15. 
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Following that meeting, some members had discussions with 
Marples and Powell (49). In the case of Marples, the 
discussion was about cost effectiveness in the NHS, from 
his perspecti ve of having a general advisory role on 
efficiency. In the case of Powell, the meeting was to 
discuss the ideas in his recently published book (50). The 
latter meeting warrants particular attention, because 
Powell's views and the response to them, especially by 
Howe, represented two distinct approaches which, among 
others, are discernible in subsequent policy deliberations. 
3.1 Powell's views on the NHS, and Howe's alternative 
In the early 1960s Powell had been Minister of Health for 
three years, until in 1963 he declined to continue after 
the appointment of Home as Prime Minister. He had been a 
member of the LCC since the 1964 election and by 1966 had 
become a controversial public figure, frequently speaking 
on matters outside his LCC brief, sometimes seemingly at 
odds with his LCC colleagues. In particular, Powell had 
become identified with the kind of economic liberalism 
associated with the lEA (51). His views on the NHS were 
thus likely to attract interest both within the Party and 
outside. 
(49) 
(50) 
(51 ) 
on 7/2/67 (Powell) and 23/3/67 (Marples). Notes of 
both (PG/13a/66/23 and 26) are on CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
A New Look at Medicine and Politics, 1966. 
Heffer S, Like the Roman, 1998, London, Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, p. 367. In a letter to Howe on 2/8/66 
Seldon, Editorial Director of the Institute, had 
described Powell as "our best political hope". Howe 
papers, white box 25, file 10. 
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Those who shared Powell's economic liberalism, and hoped 
to find him proposing a market alternative to the NHS, were 
disappointed by the conclusions he reached. Indeed Ralph 
Harris, General Director of the lEA, and Howe, then closely 
associated with the Institute, had both seen the book in 
draft and written to Powell trying, seemingly without 
success, to persuade him to modify his conclusions (52). 
In Powell's view, the central issue with regard to the NHS 
arose from its form: lithe nationalisation of medical care 
and its provision gratis at the point of consumption" (53). 
This necessarily produced a highly centralised service in 
which demands could never be satisfied and, rationally, the 
members and staff of health bodies such as HMCs and ECs had 
a "vested interest in denigration" to try to pressure 
government to allocate more money (54). 
Powell judged that any reform that did not address the 
central issue would change little. Yet, as noted in the 
Introduction, in his view the Service was so popular with 
the public that there was no realistic prospect of 
addressing the central issue: "the very contemplation of 
denationalising it is enough to daunt the stoutest 
political heart" (55). Powell was reported as saying, at 
the launch of his book, that "I am not denying that one day 
[fundamental change] might be possible, but I do not think 
it is on the horizon" (56). 
(52) 12/9/66 (Howe), 13/9/66 (Harris), Howe papers, white 
box 25, file 10. 
( 53) Powe 11, 1 966, p . 67. 
(54) ibid., p. 16. 
(55) ibid., p. 67. 
(56) Times, 24/11/66, p. 12, col. g. 
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This was the message Powell gave to the HPG members on 7 
February 1967. The note of the meeting records that he was 
"generally pessimistic about the possibilities of making 
any major fundamental changes ... He also felt that any 
changes other than major ones were pointless". He doubted 
whether private provision would ever grow sufficiently to 
enable the NHS to be reduced in size; questioned the point 
of making "marginal adjustments to the balance between 
private and public provision" and saw "little opportunity 
for the reform of the structure of the NHS" (57). 
others were more optimistic about the prospect for radical 
change. A week before Powell's book had been published, 
another Conservative, Dr Wyndham Davies, had published his 
assessment, a development of a paper he had produced 
following meetings organised by the Monday Club (58). 
Davies, MP for Perry Barr from 1964 to 1966, regarded the 
NHS as unsatisfactory, but he felt that the situation could 
be changed by the encouragement of private provision and, 
for those who could afford it, the introduction of charges 
for medical consultations and drugs which, overall, would 
result in more resources being spent on health care (59). 
This notion that more resources needed to be spent on 
health care, by the encouragement of private provision 
alongside the NHS, was the essence of perhaps the most 
considered alternative to Powell's view, that of Howe. 
(57) PG/13a/67/24, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
(58) Davies W, Reforming the National Health Service, 
1966, London, Conservative Political Centre, and 
Collectivism or Individualism in Medicine, 1965, 
London, Monday Club. The Monday Club had been formed 
in 1961 by those opposed to the government's policy 
of decolonialisation, and was generally regarded as 
"right-wing" (Ramsden, 1996, pp. 148/9). 
(59) Davies, 1966, p. 29. 
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Howe was an admirer of Powell and was concerned that A New 
Look at Medicine and Politics could lead Conservatives to 
draw wrong conclusions. He used a speaking engagement the 
day after publication to say that "the prophet Enoch has 
by no means pronounced the last word on the future of the 
NHS" , and to suggest a way to achieve over a ten to fifteen 
year timescale the kind of substantial change assumed to 
be favoured by Powell (60). 
Howe proposed an approach which brought together two major 
aspects of the form of the NHS. In respect of financing, 
his view was that the aim should be an expansion of the 
private sector, and while this was being achieved 
Conservati ves should be "willing to look favourably on 
almost any intermediate device that will boost health 
expenditure without higher taxes". In parallel, the NHS's 
structure should be reconstructed and decentralised, so 
that new "Area Heal th Executi ves" managed by "Beeching-type 
executi ve directors", wi th "genuine freedom to plan and 
organise services" could develop addi tional sources of 
revenue (such as local lotteries and contracts with health 
insurance organisations) and increase efficiency (61). 
(Howe's reference to "executive directors" may have been 
inspired by a CRD paper circulated a fortnight earlier 
(62), noting a recommendation that health boards in 
Scotland should appoint chief executi ves, rather than 
continue having the leadership responsibility at officer 
level split among three posts (63).) 
(60) speech to Hemel Hempstead Conserva ti ves, 24/11 /66, 
Howe papers, white box 24, file 3. 
(61) ibid. (Beeching was a senior executive brought in by 
the 1959 Conservative Government to prepare a plan to 
modernise the railways.) 
(62) PG/13a/66/22, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
(63) the committee, appointed by the Health Services 
Council, was chaired by William Farquharson-Lang, a 
Scottish RHB chairman. Its report was published as 
Administrati ve Practice of Hospi tal Boards in 
Scotland, 1966, Edinburgh, HMSO (see pp. 64 and 97 
for the recommendation for chief executives). 
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Thus while sharing Powell's sense of the political 
difficulty, Howe took the view that it was possible, over 
time, actively to seek to create the conditions for major 
change. 
3.2 The substantive Health Policy Group discussions 
It seems almost certain that the full HPG did not meet for 
a second time until 6 April 1967, and it may have only met 
once more after that, in August 1967 (64). Following the 
meetings, a progress report was prepared, setting out 
conclusions on key aspects of the form of the NHS. 
On 6 April, members had available to them the notes of the 
meetings wi th Marples and Powell, the paper on finance 
commissioned at the first meeting (it also covered 
structure); the paper on the 
referred to above; and papers 
Farquharson-Lang 
on Social Work 
report 
in the 
Communi ty and Interna tional Comparisons in Voluntary Heal th 
Insurance Schemes prepared by the CRD. 
Only a very brief note of the meeting was prepared, which 
did not even record the names of the HPG members attending 
( 65). From that note it would seem that the paper on 
finance and structure (prepared by Lamont) provided the 
agenda. 
(64) notes of HPG meetings an HPG papers were numbered 
consecutively in the PG/13a/66 series. The note of 
the first meeting of the reconstituted HPG was number 
21 in that series, the note of the meeting on 6 April 
was number 28. The intervening numbers were all used 
for papers. 
(65) PG/13a/67/28, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
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The paper included a description of the existing structure 
and referred to criticisms of it, including Powell's 
concern about excessive centralism and the view that the 
tripartite structure led to a lack of co-ordination between 
the various branches of the Service. The Porritt proposal 
for area health boards as a means of unifying the Service 
at local level was described (66). 
In identifying possible ways forward, the paper took the 
Porri tt recommendation as the point of departure. The 
principal difficulty was seen to be "the relationship of 
the Area Health Boards to local government". The medical 
profession would be wary of local authority control of the 
Boards, while local government was unlikely to be prepared 
to surrender heal th functions to Boards "in which they 
would have no say". 
As an alternative, the paper identified what at the time 
was the core of the Labour Government's position, examining 
the means by which integration was in practice being 
achieved wi thin the existing structure, and encouraging 
successful 
legislative 
practice. 
change 
(Despite agreeing to 
that would be needed 
explore the 
to enable 
experiments wi th new forms of NHS administration to be 
undertaken (67), Robinson was sceptical as to whether the 
Porritt recommendation would promote integration at the 
level of provision of services for the individual patient, 
and emphasised the Ministry's efforts to achieve this 
wi thin the existing structure. A wri tten parliamentary 
answer in May 1967 suggested that this remained the 
Government's position (68).) 
(66) 
(67) 
(68) 
PG/13a/67/27, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
Webster, 1996, p. 328. 
Commons Hansards for 8/8/66 and 2/5/67 (written 
answer), vols. 733, col. 1170 and 746, col. 50. 
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At its April meeting, the HPG favoured the more radical of 
the two CRD options, administrative integration of the 
hospital and general practitioner services under one 
authority which, in the "general" view, would also become 
responsible for the local authority personal health 
services. Given the continuity of membership with the pre 
1966 election HPG, which was moving toward a similar 
position, this was unsurprising. Some HPG members were, 
however, reluctant to see the local authority health 
services di vided from the welfare services, and it was 
agreed that a firm conclusion could not be reached until 
the Seebohm Committee review of the organisation of local 
authority personal social services had been completed (69). 
The meeting noted that there was also the forthcoming 
report of the Royal Commission on Local Government to 
consider. Depending on its conclusions, it might be 
feasible to bring all three branches of the Service within 
local government which would achieve administrative 
integration; avoid the problem of separating the local 
health and welfare services; and (because of local 
government's revenue raising powers) potentially shift an 
element of health service financing from central to local 
government, thus in part addressing Powell's concerns about 
central control (70). 
(69) PG/13a/67/28, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
(70) ibid. 
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The Seebohm Committee had been given an indication of the 
party's emerging policy early in 1967 when Joseph gave 
ev idence . The Commi t tee's note records that" Sir Ke i th 
Joseph's main concern was to make sure that the Committee 
had regard to the possibility of area health boards, very 
broadly on the lines suggested by the Porritt Committee" 
(71 ) . 
The emerging policy was expressed more firmly, 
authoritatively and publicly by Pike during a debate in the 
Commons on 11 July 1967 when she argued that "we should 
move towards a Porritt solution, by which all the major 
branches of the services are brought together under one 
authority on an area basis" (72). 
As regards NHS finance, the CRD paper suggested that "the 
main problem for a Conservative Government is how to 
secure rising standards and wider choice wi thout also 
increasing taxation". Five possibilities were identified: 
savings in administration, charges, increased private 
provision, the use of lotteries and encouraging charitable 
bequests and voluntary effort (73). 
(71) note of meeting on 9/3/67, PRO HLG 120/1103. In 
referring to area health boards, the note includes 
the phrase "he [Joseph] mentioned that he had put the 
same suggestion to the Royal Commission on Local 
Government in England" (reflected in Webster, 1996, 
p. 451). In fact, the note of Joseph's evidence to 
the Royal Commission, on 4/11/66, does not support 
his recollection four months later (PRO HLG 69/901). 
(72) Commons Hansard, vol. 750, col. 541. 
(73) PG/13a/67/27, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
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Of the five, "extra private provision [was] probably the 
most important". Without offering any recommendations, the 
paper outlined a range of possibilities for encouraging 
private provision, including making drugs available to 
private patients on NHS, or at least subsidised, terms; the 
payment of subsidies to reduce the cost of private beds in 
NHS hospi tals; subsidising pri vate heal th insurance schemes 
by enabling the insurance company to claim from the 
Exchequer up to 40% of the average insurance prescription 
(thus allowing companies to provide insurance markedly 
cheaper than at present); and allowing contracting out of 
the NHS Contribution for those with health insurance (74). 
The HPG agreed that private provision should be encouraged, 
and saw the two most feasible means as allowing private 
patients to have drugs on the same basis as NHS patients 
and allowing tax relief on private health insurance 
premiums (the note of the meeting does not indicate whether 
the Group favoured the CRD option of subsidising the 
companies or preferred to grant the tax relief to the 
individual subscriber). Additional revenue could be 
generated by "a campaign against waste" and the 
introduction of an earnings-related social security tax, 
a proportion of which would be borne by employers though 
relieved by reductions in the general tax burden and the 
abolition of selective employment tax" (75). 
At the April meeting, or shortly after, sub-groups were 
established on the family doctor and hospital services. 
(74) ibid. 
(75) PG/13a/67/28, CPA CRD 4/7/15. 
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The family doctor service sub-group reported in favour of 
a charge for NHS drugs, with exemptions for pensioners and 
the chronic sick, but were divided on whether the charge 
should be a flat rate one (as with prescription charges 
prior to their abolition) or be proportionate to the actual 
cost of the drug in question (the patient paying the full 
cost and then reclaiming "say 70%-80%". The sub-group also 
considered whether charges for medical attention and advice 
should be introduced, and concluded that a charge when a 
GP made home visits at night "merited particular study", 
probably more with a view to "preventing the doctors' time 
being wasted" than for its revenue raising potential" (76). 
The hospi tal service sub-group seems to have concerned 
itself principally with issues arising from the discussion 
with Marples. The theme of its report was using resources 
more effectively, by a change in the pattern of hospitals 
(to ensure that there were suitable hospitals for patients 
not needing high intensi ty, high cost care of the kind 
provided in district general hospitals), and by the greater 
use of industrialised building and computers (77). 
It seems almost certain that what was the final meeting of 
the HPG took place in August 1967, following which Bellairs 
produced a Progress Report which incorporated the views of 
the Group on the sub-groups' reports, together with the 
conclusions reached at the meeting on 6 April. The report 
records that the HPG were as divided as the family doctor 
sub-group on the form charges for drugs should take and 
about charges for medical attention and advice, but 
otherwise agreed with the views of both sub-groups. 
(76) Interim Report on Family Doctor Service, 18/7/67, CPA 
CRD 4/7/15. 
(77) as recorded in Progress Report, 24/8/67, CPA CRD 
4/7/16. 
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Pike suffered recurrent illness which led to her standing 
down from the LCC in October 1967. It seems probable that 
production of the August Progress Report effectively marked 
the end of the work of the HPG as a group. There are no 
notes in the Conservative Party Archive (CPA) of HPG 
meetings after August 1967, nor evidence that the Progress 
Report was discussed beyond the HPG, for example by the ACP 
or the LCC. 
The result of the HPG's deliberations by August 1967 was, 
on structure, that consideration of change had gone as far 
as members felt realistic in advance of the recommendations 
of the Seebohm Committee and the Royal Commission on Local 
Government, and the direction of the Group's thinking had 
been made public by Pike during the Commons debate in July, 
noted above. On the inter-related issues of the financing 
of the Service and the balance between public and private 
provision, some agreement had been reached on preferred 
options but a practical policy to give them effect had yet 
to be drawn together, and Pike had said nothing substantive 
publicly. 
Shortly after he succeeded Pike, Balniel responded briefly 
to Robinson's announcement that he had set in train studies 
of the administrative structure of the NHS (78), but until 
the resulting consultative document, and the Seebohm 
recommendations, were available, he had no need to take 
matters further. Initially, he seems to have focused mainly 
on the issues of financing and public/private balance. 
Policy development on financing and public/private balance 
to the publication of the 1970 general election manifesto 
will therefore be examined first, and then policy 
development on the structure of the NHS. 
(78) Commons Hansard, 6/11/67, vol. 753, cols. 644/5. 
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4. NHS FINANCING 
Financing was not just the first matter relating to the 
form of the NHS to which Balniel and Macmillan gave 
substantive attention, but in the latter's view also "the 
main issue" (79). Its importance was recognised by Heath 
who, prior to the 1970 election, saw it as "one of the 
biggest problems we [will] have to face as a Government 
from the financial point of view" (80). 
This concern wi th finance was by no means confined to 
Conservatives. Within the Labour Party, with its history 
of favouring resourcing the Service from taxation, some 
were beginning to express the view that additional funding 
needed to be raised through charges or putting the NHS 
Contribution on an earnings-related basis (81). The BMA was 
concerned enough to establish and resource an advisory 
panel whose main focus was financing health services, the 
origin and findings of which are summarised below. 
Why did the issue of NHS finance become of concern in the 
mid to late 1960s? Essentially because to some it seemed 
that it would be difficult to maintain, let alone improve, 
services when the annual increase in resources was 
determined by considerations of economic management. While 
the NHS's resources had been increased in real terms in 
every year from 1952, and from 1954 to 1968 NHS expenditure 
as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GOP) had 
increa"sed annually (82), to many wi thin the Service the 
rate of increase was insufficient to match growing needs. 
(79) recorded in note of meeting with Heath, 17/7/68, CPA 
CRD 4/7/16. 
(80) 31/1/70, transcript of Selsdon Conference discussion 
on health, p. 12, CRD 3/9/93. 
(81) eg Douglas Houghton, Paying for Social Services, 
1967, London, lEA, p. 18 (charges); Dr David Owen, 
Times 4/7/68, p. 9, col. e (graduated contributions). 
( 82) Cmnd 761 5, 1 979, pp. 431 /3. 
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Changes in the age structure of the population meant that 
the size of groups which made most calIon health services 
- under 5s and the elderly - were increasing relative to 
the population as a whole (83). Advances in medical and 
surgical techniques and the range of drugs being developed 
(84) , meant that the potential scope of the NHS was 
constantly expanding. The need to modernise the pattern of 
hospitals, identified in Powell's Hospital Plan for England 
and Wales, generated pressure for increased capital 
expenditure (85). Judging by resolutions at the BMA Annual 
Representative Meetings (ARMs), many doctors felt that the 
Service was inadequately resourced (86). The number of 
British born doctors emigrating (87) was cited as evidence 
of dissatisfaction with working conditions and 
remuneration. 
This, then, was the background against which, from their 
appointments in October 1967, Balniel and Macmillan began 
thinking about the Party's policy on NHS funding. 
(83) between the 1961 and 1971 censuses the population of 
England and Wales increased by 5.7%. The increases in 
the under 5s and 65s and over were 8.6% and 18.2% 
respectively. Census data summarised in Mitchell B, 
British Historical Statistics, 1988, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 15. 
(84) a range of examples is given in Rivett G, From Cradle 
to Grave, 1998, London, King's Fund, pp. 134/62. 
(85) Cmnd. 1604, 1962. £93m had been spent on hospital 
building in the five years 1956/7 to 1960/1 (p. 2). 
The Plan envisaged £200m being spent in the 
quinquennium beginning 1961/2 and £300m in that 
beginning in 1966/7 (p. 13). In the revised Plan, 
published in May 1966 as The Hospital Building 
Programme, Cmnd 3000., London, HMSO, the expec ted 
level of expenditure was increased to "roughly £1,000 
million ... over the next ten years" (p. 5). 
(86) for example, resolutions 208 and 31 at the 1966 and 
1967 ARMs, minutes, British Medical Association 
Archive (BMAA), p. 28 and p. 5 respectively. 
(87) a written parliamentary answer contained the estimate 
that there was a net loss of such doctors of 250 a 
year in 1962/3 and 1963/4, 500 in 1964/5 and 300 in 
1965/6. Commons Hansard, 25/3/69, vol. 780, col. 284. 
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A week after he succeeded Pike, Balniel used 
opportunity of responding to a debate at the 
Conference to say that he was "deeply interested ... 
the 
Party 
[ in] 
arranging for contractual savings for medical insurance, 
for private medical treatment, for nursing homes, all to 
be freed from tax", and that Paul Dean, an HPG member, was 
overseas, studying other countries' schemes (88). 
Dean's studies included three weeks looking at the 
Australian health services, which he contrasted favourably 
with the NHS. One of three areas where, in his view, the 
Australian system was superior was in the plural nature of 
its funding, with "about half the money [coming] from 
various pri vate sources voluntary heal th insurance, 
third-party motor insurance, charges of various kinds, 
charitable contributions, and lotteries". The result was 
that Australians were spending proportionately more of 
their gross national product on health. In Dean's view, the 
encouragement of such means in Britain would provide the 
extra money needed to improve services (89). 
Of the various sources of funds from pri va te sources 
referred to by Dean, action on one had, in the form of 
prescription charges, been Party policy at the 1966 
election. This policy had been reviewed and supported by 
the reconstituted HPG, albeit with differences of view 
about the form of the charge (flat rate or proportionate 
to the cost of the drug concerned). However, as noted 
above, after the 1966 election there had been some concern 
about the electoral impact of the policy. 
(88) Conservative Conference Report, 1967, p. 24. 
(89) Commons Hansard, 7/12/67, vol. 755, cols. 1792/3. 
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In the event, the state of the economy by late 1967 led the 
Government to devalue the pound and to follow this up with 
reductions in public expenditure announced on 16 January 
1968 (90). These reductions included the re-imposition of 
prescription charges just over three years after they had 
been abolished, though wi th exemptions for those under 
fifteen or over sixty five, expectant and nursing mothers 
and the chronic sick. The Conservatives supported the re-
imposition of charges, and were saved the need to decide 
whether to propose re-imposition in the next general 
election manifesto (91). 
During 1968, both Balniel and Macmillan gave thought to 
more fundamental changes to the financing of the NHS than 
the re-imposition of prescription charges. As noted above, 
it seems clear that they did not use the HPG, as a group, 
to assist them (92). 
What is less clear is what sources of information and 
advice Balniel and Macmillan did draw upon. In addition to 
the results of Dean's studies, research by the CRD and, 
almost certainly, discussions with BUPA (93), a probable 
source of information was the BMA Advisory Panel referred 
to above, of which Howe was a member. 
(90) 
(91 ) 
(92) 
(93) 
Commons Hansard, 
Commons Hansard, 
" the Group 
vol. 756, cols. 1577/1618. 
30/5/68, vol. 765, cols. 2269/73. 
has never met since [Balniel] 
Hayhoe/Fraser, 11/3/69, CPA CRD became Chairman", 
4/7/16. 
in LCC(68)202, 10/9/68, Balniel included "in strict 
confidence" information about BUPA' s future plans 
which he was most likely to have learnt from 
discussions with BUPA. CPA LCC(68)255-269. 
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4.1 The British Medical Association Advisory Panel 
Following a resolution of its ARM in July 1966 (94), the 
BMA established a Forward Planning Unit, one of whose first 
initiatives was to invite Dr lvor Jones, 
Advisory Panel, to "review the history 
Services in this country and to indicate 
(95) . 
assisted by an 
of the Heal th 
future trends" 
The Advisory Panel consisted of "a small number of 
knowledgeable and forward thinking doctors and 
laymen wi th particular experience in socio-medical problems 
and the economics of medical care" (96). The laymen were 
Howe, and Seldon of the lEA. 
The Advisory Panel began its meetings early in 1967, but 
its posi tion and remi t changed somewha t in the Summer. 
First, it ceased to be linked to the BMA's Forward Planning 
Unit (97). Second, an ARM resolution in July 1967, 
concerned about the "inadequate finance" available to the 
NHS, instructed the BMA Council to "prepare an alternative 
Heal th Service" (98) . The Council discharged this 
instruction by submitting the resolution to the Advisory 
Panel and asking that an interim report be prepared on 
matters relating to the 1967 resolution (99). 
(94) Council minutes, 8/7/66, BMAA, doc. CS, minute 44. 
(95) Council minutes, 1/2/67, BMAA, doc. C30, minute 306. 
(96) Jones' letter of invitation to prospective Advisory 
Panel members, 9/2/67, Howe papers, white box 16, 
file 5. 
(97) note of 7th meeting of Advisory Panel, 1/6/67, BMAA, 
Planning Unit papers, P/1/19. 
(98) minutes of ARM, 6/7/67, BMAA, p. 5, resolution 31. 
(99) Interim Report of Advisory Planning Panel, para. 
278(2), reprinted in the supplement to the BMJ, 
20/4/68, pp. 95/8. 
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The Advisory Panel saw its initial task as reporting on 
methods of financing medical care, and with this in view 
set up a number of research projects to inform its 
thinking, including studies of health financing in Europe, 
Australasia and the USA, mostly by commissioning university 
economic departments. The Panel thus had available to it 
very much more substantial sources of information and 
advice than the HPG, whose research had been largely 
undertaken by its members personally. 
The Panel produced an interim report early in 1968. In its 
view, the "present system of financing health services in 
Bri tain must be reconsidered", and the Panel sought to 
contribute to a reconsideration by examining six main 
sources of finance - direct payment, voluntary insurance, 
compulsory insurance (State or private), general taxation, 
special taxes and chari table funds and lot teries. The 
Panel's conclusion was that, while taxation must inevitably 
be the principal means of finance of. certain sectors of 
medical care, raising a greater proportion of finance by 
insurance would enhance choice and could result in higher 
minimum standards for everyone (100). 
Through Howe, and the interim (and, later, final) reports 
of the Panel, Balniel and Macmillan thus potentially had 
available to them a great deal of material about ways in 
which heal th services could be funded. There is clear 
evidence that they knew of the Panel's work; it was, for 
example, referred to in a CRD paper prepared for Macmillan 
and copied to Balniel (101). The extent to which they drew 
on it is unclear. 
( 100 ) 
( 1 01 ) 
ibid. 
Health Services Finance, 31/7/68, CPA CRD 4/7/84. 
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4.2 The Balniel and Macmillan approaches 
While the means by which they reached them are uncertain, 
it seems that Balniel and Macmillan formed different 
conclusions on the best way of funding the NHS. A CRD 
memorandum in July 1968 records that "Balniel favours the 
idea of the graduated health service contribution, whereas 
Maurice Macmillan strongly favours the proposal for a 
genuine health insurance" (102). 
When he had invited Pike to chair a reconstituted HPG, 
Heath had said that he was asking for all working groups 
to report by Summer 1968, as the basis for a policy 
document later in the year (103). In July 1968, having 
received no report from the HPG (except possibly the rather 
provisional Progress Report of August 1967 referred to 
above), he met Macmillan to discuss progress. (It is 
unclear why Heath did not seek to meet with Balniel, who 
was in overall charge of the development of health policy.) 
The meeting gave Macmillan, who referred to finance as the 
main issue, the chance to explain his thinking, as well as 
to mention that Balniel "and others" were working on 
different lines (unspecified in the note of the meeting). 
He favoured a two part system. Hospitals would be funded 
by "a graduated contribution preferably on an unsubsidized 
basis, and weighted to the employer rather than the 
employee". For other services - including GPs, dentists and 
outpatients - there would be charges, "so that in effect 
people were providing for themselves". The charges would 
be financed by insurance schemes. There would be a State 
scheme but, possibly aided by tax concessions, individuals 
could contract out to approved private schemes (104). 
( 1 02) 
( 1 03) 
( 1 04) 
Bellairs/Sewill, 30/7/68, CPA CRD 4/7/84. 
Heath/pike, 13/5/66, CPA CRD 4/7/16. 
note of meeting 17/7/67, CPA CRD 4/7/16. 
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Macmillan judged that with the kind of approach he 
outlined, "it might be possible to push a wide range of the 
health services, except hospitals, back into the private 
sector over a period of 15 to 20 years" (105). 
Heath seems to have been interested in Macmillan's 
approach, suggesting Dr Elston Grey-Turner, then Assistant 
Secretary at the BMA, as someone "he knew would be willing 
to help", and offering computer time for "problems 
[that] could usefully be dealt with that way" (106). 
Balniel's approach was different. According to the 
Bellairs' memorandum of 30 July 1968 referred to above, he 
favoured the idea, being considered by the EPG, of a 
graduated NHS Contribution. In addition, in a paper to the 
LCC in September 1968 (107), Balniel developed the idea of 
tax relief in respect of contractual savings he had raised 
at the 1967 Party Conference, referred to above. 
In Balniel's view, the Party should move from a "neutral" 
attitude to private health provision, to one of "positive 
encouragement". Specifically, he proposed that tax relief 
should be given in respect of contributions to BUPA and 
similar health insurance schemes, preferably as part of 
broader policy of giving tax reliefs on contractual 
savings. In addi tion, consideration should be given to 
allowing those with adequate health insurance cover, 
whether pri vately arranged or occupational, to contract out 
of the "health stamp" (the NHS Contribution) to some 
extent. 
(105) 
( 1 06 ) 
( , 07 ) 
ibid. 
ibid. 
Private Health 
LCC(68)255-269. 
Provision, LCC(68)202, CPA 
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Such a policy would, in Balniel's view, bring more money 
into health services, in the long run reduce the pressure 
on the State funded service, provide more choice in health 
services and perhaps reduce the emigration of doctors and 
nurses. 
To illustrate the potential additional resource, Balniel 
calculated that if, as a result of the availability of tax 
relief, the number covered by pri vate heal th insurance 
quadrupled from the present two million, total 
contributions would be £80m a year. Tax relief at 40% would 
mean £32m tax revenue was foregone, leaving what Balniel 
described as "a net gain" (his underlining), that is, 
additional expenditure on health services, of £48m a year. 
The total expenditure on the NHS in the UK in 1967 had been 
£1,558m (108), so Balniel was hoping to see "a net gain" 
of about 3% of expenditure through his tax relief proposal, 
though this would be reduced if a degree of contracting out 
of the "health stamp" was agreed. 
Quite apart from the assumption that the number of people 
taking out private health insurance could quadruple, and 
the issue of the revenue foregone by allowing contracting 
out, Balniel's calculation of the "net gain" was flawed. 
On his estimate, private health insurance was already 
contributing £20m a year to total expenditure on health. 
I f the numbers insured quadrupled, the comparable sum, 
after taking account of revenue foregone though tax relief, 
would be £48m per year. The real "net gain" in total health 
spending, compared to the situation then obtaining, would 
be £28m a year, not £48m (that is, the putative £48m less 
the current £20m). 
( 1 08 ) Cmnd 761 5, 1 979, p. 431. 
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The paper was intended for discussion at an LCC meeting on 
13 September 1968, but it was not reached and at Heath's 
request Fraser, who served as Secretary to the LCC, wrote 
asking members for their comments. 
Six LCC members responded. Maudling and Lord Hailsham 
replied briefly and supportively, though Hailsham pointed 
out that the line of argument applied to areas other than 
health and suggested that the principle should be examined 
by a policy group (109). Joseph Godber, Robert Carr, Joseph 
and Macleod replied at greater length. 
Godber (brother of the Ministry of Health's Chief Medical 
Officer), and Carr both supported the proposal to offer tax 
relief on contributions to health insurance schemes, but 
opposed the idea that those with insurance might, in part 
at least, be exempt from the NHS Contribution. Godber could 
see that allowing at least partial exemption might be 
logical, but thought it would be "bad politics". Carr 
thought it worth preserving the "principle of universality 
in contributions to the National Insurance Scheme", though 
noted it had been breached with the Conservative 
Government's graduated pensions scheme (110). 
Macleod expressed broad sympathy with Balniel's aims, but 
clearly regarded the likelihood of extra money flowing into 
health care as somewhat speculative. On Balniel's figures, 
whatever the "gain", for Macleod there was "a clear loss 
to the Exchequer of £32m" , the tax relief gi ven on 
contributions (111). 
( 1 09 ) 
( 11 0 ) 
( 1 1 1 ) 
23/9/68 (Maudling), 25/9/68 (Hailsham) I CPA CRD 
4/7/1. 
20/9/68 (Godber), 30/9/68 (Carr), ibid. 
3/10/68, ibid. 
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Joseph agreed with the objective of getting more private 
money into heal th, and favoured, in the longer term, 
changing the form of the NHS into an Australian type of 
health service "based on private practice with costs 
covered by insurance", with the state meeting a share of 
the individual's premiums, which would be higher for those 
with lower incomes. 
While Joseph supported Balniel's proposals he did not see 
that, in isolation, they met Powell's objection to such 
schemes that, even if they led to growth in the private 
sector, that growth would be insufficient to allow a 
reduction in NHS expenditure (112). Unless NHS expenditure 
could be reduced, the taxpayer would in effect be faced 
with additional costs, in the form of the reduction in tax 
receipts through the relief granted on contributions. 
Joseph therefore suggested that Balniel' s proposals be part 
of an overall plan to "bring more resources into medicine, 
public and private", of with the key additional step would 
be to introduce a "substantial bed-charge for hospi tal 
patients other than children, elderly and mental and 
chronic cases", against which individuals would be 
compulsorily required to take out private insurance, the 
burden of which would be mitigated for low earners through 
higher family allowances. The state would regulate the 
insurance companies, and "offer ... a partnership to help 
them cover the less good risks". 
( 1 1 2 ) Powell, 1 966, p. 70. 
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The resources raised through the bed-charge, which Joseph 
estimated at £150m a year, would be used to improve the pay 
and conditions of staff and offer bounties for British-
trained doctors who had emigrated to return, thus hopefully 
offsetting any reduction in NHS staff that growth in the 
private sector would cause in the short term (113). 
Fraser sent copies of the six replies to Heath and Balniel, 
but there was no immediate follow up. There was no mention 
of changing NHS funding arrangements or encouraging the 
private sector in the October 1968 policy document Make 
Life Better, though there was reference to giving "real 
encouragement to new savings" and "tax relief to those who 
want to save regularly over a period of years" (114), which 
would have provided a basis for giving tax relief on 
private health insurance premiums. Similarly, in his speech 
at the Party Conference, Balniel made no reference to 
either, despite being presented with the opportunity when 
one of the speaker (Dr Anthony Trafford, a future 
Conservative MP) referring to the possible encouragement 
of private medical insurance schemes, saying that it "would 
be illusory to think that they can make any real impact on 
the problem of health costs" (115). 
( 11 3 ) 
( 11 4 ) 
( 11 5 ) 
25/9/68, ibid. Joseph's letter was referred to 
misleadingly by Heath in his autobiography. Without 
any reference to Balniel' s paper, he says that 
"Joseph circula ted a paper to the Shadow Cabinet 
... ", which suggests that Joseph was taking the 
initiative in this matter. Rather, Joseph (who had 
no responsibility for health policy at this time) 
was responding to Balniel's initiative, alongside 
five other LCC members, not by "circulating a paper 
to the Shadow Cabinet" but by writing a letter to 
Fraser, copied to Balniel, which Fraser then passed 
on to Heath. (Heath, 1998, pp. 451/2.) 
1968, p. 10. 
Conserva ti ve Conference Report, 1968, London, NUCUA, 
pp. 87 (Trafford) and 90 (Balniel). 
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By Autumn 1968, therefore, Balniel and Macmillan had 
proposed different ways of increasing expenditure on 
health, and presented their ideas to Heath, who had also 
seen the reservations of some of his LCC colleagues. 
Nothing had yet been decided as regards Party pol icy, 
however, and it was unsurprising that, when relinquishing 
chairmanship of the ACP in mid November and commenting that 
"the broad pattern of policy is now complete", Heath 
excepted health (together with transport) (116). 
4.3 Discussions leading to the 1970 general election 
manifesto 
During the period between the 1968 Party Conference and the 
drafting of the 1970 election manifesto, both Macmillan and 
Balniel made what appear to have been rather spasmodic 
attempts to take their proposals forward. 
In December 1968 Bellairs prepared a paper taking forward 
the ideas that Macmillan had put to Heath at their July 
meeting. In so doing, Bellairs suggested that part, at 
least, of hospital treatment should be brought within the 
scope of the minimum level of health case for which people 
would be required to take out insurance, and spelt out some 
of the practical issues, such as insuring the "bad risks", 
which would have to be resolved. He thought that such a 
scheme would fi t well alongside the Party I s policy for 
pensions, and "give us a consistent social service policy, 
putting emphasis on encouraging people to help themselves 
and concentrating state subsidies on people rather than 
things" (117). 
( 11 6 ) 
( 11 7 ) 
Times, 15/11/68, p. 1, col. d. 
The Finance of the National 
19/12/68, CPA CRD 4/7/77. 
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Health Service, 
Bellairs' Director, Sewill, was critical of this approach. 
While "in favour of making the health service into a self-
financing insurance system", Sewill thought that the way 
to achieve this was that being examined by the EPG, namely 
by increasing, possibly on an income related basis, 
employers' contributions under the national insurance 
scheme, which could relieve the taxpayer of the need to 
finance health care except for "chronic cases and bad 
risks". His objection to the Macmillan scheme, as developed 
by Bellairs, was that it would make little practical 
difference: "contributions would still be compulsory and 
the health services would still in effect be free at the 
time of use". For Sewill, to effect such a change would 
"involve a major political upheaval for no real benefit" 
(118). 
There is no evidence that the issue of NHS financing was 
considered either by the ACP or the LCC until June 1969, 
by when the work of the BMA Advisory Panel was in its last 
stages. The Panel was moving towards a policy on the same 
lines as Macmillan's, involving compulsory insurance, 
though Howe, like Sewill, drew attention to the "enormous 
upheaval the introduction of such a scheme would involve" 
and that the notion of compulsory insurance would be 
"di fficul t to accept poli tically". At this stage Howe 
clearly regarded the expansion of voluntary insurance, 
"wi th large encouragements ... such as tax reliefs" as more 
realistic (119). 
( 1 1 8 ) 
( 1 1 9 ) 
Sewill/Bellairs 2/1/69, CPA CRD 4/7/77. 
minutes of Advisory Panel meeting 30/4/69 - 1/5/69, 
BMAA, P/1/109. 
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By June 1969, the Balniel and Macmillan approaches seem to 
have been brought together as potentially consecutive 
elements in an overall strategy on NHS financing. In a CRD 
paper put to the ACP, various "comparatively minor" ways 
of raising additional revenue for health services, 
including lotteries, a more flexible system of hospital 
finance and charging for the treatment of casualties of 
road accidents were described but, in the CRD's view "the 
most important source of new money is through the 
encouragement of private provision" (120). 
In a possible strategy to encourage private provision, the 
Balniel scheme was suggested as the immediate step - giving 
tax relief on the premiums of private health insurance 
schemes, preferably as part of general tax relief for 
contractual savings. The paper included, without comment, 
the same estimate of an addition of £48 million a year as 
Balniel's paper to the LCC. 
If further steps were judged to be necessary, there were 
three options - higher charges with wider exemptions, as 
advocated by Houghton; meeting a larger part of the cost 
of health care by earnings-related social security 
contributions; or, "the most radical alternative", 
Macmillan's proposal for charges met through compulsory 
insurance. The paper suggested that it would be useful to 
have a feasibility study of the Macmillan option. 
The ACP offered no specific advice, though in summing up 
the discussion Maudling, Chairman since December, agreed 
that a feasibility study of Macmillan's proposal would be 
use ful (1 21 ) . 
( 1 20) 
( 1 21 ) 
The National Health Service - Administration and 
Finance, 3/6/69, CPA, paper ACP/59, CRD 4/7/16. 
ACP(69)100th meeting, 11/6/69, CPA CRD 2/3. 
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Three weeks after the ACP meeting, on 1 July 1969, the 
Conservatives used one of their Supply Day opportunities 
to raise NHS financing in the Commons. Macmillan argued 
that it was unrealistic to expect the adequate financing 
of the NHS to be achieved on its present basis. To meet the 
cost pressures generated by demographic change and medical 
innovation, more resources were needed than could be raised 
by taxation, even at times of economic growth. While 
aspects of the Service, such as provision for the 
chronically ill, would always need to be funded from 
taxation, in Macmillan's view perhaps a quarter of NHS 
expenditure could be raised by other means which, in turn, 
could lead to even more resources overall being spent on 
health care. He listed most of the options set out in the 
CRD paper and invited the Government's response (122). 
Richard Crossman, the Secretary of State for Social 
Services, accepted much of Macmillan's argument about the 
need for additional resources, but regarded encouragement 
of the private sector as unacceptable, as "there may well 
be a considerable number of leading consultants who treated 
only private patients ... We could no longer claim that all 
citizens, whatever their means, were able to obtain the 
same standard of medical care". He regarded charges as 
something which "should not be made more than a small 
factor - a useful adjunct, but only an adjunct, to the main 
source of finance" (123). 
(122) 
( 1 23) 
Commons Hansard, vol. 786, cols. 242/53. 
ibid., cols. 253/66. 
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In Crossman's view, the most realistic way of raising money 
over and above taxa tion was through higher NHS 
contributions, which the Government had recently proposed 
should cease to be paid on a flat-rate basis and (like 
contributions for national insurance) be earnings-related 
(124). This represented a considerable shift in the Labour 
leadership's thinking, as statements made whilst in 
Opposition "implied that the NHS Contribution was not a 
favoured source for health service funding" (125). 
Balniel did not take part in the Supply Day debate, but he 
opened a debate a few days later about what the 
Conservatives saw as the muddle in respect of the 
introduction of higher charges for dentures and spectacles. 
While agreeing with Crossman that the scope for increasing 
revenue through charges was limited, he regretted that the 
Government were not exploring other possibili ties, 
including encouraging private insurance (126). 
Later in July Balniel sought to persuade his LCC colleagues 
to take a positive step in respect of encouraging the take 
up of private insurance, by asking for agreement that he 
could announce at the next Party Conference that tax relief 
would be offered in respect of private health insurance 
premiums, within a framework of encouraging savings through 
tax relief. Heath asked that, before the Conference, the 
matter should be discussed by the LCC on the basis of a 
paper Balniel should prepare in consultation with Macleod, 
Boyle and Barber (127). 
( 1 24) 
( 1 25) 
( 1 26 ) 
( 1 27 ) 
ibid. (The Government's White Paper, National 
Superannuation and National Insurance, Cmnd. 6883, 
1969, London, HMSO, published in January, had 
proposed putting social security contributions, 
including the contribution towards the NHS, on an 
earnings-related basis.) 
Webster, 1996, p. 190. 
Commons Hansard, vol. 786, cols. 1031/2. 
LCC(69)319th, 23/7/69, CPA LCC(69)312-319. 
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The LCC's remit to Balniel seems not to have been 
discharged directly. Rather, in the light of the motion on 
social security and health proposed for the Party 
Conference, a paper was prepared wi thin CRD on pr i va te 
provision in the social services generally, which included 
a section on tax relief on health insurance. 
This paper made it clear that details of the framework for 
tax reliefs for contractual savings generally had yet to 
be worked out, and therefore any announcement in respect 
of relief on private health insurance could not be made in 
that context. A form of words was suggested for an 
announcement on tax relief for private health insurance -
"I am authorised to give the assurance that when we return 
to office we will see that tax relief is available for 
health insurance on a no less favourable basis than exists 
for life assurance" (128). 
The paper was not put to the LCC, and it is not clear from 
the CPA in what forum it was discussed. In the event, at 
the Party Conference Balniel did not use the form of words 
proposed, instead simply referring to tax relief on health 
insurance as "a proper objecti ve for the Conserva ti ve 
Party, but ... subordinate to our wider aim of an overall 
reduction in direct personal taxation" (129). 
( 1 28 ) 
( 1 29 ) 
Private Provision, 26/9/69, CPA CRD 4/7/16. 
Conserva ti ve Conference Report, 1969, London, NUCUA, 
pp. 57/8. 
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By December 1969, preparation of the manifesto for the next 
general election began in earnest. As the policy on health 
financing had still to be agreed, the first draft was able 
only to contrast the Conservative attitude - welcoming the 
growth in private provision and asserting the Party's 
belief that it was right that individuals should be free 
to make provision for themselves - with the "danger" that 
Labour saw in such freedom (130). The word "danger" in this 
context referred to a phrase in a recently published Labour 
Party publication which referred to the need to be "alive 
to the danger of a growth in private health and welfare 
provision which is now gathering momentum" (131). 
The Conservatives used another Supply Day to emphasise the 
different attitudes of the two major parties, by debating 
a motion welcoming the development of private health 
insurance schemes. The two themes of Balniel's speech were 
the potential contribution of the private sector, and a 
warning to the Government to "keep their hands off the 
freedom of choice which men and women want and off 
private health insurance" (132). 
The second draft of the manifesto was prepared in time for 
discussion at a meeting of the LCC over the last weekend 
of January 1970, at the Selsdon Park Hotel. The meeting 
also considered a number of other papers, including one by 
the CRD specifically on health. 
( 1 30 ) 
( 1 31 ) 
( 1 32) 
draft dated 8/12/69, CPA SC/69/3. 
quoted by Balniel, Commons Hansard vol. 793, col. 
492. 
Commons Hansard 10/12/69, vol. 793, cols. 491/6. 
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This paper, prepared by Sewill and Bellairs, dealt solely 
with the inter-related issues of finance and private 
provision. It rehearsed the minor possibilities for raising 
additional revenue, such as lotteries; took the Balniel 
view that additional charges could only raise relatively 
small additional sums; welcomed Crossman's plans to put 
health contributions on an earnings related basis 
"revenue would be much more buoyant", and effectively added 
Balniel's proposal for tax relief on private health 
insurance premiums to the list of measures of marginal 
effect. In Sewill and Bellairs' view, the major decision 
was whether to continue wi th the present system, or to 
transfer the bulk of the FPS to a charging basis. If the 
latter option was preferred, there was then the choice of 
instituting compulsory insurance arrangements to cover the 
charges, as proposed by Macmillan, or to introduce a re-
imbursement scheme of the kind examined by the HPG (133). 
To reflect the need for decision, the health section of the 
second draft of the manifesto contained an additional, 
provisional, paragraph committing the Party to "consider 
the financing of the National Health Service with a view 
to finding ways of devoting more resources to the health 
of the nation without increasing the burden on the 
taxpayer" (134). 
At the Selsdon meeting, health was discussed on 31 January. 
According to a verbatim transcript, although a variety of 
issues were touched upon, most of the discussion focused 
on financing and proposed changes in the structure of the 
NHS (the latter is considered below). 
(133) 
( 1 34) 
Health, 22/1/70, SP/70/7, CPA CRD 3/9/92. 
SP/70/1, CPA LCC(70)340-3S7. 
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Macmillan explained the issues as he saw them, essentially 
as he had in the Supply Day debate on 1 July 1969. He seems 
to have received little support for the idea of putting the 
FPS on a charging basis with the charges being covered by 
compulsory insurance. In particular, Macleod, the Shadow 
Chancellor, came down "flatly in favour of continuing 
broadly with the present system", and regarded an estimate 
that the compulsory insurance would cost 15/- (75p) per 
week per insured worker as "quite unacceptable". Balniel 
agreed with Macleod that "it was not on for [the] 
Manifesto" (135). 
Despite the fact that the radical alternative deployed in 
the CRD paper and, in particular, Macmillan's option within 
that alternative, seems to have found no support within the 
LCC, the possibility of including in the manifesto a 
reference to alternative means of funding the NHS was left 
open. 
The provisional paragraph referred to above was carried 
unchanged into the third draft. At that stage Heath 
criticised it as "weak", and "was now becoming convinced 
that it would eventually be necessary to charge a fee for 
every visit to the doctor, which would both relieve the 
general practi tioner and in time the hospi tal 
service". Fraser argued that it would be "unwise to say 
this in the Manifesto". Maudling, however, thought that 
there should be a sentence, to justify a Conservative 
Government if it decided to act (136). 
( 1 35 ) 
( 1 36) 
transcript, CPA CRD 3/9/93, pp. 12/9. 
Steering Committee minutes, 12/3/70, CPA SC/70/10. 
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No change resulted from the discussion on the third draft, 
the provisional paragraph was carried forward, wi thout 
amendment, into the fourth, fifth and sixth drafts. It was 
only in the week prior to publication that it was omitted, 
following consideration of a "new draft section on health" 
circulated by Sewill (137). The notes of the Steering 
Committee meetings on 18 and 19 May at which the manifesto 
was finalised do not include the reason. Years later, 
Sewill, who had been present at both meetings, expressed 
the view that it was to avoid giving an unnecessary point 
of possible attack, at a time when it looked as though 
Labour might be recovering electoral support (138). 
The result was that, in respect of what both Heath and his 
frontbench spokesmen on health regarded as a major issue, 
the manifesto included only a shortened version of 
reference in the first draft, some six months earlier. The 
final, published wording contrasted the Party's belief that 
it was "right and proper" that people should have the 
freedom to provide for themselves with Labour's view that 
there was "danger" in the growth of pri vate provision 
(139). 
5. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE NHS 
As noted above, by August 1967 the HPG had taken its 
thinking as far as was regarded realistic in advance of the 
Seebohm and Royal Commission on Local Government 
recommendations. 
( 1 37) 
( 1 38 ) 
( 1 39 ) 
CPA SC/70/10. 
discussion with author, 21/9/99. 
Craig, 1975, p. 339. 
103 
In November 1967 Robinson announced that he had begun "full 
and careful examination of the administrative structure" 
of the Service, with a view to setting out his views "as 
a basis for public discussion and wide consultation" (140). 
This decision opened up the possibili ty of structural 
change of the kind advocated by some of his parliamentary 
colleagues (141). His principal official advisers, too, had 
for some months been of the view that the triparti te 
structure "was not satisfactory [it] creates 
difficulties of co-ordination and must waste manpower" 
(142) . 
Balniel responded briefly to Robinson's 
welcoming the studies (143). 
statement, 
The report of the Seebohm Committee and the Government's 
consultative document (or Green Paper, as it was commonly 
called) were both published on 23 July 1968 (144), by when 
the mid-term Conservative policy document for the Party 
Conference in October was in an advanced stage of 
preparation. 
( 1 40) 
( 1 41 ) 
( 1 42) 
( 1 43) 
(144) 
Commons Hansard, vol. 753, cols. 643/6. 
for example, Laurie Pavitt who favoured structural 
change in his pamphlet The Health of the Nation, 
1965, London, Fabian Society, and Dr David Owen who 
criticised the tripartite system in a Commons debate 
on 8/6/66, Hansard vol. 733, cols. 1153/5. 
informal evidence by the Ministry of Health's 
Permanent Secretary and Chief Medical Officer to the 
Royal Commission on Local Government, 7/7/67, PRO 
HLG 69/902, RC(67)24th meeting. 
Commons Hansard, vol. 753, cols. 644/5. 
Report of the Commi ttee on Local Authori ty and 
Allied Personal Social Services, Cmnd. 3703, 1968, 
London, HMSO, and The Administrative Structure of 
the Medical and Related Services in England and 
Wales, 1968. 
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In the seventh draft, which was considered by the LCC on 
27 August, it had not been felt necessary to say anything 
about the structure of the NHS beyond a re-ordering of the 
brief reference in the 1966 general election manifesto 
(145). The wording of the seventh draft was carried 
unchanged into the final version published as Make Life 
Better on 7 October, though by then a commitment to take 
"immediate action to implement the recommendations of the 
Seebohm report" had been added (146). 
5. 1 The Seebohm Committee's conclusions and the first 
Green Paper on the administrative structure of the 
NHS 
As noted in Chapter 1, the Seebohm inquiry had been 
announced in December 1965, wi th a remi t to review the 
organisation and responsibilities of the local authority 
personal social services (PSS). 
The Committee regarded the term PSS as including some or 
all of the services then being provided by a range of local 
authority departments. It concluded that the local 
authori ties concerned should create new social services 
departments, into which would be incorporated the existing 
children's department, most of the functions of the welfare 
department and some of the responsibilities of the 
education, health and housing departments. 
( 1 45 ) "Hospitals family doctors and the local health 
, " 
services should be brought closer together , paper 
LCC(68)201, p. 15, CPA LCC(68)225-269. 
(146) "Make Life Better", 1968, p. 23. 
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The potential impact on the local authority health 
departments was considerable. The Committee estimated that 
its recommendations "would remove half their staff and a 
substantial part of their budgets, contracts and interests" 
(147). This would call into question whether the residual 
health departments would be "viable working unit[(s]". The 
Committee had noted the Government's November 1967 
announcement that it was to review the structure of the 
NHS, and emphasised the importance of the review paying 
"particular attention to the need for a coherent 
organisation of local medical services and to the [local 
authority] medical officer of health and his team" 
( 1 48 ) . 
The Government's proposals in respect of the structure of 
the NHS did indeed address the question of the local 
authority health services generally, and the role of the 
medical officer of health in particular. 
In its Green Paper the Government noted both the 
"increasing efforts devoted to trying to secure proper 
collaboration [among the elements of the tripartite 
structure], and the obstacles to their success" (149). It 
noted, too, the "great challenges" of the next two decades: 
and particularly the need to use staff effectively 
"wi thout duplication of tasks and wi thout confusion of 
function" (150). 
( 1 47) 
( 1 48) 
( 1 49 ) 
( 1 50) 
Cmnd. 3703, 1968, p. 120. 
ibid., p. 122. 
The Administrative structure of the Medical and 
Related Services in England and Wales, 1968, p. 9. 
ibid., p. 10. 
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The Government's conclusions were that the existing 
arrangements inhibited both "more integrated services and 
patterns of care" and the effective use of resources, and 
that "a new administrative structure is required" (151). 
That structure, it proposed, should be new area boards for 
medical and related services in each area, appointed by and 
directly responsible to the Minister of Health, which would 
take over the functions of the RHBs, BGs, HMCs, ECs and 
"all the heal th functions of the present local heal th 
authorities". The medical officers of health would become 
officers of the area boards, of which the Green Paper 
suggested there might be "about forty" in England and Wales 
(152). 
Although the paper included some detail about the proposal 
for area boards, it was made clear that other options were 
not ruled out, including the integration of health services 
under "a suitably constituted committee of the new type of 
local authority that may be established when the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Local Government 
have been received and considered" (153). 
5.2 Policy development from July 1968 to June 1969 
The publication of the Seebohm report and the Green Paper 
in late July gave those within the Conservative Party 
concerned with policy on the NHS issues of substance to 
address. 
Publication of the documents was not accompanied by a 
statement in the Commons and, wi th the Summer recess 
imminent, there was no parliamentary opportunity for 
discussion of them until the Autumn. 
( 1 51 ) 
( 1 52) 
( 1 53) 
ibid. 
ibid., pp. 12 and 14. 
ibid., p. 19. 
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The first substantive opportunity came on 24 October during 
a debate on the Order that gave statutory force to the 
merger of the Ministries of Health and Social Security into 
the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS). As 
merger had been in the Conservative general election 
manifesto in 1966, it was unsurprising that, in responding 
to Crossman, Balniel welcomed it, though he urged him to 
take two further steps. First, to establish within the new 
Department a "substantially stronger" research intelligence 
unit than currently existed. Second, to announce the 
Government's acceptance of the principles of the Seebohm 
report (154), something that, as noted above, the 
Conservatives had already done in the policy document Make 
Life Better. 
As Webster has documented, the Government was at that time, 
and for several more months, in something of a quandary 
over Seebohm. Qui te apart from the question of which 
department should become responsible for the social 
services, there was the question of whether it was 
reasonable to take action on the Committee's 
recommendations in advance of knowledge of the conclusions 
of the Royal Commission on Local Government (155). Crossman 
was therefore unable to respond substantively. 
The Debate on the Address provided Balniel with a further 
opportunity to press the Government to accept the principle 
of the Seebohm report, as well as to offer an ini tial 
Conservative response to the Green Paper. While noting the 
"fairly general agreement" within the Commons that the 
three branches of the NHS should be "brought together on 
an area basis", he suggested that the Conservatives would 
prefer to see the necessary unification within local 
government (156). 
(154) 
(155) 
(156) 
Commons Hansard, vol. 770, col. 1619/20. 
Webster, 1996, pp. 305/9. 
Commons Hansard, 1/11/68, vol. 772, col. 370. 
108 
Such a solution would offer the best means of achieving "a 
massive administrative devolution", to redress what Balniel 
saw as the undue centralisation of the existing structure. 
In his view, "it is easier and more acceptable to delegate 
authority to bodies which are answerable to local electors 
than to a ministerially appointed board" (157). 
Balniel seems to have been expressing a personal preference 
rather than Party policy, for in January 1969 the CRD 
prepared a paper for Macmillan, copied to Balniel and Dean, 
which set out the history of the proposal for area [health] 
boards and the issues which needed resolution if such 
boards were to be established. First among these issues was 
whether boards should be "entirely professional in 
compos i t ion", as proposed by the Porr itt Commi t tee, or 
"fitted into the local government structure" (158). 
The CRD conclusion was that "it would be much more in line 
with current Conservative thinking if any new area health 
service council could be fitted into the structure of local 
government". Noting the concerns of the medical profession 
about being "controlled by local authori ties", however, the 
CRD suggested there should be a large professional element 
in the new arrangement (159). 
( 1 57) 
(158) 
( 1 59 ) 
ibid. 
Administration of the National Health Service, 
3/1/69, CPA CRD folder Health Service Finance 
1968/9. The paper was misleading when it asserted 
that the Porritt Committee favoured "an entirely 
professional administrative body". Rather, the 
Committee had recommended that on the area health 
boards "all professions involved in the Service 
should be represented" (A Review of the Medical 
Services in Great Britain, 1962, p. 25). 
ibid. 
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As to devolution, the CRD linked administrative 
restructuring wi th the parallel discussions wi thin the 
Party on NHS finance. Adoption of the Macmillan proposal 
that part of the Service should be funded from 
contributions to health insurance would reduce the extent 
to which NHS resources came from the Exchequer, and would 
make devolution easier, especially to a local government 
based structure. In the CRD's view, consideration should 
also be given to the establishment of a NHS Corporation, 
with "a large professional element in its membership", to 
be responsible to Parliament for running the Service. Such 
a Corporation could help diminish "excessive central 
government control" (160). 
Whatever approach was adopted, the CRD suggested that it 
should first be tested through pilot schemes, as suggested 
by Porritt, and indeed in the Party's policy document 
Putting Britain Right Ahead (161). 
During the period when Balniel and the CRD were indicating 
a preference for placing the administration of the NHS 
within local government, Crossman had been advised in an 
"off the record" conversation Dr Derek Stevenson, Secretary 
of the BMA, that a Special Representative Meeting (SRM) of 
the Association called to discuss the Government's Green 
Paper was likely to resolve that this should not happen 
(162). 
( 1 60 ) 
( 1 61 ) 
( 1 62) 
ibid. The notion of an NHS Corporation or Board had 
a long history. In the 1960s, on the Conservative 
side, "non-ministerial management" of the NHS, had 
been rejected by Powell as "a chimera" (Powell, 
1966, pp. 12/3). Considerations by the Labour 
Government are summarised in Webster, 1996, pp. 
334/6. 
ibid. 
note of meeting, 18/11/68, on PRO MH 166/7. 
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stevenson's expectation was confirmed at the SRM in 
January, which approved a recommendation from the BMA 
Council that "the profession is opposed to the transfer of 
the administration or financing of the health service to 
local authorities, either in their present form or 
[anticipating the Royal Commission] in any modified form" 
(163). Council representatives put this formally to 
Crossman at a meeting at the Department of Health and 
Social Security (DHSS) on 5 March (164). 
Possibly because of the BMA's opposition, the preference 
for a local government solution expressed by Balniel, and 
in the CRD paper, seems to have become less marked during 
the early months of 1969. In a paper the CRD prepared for 
an ACP meeting in June, under the heading "Administration" 
several "things which should be done" were itemised - the 
appointment of an Ombudsman and a Health Inspectorate, the 
promotion of group practices and health centres, the 
provision of "cottage type" hospitals, and the expansion 
of voluntary effort. Reform of the administrative structure 
was "not a first priority". No mention was made that a 
local government solution was the preferred option (165). 
The minutes of the ACP meeting contain no reference to 
discussion on the administrative structure of the Service 
(166). 
(163) 
( 1 64) 
( 1 65 ) 
( 1 66) 
resolution C, SRM minutes, 30/1/69, BMAA, pp. 5/6. 
para. 11 of DHSS note of meeting, included wi th 
papers for Council meeting on 16/4/69, BMAA, C31, 
1968/69, pp. 4/10. 
ACP/59, 3/6/69, CPA CRD 4/7/16. 
ACP(69)100th meeting, 11/6/69, CPA ACP 2/3. 
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5.3 The Report of the Royal Commission on Local 
Government in England 
The Commission's report was published on 11 June 1969. For 
most of England (except the Greater London area, 
specifically excluded from its remit), the establishment 
of fifty eight unitary authorities was recommended, to 
undertake all local government functions for their areas. 
Three exceptions were Merseyside, the West Midlands and 
SELNEC (the South East Lancashire. North East Cheshire 
area), where a two tier structure was recommended, 
metropolitan areas, principally responsible for planning 
and co-ordination, and metropolitan districts, responsible 
for delivering most services (167). 
The Commission made no formal recommendation about whether 
the NHS should be incorporated within the new structure of 
local government it favoured, because to have done so 
"would exceed our competence". However, the Commission 
expressed the view that incorporation "offers as good a 
chance of ending the present divided administration of the 
national health service as do nominated boards - and a 
better chance of establishing close relationships between 
the national health service and the personal social 
services" (1 68) . 
The Government's considered response to the Commission's 
report was not given until February 1970, when its main 
recommendations were broadly accepted, though not its 
"steer" on incorporating the NHS in local government (169). 
( 1 67) 
( 1 68 ) 
( 1 69 ) 
Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government, 
1969, Cmnd. 4040, London, HMSO. 
ibid., p. 92. 
in Reform of Local Government in England, Cmnd. 
4276 1970, London, HMSO, and The Future structure 
, " of the National Health Service, 1970, London, HMSO. 
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5.4 Policy development to the 1970 general election 
While interest in placing the NHS within local government 
may have diminished among those responsible for heal th 
policy wi thin the Conservati ve Party, it had not gone 
completely. A fortnight after the June ACP meeting and the 
publication of the Royal Commission on Local Government's 
report, Bellairs wrote to Macmillan, noting that the 
"professions are pretty solidly against local government 
control" but suggesting that the Party should "keep the 
options open". Discussions with interested bodies "would 
probably result in a compromise whereby the membership of 
the AHC [area health council] is shared between the 
professions and local authority representatives (rather on 
the analogy of the Police Authorities ... ) and there is a 
right to pre-empt rates within certain defined limits" 
(170). 
While the Conservative preference for the nature of any new 
structure was still for decision, there seemed to be 
substantial agreement on the desirable attributes of such 
a structure. There should be "proper representation ... at 
a genuinely local level" and devolution to avoid "too much 
con trol from the centre" ( 1 71 ). Both at tr ibu tes were 
emphasised in the July 1969 Quick Brief on Health sent to 
constituency parties (172). 
( 1 70) 
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Bellairs/Macmillan, 25/6/69, CPA CRD 4/7/16. 
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In an August Daily Telegraph article, Howe linked the idea 
of devolution through structural change to increasing 
overall spending on health. New area health boards should 
be "truly independent agencies. They should control their 
own budgets - with freedom to sell and develop land, to 
promote lot ter i es, to rece i ve char i table gifts, and to 
raise money as they please". In his view, administrative 
change was "as important as extra cash" (173). 
With the Government clearly rethinking its approach, 
Balniel and Macmillan had no need to identify, let alone 
announce, a definitive policy position, but could explore 
possibilities. 
At the Party Conference in October, Balniel referred to the 
need to bring together the "two main branches of the Health 
Service and the welfare service under one 
administrative roof" (without reference to whether this 
would be within or outside local government). He added the 
idea that these might also amalgamate at local level with 
the social security organisation of the DHSS (174). It was, 
however, unclear whether by "welfare service" Balniel was 
referring just to the local authori ty personal heal th 
services, or also to the welfare services provided, 
largely, under the National Assistance Act. 
(173) 
( 1 74) 
12/8/69, p. 12. 
Conservative Conference Report, 1969, pp. 58/9. 
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Following the announcement in the Queen's Speech that the 
Government would be bringing forward "fresh proposals" for 
the future administration of the NHS (175), Balniel used 
the opportunity of the Debate on the Address to go beyond 
what he had said at the Conference. 
He re-i terated his support for the Seebohm Commi ttee' s 
recommendation in favour of a unified social services 
department, but would be "very reluctant ... to see any 
break between this new department and any of the health and 
welfare services for the elderly, the handicapped, the 
disturbed, the unfortunate and the homeless" (176). 
This implied that Balniel favoured retaining the personal 
heal th services wi thin local government, alongside the 
proposed new local authority social services departments. 
However, when referring explicitly to the future structure 
of the Health Service, his position was not wholly clear. 
Balniel favoured a "two-tiered reconstruction of the NHS, 
the upper of which would be "an authority covering a large 
area, because overall health planning must be on a regional 
basis", and "perhaps [its] chairman should be appointed by 
the Minister, but there should be firm local authori ty 
representation and equally firm professional 
representation". The day-to-day running of the "hospitals 
and the health and welfare services" would be the 
responsibility of the lower tier, covering areas providing 
the appropriate population for a 600 to 800 bedded district 
general hospi tal" (177). This suggested an organisation for 
the NHS separate from local government. 
( 1 75) 
( 1 76) 
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Commons Hansard, 31/10/69, vol. 790, cols. 6/7. 
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The "health" section of the first draft of the Party I s 
manifesto for the next general election, produced in early 
December, did not provide a definitive answer. In respect 
of the structure of the NHS, the draft was limited to an 
undertaking to bring the hospitals, GPs and local health 
services together "under a unified administration on an 
area basis with genuine local participation" (178). 
The possible need to go beyond this was identified by the 
CRD in a paper on a wide range of outstanding policy issues 
prepared for the LCC meeting at Selsdon Park. While noting 
the commi tment to reorganise the NHS so that its three 
branches were under the same administrative responsibility 
in each area, the CRD pointed out that "the nature of the 
new administrative authority implied has not been decided, 
nor the extent of its responsibilities. For example, should 
it be a local authority, a professional body, or a 
combination of both; how far should it take over local 
authority welfare services like meals-on-wheels" (179). 
The Selsdon discussion on the future structure of the NHS 
was inconclusive. Macmillan explained his difficulty in 
thinking about solutions in advance of a firm Party view 
on the Royal Commission on Local Government's 
recommendations. His suggestion was a three stage approach 
which would conclude with regional boards responsible for 
all three major elements of the Service, constituted solely 
of "representatives of local authorities and of 
professions". This new arrangement could then be "adopted 
in [the] two-tier local government structure", but still 
receiving the majority of funding from the Exchequer (180). 
( 1 78) 
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There was Ii ttle discussion of Macmillan's suggestion, 
though Heath made it clear that he was sceptical of 
structural change. While in certain circumstances "changing 
structure is useful", it was important not to "fall into 
[the] error that by changing system it will make life of 
[the] citizen better". In his view, "the more that local 
councils have to do with [the NHS] the better" (181). 
As noted above, in February 1970, shortly after the 
inconclusive Selsdon discussion, the Government announced 
its broad acceptance of the main recommendations of the 
Royal Commission on Local Government and issued revised 
proposals for the structure of the NHS. The latter 
document, although widely referred to as the second Green 
Paper, announced "three firm decisions" and sought comments 
on what were, arguably, second order issues (182). 
The "three firm decisions" were, first, that the NHS was 
not to be administered by local authorities but by area 
health authorities (AHAs) directly accountable to the 
Secretary of State for Social Services. Second, that the 
reorganised NHS would include many of the personal health 
functions of the local authorities. Third, that in general 
the new AHAs would match the boundaries of the uni tary 
authori ties and metropoli tan districts proposed by the 
Royal Commission, which were to be the social services 
authori ties but not, in the case of the metropoli tan 
districts, the education authorities (183). 
( 1 81 ) 
( 1 82 ) 
( 183) 
ibid., p. 18. 
The Future structure of the National Heal th Service, 
1970, p. v. 
ibid. The Government's decision that the 
metropolitan authorities, rather than metropolitan 
districts, should be the education authorities was 
one of the issues on which it rejected the Royal 
Commission's view. 
11 7 
While Balniel and the CRO's preference for the transfer of 
the NHS to local government may have been modified somewhat 
during 1969, the tenor of the admittedly brief and (from 
the transcript) somewhat disjointed Selsdon discussion 
seemed favourable to it, particularly perhaps Heath's 
comment. The Government's decision to restructure the NHS 
outside local government thus created the possibility of 
a clear policy difference between the two major parties. 
No indication of whether the Conservatives did intend to 
press for transfer of the NHS to local government was given 
in the brief responses of Macmillan and Balniel to 
Crossman's statement announcing publication of the second 
Green Paper (184). 
The first substantial parliamentary opportuni ty for the 
Conservatives to comment came on the Second Reading of the 
Bill to implement the Seebohm recommendations. In fact, 
Balniel, essentially reserved his position. In welcoming 
the main purpose of the Bill, he said that he accepted "for 
the purpose of discussing this Bill the 
Government's assumption that the National Health Service 
will be administered outside local government" 
(author's underlining) (185). 
The following month, however, the Party could no longer 
real i s t i call y reserve its pos i t ion, as debates on the 
second Green Paper were held in the Commons and the Lords. 
( 1 84) 
( 185 ) 
Commons Hansard, 11/2/70, vol. 795, cols. 1255/61. 
Commons Hansard vol. 796, cols. 1406/1520. 
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In the Lords, Baroness Brooke of Ystradfellte spoke for the 
Conservatives. She was clear that "the medical world has 
won the battle of administration" and that transferring the 
NHS to local government "in 1970 ... is obviously not going 
to be "on"". Noting the intention that the new area health 
authorities were to have boundaries coterminous with the 
local authorities responsible for social services, however, 
Brooke thought that part of the reason was to facilitate 
transfer if the medical opposition diminished. That this 
might be the Conservative preference was suggested by her 
comment that "perhaps after another decade such a transfer 
would be in the best interests of everyone" (186) 
Before the Commons' debate nearly a fortnight later, the 
second Green Paper was discussed by the LCC. Balniel 
suggested that the Party's line should be that the 
Government's proposals were excessively centralist 
"every decision would have to be approved by the Minister". 
He would also like to see stronger local government 
representation on the new health bodies (187) 
There seems to have been no objection to the line Balniel 
proposed though Heath, consistent with his comments at the 
Selsdon meeting, was clearly sceptical about the proposed 
new structure, which he saw "as the beginnings of 
bureaucracy". He acknowledged, however, that there might 
a case for it "in exceptional circumstances" (188) 
( 1 86) 
( 187 ) 
( 188 ) 
Lords Hansard, 10/3/70, vol. 308, cols. 710/1. 
LCC(70)356th, 18/3/70, CPA LCC(70)340-357. 
ibid. 
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Both Balniel and Macmillan spoke in the Commons' debate on 
the Green Paper on 23 March. On the issue of transferring 
the NHS to local government, Balniel took exactly the same 
1 ine as had Brooke in the Lords debate. He accepted, 
"sadly", that "old fears" required "a line ... to be drawn 
for the moment between local government and central 
administration", but hoped that "good leadership of the 
medical profession and good leadership in local and 
national public life will one day overcome this fear". He 
also welcomed the principle that the boundaries of the 
proposed new AHAs and local government bodies should be 
coterminous, though not the Government's broad acceptance 
of the Royal Commission's recommendations for the new 
structure of local government (189). 
Balniel's principal cri ticism of the Government's proposals 
was that they were too centralist, that by having the 
proposed AHAs directly accountable to him, the Secretary 
of State "will become involved in detailed control which 
will not only be inefficient, but positively harmful to the 
interests of the medical profession" (190). In particular, 
Balniel drew attention to the proposal that the chairmen 
and one third of the membership of the AHAs should be 
appointed by the Secretary of State, the other two thirds 
being appointed half by the health professions and half by 
the relevant local authorities. He would prefer to see a 
reduction, perhaps elimination, of the ministerially 
appointed element (191). 
( 189 ) 
( 1 90) 
( 1 91 ) 
Commons Hansard, 23/3/70, vol. 798, cols. 1015/6. 
ibid., col. 1012. 
ibid., col. 1017. 
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During the debate, one Conservative MP, Arthur Jones, a 
vice Chairman of the Association of Municipal Corporations, 
questioned the reasons advanced for rejecting the transfer 
of the NHS to local government (192) but, in closing the 
debate for the Conservatives, Macmillan made it clear that 
he did not "quarrel" wi th the Government's decision to 
reject that option. He, like Balniel, emphasised the 
Party's concern over undue central control (193). 
By the end of March 1970, therefore, the Conservati ve 
Party's policy on the future structure of the NHS had 
become more definite. While seeming in principle to favour 
transfer to local government, the leadership had accepted 
that the opposition of the medical profession precluded 
this for the foreseeable future. Given the reluctant 
acceptance of a structure for the NHS outside local 
government, the principle of coterminosity of health and 
local authority boundaries was seen as offering the best 
opportuni ty of ensuring effecti ve collaboration between 
health and the proposed new social services departments. 
On these issues of principle, both major parties had 
effectively reached the same conclusions. Significant 
differences remained, however, over implementation. The 
Conservatives opposed the local government structure the 
Government was proposing and, gi ven the commi tment to 
coterminosi ty of heal th and local authori ty boundaries, 
this had implications for the number of health authorities 
and the size of population they served. The Party also 
opposed what it saw as the excessi ve centralism of the 
Government's proposals, and had given some indication as 
to how it would seek to eliminate this, for example having 
greater local authority and health professional membership 
of the AHAS, rather than the third of centrally appointed 
members proposed in the second Green Paper. 
( 192 ) 
(193) 
ibid., col. 1076. 
ibid., cols. 1090 and 1097. 
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None of this was inconsistent with the brief undertaking 
to "reorganise the National Heal th Service so that its 
three main branches - hospitals, general practitioners, and 
local heal th services are brought together under a 
unified administration on an area basis with genuine local 
participation" included in the first draft of the manifesto 
for the next election that had been circulated in December 
1969. No changes in this form of words were made in 
successive drafts circulated after the debate on the second 
Green Paper, as late as 15 May (194). 
In the ten days before the manifesto was published on 26 
May under the title A Better Tomorrow (195), however, a 
potentially significant change was made. For the commitment 
to "reorganise the National Heal th Service so that its 
three main branches are brought together under a 
unified administration on an area basis" was substituted 
one to "improve the administration ... so that its three 
main branches ... are better co-ordinated" (196) 
The CPA contains no material to indicate whether this late 
change was a considered shift in policy, or simply some 
late "polishing" by someone who did not recognise its 
potential significance. 
The effect of the manifesto wording was to leave open the 
Party I s options if elected. For the commi tment nei ther 
promised nor precluded any change to the structure of the 
Service. It was, for example, entirely compatible with the 
type of approach favoured by Robinson before he became 
convinced of the need for structural change, noted above, 
namely of trying to find means of ensuring that the 
separate administrati ve elements worked together to deli ver 
co-ordinated services to the individual patient. 
( 1 94) 
( 195 ) 
( 196 ) 
6th draft, 15/5/70, CPA SC/70/17. 
Times, 27/5/70, p. 1, col. c. 
Craig, 1975, p. 339. 
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6. THE SITUATION IN 1970 
6.1 Policy development 
As described above, between 1966 and 1970, despi te the 
evident interest of Pike, Balniel and Macmillan in 
alternative financing 
that new structural 
lines, were favoured 
arrangements, and the indications 
arrangements, possibly on Porritt 
by successive LCC spokesmen, no 
substantive proposals for change in the form of the Service 
were included in the 1970 election manifesto. In that 
sense, the Party's policy on the form of the NHS was 
conservative (with a small "c"). The question arises as to 
how characteristic this was of the Party's overall policy 
stance? 
For some commentators, the Conservative Party had changed 
its overall policy stance dramatically between 1964 and 
1970. Thus, in Blake's view, the 1966 election manifesto 
marked "a 
progressivism 
the programme 
clear departure from the paternalistic 
of 1959-63" (197), while for Norman Tebbit, 
adopted at the Lce weekend at Selsdon Park 
was "the Tory Party's first repudiation of the post-war 
Butskellite consensus ... [a commitment] to the new liberal 
economics" (198). The Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, 
sought to create an image of change by coining the phrase 
"Selsdon Man", personifying for him "an atavistic desire 
to reverse the course of 25 years of social revolution" and 
the rejection of "a civilised society in which the 
community, working through Government and Parliament, 
provides for the needs of the community" (199). 
( 1 97 ) 
( 1 98) 
( 199 ) 
Blake, 1985, p. 300. 
Tebbit N, Upwardly Mobile, 1988, London, Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, p. 94. 
speeches given on 6 and 21 February 1970, quoted in 
Wilson H, The Labour Government 7964-7970, 1971, 
London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, pp. 758/9. 
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others have disagreed. For Anthony Seldon, for example, 
"Heath I sa' t k th 1m was 0 rna e e post-war settlement work 
better, not to destroy it" (200), while for Norton to 
regard Heath as "neo-liberal" was to "misdiagnose" - he was 
"a corporate Whig [whose] emphasis was on achieving 
efficiency" (201). 
The Conservative election manifesto in 1970 undoubtedly 
included new emphases and policies, for example the 
emphasis on incentives such as lower taxation and the 
proposal to introduce legislation to provide a framework 
of law for the conduct of industrial relations. 
On the other hand, there was much in the manifesto that 
suggested continuity with the policies of the 1950s and 
1960s, for example regional policy where the commitment was 
to "stimulate long-term growth by increasing the basic 
economic attraction of [areas of high unemployment]" (202). 
On social policy as a whole, including the NHS, Raison has 
suggested that "nobody could say [the manifesto policies] 
represented a radical change of direction" (203). 
Overall, on its face, it is difficult to see the 
Conservative manifesto in 1970 as marking as major a shift 
away from the policies of the post-war years as Tebbit had 
hoped and Wilson had sought to suggest. At that stage it 
was simply too early to judge whether Heath intended "to 
break the postwar social settlement accepted by Churchill, 
Eden, Macmillan and Home" (204). 
(200) 
(201 ) 
(202) 
(203) 
(204) 
Seldon A, "Conservative Century", in Seldon A and 
Ball S (eds.), Conservative Century, 1994, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, p. 56. 
Norton P, "History of the Party III", in Norton P 
(ed. ) , The Conserva ti ve Party, 1996, Hemel 
Hempstead, Prentice Hall, p. 54. 
Craig, 1975, p. 333. 
Raison T, Tories and the Welfare state, 1990, 
London, Macmillan, p. 69. 
Campbell, 1993, p. 267. 
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Within this overall context, the conservatism of the 
Party's policies on the NHS was by no means exceptional. 
Equally, it was by no means the rule, and therefore invites 
specific understanding. 
Among relevant considerations was the popularity of the NHS 
and the consequent difficulty perceived in making 
substantial change. Conservatives drawn towards economic 
liberalism, who might in principle have favoured radical 
change, acknowledged this. Thus, for example, Joseph 
regarded "a free GP service [as] so hallowed that we cannot 
move"; for Powell, "the very contemplation" of radical 
change was "enough to daunt the stoutest political heart", 
and Howe saw it as an "immutable rule that [quoting 
Powell] in a democracy "social benefi ts once conferred 
cannot be withdrawn"" (205) 
A further consideration was the difficulty in finding 
practical solutions to the perceived problems of the 
Service. Agreement seems often to have been reached on 
objectives expressed at a relatively high level of 
abstraction, such as "encouraging the private sector" and 
"unifying the triparti te structure". Agreement on practical 
steps to achieving such objectives, without creating what 
were seen as additional problems, such as increasing public 
expenditure (in the case of encouraging the private sector) 
or distancing the personal health services from the welfare 
services (in the case of unifying the tripartite structure) 
proved less easy to reach. 
(205) PG/13a/65/8, 5/7/65, CPA CRD 4/7/15 (Joseph); 
Powell, 1966, p. 16; Howe's speech to the Fellowship 
for Freedom in Medicine, 9/5/70, copy in Treasury, 
2SS 21/338/02. 
125 
Overall, the impression the material studied gives of those 
thinking about Party policy in respect of the NHS from 1966 
to 1970 is not that they displayed an "atavistic desire to 
reverse the course of the last 25 years", but rather were 
searching for ways to address what they perceived to be 
real but complex problems, with caution flowing, in part 
at least, from a clear sense of the populari ty of the 
Service with the electorate. 
6.2 Arrangements for policy review 
Following the 1966 general election, the formal pol icy 
review arrangements continued essentially as they had been 
since the establishment of the HPG though, as noted above, 
after Balniel succeeded Pike in practice the Group seems 
not to have met. At that point Balniel and Macmillan were, 
in effect, the Party's policy reviewers, in discussion with 
LCC colleagues as appropriate. 
That Pike and the HPG, and later Balniel and Macmillan, 
drew on expert sources outside the Party is clear. Under 
Pike, the Porritt recommendations continued to be the 
starting point for consideration of the issue of the 
structure of the NHS, and there can be little doubt that, 
later, Balniel and Macmillan drew on the work of the BMA 
Avisory Panel on issues of financing. Further, 
Conservati ves would have been aware of relevant 
statements, such as the resolution of the BMA' s 
January 1969. 
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leading 
public 
SRM in 
However, the evidence is that the Party drew on written 
sources rather than having substantial relationships with 
any of the many bodies representing health service 
professionals, or other organisations knowledgeable about 
the NHS. Overall, the evidence gives the impression that 
policy consideration was a very close-kni t acti vi ty, to 
which only a very small number of people contributed 
directly. 
Similarly, as with the period prior to the 1966 general 
election, the author has found little evidence of 
discussions between Pike and the HPG (and, later, Balniel 
and Macmillan), and the wider parliamentary Party, though 
this may reflect the lack of surviving evidence, such as 
notes of PHSSC meetings, rather than the absence of such 
discussions. However, parliamentary colleagues interested 
in NHS matters had opportunities both to set out their 
views, and hear those of the frontbench spokesmen, in the 
several Commons debates, both on organisational and 
financial issues, referred to above 
As to the wider Party, the NHS was discussed, relatively 
briefly, at the 1966, 1967, 1968 and 1969 Annual 
Conferences where, as noted above, LCC spokesmen disclosed 
a continuing interest in encouraging private provision, and 
(at the 1969 Conference) Balniel set out his views, not 
without ambiguity, on the Service's structure. In addition, 
an initiative was taken to secure constituency-level 
feedback, by including questions on 
organisation of the NHS in one of 
consultative processes (206). 
the financing and 
the Party's regular 
(206) through the leaflet Three Way Contact Brief 28: 
Health and Family, November 1969, London, CRD. The 
author has not yet been able to trace what feedback 
resulted. 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN GOVERNMENT, 1970-74 
1. THE 1970 GENERAL ELECTION 
As noted in Chapter 2, following the 1966 election Labour 
Party had an overall Commons majority of 96, sufficient for 
a full term. 
Opinion poll evidence suggests that support for the 
Government fell markedly after the devaluation of the pound 
in November 1967, with a Conservative lead of over 10% 
until Autumn 1969. Then support for the Government seems 
to have recovered, until by Spring 1970 on some polls 
Labour was ahead (1). Following favourable local election 
results in May 1970, and a poll showing a Labour lead of 
7% (2), Wilson successfully sought a dissolution for a 
general election on 18 June. 
Four opinion polls just prior to election day forecast a 
Labour lead averaging over 5%. In the event, however, the 
Conservatives won 330 seats and an overall majority of 30 
in the new House of Commons (3). 
Explanations of this outcome vary, but tend to focus on 
aspects of economic management. Among leading Labour 
poli ticians, for example, in Wilson's view "the improvement 
in our economic position had not erased all the scars 
from the tough things we had to do" to achieve it. Barbara 
Castle, a cabinet member prior to the election, seems to 
have shared the view of "a lot of people in the Labour 
movement" that the Government failed to budget "more 
generously for growth - and for the Election" (4). 
( 1 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 
( 4 ) 
Butler 0 and Pinto-Duschinsky M, 1971, p. 24. 
ibid., pp. 134/5. 
ibid., p. 354. 
Wilson, 1971, p. 790; Castle B, The Castle Diaries 
7964-70, 1984, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 805. 
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The view that economic management was the main factor is 
shared by academic commentators, who have drawn attention 
to the possible influence of short term matters such as the 
large trade deficit for May announced three days before 
polling, as well as to longer term disillusion with the 
competence of the Wilson Government (5). There seems to be 
no evidence that perceived differences in the parties' 
policies on the NHS were factors. 
2. THE "NEW STYLE OF GOVERNMENT" 
A party's manifesto provides some evidence of its 
leadership's intentions and, if the party goes on to form 
the government, a frame of reference that can help to make 
subsequent actions understandable. The Conserva ti ve 
manifesto for the 1970 election is thus of particular 
interest in considering the actions of the Heath 
Government. 
As noted in Chapter 2, the Party's manifesto, A Better 
Tomorrow, was a meld of new emphases and proposals arising 
from the policy work initiated by Heath, with much that 
suggested continui ty wi th the 1950s and 1960s. To the 
extent that the manifesto had a theme, it was the 
commitment to introduce what, in his Foreword, Heath 
referred to as "a new style of government" (6). 
( 5 ) 
( 6 ) 
see, for example, Ramsden, 1996, 
1985, pp. 307/9, and Butler and 
1 971, pp. 343/51. 
Craig, 1975, p. 325. 
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pp. 314/8; Blake, 
Pinto-Duschinsky, 
Shortly before the election David Howell, who from 1967 had 
worked with Marples at the PSRU and become its head, had 
published a booklet enti tIed A New Style of Government. 
This offered "a Conservative view of the tasks of 
administrative, financial and parliamentary reform facing 
an incoming government" (7), and the ti tIe phrase has 
sometimes been used to describe the programme of changes 
to central government introduced by the Heath Government. 
Indeed, it was used specifically in that sense in the 1970 
election manifesto, which included commitments to 
"systematically rationalise" the "functions and 
responsibilities of all departments and public agencies", 
and introduce "the most modern management, budgeting and 
cost-effectiveness techniques" (8). 
As used by Heath in his Foreword, however, the phrase "new 
style" meant more than changes in the structures and 
management processes of central government. It had what 
could properly be termed a moral aspect, as well as one in 
respect of the nature of future policies. 
As to the moral aspect, Heath regarded Wilson as leading 
"a cheap and trivial style of government", where "decisions 
lightly entered into [had] been as lightly abandoned". As 
a result, in Heath's view, the country had not just 
suffered from "bad policies". Politics itself was falling 
into disrepute, with young people becoming "suspicious and 
cynical" about it. Heath promised a different poli tical 
morality. If elected, his Government would "sweep away the 
trivialities and gimmicks" and "re-establish our sound and 
honest British traditions" (9). 
(7) Howell 0, A New Style of Government, 1970, London, 
Conservative Political Centre. 
(8) Craig, 1975, p. 330. 
(9) Craig, 1975, p. 325. 
130 
Beyond that, "a new style" promised substantively better 
government. In contrast wi th what Heath saw as the" lightly 
entered into" short-termism of the Wilson Government, if 
elected Conservati ve policy making would be "deliberate and 
thorough", based on "up to date techniques for assessing 
the situation", and for "the long term". In particular, 
when a policy was established, the Government would "have 
the courage to stick to it, for in Heath's view, nothing 
had "done Bri tain more harm in recent years than the 
endless backing and filling which we have seen" (10). 
With regard to the NHS, as noted in Chapter 2, no 
substantive proposals for changes in its basic principles 
or organisational arrangements were included in the 
manifesto. 
On financing, there was an acknowledgement that the NHS was 
short of resources, with the implication that this would 
be addressed as Conservati ve government led to higher 
economic growth. As noted above in Chapter 2, however, a 
commi tment to "consider the financing of the National 
Health Service with a view to finding ways of devoting more 
resources to the health of the nation without increasing 
the burden on the taxpayer" had been excised shortly before 
the manifesto was published. There was no mention of tax 
relief on health insurance premiums, though there was a 
commitment to "introduce a more imaginative contractual 
savings scheme" which in principle could have included such 
relief (11). 
On the structure and management of the NHS, a commitment 
to unify the three main branches of the Service had been 
replaced at the final stage before publication by one to 
improve its administration through better co-ordination. 
(10) ibid. 
(11) ibid., pp. 
savings). 
339 (the NHS) and 330 (contractual 
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Overall, therefore, the impression conveyed by the election 
manifesto was that, if elected, an incoming Conservative 
Government would pursue organisational change in the public 
sector (including local government), but as regards the NHS 
this might be limited to improving co-ordination, with 
basic principles and organisational arrangements left very 
much as they were. 
3. MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE NHS 
From October 1967, Balniel had been the LCC member 
responsible for social services policy including the NHS. 
Heath did not, however, appoint him as Secretary of State 
for Social Services (or indeed to any Cabinet position) in 
the new Government. Instead Joseph, who had shadowed trade 
and technology immediately prior to the election, was 
appointed, with, as his junior ministers on Health Service 
matters, Lord Aberdare and Michael Alison (12). 
As noted in Chapter 1, in the 1960s Joseph had been 
associated with the economic liberalism of the lEA. One 
commentator, writing just before the 1970 election, summed 
up the essence of Joseph's view as being that "the struggle 
for profit in a competitive situation is the best engine 
of material progress that we have" (13). Joseph's 
biographer has noted that, through a series of speeches 
"about the invigorating effect on industry of the free-
market economy", he had been referred to as "Selsdon Man 
incarnate" and as such had become a target of Labour 
criticism (14). 
( 1 2 ) 
( 1 3 ) 
( 1 4 ) 
Times, 22/6/70, p. 2, col. f. (Joseph), 23/6/70, p. 
1, col. b (Aberdare) and 24/6/70, p. 2, col. c 
(Alison). 
Harrington M, in Stacey T and st Oswald R, Here Come 
the Tories, 1970, London, Tom Stacey Ltd., p. 81. 
Halcrow M, Keith Joseph, 1989, London, Macmillan, p. 
43. 
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In Campbell's view, Joseph's appointment "was a surprise", 
but there "was probably no significance in Heath's deciding 
to swi tch him" to social services (1 5 ). There was, however, 
some press speculation that it was Joseph's free-market 
views that led Heath to decide to appoint Geoffrey Rippon 
as Trade Secretary (16). Nearly thirty years later, Heath 
wrote that he appointed Rippon because of his "more 
reliable judgement" (17). Given Joseph's role in Heath's 
demise in 1975, however, (see Chapter 4), this comment 
needs to be treated with caution. 
There can be no doubt of Joseph's personal interest in 
social services matters, and in particular the NHS. As 
noted in Chapters 1 and 2, Joseph had been the LCC 
spokesman on social services from 1964 to 1966 and had 
chaired the HPG from its inception to the 1966 election. 
Although responsible for shadowing labour issues after that 
election he had, at his own request, remained a HPG member, 
and had contributed to the WGSP. 
In Opposi tion, Joseph had shown himself to be open to 
change in the organisational arrangements of the NHS. On 
NHS financing and the private sector, as noted in Chapter 
2, Joseph seemed in principle to favour opening up health 
care provision to the market "to a limited extent", though 
saw formidable political difficulties. In supporting 
Balniel's proposals for tax relief on insurance premiums, 
he had suggested "the minimum adequate accompaniment" that 
would render them effecti ve. On structure, Joseph had, 
after some doubts, expressed himself cautiously in favour 
of change on Porritt lines, the policy favoured by Pike, 
his immediate successor as LCC spokesman on social 
services. 
( 1 5 ) Campbell, 1 993, p. 381. 
(16) Times, 22/6/70, p. 2. col. b. 
(17) Heath, 1998, pp. 310/1. 
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During his years in office Joseph did not seek to change 
the basic principles of the NHS as described in the 
Introduction. He did, however, examine the organisational 
arrangements of the Service, and ini tiated substantial 
change. In this chapter, Joseph's approach will be examined 
under the two headings of Financing, and Structure and 
Management, and some conclusions reached as to Conservative 
policy in respect of the form of the NHS by the February 
1974 general election. 
4. NHS FINANCING 
In the 1970 election manifesto, while committing itself to 
"cutting out unnecessary state spending" to help provide 
the basis for reductions in taxation, the Conservative 
Party had also noted areas of public provision, including 
the social services, where the fundamental problem was "the 
shortage of resources" (18). 
The NHS was specifically included as a service viewed as 
inadequately resourced. Due to what the Conservatives saw 
as "the slow rate of economic growth under Labour", the 
"resources going into the Health Service are inadequate" 
(19). (1969 was the first year expenditure on the NHS fell 
in volume terms, and as a percentage of the GOP, since the 
early 1950s (20).) In the Conservati ve view, there were 
"too many outdated hospi tals, too many old people not 
getting the care they need in their own homes, too many 
mentally ill people either in overcrowded hospital wards 
or getting insufficient care through local community 
services" (21). 
(18) Craig, 1975, pp. 328 and 336. 
(19) ibid., p. 339. 
( 20) Cmnd 761 5, 1 979, pp. 433/4. 
(21) Craig, 1975, p. 339. 
134 
However, apart from a general commitment that "more 
sensible priorities" within the social services would be 
established; the implication that the NHS could expect 
additional funding if and when a faster rate of economic 
growth was achieved; and a promise of "better value for 
money" through improved co-ordination of its three 
branches, the manifesto gave no indication of how 
inadequate resourcing of the Service would be addressed 
( 22) . 
4.1 The Government's 
expenditure 
overall approach to public 
Shortly after taking office, the Government set in hand 
what Macleod, Heath's first Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(and a former Minister of Heal th) , referred to as a 
"radical and searching review of public expenditure" (23). 
Its first products were a statement and Whi te Paper in 
October 1970 (24). 
In this statement, Barber, another former Minister of 
Health, who had succeeded Macleod after the latter's 
unexpected death in July, emphasised that in respect of the 
social services, the Government intended to adopt "a more 
selective approach". There would be increased public 
expenditure "on the basic structure - schools, hospitals, 
payments to those in need", but with "the scope of free or 
subsidised provision more closely [confined] to what is 
necessary on social grounds" (25), because "many services 
are subsidised to an extent which is unnecessary and out 
of date in our present society" (26). 
(22 ) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
ibid., p. 336 (priorities) and p. 339 (economic 
growth and better value for money). 
Commons Hansard, 7/7/70, vol. 803, col. 510. 
Commons Hansard, vol. 805, cols. 37/51; New Policies 
for Public Spending, Cmnd. 4515, 1970, London, HMSO. 
Commons Hansard, vol. 805, col. 37. 
ibid., col. 42. 
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Henceforth, it was the Government's view that where the 
user of a social service could afford to do so, "he should 
bear more of the cost and the taxpayer less", this shift 
to be achieved "partly by the abolition of subsidies and 
partly by new or increased charges, but with exemptions and 
better remission arrangements for those who are poor or who 
have special needs" (27). 
Barber also announced the first application of these new 
public expenditure principles to the health and welfare 
services. A subsidised service - cheap welfare milk - was 
to be wi thdrawn, and various NHS charges increased for 
those the Government judged able to pay them (28). Taken 
together, it was es t ima ted that, acros s the UK, these 
measures would result in a net reduction in planned public 
expendi ture of about £64m in 1971 /2, rising to £81 m in 
1974/5 (29). 
However, part of the potential net reduction in planned 
public expenditure was foregone, as Barber also announced 
increases in the resources to be made available to "those 
parts of the [health and welfare] services which are in 
greatest need", particularly services for the elderly and 
mentally handicapped (30). 
Thus in its first statement of public expenditure plans, 
the 1970 Conservative Government announced an overall 
reduction in public expendi ture on heal th and weI fare, 
while increasing expenditure in areas it regarded as in 
greatest need, by withdrawing a subsidy it regarded as no 
longer necessary and requiring those it judged able to do 
so to pay more in dental, ophthalmic and prescription 
charges. 
(27) ibid. 
(28) ibid., cols. 42/3. 
(29) Cmnd. 4515, 1970, para. 26. 
(30) Commons Hansard, vol. 805, col. 45. 
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Allowing for a small increase in expendi ture on social 
security that the Government estimated would flow from its 
decisions on health and welfare (31), the overall reduction 
in planned public expenditure in 1971/2, on a UK basis, was 
estimated to be £45m, or about 2.1%, on a programme 
hitherto expected to be £2,108m (32). 
Within the Government's broad approach to public 
to address expendi ture described above, in order 
deficiencies in the NHS of the kind set out in the 1970 
general election manifesto Joseph pursued what could be 
viewed as a fourfold approach, the elements of which are 
described in the following sections. 
(31 ) 
(32) 
Cmnd. 4515, 1970, para. 26. 
ibid., table 1, p. 4. (Calculated on the basis that 
the net reduction of £49m in health and welfare 
expenditure shown in line 15 of the table was offset 
by the £4m increase in soci~l security e~pen?iture 
referred to in para. 26 and 1ncorporated 1n llne 16 
of the table.) 
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4.2 Asserting the needs of the NHS 
Throughout his period as Secretary of State, Joseph sought 
to persuade colleagues of what he saw as the needs of the 
NHS. For example, in September 1970 he wrote that "what we 
said in our Manifesto was not an exaggeration [for 
example] standards in psychiatric and geriatric hospitals 
are scandalously low" (33). In May 1972, the draft White 
Paper on NHS reorganisation included the statement that 
"there is no question about the need for continued increase 
in [NHS] resources", until it was vetoed by the Treasury 
(34). In February 1973 Joseph wrote to Barber that 
"condi tions in many of our long-stay hospi tals are 
still deplorable and are likely to remain so until 
[substantial] additional funds can be injected" (35). In 
July 1973, responding to a request from Heath for items for 
the next manifesto, Joseph noted that, despite devoting "a 
slightly higher proportion of the GNP ... than ever before" 
to the NHS, "the expectations of the disabled, the 
mentally ill and the mentally handicapped AND their 
families have rocket ted: the impatience to rebuild our 
obsolete hospitals has intensified: the acute services are 
all asking to expand or improve: waiting times are awful: 
and the working and living conditions for doctors, nurses 
and other groups of workers are often intolerable" (36). 
Supported, as they were, by evidence of shortcomings such 
as the reports on specific long-stay hospitals prepared by 
the Hospi tal Advisory Service (HAS) (37), Joseph's 
assertions seem to have borne some fruit. 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
quoted in Webster, 1996, p. 392. 
Treasury/DHSS, 18/5/72, PRO MH 166/31. 
quoted in Webster, 1996, p. 397. 
Joseph/Heath, 26/7/73, CPA Official Group box 28-44. 
an inspectora te establ ished in 1969 by the Labour 
Government. For the origins of the HAS, and an 
example of the evidences of shortcomings detailed in 
HAS reports, see Webster, 1996, pp. 231/6. 
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In the 1971 review of public expenditure, an additional 
£100m was allocated to the health and personal social 
services in England, while in the 1972 and 1973 reviews, 
despite the deteriorating economic situation, the services 
largely escaped reductions in the growth planned for future 
years (38). 
Even in December 1973 when a curtailment in oil supply and 
industrial action in the coal and electricity industries 
faced Bri tain wi th what Barber agreed was "the gravest 
[situation] since the end of the war" (39), the planned 
spending on the NHS was reduced by less than some other 
programmes (40). 
4.3 Increasing revenue through charges 
As noted above, the Government explicitly adopted a policy 
of seeking to transfer the costs of public services from 
the taxpayer to those who used them and were judged to be 
able to afford to pay. With respect to the NHS this meant 
examining the scope for introducing new charges and 
increasing existing ones. 
Within a month of taking office, Joseph had asked officials 
to examine the scope for two new direct charges on those 
using services - a boarding charge for hospital patients 
(which, as noted in earlier chapters, had frequently been 
considered) and a charge for visiting GPs (41). 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
( 41 ) 
Commons Hansard, vol. 826, cols. 957/8; Webster, 
1996, pp. 396/8. 
Commons Hansard, vol. 866, col. 952. 
the NHS gained substantial exemptions from the 
general 10% reduction in public expenditure on 
supplies. The exemptions were in respect of "food, 
drugs and rela ted suppl i es" (Commons Hansards vol. 
866, col. 964 (the general policy) and vol. 868, col. 
117 (the NHS's exemptions). 
note of Joseph's meeting with officials, 21/7/70, no. 
70/200, PRO BN 13/156. 
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By August 1970, however, Joseph seemed to have been largely 
convinced that the boarding charge "was not worth 
pursuing, in view of the substantial administrative burden 
and litigation that would be involved", and Macmillan, the 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, agreed that "this proposal 
should not now be pursued" (42). 
Joseph referred to the limitations on charging within the 
NHS at the Party Conference in October. While stating that 
the Government had "no ideological objection as such to 
charges", he noted the "real, not ideological limitations" 
which included the need for widespread exemptions, the 
costs of collection, and the danger that some would be 
deterred from seeking medical attention (43). 
Despite these doubts, the possibility of introducing the 
boarding charge, perhaps if recommended by the Working 
Party on NHS Finance (see below), was still in Joseph's 
mind as late as January 1971 (44). 
However, the Working Party reached essentially the same 
conclusions as had Joseph the previous August "the 
administrative costs would far outweigh any possible 
advantages". On charges for visi ts to the GP, in the 
Working PartY_'E view there were "strong medical arguments 
against" and in any case it was "doubtful whether the 
medical profession would be willing to operate" them 
without a "change in their method of remuneration", which 
would be "undesirable" (45). 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
note of Joseph's meeting with the Macmillan, 19/8/70, 
Treasury file 2SS 21/338/01A. 
Conservative Conference Report, 1970, London, NUCUA, 
p. 53. 
Joseph/Sir Philip Rogers, 1/1/71, PRO BN 13/163. 
(Rogers was Permanent Secretary of the DHSS.) 
the Working Party's report, sent to Joseph under a 
covering letter from JJB Hunt dated 4/6/71, Treasury 
file 2SS 21/338/01E. Copy of report also in PRO BN 
13/219. 
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On 3 June 1971, the day before the Working Party's report 
was sent to him, Joseph decided not to pursue ei ther 
possible new charge, and asked that the Treasury should be 
advised that "once the pledge of proportionate prescription 
charges is fulfilled [see below] ... it is not proposed to 
impose any more new charges (46).) At a meeting of the ACP 
a few days later Joseph was frank about what he saw as the 
disadvantages of such charges. In addition to the 
"administrative and legal complications of charging", there 
would be "political odium" (47). 
On the face of it, the timing of Joseph's decision was 
strange, as he had not received the Working Party's report. 
There is, however, clear evidence that he had seen it in 
draft, and his senior official on the Working Party, CL 
[Dick] Bourton, was present at the meeting on 3 June, so 
Joseph could have been in no doubt as to the Working 
Party's conclusions (48). 
In parallel with the initial consideration of the two new 
charges, the scope for increasing revenue by raising or 
extending existing ones was examined. In the discussion 
with Macmillan in August 1970, Joseph agreed to the 
introduction of higher charges for dental and ophthalmic 
services (49), which were announced by Barber in October 
1970 (50). 
(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
note of Joseph's meeting with officials, 3/6/71, no. 
1 40/71, PRO BN 13/1 57. 
ACP(71 )112th meeting, CPA ACP 2/3. 
that Joseph had seen a copy of the report in draft is 
stated in a Treasury note, 10/6/71, of a conversation 
with Bourton, Treasury file 2SS 21/338/01E. 
Webster, 1996, p. 391. 
Commons Hansard, vol. 805, col. 43. 
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It was also agreed, and announced by Barber, that the 
prescription charge would be increased from 2/6 (12.5p) to 
4/- (20p) per item, with the existing exemptions from 
payment continuing, and in due course be converted into a 
charge proportionate to the cost of what was prescribed 
(51 ) . 
Webster records that in July 1971 it was reported to the 
Cabinet that discussions with doctors, dentists and 
pharmacists on the possible form of what was referred to 
as the graduated prescription charge had failed to reach 
a workable solution, but that health ministers were asked 
to continue to seek one (52). By October, however, Joseph 
was clear that no solution could be found (53), and the 
decision not to proceed with graduated charges was publicly 
announced on 15 November 1971 (54). 
Another area of possible charges was in respect of aids and 
appliances. In September 1970 Joseph held a meeting with 
officials on the scope for charging for numerous categories 
of aids and appliances hitherto provided free. He decided 
not to pursue charges in respect of eleven categories 
(including wheelchairs), but commissioning further work on 
others, such as the possibility of a 10/- (SOp) or 15/-
(75p) charge on elastic hosiery and charges for wigs (55). 
The possibility of raising additional revenue through 
restructuring the charges for the use of beds in NHS 
hospi tals by pri vate patients pay beds was also 
considered. The idea was that higher charges should be made 
for pay beds wi th in more modern rooms, or wi th bet ter 
associated facilities such as adjacent sitting rooms or 
bathrooms, than for more basic accommodation. 
(51) ibid. 
(52) Webster, 1996, p. 394. 
(53) meeting with officials, 7/10/71, PRO BN 13/158. 
(54) Commons Hansard, vol. 826, col. 72 (written answers). 
(55) 22/9/70, meeting note 232/70, PRO BN 13/156. 
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Officials reported that the scope for differential charges 
was so narrow under existing legislation, but that the idea 
might be reconsidered "at the next suitable legislative 
opportuni ty" (56). Aberdare was reported as wanting to 
increase hospitals' discretion in relation to such charges 
(57), but the author has found no evidence that any further 
action was taken. 
Overall, after considerable reflection no new charges were 
introduced by the Government. The effect of the increase 
in prescription charges and restructuring of dental and 
ophthalmic charges was to raise the proportion of NHS 
finance raised through charges from 3.2% in 1970/71 to 3.5% 
in 1973/74 (58), a very small step towards the Government's 
objective of transferring costs from the taxpayer to the 
service user. 
4.3 Using resources more efficiently 
In parallel with seeking to persuade ministerial colleagues 
that the NHS needed additional resources, and searching for 
ways of increasing revenue through charges, Joseph sought 
to remedy some of what he regarded as the deficiencies of 
the Service by increasing the efficiency with which 
existing resources were deployed. 
(56) 
( 57) 
(58) 
paper prepared for Aberdare by 
1/3/72, PRO MH 166/45. 
note dated 13/3/72, PRO MH 166/45. 
Cmnd 7615, 1979, p. 436. 
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officials dated 
As noted in the Introduction, in the early years of the NHS 
some Conservatives suspected that it was inefficient. 
However, two Party parliamentary Health Policy Committee 
enquiries and the Guillebaud Committee failed to identify 
any major inefficiencies. 
The view that there was little significant scope for 
improvements in efficiency continued into the 1960s. 
Powell, for example, when interviewed by members of the HPG 
following the publication of A New Look at Medicine and 
Poli tics, was reported as saying that he "did not think 
that there was scope for dramatic savings in the NHS by 
reducing cost differences between different hospi tals", 
though "savings could be made ... by a careful examination 
of staffing policies" (59). 
Joseph took a different view. In 1958, two years after the 
Guillebaud Committee had reported, he gave a paper on 
prospects for the second decade of the NHS. Although he did 
not expect improvements in efficiency to enable future 
demands on the NHS to be met without additional Exchequer 
funding, he regarded there as being scope for greater 
management efficiency, more effecti ve co-ordination between 
the elements of the tripartite structure and savings in the 
management of the hospital building programme and in the 
cost of drugs (60). 
(59) note PG/13a/67/24, 7/2/67, CP CRD 4/7/15. 
(60) Joseph, 1958. 
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As Chairman of the HPG after the 1964 election, Joseph 
demonstrated continuing interest in ways of improving the 
efficiency of the NHS, ini tially by having a management 
consultant (Hamilton) and a specialist in the application 
of automation (Payne) appointed to the Group. Following 
discussions within the HPG, in his draft working paper of 
November 1965 Joseph included the application of 
operational research and automation, and improvements in 
arrangements for hospital building, as avenues to be 
pursued in the interests of efficiency (61). 
As Secretary of State, Joseph immediately took the 
opportunity to set in hand work to pursue improvements in 
efficiency. 
Early in July 1970, officials were commissioned to explore 
a number of options to improve efficiency in the hospital 
service, including widening the responsibility of the HAS 
to include the acute hospital service and extending its 
remi t to cover "the efficient use of resources"; developing 
"comparative statistics, one HMC with another, of indices 
of effective resource utilisation"; and holding "a 
conference of RHB Chairmen to discuss ways of increasing 
performance, of persuading staff to adopt them, and of 
following-up progress" (62). 
(61) Draft Heal th Working Paper, PG/1 3a/ 65 /10, CPA CRD 
4/7/15. 
(62) 6/7/70, draft meeting note 182/70, PRO BN 13/156. 
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In the same month Joseph held discussions with officials 
on hospital building and the capital investment programme, 
and commissioned a detailed analysis of the use of space 
within hospitals (63), and papers on "the possibility of 
financing hospital building by private capital" (64) and 
"ways of breaking down consultants' autonomy in resource 
allocation and utilisation (65). In addition, he had 
carried forward his interest in operational research by 
proposing its use "to construct mathematical models to 
optimise resource allocation both between and within the 
hospital and community health services" (66), an initiative 
that led to an extensive examination of "the balance of 
care". 
The issue of efficiency was not a transi tory interest: 
during his first year in office Joseph held numerous 
meetings on different issues bearing on it. In the early 
Autumn of 1970, for example, he asked that financial 
incentives and "Queens Awards" to encourage better 
management be considered, together with the establishment 
of a "Hospi tal Corporation" which would take over the 
management of some hospitals to provide exemplars of 
efficient management (67). Later in the year he requested 
an operational research study "to evaluate the case for day 
treatment rather than in-patient care", instigated an 
enquiry into hospital building procedures, and discussed 
the establishment "as soon as possible" of an inspectorate 
which would "supervise the total performance of both 
hospital and local authority services" (68). 
(63) 
(64) 
(65) 
(66) 
(67) 
(68) 
9/7/70, meeting note 70/188, PRO BN 13/156. 
21/7/70, meeting note 70/200, PRO BN 13/156. 
27/7/70, meeting note 203/70, PRO BN 13/156. 
ibid. 
"Setting standards in the NHS" , 1 0/9/70 (financial 
incenti ves) and "Stimuli to good management in the 
NHS" , 24/9/70 (Queens Awards and the Hospital 
Corporation), both PRO BN 13/156. 
notes 70/277, 18/11/70 (OR study) and 
9/1 2/7 ° , ( procedures enqu i ry ), both PRO BN 
and 70/306, 17/12/70, (inspectorate), PRO BN 
146 
70/300, 
13/156; 
13/157. 
As Joseph's interest in the administrative reorganisation 
of the NHS developed, however, initiatives in respect of 
efficiency seem increasingly to have became aspects of that 
policy. This was foreshadowed in September 1970 when, in 
taking the decision to recommend to ministerial colleagues 
that the Government ought to go ahead with the 
administrative reorganisation of the NHS, Joseph told his 
officials that he was "particularly keen to discuss 
management, competition, standards and inspectorate" (69), 
with the implication that these would be issues within the 
reorganisation policy. Over the subsequent two years until 
the publication of the White Paper on NHS reorganisation, 
Joseph sought repeatedly to see that these issues were 
indeed part of the reorganisation discussions. 
Although Joseph came to see NHS reorganisation as central 
to using existing resources more efficiently, that policy 
was much more than an efficiency initiative. It will 
therefore be considered separately, below. 
4.5 Alternative means of financing the NHS 
The three elements of Joseph's approach to increasing the 
resources available for the NHS described above were 
essentially working within the financing arrangements 
established at the inception of the Service, as only 
slightly modified (in respect of charges) since. 
Potentially the most radical element was a fourth 
examination of alternative means of financing the NHS. 
(69) Joseph's manuscript note, 16/9/70, PRO MH 166/97. 
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Joseph's position on alternative financing in the 1960s has 
been summarised above. Although, as noted in Chapter 1, his 
correspondence with the lEA in 1965 had evidenced caution, 
by 1970 Harris and Seldon are said to have come "to regard 
Joseph as their principal political hope" (70). 
Seldon wrote to Joseph shortly before the 1970 general 
election, enclosing a copy of the report of the BMA' s 
Advisory Panel (which he regarded himself as having greatly 
influenced (71)). He expressed the hope that an incoming 
Conservative Government would "come out more clearly in 
favour of a growing private sector of medicine, and with 
proposals to help everyone - including the "poor" to pay 
for it" (72). Perhaps mindful of the apparent lack of 
response to the suggestions he had made on Balniel's paper 
in September 1968, and the reaction to Macmillan's 
proposals at the Selsdon meeting, Joseph responded that 
"the first thing is to get the policies that some of us can 
put forward enthusiastically among our colleagues" (73). 
(70 ) 
(71 ) 
(72) 
(73) 
Cockett, 1994, p. 169. 
in a letter to Joseph dated 7/8/70, Seldon described 
the report as "about 70% "pure" Seldon (and Howe?), 
and the rest was sordid expediency in the hope of 
pushing the report through the BMA". HI, lEA papers, 
box 333, folder 5. 
Seldon/Joseph, 10/6/70, ibid. 
Joseph/Seldon, 12/6/70, ibid. 
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Soon after taking office, and despite stating in the Debate 
on the Address that he could "confidently assert" that the 
NHS would continue "to be paid for very largely out of 
taxes and contributions" (74), Joseph took a step towards 
exploring alternative financing arrangements. He convened 
a meeting with Macmillan and Howe (who had returned to the 
Commons at the 1970 election and been appointed Solicitor 
General), to discuss possibili ties "from the background 
they had collected in previous thinking about financing 
health services by insurance rather than from the point of 
view of their Ministerial Offices" (75). 
Macmillan, when an Opposition frontbench spokesman, had 
favoured putting the FPS on an insurance basis, a proposal 
which, as noted in Chapter 2, seems to have received no 
support at the Selsdon meeting. Howe, at the time of the 
publication of Powell's A New Look at Medicine and 
Politics, had expressed the hope that radically different 
arrangements for the organisation and funding of health 
care could be achieved over a ten to fifteen year 
timescale, and later became a member of the BMA Advisory 
Panel examining methods of financing health care. 
The Advisory Panel's report had been published prior to the 
general election (76). It had recommended that a range of 
NHS services should continue to be funded from taxation, 
including the services then provided by local health 
authori ties and hospi tal in-patient care for geriatric 
patients, the chronic sick, and patients suffering from 
mental subnormality or long term mental illness. In its 
view, however, the remainder of medical services, 
comprising "the bulk of medical care given to those who are 
normally well", should be "financed by insurance" (77). 
(74) Commons Hansard, 13/7/70, vol. 803, col. 1176. 
(75) DHSS note of meeting on 28/7/70, Treasury file 2SS 
21/338/01A. 
(76) a summary was published in the BMJ, 25/4/70. 
(77) ibid., p. 90 (paras. 22/5). 
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The Panel proposed that" the act of insurance should be 
compulsory", though individuals would have the opportunity 
of contracting out of the "compulsory heal th insurance" 
scheme into alternative schemes offering increased benefits 
in return for higher premiums (78). 
Al though only able to attend about a quarter of its 
meetings, Howe was present at the one at which the Advisory 
Panel discussed its emerging conclusions. The note of that 
meeting recorded that, while warning of the political 
difficulties of the proposal for compulsory insurance, "G 
Howe accepted the general outline of the insurance 
proposals" (79). Some months later, when commenting on the 
final draft of the Panel's report, Howe wrote that "I see 
no point on which I feel disposed to dissent wi th any 
violence the entire tenor of the report ... is most 
attractive to me" (80). 
Shortly after the Panel's report was published, Howe gave 
a speech to a Fellowship for Freedom in Medicine 
conference. The starting point of his analysis was the 
"need for more money to be brought into health", something 
he did not think "anyone challenges". Howe thought it 
"almost impossible to see how we can hope to raise the 
additional expenditure necessary from general taxation". 
More realistically, it could be secured by giving 
individuals opportunities to choose to divert to spending 
on health part of the "£25,000 million a year" spent in 
aggregate on consumption (81). In Howe's view, the BMA 
Advisory Panel's recommendations offered a way of creating 
the opportunity for increased personal expenditure on 
health care. 
(78) ibid. , (para. 26). 
(79 ) Panel meeting 30/4/69 and 1/5/69, note on BMAA, 
P/1/109. 
8/12/69, white (80) Howe/Macpherson (BMA) , Howe papers, 
box 16, file 5. 
(81 ) 9/5/70, copy on Treasury file 2SS 21/338/02. 
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At the meeting Joseph had convened, both Macmillan and Howe 
explained the thinking that had led them to make their 
respective proposals. Macmillan said his proposal had been 
designed so that "patients themselves would assume an 
interest in the costs and standards of the services they 
used" (82). Howe who, without disclosing the reason for his 
request, had asked Seldon for urgent briefing on twelve 
questions about the BMA Advisory Panel's report prior to 
the meeting (83), emphasised the potential of Panel's 
scheme to tap into the £25,000 million a year consumer 
expenditure (84). 
Joseph's position was unclear. On the one hand, he thought 
the compulsory insurance premium under the Panel's scheme 
might be £15 a year per person, and thus "very high", and 
"doubted whether Government had a mandate to swi tch the NHS 
fully to an insurance-based system". On the other, he 
clearly did not want to leave matters as they stood, and 
concluded that further studies should be made of schemes 
in other countries and consideration given to the 
possibility of experimentation (85). 
In parallel with considering Macmillan and Howe's ideas, 
Joseph had been thinking about a different option, shifting 
part of the cost of the NHS "from the taxpayer to industry 
over a period of years" (86). 
(82) DHSS note of meeting on 28/7/70, Treasury file 2SS 
21/338/01A. 
(83) Howe/Seldon, 23/7/70 and Seldon/Howe, 24/7/70, both 
HI lEA papers, box 332, folder 3. 
(84) DHSS note of meeting on 28/7/70, Treasury file 2SS 
21/338/01A. 
(85) ibid. 
(86) 29/7/70, meeting note 70/211, PRO BN 13/156. 
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Joseph had read the BMA Advisory Panel's report "three 
times" ( 8 7 ) and, despi te concerns over what would be 
"politically possible (or administratively practicable?)" 
(88), he decided to explore alternative funding 
possibilities. On 15 August he wrote to Seldon: "Despair 
not. I hope you won't be too dissatisfied even if my 
methods and aims are not exactly as you would wish" (89). 
Four days later he had a further meeting with Macmillan, 
this time with the latter firmly in his role as Chief 
Secretary, on public expendi ture. This resul ted in the 
decision that an official working party should be 
established to study alternative methods of funding (90). 
A note to a colleague by one of the Treasury officials 
present stated that this proposal was Joseph's (91). 
At the beginning of September Joseph wrote to Barber to 
advise him that he intended putting to the Working Party 
his proposal to shift "most" of the cost of the NHS from 
the taxpayer to industry. The shift would take place over 
"5 or 6 years", and its impact "could be divided as seemed 
best between employer and employee" (92). Joseph envisaged 
that "in due course" contracting out of part of the 
"indus tr ial cos t" might be permi t ted, rather as the BMA 
Advisory Panel had envisaged contracting out of the 
"compulsory health insurance" it favoured. 
(87) 
(88) 
(89) 
(90) 
(91 ) 
(92) 
according to Seldon, letter to Joseph, 7/8/70. HI, 
lEA papers, box 333, folder 5. 
Seldon, summarising Joseph's view that he, Se~don, 
did not allow sufficiently for these consideratlons, 
ibid. 
Joseph/Seldon, 15/8/70, ibid. 
note on Treasury file 2SS 21/338/01A. 
M Widdup/J Patterson, 20/8/70, ibid. 
Joseph/Barber, 1/9/70, ibid. 
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Joseph's letter led to discussion within the Treasury on 
whether what was proposed represented a move away from 
financing the NHS by taxation, or merely a shift in the 
incidence from one tax to another, and on the acceptability 
of hypothecating the proceeds of a particular tax to the 
NHS (93). The resul twas that Barber sent Joseph an 
acknowledgement in which he commented that "it seems 
possible that it will be difficult to distinguish 
employers' and employees' contributions from other forms 
of taxation" (94). 
The Working Party on NHS Finance (WPNHSF) met for the first 
time on 13 October. Its terms of reference were "To examine 
possible alternative methods of financing health and 
welfare services in the public and private sectors, having 
regard, particularly, to the probable continuing increase 
in demand for the services, the inevi table continuing 
constraint on resources, the planned re-organisation of the 
structure of the National Health Service and of local 
government, and the government's general taxation policy" 
(95) . 
The WPNHSF consisted solely of civil servants (96), and 
seems not to have been overseen by a Cabinet committee, 
unlike a similarly titled group established in 1960 under 
the auspices of the Social Services Committee (97). 
(93) 
(94) 
(95) 
(96) 
(97) 
minutes by Patterson, 
(Financial Secretary), 
15/9/70, ibid. 
10/9/70, 
14/9/70, 
Barber/Joseph, 16/9/70, ibid. 
Treasury file 2SS 21/338/02. 
Patrick Jenkin 
and Macmillan, 
from Treasury, Inland Revenue, Cabinet Office, 
Department of Heal th and Social Securi ty (DHSS) , 
Welsh Office and Scottish Home and Health Department. 
personal communication, R Ponman, Cabinet Office, 
4/10/00 (Working Party); Webster, 1996, p. 77 (1960 
group) . 
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At its first meeting the WPNHSF was advised that Joseph 
"felt strongly that additional national resources should 
be applied to health and welfare services ... [and] wanted 
to find ways in which the pressures on public expenditure 
could be relieved to allow further growth in the services" 
(98). In identifying possibilities, however, "there should 
be no distinction in medical treatment and no one should 
enjoy worse conditions than now" (99). 
A copy of Howe's speech to the Fellowship for Freedom in 
Medicine was circulated, with a covering note from the DHSS 
to the effect that Joseph was understood to agree with some 
of the views expressed in the paper (100). 
A positive decision was taken that the formation of the 
WPNHSF should not be announced, as it "would inev i tabl y 
lead to pressure from the BMA and others to be afforded an 
opportunity to put forward their own partisan views, and 
the character of the exercise would change" (101). This 
decision was adhered to even after the Times carried a well 
informed report of the initiative (102). For example, in 
briefing Aberdare for an appearance before the Party's 
parliamentary Health and Social Services Committee in 
January 1970, the secretary to the WPNHSF advised that its 
existence "has somehow become known to the Press but it 
would be embarrassing if this were confirmed by the 
Government and any question on it could best be answered 
. 1 " evaSlve y ... (103). 
(98) 
(99) 
( 1 00) 
( 1 01 ) 
( 1 02) 
( 1 03) 
minutes, Treasury file 2SS 21/338/02. 
ibid. 
ibid. 
Rogers/Joseph, 30/10/70, PRO BN 13/163. 
Times, 21/12/70, p. 1, col. g. 
H Salter/Aberdare, 25/1/71, PRO BN 13/219. 
154 
Despite the existence of the WPNHSF, it seems that Joseph 
did not expect to be proposing any radical change in NHS 
financing arrangements. In January 1971 he attended a BMA 
dinner, at which he was reported as having given his pledge 
that the NHS would remain "overwhelmingly financed by 
taxation and contributions" (104), much what he had said 
in the Debate on the Address the previous July. In March, 
in answer to a parliamentary question Joseph stated that 
"alternative sources of revenue are constantly under 
consideration", but qualified this by repeating the phrase 
he reportedly used at the BMA dinner, that as far as he 
could see the NHS would remain "overwhelmingly financed by 
taxation and contributions" (105). 
Possibly in Joseph's mind the issue was in part one of 
timescale. Certainly this was the position of some of his 
parliamentary colleagues. A sub-committee of the Party's 
parliamentary Health and Social Security Committee 
completed a report on the organisation of the NHS in April 
1971. While accepting "that for the time being the major 
sources of finance ... must be taxation and/or national 
insurance", most members favoured more radical change in 
the longer term. Specifically, the sub-committee believed 
that "the basis of finance should be compulsory heal th 
insurance (normally non-state) which would allow patients 
to buy either NHS or private services as they preferred". 
As a "step towards" change, relief on private health 
insurance "would be a valuable way of testing whether the 
demand for choice and an enhanced pri vate sector [was] 
strong enough to justify a radical shift in policy designed 
to restore the market element to health provision" (106). 
( 1 04) 
( 1 05) 
( 1 06) 
Guardian, 15/1/71, p. 13" col. b. 
Commons Hansard, 16/3/71, vol. 813, cols. 1177/8. 
copy of report, under cover of letter from Raison to 
Macmillan, 20/5/71, Treasury file 2SS 21/338/01E. 
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This potential "step towards" a more radical pol icy was 
essentially what Balniel had proposed in Opposition. It had 
been put to Joseph by BUPA during a meeting in August 1970, 
but his reply had been that "it would be very difficult for 
the Government to give tax relief on subscriptions to BUPA 
and similar organisations", though the nature of the 
difficulty was not specified (107). 
Shortly before receiving the sub-committee's report, 
Macmillan had been approached on the same issue by the BMA. 
His response was that he did "not think that the granting 
of tax relief would give sufficient extra encouragement to 
[private health insurance] to justify creating the very 
considerable difficulties involved". These he specified as, 
first, explaining why similar relief could not be given in 
respect of "many forms of expenditure which are considered 
to be especially worthy" and, second, the increased number 
of civil servants that would be needed to run the 
consequently more complex tax system (108). 
The WPNHSF report was submitted to Joseph on 4 June. In the 
members' view, "any change which carried wi th ita 
substantial switch from State to private provision outside 
the National Health Service could increase the cost and 
reduce the effect of the co-ordinated Service" (109). 
( 1 07) 
( 1 08) 
( 1 09 ) 
note 216/70, 19/8/70, PRO BN 13/156. 
Macmillan/BMA, 7/5/71, on PRO BN 13/200. 
report, p. 37 (para. 91), PRO BN 13/219. 
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On the sort of arrangement favoured by Macmillan in 
Opposition, and by the BMA Advisory Panel and Conservative 
Party Heal th and Social Securi ty sub-commi t tee, members 
judged that the administrative costs "would far outweigh 
any possible advantages" and "be far greater than any 
likely diversion of extra resources to the health services 
which contracting out might bring". On ideas for what would 
in effect be a "health tax", with the yield allocated to 
the NHS, members saw objections on the ground of 
hypothecation (which would reduce "the Government's freedom 
of action in controlling expendi ture or taxation"). A 
health tax of the kind favoured by Joseph, paid by 
employers and employees, was open to the additional 
objection of making the proposed reconstruction of the 
National Insurance scheme more difficult (110). 
The "step towards" a more radical solution proposed by the 
Party sub-committee, giving tax relief on private health 
insurance premiums, would, in the Working Party's view, 
"have a very small effect on the problems of financing the 
NHS", "complicate the income tax" and carry the implication 
tha t taxpayers "should get reI ief from general taxes if 
they choose not to contribute to the cost of public 
expenditure programmes of which they do not make direct 
use". If relief was given the cost of the NHS "might 
actually increase" (111). 
( 11 0 ) 
( 1 1 1 ) 
ibid., pp. 38/9. 
ibid., p. 40 (paras. 105/7). 
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Three days after the WPNHSF's report was sent to ministers, 
M Widdup, a Treasury Assistant Secretary, asked Bourton 
what view Joseph had taken of it. According to Widdup's 
note, Joseph had seen a draft of the report, which had been 
returned "with the sole comment "Read" Bourton has 
presumed from this that [Joseph] accepts the main 
conclusions there was no likelihood ... at present ... 
of [Joseph] wishing the Working Party to pursue 
particular lines of further enquiry" (112). 
Within the Treasury, officials reported this assessment of 
Joseph's posi tion to Macmillan when discussing the WPNHSF' s 
report with him. Macmillan "accepted the main findings 
viz, that, short of a major revolution in the whole NHS 
system, there is very limited scope for any changes whose 
benefits would outweigh the practical difficulties to which 
they would gi ve rise" (113). Subsequently Bourton was 
advised that "he might inform his Secretary of State that 
the Chief Secretary is not proposing that any further 
action should be taken on the Working Party's report" 
(114). 
A few days later, a paper on NHS reorganisation drafted for 
Joseph was circulated for comment wi thin the DHSS. It 
contained a reference to possible consideration by 
ministers of the WPNHSF's report (115). This elicited an 
immediate and successful request from Bourton that the 
reference be deleted, as "both [Macmillan] and [Joseph] 
have now, separately, studied the Report ... and neither 
seems disposed to take any action on it. I should not like 
us to lead [Joseph] to think that we are expecting him to 
take some kind of initiative" (116). 
( 11 2 ) 
( 11 3 ) 
( 11 4 ) 
( 11 5 ) 
( 11 6 ) 
note by Widdup, dated 10/6/70, Treasury file 2SS 
21/338/01E. 
note of meeting 8/6/70, Treasury file 2SS 
21/338/01F. 
manuscript note by Widdup, 9/6/70, ibid. 
paper by T Nodder, 15/6/71, PRO MH 166/45. 
Bourton/Nodder, 16/6/71 ibid. 
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As far as the OHSS papers currently publicly available 
show, no further action was taken in respect of the 
WPNHSF's report. Joseph certainly made no reference to it, 
or to the issue of alternative financing for the NHS, in 
a six page report on the areas within his responsibility 
made to Heath in October 1971 (117), or in his speeches to 
the 1971, 1972 and 1973 Party conferences. 
4.6 The effects of Joseph's approach 
As noted above, Joseph had some success in increasing 
Exchequer funding of the NHS resources. Between 1971 and 
1974 expenditure increased by 10% in volume terms, and rose 
from 4.67% of GOP to 5.34% (118). Joseph secured this 
increase by successfully arguing for a degree of priority 
for the service in question, and by increasing and 
restructuring existing charges. He was assisted initially 
by the acknowledgement in the manifesto that the resources 
of the NHS were "inadequate", and later by Barber's 
policies to seek to reduce unemployment. 
In parallel, Joseph took a sustained interest in improving 
the efficiency of the Service, both at the micro level, 
through individual initiatives such as improved hospital 
building procedures, and at the macro level, through the 
emphasis on better management in the policy of reorganising 
the NHS. It is impracticable to estimate what effect his 
efforts had in this regard. 
In addition, Joseph explored the scope for new charges, and 
set in hand a review of alternative funding arrangements, 
the latter of which, in particular, could have resulted in 
a major change in the form of the NHS. 
( 11 7 ) 
( 11 8 ) 
Joseph/Heath, 5/10/71, 
papers, 1970/4 box. 
Cmnd 7615, 1979, p. 
calculated from p. 433 
1 59 
CPA, Strategy Committee 
434 (volume increase) and 
(GOP) . 
Joseph seemed to have been persuaded against the possible 
new charges on the merits of each case. What is less clear 
is why he seemed to take no follow up action in respect of 
the report of the WPNHSF. How is this to be understood? 
It was characteristic of Joseph to study reports he 
received in detail, making numerous comments and posing 
officials many further questions. For example, when sent 
the first draft of a "full summary of what the White Paper 
[on NHS Reorganisation] might say", Joseph responded with 
three typed pages of general comments and 17 manuscript 
pages of comments on the text (119). He studied HAS reports 
in detail: "I would get say three reports, one 90 pages, 
one 40, one 70. After reading them I would have put a cross 
against say 170 different items" (120). 
It would, therefore, have been uncharacteristic of Joseph 
to have received both a draft of the WPNHSF's report, and 
the report itself, and to have contented himself wi th 
responding simply "Read" to the former. 
The DHSS files currently available seem not to include the 
copy of the WPNHSF report sent to Joseph, and there is no 
evidence that the Official Historian of the NHS had access 
to it (121). Aberdare's copy is publicly available, but not 
accompanied by any evidence of a detailed response or 
follow up action (122). 
( 11 9 ) 
(120) 
( 1 21 ) 
(122) 
draft dated 29/7/71 , Joseph's response da ted 
12/8/71, both PRO MH 166/130. 
quoted in Halcrow, 1989, p. 50. 
the section in the Official History is based on 
Treasury, not DHSS, papers - Webs ter , 1996, pp. 
385/390. 
on PRO BN 13/219. 
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One possible explanation is that Joseph did not have time 
to deal wi th the report immediately, that officials (as 
noted above) did not prompt him for a response, and that 
the whole matter vanished from view under the weight of the 
business that was occupying Joseph. 
However, the notion that, unprompted by officials who might 
well have preferred no further action to be taken on the 
report, Joseph simply overlooked it, is as inconsistent 
with his character as the idea that he would have returned 
it simply marked "Read". There is clear evidence on other 
issues that Joseph kept in view matters which officials 
seemed reluctant to action. For example, he noted as an 
omission from both the draft consultative document on NHS 
reorganisation, and the draft White Paper, one of his ideas 
(that health authority senior officers should not have 
tenured posts), despite the fact that he was presented with 
the second document well over a year after the first (123). 
It seems unlikely, therefore, that Joseph simply overlooked 
the WPNHSF's report, even if his officials did not seek 
actively to encourage a response. Rather, it seems more 
likely that, despite some evidence of support within the 
Party for change over the longer term, as evidenced by the 
report of the sub-committee of the PHSSC referred to above, 
Joseph consciously decided to take no further action. He 
possibly agreed with the PHSSC sub-committee that achieving 
change would be a long term matter - some years later he 
was quoted as saying that such change "would take up to 
four consecutive parliaments" (124) and, with NHS 
reorganisation, regarded himself as having enough on hand 
in this Parliament. 
( 1 23) 
( 1 24 ) 
21/1/71 (comments on the draft consultative 
document), PRO MH 166/129, and 9/5/72 (comments on 
the draft White Paper), PRO MH 166/131. 
Times 17/4/78, p. 2, col. c, reporting Joseph's 
comments at a Conservative Medical Society (CMS) 
meeting on 15/4/78. 
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This possibility may be supported by a comment in a letter 
to Joseph from Seldon, following up a meeting at the DHSS 
in April 1972. With regard to alternative financing, Seldon 
wrote "I will remind you that you said last week you would 
consider making public the reasons why you rejected the 
proposals you examined last year" (125). It is not clear 
to which "proposals" Seldon was referring: possibly the BMA 
Advisory Panel's, or perhaps the proposals examined (though 
certainly not proposed) by the WPNHSF. The sentence does, 
however, suggest that Joseph had reached a positive 
decision not to pursue alternative funding possibilities. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that while Joseph was 
interested in alternative financing as a theoretical 
proposition, especially perhaps through his extensive 
contacts wi th Seldon (126), he could not see a way of 
addressing to his satisfaction what he believed to be the 
political and practical difficulties that radical change 
would involve. Although in March 1972 Joseph was minded to 
raise alternative financing in a speech "later in the year" 
(127), the author has found no evidence that he did so, or 
reverted to it again while Secretary of State. 
( 1 25) 
( 1 26) 
(127) 
Seldon/Joseph, 1/5/72, HI lEA papers, box 333, 
folder 5. 
the lEA papers (ibid.) show that Joseph was on close 
terms with Seldon, with several meetings, including 
dinner at Joseph's home, in addition to 
correspondence. Cockett has suggested something of 
a falling out, quoting a letter from Seldon, 
incorrectly referenced as dated 7/2/72 (it is dated 
3/3/72), as being "his last, exasperated, plea for 
Joseph "to at least consider the alternatives", and 
stating that this was Seldon's "last letter of the 
1970-4 Government to Joseph" (Cockett, 1994, pp. 
206/7) . In fact, friendly correspondence on 
alternative financing continued until at least May 
1972, eg Joseph/Seldon of 2, 14 and 24 March 1972 
and 2 May; Seldon/Joseph of 17 and 30 March and 1 
May (HI lEA papers, box 333, folder 5.) 
Joseph/Seldon, 2/3/72, HI lEA papers, box 333, 
folder 5. The papers do not include the draft 
speech, which had been enclosed with the letter. 
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5. NHS STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT 
The Government took office committed to rationalising the 
"functions and responsibilities of all departments and 
government agencies", which could in principle have 
included the NHS. However, as also noted, a commitment to 
"reorganise the NHS so that its three main branches ... are 
brought together under a unified administration" was 
replaced at draft stage by the less specific undertaking 
to improve co-ordination. 
Work on the "new style" in the sense of improving the 
machinery and processes of government was set in hand soon 
after the general election. The first substantive product 
was a White Paper, published in October 1970. 
This dealt with core central government matters rather than 
with agencies such as the NHS. It announced the 
amalgamation of existing ministries to create the 
Departments of the Environment and Trade and Industry; the 
establishment of the Central Policy Review Staff to help 
produce "a strategic definition of objectives"; and a new 
management process (which became known as Programme 
Analysis and Review), to facili tate regular reviews of 
existing programmes (128). 
(1 28) The Reorganisa tion of Cen tral Governmen t, Cmnd. 
4506., 1970, London, HMSO. 
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In parallel with the review of central government functions 
and organisation, Peter Walker, appointed Minister for 
Housing and Local Government after the election (and made 
Secretary of State for the Environment in October 1970), 
began preparing proposals for the reorganisation of local 
government, in accordance wi th a manifesto commi tment 
(129). These were published in February 1971, and proposed 
the establishment of a two tier structure of local 
government (130), in contrast to the uni tary structure 
recommended by the Royal Commission on Local Government and 
favoured by the Labour Opposition. Like the proposals for 
central government, the White Paper on local government 
envisaged improvements in management arrangements as well 
as structural change (131). 
Early work by the new Government to carry forward manifesto 
commitments and put in hand reviews of the structure and 
management processes of central and local government was 
not matched in relation to the NHS. 
As described in Chapters 1 and 2, considerable thought had 
been gi ven to the administrati ve structure of the NHS 
between 1965 and 1970, and by March 1970 the Conservative 
policy position seemed to have crystallised in favour of 
unification of the tripartite arrangement outside local 
government, but with the new health authorities having the 
same boundaries as the local authorities responsible for 
social services. However, the manifesto commitment was, as 
noted above, not nearly that specific. 
( 1 29 ) 
( 1 30) 
( 1 31 ) 
Craig, 1975, p. 340. 
Local Government in England, Cmnd. 4584, 1970, 
London, HMSO. 
ibid., p. 12. 
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Early in July 1970 Joseph discussed the future structure 
of the NHS with DHSS officials, who favoured administrative 
unification, without which "the economic and other gains 
we want could not be secured" (132). Officials argued that, 
if the health services were not integrated "damaging 
divisions" would remain between the three branches (133). 
The note of the meeting suggests that Joseph was cautious. 
While he regarded it as "important to have the control of 
investment in health and welfare services under a single 
directing authori ty", he recognised that this was not 
practicable. For the legislation following the Seebohm 
report had confirmed the welfare services as a 
responsibility of local government, while Joseph agreed 
"tha t the hospi tal and Execu t i ve Counc i 1 serv ices could not 
be put under local government, because of the opposition 
of the medical profession" (134). 
Given that unifying the health and welfare services was not 
practicable, Joseph questioned the value of unifying the 
three branches of the NHS, and (in the light of his 
experience of local government reorganisation in London) 
was concerned about the upheaval unification would cause 
(135). 
( 1 32) 
( 1 33) 
(134) 
( 1 35) 
DHSS memorandum, quoted in Webster, 1996, p. 453. 
note of meeting on 8/7/70, PRO MH 166/125. 
ibid. 
ibid. 
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No decision on whether to proceed with unification of the 
Service was reached at that meeting, and Joseph was non-
committal in the debate on the NHS and social services in 
the Commons on 13 July. He emphasised the importance of 
"linkages" wi thin the NHS and between the NHS, local 
authority and voluntary services, but made no commitment 
to structural change as a means of improving them. Noting 
the [second] Green Paper and the comments on it, Joseph 
said that "this whole massive reorganisation is something 
which we shall have to consider closely in conjunction with 
proposals for local government reform" (136). This strongly 
suggests that, at this stage, reviewing the organisational 
arrangements of the NHS was not part of an over-arching 
policy of introducing the "new style" across the whole 
public sector, and perhaps supports the idea that the late 
change made to the draft manifesto in respect of the NHS 
was a consciously substantive one, rather than "polishing". 
5.1 The decision to unify the NHS 
Joseph asked for consideration to be given to alternative 
ways of addressing the problems of lack of co-ordination 
from which it was widely agreed the tripartite arrangement 
suffered. He wanted to be "sure that there were no simpler 
and less radical means of achieving the objectives" (137). 
By 21 July a paper by officials "on ways in which the 
purpose of the Green Paper might be achieved wi th less 
upheaval" was "nearly ready" (138). 
(136) 
( 1 37) 
( 1 38) 
Commons Hansard, vol. 803, cols. 1177/9. 
note of meeting on 8/7/70, PRO MH 166/125. 
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There is some evidence to suggest that quite soon after the 
ini tial meeting on 8 July, and possibly before Joseph 
considered the "less upheaval" paper referred to above, 
ministers were becoming persuaded of DHSS officials' view 
that unification was necessary. 
On 4 August Aberdare had a meeting with the leader of the 
team of businessmen recruited by the Government (see 
below), and asked for help wi th "the very di ff icul t problem 
of working out an administrative structure for the National 
Health Service", which suggests structural change, rather 
than different working practices within the existing 
structure, was in the Minister's mind (139). On 8 August 
Joseph sent a minute to the DHSS Under Secretary taking 
forward work on the possibility of unification, and 
alternatives to it, commenting on Labour's second Green 
Paper in terms which suggested he was already thinking 
about the relationship between the Department and new area 
health boards (140). On 12 August a senior DHSS official 
minuted a colleague that "the Secretary of State has not 
yet agreed in principle that the NHS should be unified" 
(author's underlining), which perhaps suggested a sense 
among officials that Joseph was moving in that direction 
(141). 
Whether or not ministers were persuaded by or during August 
that unification was necessary, the evidence is that by 
early September Joseph had reached that view. According to 
the note, at a meeting with officials split over two days, 
he took "unifying the National Health Service" as a given: 
for him "the main questions on unification were the 
timetable and the regional tier" (142). 
( 1 39 ) 
(140) 
( 1 41 ) 
( 1 42) 
note of meeting on PRO MH 166/97. 
Joseph/ J Dodds, PRO MH 166/125. 
J Cashman/F Farrant, ibid. 
note of meeting 8 and 10/9/70, ibid. 
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Given that there was no specific manifesto commitment, and 
his initial doubts, how is Joseph's decision to propose 
unification to be understood? It is impossible to be sure, 
but four considerations in particular may have been 
relevant. 
First, as noted above, work on the reorganisation of 
central and local government was set in hand early. In this 
context, perhaps Joseph came to see trying to make the 
widely criticised tripartite system work more effectively 
as insufficiently "new style" compared with structural 
change. 
Second, relevant DHSS officials seemed clear and unanimous 
that unification was desirable (143), and Joseph may well 
have given considerable weight to their views. His 
biographer reports unattributed comments to the effect 
that, as a minister, Joseph had a history of being over-
influenced by his officials (144). Alfred Sherman, a 
journalist who has been described as "Joseph's intellectual 
mentor", apparently used to refer to him as "a good man 
fallen among civil servants" (145). 
( 1 4 3 ) 
( 1 4 4 ) 
( 1 45 ) 
as far as can be judged from the note of the meeting 
on 8 July (PRO MH 166/125). 
Halcrow, 1989, pp. 21/2. 
Cockett, 1994, p. 206. 
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A third possible consideration is that in July 1970 Joseph 
received the report of a group convened in Opposition by 
Brooke, with the agreement of Balniel and Macmillan (146). 
The group consisted of "twelve members '" drawn from all 
parts of the National Health Service" (147), among whom 
were Freeman, who had been a member of the HPG with Joseph, 
and Trafford, who had become a MP at the 1970 general 
election (148). 
The group's report noted the "general agreement that the 
present three parts of the service should be brought 
together under one administrative roof", and expressed a 
preference for a two tier system outside local government 
(149). This recommendation, matching in kind if not detail 
the view of his officials, may well have helped persuade 
Joseph to adopt unification as a policy. 
Finally, as noted above, Joseph was enthusiastic about 
improving the efficiency of the NHS, and began to see 
reorganisation of its structure and management arrangements 
as a means of doing so. webster has suggested that the 
prospect of using unification as the opportunity to 
introduce "sound management principles" made it "a more 
congenial prospect" for Joseph (150). 
Given his view about the medical profession's opposition 
to control of the NHS by local government, Joseph naturally 
thought in terms of unification outside local government, 
as proposed in the Labour Government's second Green Paper. 
( 1 46) 
( 1 47) 
( 1 48) 
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personal communication from Professor Freeman, 
3/8/2000. The report itself (copy ibid.) does not 
include a list of the group members. 
Brooke group report, pp. 7/9, ibid. 
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The ideas that the NHS should be unified, but outside local 
government, were set out in a draft cabinet commi t tee 
paper, together with a timetable for the reorganisation, 
which Joseph approved on 16 September, and an advance copy 
was sent to officials in other government departments on 
21 September (1 51 ) . 
The draft paper briefly discussed the option of unifying 
the NHS within local government as advocated by the local 
authority associations. The principal advantage was seen 
as having both health and social services administered by 
the same set of authorities. In the light of "very strong 
arguments against", including the likely need for the NHS 
to continue to be funded mainly from the Exchequer, and for 
decisions on planning and priori ties 
national scale, Joseph concluded, 
unification should take place outside 
(152). 
to be taken on a 
however, "that 
local governmen t" 
To help secure effective linkage between the proposed new 
health authorities and local government, Joseph proposed 
that the two sets of authorities should match "in area and 
in boundaries" (a feature referred to subsequently as 
coterminosity), and anticipated an examination of ways of 
linking the two through, for example, "some common 
membership, a sharing of staff and joint advisory 
machinery" (153). 
( 1 51 ) 
( 1 52) 
( 1 53) 
under cover of a letter from Nodder (DHSS)/other 
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Reflecting his judgement that reorganisation of the NHS 
could be the basis for achieving greater efficiency, Joseph 
also proposed further reflection on the administrati ve 
structure proposed in Labour's second Green Paper, with a 
view to identifying "stronger devices for ensuring sound 
and effective management" (154). 
Joseph's draft proposals secured broad support from other 
government departments at official level, and on 29 October 
were considered by the Cabinet Social Services Committee 
(along wi th parallel proposals from the Secretaries of 
State for Scotland and Wales). Following "a brief 
discussion", the Committee "agreed with the general 
approach proposed", and approved an announcement of what 
had now become Government policy through the medium of a 
written reply to a parliamentary question (155). The 
announcement was made on 5 November (156). 
Thus by November 1970 the Government had decided to unify 
the three branches of the NHS, and had accepted, as had the 
Conservative spokesmen in Opposition, that there were 
practical reasons against doing so wi thin local government. 
Effectively, the NHS joined central and local government 
as the subject of formal organisational review, including 
the attention of the Government's team of businessmen 
advisers, and so came, albeit loosely, within the scope of 
the "new style". It was certainly so linked by one of the 
archi tects of the "new style", Howell, in a paper published 
in November 1971 (157). 
( 1 5 4 ) 
( 1 5 5 ) 
(156) 
(157) 
ibid. 
minutes of SL( 70) 4th, copy on Treasury file 2SS 
21/04A. 
Commons Hansard, vol. 805, cols. 437/9 (written 
answer) . 
A New Style Emerges, 1971, London, Conservative 
Political Centre, p. 10. 
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5.2 The implementation of unification 
The decision announced on 5 November of itself signalled 
a significant change in the form of the Service, as it 
invol ved taking respons ibi lit y for the personal heal th 
services away from local authorities and making the NHS an 
entirely central government service. Before unification 
could be implemented, however, a large number of 
consequential policy decisions had been reached, for 
example about the nature of the new administrative 
structure; the necessary legislation had been enacted; and 
practical issues, such as the appointment of members and 
senior officers of the new authorities, had been put into 
effect. These took most of the lifetime of the Government 
to complete (158). 
A substantial account of the development of the 
Government's detailed proposals, and of the passage of the 
Reorganisation Bill, is included in the Official History 
of the NHS (159). The following sections do not seek to 
duplicate that account, or explore all aspects of the 
development and implementation of the policy of 
reorganisation of importance in the history of the NHS. 
Rather, they seek to examine in some detail those issues 
arising which seem to throw particular light on 
Conservative attitudes to, and policy in respect of, the 
form of the NHS. These issues all related to Joseph's 
objective of improving the efficiency of the NHS through 
unification. 
( 1 58 ) 
( 1 59 ) 
the unified Service did not come into effect until 
after the Heath Government had resigned following 
the February 1974 general election. 
Webster, 1996, pp. 451/579. 
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5.3 Unification and efficiency 
Criticisms of the tripartite structure, dating from early 
in the life of the NHS, including those by Conservatives, 
were often expressed in terms of the disadvantage in the 
treatment and care of the individual patient, or to the 
development of a Service wi th a proper balance between 
preventi ve and curati ve medicine, and between communi ty 
based services (the local authority health services and the 
FPS) and hospital based services (160). However, they also 
included concern that, in a variety of ways, the tripartite 
structure was wasteful (161). 
This concern about the waste inherent in the tripartite 
structure was reflected in the 1966 Labour Government's two 
Green Papers, the second of which concluded that only if 
there was a single authority responsible for the NHS in 
each area would "resources be efficiently deployed to meet 
the needs of each patient" (162) 
(160) for example, Evelyn Emmet's note of dissent to the 
report of the parliamentary Health Policy Committee 
report in 1951, para. 4, CPA, ACP/51/10 on CRD 
4/7/19 (Conservative); Sir John Maude's reservation 
to the report of Committee of Enquiry into the Cost 
of the National Health Service, pp. 279/284, Cmd. 
9663, 1956 (a view from a former senior civil 
servant) . 
(161) for example, "a lack of proper co-ordination ... is 
impairing efficiency", report of the Health Policy 
Sub-Committee, 1953, para. 62, CPA, PMC(53)8, on CRD 
2/30/10 (Conservative); the tripartite structure 
could lead to "a loss of economy and efficiency", A 
Review of the Medical Services in Great Britain, 
1962, pp. 18/9 (the Porritt Committee). 
(162) The Future Structure of the National Health Service, 
1970, p. 6. 
173 
Joseph had long been alive to the possibility of 
improvement in efficiency through better co-ordination. A 
conclusion of his 1958 paper was that improved co-
ordination was "perhaps the principal way of making more 
effecti ve use of the resources already employed in the 
heal th service" ( 1 63). In addi tion, however, as noted 
above, Joseph was concerned that the NHS was lacking In 
what he termed "managerial efficiency" (164). 
As Secretary of State, Joseph increasingly saw unification 
as a major opportunity for taking forward his concern to 
improve the efficiency of the NHS through better 
management. His intention in this regard attracted early 
support from officials within the Treasury and the Civil 
Service Department (CSD) who were, from differing 
perspectives, concerned with efficiency in the public 
services. Carrying through what he saw as its implications, 
however, led to sustained opposition by Labour, some 
general criticism from his own backbenchers and a number 
of specific disagreements which brought out differences of 
view among Conservatives as to what should be the form of 
the NHS. 
John Silkin, Labour's principal spokesman, seemed to be 
favouring merging the NHS into local government, and 
regarded Joseph's overall proposals as having "all the 
vision and imagination of the cost accountant and all the 
warmth and compassion of the balance sheet" (165). The 
Party voted against the enabling legislation on Second and 
Third Readings. 
(163) 
( 1 64) 
( 1 65 ) 
Joseph, 1958, p. 8. 
ibid., p. 6. 
Commons Hansard, vol. 853, cols. 946/7. 
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To some Conservatives, such as Dr Tom Stuttaford, Joseph's 
whole approach was simply too managerial (166). 
It was, however, discussion on a number of specific issues 
that brought out different views within the Conservative 
Party on the form of the NHS. Four of these: the decision 
to unify the Service outside local government and the 
related question of the composi tion of the new heal th 
authorities; the need for and role of a regional tier of 
administration; the form management should take within the 
unified structure, and arrangements for oversight of the 
NHS at national level, will be considered below, following 
descriptions of the positions of the Treasury and CSD. 
5.4 The Treasury and CSD 
The Treasury had traditionally been concerned with economy 
within public services, and had criticisms of the adequacy 
of the DHSS's oversight of the NHS in this respect which 
predated the formation of the Heath Government. 
In July 1969, for example, a minute from a senior Treasury 
official to a colleague commented that "there is nothing 
in the way of a comprehensive and deliberate attempt to 
maintain surveillance over the quality of the managerial 
decisions taken by the Health Departments' agencies in the 
field" (167). A month later another official offered the 
view that "the Health Departments are remarkable in 
ignoring the material [about comparative costs within the 
NHS] and the possibilities which it opens up", and 
commented "we have to press with the utmost energy for an 
efficient professional managerial system" within the 
proposed new NHS structure (168). 
( 1 66) 
( 167 ) 
( 1 68) 
ibid., col. 981. 
Widdup/N Jordan Moss, 28/7/69, Treasury file 2SS 
21/786/01E. 
F Vinter/Jordan Moss, 22/8/69, ibid. 
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The Treasury found the Labour Government's ideas on 
reorganising the NHS unsatisfactory from the management 
perspective. In the brief for Conservative ministers 
attending the Cabinet Social Services Committee meeting on 
29 October 1970, referred to above, for example, it was 
noted that, under Labour's proposals, ""management" would 
have been in the hands of a series of totally unwieldy 
commi ttees, composed to a large extent on syndicalist 
lines, and with responsibility blurred or divided all down 
the line" (169). 
Given these concerns, it was not surprising that Treasury 
officials "heartily welcome[d]" Joseph's intention to look 
again at the administrative structure proposed by Labour 
(170). 
Part of the CSD's remit was to encourage the adoption of 
efficient management practices in the public service. After 
the 1970 election it became the base for a number of 
businessmen recruited by the Conservatives to bring private 
sector expertise to the management of the public services. 
In Opposition, Heath had identified "the machinery of 
government" as an issue to be examined, and one of the 
policy groups established had that remit. In parallel, as 
noted in Chapter 2, Heath had gi ven Marples a brief, 
initially from the angle of the application of new 
technology, to make recommendations for improving 
management in the public sector (171). Marples' activity 
developed into the PSRU, separate from the CRD and 
accountable to Heath (172). 
( 1 69 ) 
( 1 70) 
( 1 71 ) 
( 1 72) 
brief dated 27/10/70, on Treasury file 2SS 21/04A. 
Widdup/Nodder (DHSS), 30/9/70, PRO MH 166/97. 
Heath/Marples, 16/3/67, copy at appendix 1 of 
ACP(69)58, CPA ACP 3/18. 
ACP(69)58, ibid. 
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One of the PSRU' s ini tiati ves was to recrui t business 
expertise to be "actively involved in preparatory work on 
the organisational and administrative implications of party 
policy (173). In office, six of the businessmen so 
recruited were seconded part-time to the CSD, forming what 
became known as the Business Team, led by Richard Meyjes 
of Shell. Others were added later (174). 
When consulted at official level on Joseph's proposal that 
the NHS should be unified outside local government, the CSD 
expressed itself as "quite content" and suggested that, in 
thinking about management principles, a member of the 
Business Team should be involved (175). 
There was some confusion among CSD, Treasury and DHSS 
officials as to whether the Business Team was prepared to 
be involved. In the event, Meyjes became an adviser to the 
DHSS and a member of the Steering Committee for the Study 
Group established to work on new management arrangements 
for the unified NHS (176). This offered a tangible link to 
the "new style" approach in central government. 
(173) 
(174) 
( 1 75) 
(176) 
paper by Howell, 22/1/70, ACP/70/70, CPA ACP 3/19. 
Commons Hansards, vol. 804, cols. 533/4 (initial 
appointments); and vol. 814, col. 144, written 
answer (a later addi tion). The background to the 
Business Team, and official advice to the 
Conservatives in Opposition, are briefly described 
in Pollitt C, Manipulating the Machine, 1984, 
London, Allen & Unwin, pp. 85/6. 
T Caulcott/Nodder, 5/10/70, PRO MH 166/97. 
see, for example, DHSS note of meeting between 
Aberdare and Meyjes, 4/8/70, PRO MH 166/97; notes by 
Widdup, 18/11/70, 0 Henley, 19/11/70 and Widdup 
23/11/70, all on Treasury file 2SS 21/04. 
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5.5 The new health authorities 
From November 1970, the Government viewed the unification 
of the NHS outside local government as a decision, and not 
one of the issues open to consultation. And, as noted 
above, in its second Green Paper the previous Labour 
Government had reached the same view. Nevertheless, the 
decision attracted comment. 
For the Opposition, John Silkin implied that his Party now 
felt that a local government solution might be realistic 
and, during the Bill to give effect to the Government's 
proposals, said that it would be Labour's "purpose to move 
the Bill in the direction of democracy" (177). 
Among Conservatives, too, there were concerns about the 
Government's proposal to make the NHS an entirely central 
government service, organised through local agents of the 
Secretary of State. 
On one hand, Arthur Jones, who had argued the case for 
unifying the NHS within local government during the debate 
on Labour's second Green Paper, saw the Government's NHS 
proposals as "an undesirable erosion of local democratic 
control over essential services, whereas what is needed in 
the Health Service is increased sensitivity and 
responsiveness to local communities" (178). 
( 1 77) 
( 1 78) 
Commons Hansard, vol. 853, col. 946. 
ibid., col. 1019. 
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Powell took a contrary view to Jones about making local 
government responsible for the NHS, but shared his regret 
at the proposed transfer of the local authori ty heal th 
services to central government. Powell saw this as having 
two consequences. First, it meant the loss of "the only 
sources of independent policy, initiative and decision 
which existed outside the central Government in the whole 
range of health services ... From now one there will only 
be one sort of policy and initiative in the community 
heal th services as in the rest of the National Heal th 
Service". Second, and "perhaps [the] most serious" loss, 
it removed from local government "one of its most valuable 
and valued functions" (179). 
Jones and Powell's concerns, expressed quite late in the 
process of implementation of the Government's proposals, 
did not seem to have been shared by ministers at the outset 
of consideration of the reorganisation policy, or indeed 
by most Conservative backbenchers subsequently. 
Among ministers, in the early stages of development of the 
Government's policy the contentious issue was the 
composition of the new health authorities which were to act 
as the Secretary of State's agents. 
Given the desire for effective linkage, Joseph was clear 
that the new health authorities must have the same 
boundaries as the local authorities with social services 
responsibilities. Given the proposals emerging in early 
1971 from the Department of the Environment, this meant 
there would be about ninety health authorities at what was 
termed area level. 
(179) ibid., cols. 1125/7. 
179 
This in turn led to consideration of the need for a tier 
of authorities above these area health authorities, at 
regional level (discussed below), and of arrangements below 
area. On this latter issue it was decided that there should 
be no formal tier of authority below area level, but that 
some areas should be divided into districts, each with its 
own team of senior officers. The AHAs were thus to be the 
basic level of statutory authority responsible for the 
hospital and specialist services, the FPS, and the personal 
health services to be transferred from local government. 
In the second Green Paper, the Labour Government had 
proposed that a third of the members of each AHA should be 
appointed by local authorities, the health professions and 
the Secretary of State, respectively (180). As noted above, 
Conservative frontbench spokesmen questioned the need for 
the Secretary of State's appointees, and seemed to favour 
AHA members being appointed in equal numbers by the 
relevant local authority and health professions. 
Joseph was concerned that the AHAs should be constructed 
"on the principle of sound management rather than 
participation", and when putting proposals to the Cabinet 
Social Services Committee in Match 1971 emphasised that, 
while some AHA members would be members of local 
authorities or the health professions, none would be chosen 
"on a representational footing" (181). Instead, the 
Secretary of State would appoint the chairmen of the AHAs, 
and their members would be appointed by the proposed 
regional health authorities (RHAs), who would in turn have 
been appointed by the Secretary of State. 
(180) The Future of the National Health Service, 1970, p. 
8. 
(181) SL(70)7th, 23/3/71, copy on Treasury file 2SS 
21/04C. 
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To provide a means of expressing communi ty views about 
local health services, Joseph proposed the establishment 
of new bodies, outside the management structure of the NHS. 
These were enacted, as community health councils, despite 
some departure from the idea that the AHAs would not be 
representative bodies. 
The basis of composition that Joseph proposed for AHAs led 
to disagreement within the Committee, with some ministers 
supporting him while others argued that local authorities 
should have the right to appoint representatives to AHAs. 
The Chairman, Maudling as Home Secretary, decided to refer 
the issue to Cabinet (182). 
The issue was discussed in Cabinet on 1 April 1971. 
According to the Conclusions (183), Joseph emphasised the 
need for efficient management with "a direct and 
unambiguous chain of accountabili ty". As agents of the 
Secretary of State, AHAs should be appointed by him and his 
regional appointees. Local authority appointments to AHAs 
"militated against the principle of sound management". 
Some ministers disagreed, pointing out the position taken 
in Opposition, noted above. Not to give local authorities 
appointment rights in regard to AHAs would not only go 
against what had been said then, but would also be 
"inconsistent with the Government's professed intention to 
delegate functions to local authorities as far as 
possible", and might resul t in a lack of willingness by 
local authorities to collaborate with the new AHAs. 
( 1 82) 
( 1 83) 
ibid. 
Conclusions of CM(7)19th, ibid. 
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other ministers supported Joseph, arguing that as local 
authorities had no financial responsibility for the NHS, 
they did not have a "presumptive right" to appoint AHA 
members. If they were given the right, the local authority 
appointees might find themselves with a conflict of 
interest, for example favouring uses of AHA resources which 
relieved the local ratepayer rather than the taxpayer. 
Further, if the right of appointment was conceded to the 
local authorities, it would be difficult to deny it to the 
heal th professions, which could again detract from the 
principles of effective management. 
The Conclusions do not indicate the posi tions taken by 
individual ministers. As Official Historian of the NHS, 
however, Webster had access to the Cabinet Secretary's 
notebook, which it may be presumed included a fuller record 
of the meeting that the Conclusions. Webster records that 
Barber and Lord Jellicoe supported Joseph which, as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and minister in day to day 
charge of the CSD respectively, was to be expected, 
together with Gordon Campbell (Secretary of State for 
Scotland and thus responsible for the Scottish NHS). Those 
in favour of giving local authorities appointment rights 
included Peter Walker, the Secretary of State for the 
Environment, and Peter Thomas, the Secretary of State for 
Wales (184). Thus on this issue there was a difference of 
view between Health ministers, as well as between Joseph 
and Walker, responsible for local government. 
( 184) Webster, 1996, p. xi (access to Cabinet Secretaries' 
notebooks) and p. 467 (details of ministers' 
positions, and of the discussion not incorporate? in 
the Conclusions, not referenced but almost certainly 
obtained from the relevant notebook). 
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Heath did not feel able to resolve the issue, and instead 
invited Joseph to reconsider his proposals "and attempt to 
reconcile the needs of sound management with the demand for 
local representative participation" (185). 
Given the level of opposition to his initial proposals, 
Joseph clear I y judged it necessary to compromi se . At a 
meeting of the Social Services Committee on 28 April, he 
conceded the principle that local authorities should have 
the right of appointment to AHAs, and indeed proposed to 
give universities providing medical teaching facilities a 
similar right. Rather than extend the right to the health 
professions as well, Joseph proposed that at RHAs would 
appoint at least two doctors and a nurse to each AHA, after 
consultation with the professions (186). 
Within the Committee there was some concern that Joseph's 
revised proposals did not go far enough, as he sought to 
limit local authority representation to three out of the 
proposed fourteen members on each AHA. It was noted that 
this was less than the one third proposed in Labour's 
second Green Paper, and much less than the half that had 
been proposed by the Conservatives in Opposition (187). 
In summing up the discussion, Maudling regarded Joseph's 
proposals as acceptable as a basis for consultation, though 
he needed to ascertain whether Heath wanted the issue 
discussed in Cabinet again (188). 
( 185 ) 
( 186) 
( 187 ) 
( 188) 
Conclusions of CM(71 )19th, copy on Treasury file 2SS 
21/04C. 
SL(71 )9th, ibid. 
ibid. 
ibid. Webster's account, "Once again the Home 
Secretary was obliged to refer the disagreement to 
the full Cabinet for further discussion" (1996, p. 
468), does not precisely reflect the minutes of the 
Social Services Committee meeting but, informed by 
access to the Cabinet Secretary's notebook, is 
likely to be more accurate than the publicly 
available record. 
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Heath presumably judged that the issue should be brought 
back to Cabinet, as it was discussed there on 6 May. Joseph 
explained his new proposals, seeing the local authority 
nominees as having "managerial, as well as representational 
value", but sought to hold the number of local authority 
appointees to three per AHA on the ground that that went 
"as far as was consistent with securing sound management" 
(189). Other ministers (led, according to Webster, by 
Walker (190» argued for a higher level of local authority 
representation. It was agreed that, in the proposed 
consultative document, it would be made clear that local 
authori ties would have the right to appoint" some" members, 
without specifying how many (191). 
The view that local authorities should appoint members of 
AHAs was not limited to members of the Cabinet. As noted 
above, a sub-committee of the Conservative parliamentary 
Health and Social Security Committee had been examining NHS 
issues and had reported in April 1971. It recommended that 
local authori ties should appoint eight of "perhaps 21 
members" of AHAs, and indeed favoured giving the health 
professions the right to make a similar number of 
appointments (192). Several members of the sub-committee 
spoke in the Commons debate on the consultative document, 
which had been published on 17 May, and two (Timothy Raison 
and Peter Fry) referred to these appointment proposals 
(193). 
( 189) 
( 190) 
( 1 91 ) 
( 192) 
( 193) 
Conclusions of CM(71 )24th, copy on Treasury file 2SS 
21/04C. 
Webster, 1996, p. 469. 
Conclusions of CM(71 )24th, copy on Treasury file 2SS 
21/04C. 
copy, under cover of letter from Raison to 
Macmillan, 20/5/71, on Treasury file 2SS 21 /338/01E. 
National Heal th Service Reorganisation, 1971 , 
London, DHSSi Commons Hansard, vol. 820, cols. 635 
(Raison) and 639 (Fry). 
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Despite arguing in Cabinet on 6 May 1971 that three local 
authority appointees per AHA was "as far as was consistent 
wi th securing sound management", in the light of reflection 
on comments on the consultative document, Joseph increased 
this to four when presenting his draft White Paper to the 
Cabinet Home and Social Affairs Committee on 30 June 1972 
(194). 
Again some regarded Joseph's proposal as inadequate, on 
similar grounds as before. However, this time "the majori ty 
view [was] ... that the number of local authority members 
should not exceed four" (195). Maudling reported this to 
Heath, adding that Walker "felt strongly that the minimum 
number we could defend was five which would be one third 
of the membership as proposed by our predecessors" (196). 
The draft White Paper, including the issue of local 
authority appointments to AHAs, was discussed in Cabinet 
on 20 July. In summing up the discussion Heath said that 
the draft was approved, and the issue of local authority 
appointments "could be reconsidered in the light of the 
representations which were bound to be made" (197). 
The White Paper was published on 1 August, proposing that 
local authorities should appoint four members of each AHA 
(198). 
( 194) 
( 1 95) 
( 196) 
( 197 ) 
( 198) 
HS(72)16th meeting, copy on 
21/04E. 
ibid. 
Treasury file 2SS 
on Treasury file 2SS 
minute dated 3/7/72, ibid. 
Conclusions of CM(72)37th, copy 
21/04C. 
Commons Hansard, vol. 842, col. 349; National Health 
Service Reorganisation: England, Cmnd. 5055, 1972, 
London, HMSO, p. 24. 
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In the debates on the NHS Reorganisation Bill in both Lords 
and Commons "relatively little attention [was] given to the 
question" (199). Webster reports that it had been agreed 
in the Cabinet Legislation Committee that greater 
representation that the four local authority appointees per 
AHA proposed in the White Paper could be offered (200), but 
in the event no such concession proved 
as enacted provided that the number 
appointees should be "not less than 
necessary. The Bill 
of local authori ty 
four" ( 2 0 1 ), thus 
leaving open the possibili ty of more members if 
circumstances required. 
From the perspective of the form of the NHS, the 
discussions on Joseph's proposals suggest that there were 
at least two views about what was desirable. 
At the time he became Secretary of State, Joseph shared 
Brooke and Balniel's sense that it was not practicable to 
unify the NHS wi thin local government. It is unclear, 
however, whether he shared their regrets that this was the 
si tuation. Regretfully or otherwise, but accepting the 
impracticability of transfer to local government, Joseph 
developed a vision of the NHS as a central government 
service delivered through local agencies organised on "the 
principle of sound management", which had clear attractions 
to the Treasury and the CSD. Nothing in his proposals 
suggested he envisaged the longer term transfer of the NHS 
to local government. 
( 199 ) 
(200) 
(201 ) 
Webster, 1996, p. 522. 
quoted in Webster, ibid. 
NHS Reorganisation Act 1973, schedule 1, para. 
2(1)(d). 
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Among the backbenchers who, in the parliamentary Health and 
Social Security Committee, had proposed that local 
authorities should appoint eight AHA members of "perhaps 
21", and possibly among ministers who successfully opposed 
Joseph's initial proposals in Cabinet, a different view of 
the form of NHS desirable in the longer term is 
discernible. 
Some ministers may have opposed Joseph's proposals because 
of what had been said in Opposition, to sustain the "high 
degree of co-operation among local authori ty interests 
[that] had now been created in the context of local 
government reform" (202), and to help secure what they 
regarded as appropriate conditions for effective co-
operation between local government and the reorganised NHS. 
However, Walker and ministers who shared his view wanted 
the Governme'nt to "delegate functions to local government 
so far as possible". Their rejection of what might be 
termed Joseph's pure central government model, and 
sustained determination that local authorities should have 
the right to appoint a significant number of AHA members, 
suggests that they shared the longer term aim of 
backbenchers like Raison who, along with Brooke and Balniel 
in Opposition, explicitly envisaged the NHS becoming part 
of local government (203). 
(202) 
(203) 
Conclusions of CM(71 )24th, copy on Treasury file 2SS 
21/04C. 
Raison made his position explicit in the debates on 
the consultative document and Reorganisation Bill, 
Commons Hansards vol. 820, col. 635 and vol. 853, 
col. 1193 respectively. 
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5.6 The NHS regional tier 
As noted in the previous section, Joseph saw the 
composition of the proposed AHAs as material to his vision 
of the NHS as an efficiently managed central government 
service, albeit one delivered through local agents of the 
Secretary of State. Several key ministerial colleagues did 
not share this view, however, and the outcome was a 
compromise, in which the AHAs were in part representative 
bodies. 
A second material consideration to Joseph in seeking to 
create an efficient management structure for the NHS was 
the role of regional health authorities (RHAs). 
The NHS had had a regional element - the regional hospital 
boards since its inception. The role of the RHBs, 
"appointed by and directly responsible to the Secretary of 
State", was officially described in 1971 as to administer 
"all NHS hospi tals other than designated teaching 
hospitals", by appointing "Hospital Management Committees 
to manage groups of hospitals on their behalf and subject 
to their overall oversight and direction" (204) 
(204) Handbook for Members of Hospital 
Committees, 1971, London, DHSS, p. 4. 
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Management 
When first considering reorganising the NHS, the 1966 
Labour Government had proposed to replace the two tiers of 
administration of the hospital service below national level 
(RHBs and HMCs) by one - area authorities - which would 
also have had responsibility for the FPS and local 
authority health services (205). However, when 
reconsidering these proposals that Government decided that 
AHAs as by then concei ved would be "too small for the 
performance of a number of important functions" including 
the planning of the hospital services, the organisation of 
facilities for medical, the deployment of senior medical 
staff, some staff training activities and the provision of 
blood transfusion and ambulance services (206). 
Accordingly, in the second Green Paper it was proposed to 
establish regional health councils (RHCs) to carry these 
responsibili ties, but not to "supervise or control the area 
health authorities" which, like the RHCs, would "have a 
direct relationship to the central Department" (207). 
(205) 
(206) 
(207) 
The Administrative structure of the Medical and 
Related Services in England and Wales, 1968, p. 12. 
The Future Structure of the National Health Service, 
1970, p. 23. 
ibid., p. 24. 
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By the time he was becoming convinced that unification, 
rather than finding better ways of achieving coordination 
within the tripartite structure, was the right policy to 
pursue, Joseph was also clear that it "would not make sense 
to have the 90-odd Area Health Boards reporting direct to 
the Department" (208). Drawing on his business experience, 
he asserted that having ninety "subsidiaries" accountable 
to the centre was "totally outside the scope of any chief 
executive" and that "good business experience limits the 
number of people reporting to any manager, however senior, 
to about 8" (209). 
Given his view that health authorities in a unified NHS 
would, in the interests of collaboration, need to match the 
boundaries of one or more local authorities with social 
services responsibilities, and the emerging proposals for 
local government noted in the previous section, Joseph was 
thus faced with the problem of finding a way of 
establishing accountable management for some ninety or so 
AHAs. At his meeting over two days wi th officials in 
September 1970, there was brief discussion "on the proposal 
that a National Corporation might be set up to run the 
heal th service". However, there was "no support in the 
Department for this", and the alternative seemed to Joseph 
to be a regional tier "with a stronger business element" 
than proposed in Labour's second Green Paper (210). 
(208) 
(209) 
( 21 0 ) 
Joseph/Dodds (DHSS), 8/8/70, PRO MH 166/125. 
ibid. 
note of meeting 8 and 10/9/70, PRO MH 166/125. 
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This emerging view was reflected in the draft memorandum 
circulated to other government departments on 21 September, 
where Joseph said that one of the points requiring 
consideration was "the function of any regional health 
authorities that may be set up. It is in my view of crucial 
importance to build into the new structure stronger devices 
for ensuring sound and effective management ... " (211). 
A few days later, Joseph re-emphasised to officials his 
sense that a level of organisation between the Department 
and the proposed AHAs was necessary "It would be 
hubristic madness for the Department to contemplate direct 
managemen t of 90 Area Heal th Au thor i ties". He was, however, 
determined to avoid "4 tiers" (Joseph's underlining), which 
seemed to preclude having a formal level of organisation 
below AHA level (212). 
By the time the Cabinet considered a draft of the 
consultative document on NHS reorganisation, having 
"regional authorities for the co-ordination, supervision 
and allocation of resources of the area authorities", that 
is, as "an integral part of the management structure", had 
become a firm part of Joseph's proposals (213), Unlike the 
question of local authority appointees to AHAs discussed 
in the previous section, this aspect of Joseph's proposals 
seem to have been unopposed in Cabinet. The "creation of 
a strong regional tier" was included in the consultative 
document as "one of the main di fferences between the 
present proposals and the 1970 Green Paper" (214). 
(211 ) 
( 21 2 ) 
( 21 3 ) 
( 21 4 ) 
sent under cover of a letter from Nodder to other 
government departments, copy on Treasury file 2SS 
21/04A. 
Joseph/Rogers, 28/9/70, PRO BN 13/165. 
Conclusions of CM(71 )19th, copy on Treasury file 2SS 
21/04C. 
National Health Service Reorganisation, 1971, p. 6. 
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Although Joseph's proposals as regards RHAs were accepted 
by Cabinet colleagues, they were not what some Conservative 
backbenchers favoured. 
A majority of the Health and Social Security Committee sub-
committee, in their April 1971 report, recommended "that 
there should be no executive body between the Department 
and the area boards". Two spec if i c reasons were given. 
First, having only one tier of organisation below the 
Department "should accelerate action". Second, whereas the 
Department would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and 
the proposed AHAs subject to "a considerable degree of 
local scrutiny", a regional body "would be much less 
clearly responsible to anyone" (215). 
There was, however, a perhaps more significant reason for 
rejecting "the idea of any formal regional organisation" 
implicit in the sub-committee's view of the kind of NHS 
they favoured. Members held the view that, within "clear 
policies ... the area boards should be given as much power 
as possible", making "non-medical decision-making less 
bureaucracy-bound that it is at the moment", To this end 
it wanted "a reduction of central government interference" 
(216). In other words, within a service ultimately 
accountable to ministers and Parliament, the sub-committee 
wanted to create a situation where AHAs enjoyed in practice 
a degree of independence broadly analogous to that of local 
authori ties. In this context, a regional tier would be 
unwelcome because it would have the potential both to 
reduce the responsibilities delegated to AHAs (some could 
be assigned to the regional tier), and to be a further 
source of "interference" in their work. 
( 21 5 ) 
( 21 6 ) 
copy, under cover of letter from Raison to 
Macmillan, 20/5/71, on Treasury file 2SS 21/338/01E. 
ibid. 
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Two members of the sub-commi ttee spoke on the regional 
issue during the Commons debate on the consultative 
document on 1 July 1971. While Dr Gerard Vaughan "had hoped 
that we would be able to do away with the regional boards", 
but had "reluctantly" (and, it proved, only temporarily) 
come to the conclusion that Joseph's proposal for RHAs was 
right, Raison was "still worried about the regional tier" 
and hoped Joseph would look at the issue again (217). 
The detailed working out of the role of the proposed RHAs, 
together with other detailed management issues, was 
remi t ted to a study Group of officials, supported by 
management consul tants from McKinsey and Co. Inc. and 
academics from the Health Services Organisation Research 
Unit (HSORU) at BruneI University, overseen by a thirty 
strong Management Study Steering Committee (218). 
In early 1972 Joseph requested a short statement of the 
Study Group's emerging work on the role of the RHA. This 
was furnished by Henry Strage of MCKinsey's and endorsed 
by Sir Philip Rogers, the DHSS Permanent Secretary (219). 
The statement, in the form of a two page memorandum, listed 
eight functions for the proposed RHAs, envisaged them as 
"firmly in the "chain of command" between the Department 
of Heal th and the Area Heal th Authori ties", wi th the lat ter 
corporately accountable to them (220). 
(217) 
(218) 
(219) 
(220) 
Commons Hansard, vol. 820, cols. 618 (Vaughan) and 
636 (Raison). 
details of the Study Group, and the Management Study 
Steer i ng Commi t tee, are given in Managemen t 
Arrangements for the Reorganised Na tional Heal th 
Service, 1972, London, HMSO, pp. 3/4. 
Rogers/Joseph, 13/3/72, covering memorandum from 
McKinsey's dated 9/3/72, Graham papers. 
memorandum, ibid. 
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Joseph declared himself "shocked" - "1. could have written 
this" (Joseph's underlining), and clearly wanted a more 
substantial analysis as to how the eight functions listed, 
particularly developing plans, allocating resources and 
ensuring that AHAs planning and operational activities was 
co-ordinated with local authorities, would be made to work 
in practice (221). Having shortly before rejected the 
advice of Meyjes and Professor Elliott Jaques, the director 
of the HSORU, that his proposed structure of 
Department/RHAs/AHAS "simply will not work" (222), it is 
understandable that Joseph was becoming concerned at what 
he regarded as lack of progress on a key issue. 
The White Paper published on 1 August 1972 referred to the 
role of the proposed RHAs in similar length and substantive 
content to the McKinsey memorandum (223), and a month later 
the report of the study Group, widely referred to 
thereafter as the Grey Book, was published (224). The Grey 
Book built on the account of the regional role given in the 
McKinsey memorandum and White Paper, giving a very brief 
account of the means by which functions would be 
discharged, including the relationships between RHA and AHA 
senior officers (225). 
The policy proposals in the White Paper and the management 
arrangements in the Grey Book provided the context for the 
NHS Reorganisation Bill, and the role of the RHAs was one 
of the issues raised during its passage. 
( 221 ) 
(222) 
(223) 
(224) 
(225) 
Joseph/Rogers, 13/7/72, ibid. 
Meyjes R and Jaques E, A National Organisation Model 
for a Unified NHS, undated but undoubtedly February 
1972, in the currently closed CAB 157 (Webster, 
1996, p. 922). Copy provided to the author by 
Jaques. This issue is explored in section 5.8 below. 
Cmnd. 5055. 
Management Arrangements for the Reorganised National 
Health Service, 1972. 
ibid., pp. 24/6. 
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During the Commons Second Reading, both Vaughan and Raison 
questioned the need for RHAs. Vaughan regarded the need for 
a regional tier, "except perhaps as a planning and advisory 
body", as something that would need to examined closely 
during the Bill's Committee stage (226). Raison was "still 
not persuaded that a regional tier is necessary", and 
thought that the various functions proposed for RHAs could 
be assigned to the Department and the AHAs (227). 
Both Vaughan and Raison were appointed to the Standing 
Committee to which the Reorganisation Bill was allocated, 
and Raison tabled an amendment which would have had the 
effect of removing RHAs from the structure proposed by the 
Government. In an attempt to resolve differences between 
the Government and the two backbenchers on the issue, 
Joseph met them on 30 April 1973, the day before the 
relevant Committee sitting. 
According to Joseph's private secretary's note of the 
meeting, Vaughan and Raison raised four particular 
concerns: that the new structure would be less flexible 
that the existing one, more administrative staff would be 
needed, members on RHAs would be more usefully deployed at 
area level, and the new structure would "increase 
interference between Government and those actually 
delivering health care". The private secretary's note 
recorded that these concerns had been put to Vaughan and 
Raison by some hospital administrators who had impressed 
them, and that Joseph had offered to meet the 
administrators concerned, with the two MPs, to hear their 
views at first hand (228). 
(226) 
(227) 
(228) 
Commons Hansard, 27/3/73, vol. 853, col. 1143. 
ibid., col. 1194. 
note by G Hart, 30/4/73, PRO BN 13/172. 
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The following day, 1 May 1973, Raison moved his amendment 
in Committee, "to test and examine the need for a regional 
tier". In his view, the arguments for RHAs presented by the 
Government in the White Paper were thin - we are entitled 
to a much fuller explanation ... than we have had so far". 
Raison expressed several concerns about the proposed 
regional tier: its proposed existence called into question 
whether AHAs were trusted to do their job, offered scope 
for unnecessary interference with AHAS, helped create a 
structure with "a pretty lengthy chain of command", would 
be difficult to hold to account, and would be remote from 
the patient (229). Vaughan agreed with all Raison's points 
(230). 
Another Conservative on the Committee, David Crouch, a 
member of a RHB, disagreed with his colleagues, arguing 
that "it would be fundamentally wrong to remove the 
regional authori ty because to do so would produce even 
greater delay". In his view, AHAs who needed to submit a 
matter to higher authority would be likely to get a 
speedier response from a RHA than from the DHSS (231). 
Joseph's Parliamentary Secretary, Alison, sought to re-
assure the Committee about the need for RHAs, but Joseph 
felt the need to contribute, too, accepting personal 
responsibili ty for "not having explained clearly enough how 
the Government foresee these tier interacting". He sought 
to offer re-assurance by described the proposed RHAs as 
"local sensitive but constructive agents of the Secretary 
of State, carrying out locally but sensitively national 
strategy modified to local needs" (232). 
(229) 
(230) 
( 231 ) 
(232) 
Commons Standing Committee G Hansard, 1/5/73, eols. 
316/23 
ibid., col. 323. 
ibid., eols. 329/32. 
ibid., eols. 348/54. 
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Both Vaughan and Raison expressed "lingering doubts" (233), 
but the amendment to remove RHAs from the Bill was not 
pressed. Despite, therefore, sustained concern from some 
Conservative backbenchers, the second element of Joseph's 
strategy to improve the efficiency of the NHS through 
better management was enacted as he had proposed. 
Like the discussion in Cabinet on the composition of AHAs, 
the sustained criticism of Vaughan and Raison suggests a 
preference for a different form of NHS to that the 
Government was proposing - one with less central control. 
In Raison's case, it was consistent with his stated view 
that, in time, the NHS should become a local government 
service. 
5.7 The form of management within the proposed NHS 
structure 
Unlike many other organisations, the statutory bodies 
responsible for the hospital services created by the NHS 
Act 1946 had no single executive head, 
accountable for the work of all other staff. 
ultimately 
HMCs and RHBs were bodies corporate, and comprised of part 
time members appointed by the Secretary of State (in the 
case of the RHBs and the chairmen of HMCs) and the RHBs (in 
the case of HMC members). Accountable to each RHB were 
three "principal administrative officers" (secretary, 
senior administrative medical officer and treasurer) and 
several other "chief officers" (such as the regional 
architect, engineer and nursing officer). Accountable to 
each HMC were two principal officers, the group secretary 
and treasurer, and other "chief officers" (234). 
(233) 
(234) 
ibid., col. 354. 
Handbook for Members 
Committees, 1971, pp. 11 
officers) . 
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of Hospi tal Managemen t 
(RHB officers) and 7/8 (HMC 
In the 1960s this form of organisation had been examined 
by a Commi t tee of the Scot t i sh Heal th Serv ices Counc i I 
chaired by Farquharson-Lang which, as noted in Chapter 2, 
had recommended that, as an alternative, a "chief executive 
pas t should be es tabl i shed at each type of [ Scot t i sh ] 
board". The CRD had circulated a short paper to the HPG, 
summarising the Farquharson-Lang report (235), so Joseph, 
as a member, would have known of the recommendation, which 
may have resonated wi th his commercial experience as a 
manager, director and ultimately chairman of Bovis. 
Whatever influenced him, it is clear that as Joseph became 
persuaded that the NHS should be unified, he favoured the 
introduction of the chief executive role, in the Department 
and the new health authorities. From the outset, however, 
officials sought to dissuade him from the idea. 
As early as 26 August 1970, Sir Alan Marre, his Second 
Permanent Secretary, with many years experience of the NHS, 
sent Joseph a memorandum noting the difficulty in 
establishing a chief executive role in an organisation 
where medical practice was characterised by clinical 
autonomy, and where many other staff were professionals 
exercising professional judgement. For Marre, "clearly 
managers [he had in mind Joseph's putative chief executive] 
cannot interfere with the exercise by a professional man 
of his professional judgement". Marre acknowledged that "I 
think we all see the need for more concentrated authori ty" , 
and suggested the answer might lie in placing "beyond all 
doubt the manager's responsibili ty for effecti vely co-
ordinating the provision of the totality of the services" 
(236). 
(235) 
(236) 
Administrative Practice of Hospital Boards in 
Scotland, 1966, p. 64 (Farquharson-Lang report); 
PG/13a/66/22, CPA CRD 4/7/15 (CRD paper). 
Marre/ Joseph, extract in note by Cashman (DHSS), 
28/9/70, PRO BN 13/165. 
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Joseph, having decided to pursue a policy of unification, 
re-read the Labour Government's second Green Paper and 
minuted Rogers to emphasise his sense that the management 
proposals needed strengthening. In particular, Joseph 
envisaged, at area level, "a chief executive with 
outstanding management ability, drive and sustained 
determination ... who will accept the obligation to manage 
by persuasion within the professional areas, but directly 
elsewhere" (237). 
A month later, Joseph and officials discussed a 
key aspects of a reorganised NHS, including the 
role of chief executive officer. This noted 
paper on 
proposed 
likely 
objections to the proposal from the BMA (who would accept 
it only if the chief executives were medically qualified) 
and other professional interests; identified the main 
components of the role (leadership of the authority's team 
of senior officers, interpretation and implementation of 
the authority's policies and co-ordination of the 
authori ty' s acti vi ties and of the work of its various 
departments); and set out the role's limitations (much as 
in Marre's memorandum). The paper also suggested, as an 
alternative, leadership by a "triarchy of lay 
administrator, doctor and nurse, who would carry collective 
responsibility for administration of the area's health 
services" (238). 
Joseph was not content with the formulation in the paper: 
for him "it was essential" that the chief executive officer 
"should not merely co-ordinate but should act as a driving 
force for the area authority". It was agreed that further 
thought would be given to the issue (239). 
(237) 
(238) 
(239) 
Joseph/Rogers, 21/9/70, PRO BN 13/165. 
NHS Reorganisation: Main structural 
LP ( 70) 1, paras. 31/8, sen t under cover 
from Dodds, 22/10/70, PRO MH 166/126. 
note of meeting, 28/10/70, ibid. 
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Features, 
of minute 
At this stage Joseph hoped to include the proposal for 
chief executive officers in "our first published proposals 
with appropriate riders about clinical freedom and 
medical access to the Board [authority]" (240). 
In December 1970 a Departmental paper specifically on the 
issue of a possible chief executive role was produced, 
covering much the same ground as Marre's August memorandum, 
and explored the issue of a co-ordinator as an alternative 
to the kind of chief executive Joseph had envisaged (241). 
Joseph discussed the Departmental paper on 19 January 1971 
with officials, a number of health service representatives, 
and Meyjes who was an adviser to DHSS on matters of NHS and 
Departmental reorganisation from late 1970. 
After the meeting Meyjes wrote to say that he was "more 
convinced than ever of the need for a Chief Executi ve 
Officer at each level in the NHS hierarchy", regarded the 
Department I s notion of a co-ordinator as "a wishy-washy and 
dangerous compromise", and suggested that arguments 
advanced that the NHS was a special case and different 
considerations should apply about its management that in 
other spheres were over-stated (242). Joseph drafted his 
own reply, expressing his concern about moving "too far or 
too fast" and harming "the spirit of co-operation we need", 
but saying that he would go as far as he safely could 
(243). 
(240) 
( 241 ) 
(242) 
(243) 
Joseph IS wr i t ten comments on paper LP ( 70) 1 , 
30/10/70, ibid. 
Chief Officers of Regional and Area Heal th 
Authorities, LP(70)11, December 1970, PRO MH 
159/406. 
Meyjes/Joseph, 22/1/71, ibid. 
Joseph/Meyjes, draft and letter as sent dated 
27/1/71, ibid. 
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Sir George Godber, the Department's Chief Medical Officer, 
and others at the meeting had clearly disagreed wi th 
Meyjes. Reflecting on the various arguments, Marre prepared 
a note suggesting that the differences were "less great 
than might be inferred from the discussion". Everyone at 
the meeting had accepted that a chief executive "cannot 
interfere with clinical freedom". At depth, the key 
difference seemed to Marre to be whether or not it was 
accepted that, issues of clinical freedom excepted, there 
were "some, professional, areas" in respect of which the 
chief executive could not give orders. Marre also suggested 
that "general manager" might be a more acceptable term than 
"chief executive" (244). Rogers and, to an extent, Joseph 
agreed with Marre's view, but his analysis attracted 
criticism from Godber who commented "this is all about 
running an office, not organising a service provided by 
professionals independent in their own responsibility. It 
wholly misses the operational requirement" (245). 
Joseph held a further meeting on 10 February with Meyjes 
and senior officials, and questioned whether, "unless there 
was one person wi th ul timate responsibili ty, there was 
likely to be enough drive and purpose injected into the 
organisation". There was discussion as to what "ultimate 
responsibili ty" was practicable wi thin the NHS wi th its 
many professional staff - the authority to decide, or to 
co-ordinate. In the event, "given the difficulty of 
reaching agreement", Joseph proposed that the issue should 
be given more detailed examination, and it was decided that 
this should be in the context of the "general study on ... 
management" (the Study Group and Steering Committee 
referred to above) (246). 
(244) 
(245) 
(246) 
Marre/Rogers, 25/1/71, PRO BN 13/157. 
Rogers/Joseph, 26/1/71; Joseph/Rogers, 27/1/71; 
Godber/Henry Yellowlees, 26/1/71, all PRO BN 13/157; 
Godber/Joseph, 8/2/71, PRO MH 159/406. 
note of meeting, 10/2/71, PRO MH 159/406. 
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Before the issue was remitted to the study Group, Rogers 
sought to discover whether differences could be resolved. 
Following consultations with Godber and Meyjes in 
particular, he found a measure of agreement on what might 
be termed a strong co-ordinator post, a "role which did not 
carry or imply executive authority over other professional 
officers in the exercise of their professional judgement 
but should make clear the task of leadership and co-
ordinating management" (247). In reply to Rogers, Meyjes 
expressed minor reservations "which can remain between us", 
but said that he was content with the proposal which he saw 
as "a great advance" (248). 
Rogers' proposal was considered by Joseph at a meeting on 
7 May, where it was agreed, the proposed new role being 
referred to as "a co-ordinating post". The definition of 
the functions of the post was remitted to the management 
study (249). 
It seems possible, however, that the management study Group 
was not advised that the strong "co-ordinating" role agreed 
at the 7 May meeting was a "given" for its purposes. For 
by January 1972 discussion within the Group had led to the 
formulation of "five basic alternatives" for the executive 
function, including "a chief executive officer with 
subordinate officers" (250). 
(247) 
(248) 
(249) 
(250) 
Rogers/Joseph, April 1971 (see also Godber/Rogers, 
10/3/71 and 7/4/71), all on PRO MH 159/406. 
Meyjes/Rogers, 16/3/71, ibid. 
note of meeting 7/5/71, PRO BN 13/166. 
paper dated 14/1/72, PRO BN 13/168. 
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The issue evidently generated difficulty within the 
management study Steering Committee, because in March 
Rogers minuted senior officers to invite then to a meeting 
to discuss "the problem of "coordination" ... [about which] 
it is very clear that suspicion and uncertainty are 
poisoning the reaction of a number of members of the 
Committee and ... many members of the NHS, about the whole 
question of reorganisation". This followed an "off the 
record and over drinks" meeting that Rogers had had with 
"the medical members of the Steering Committee" which had 
led to the thought that, "while the "testing" by the Study 
Team of the various hypotheses [presumably the five put to 
Joseph in January] would continue, we might make it clear 
that the Department does not wish to pursue any proposal 
for a "Chief Executive" with subordinates" (251). 
Rogers' minute made it clear that, if colleagues agreed, 
the intention was to sound others wi thin the Steering 
Committee, and if the reaction was favourable the 
Department would then put a paper to the Committee setting 
out this "method of approach" (252). 
The approach proposed seems to have been agreed, as Rogers 
wrote to "representative groups of members" of the Steering 
Committee a week later, suggesting meetings to discuss his 
proposi tion. His sense of the potential di fficul ty was 
perhaps conveyed by the following sentence from the letter: 
"I suggest the preliminary of smaller meetings because I 
feel they might be helpful to all of us before we tackle 
so delicate an issue in a Commi ttee of such a size" (253). 
( 251 ) 
(252) 
(253) 
Rogers/R Gedling and others, 7/3/72, Graham papers. 
ibid. 
Rogers' letter, 
papers nor the 
indicate to which 
sent the letter. 
14/3/72, ibid. Neither the Graham 
DHSS files available in the PRO 
Steering Committee members Rogers 
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Following these smaller meetings, Rogers put a paper to the 
Steering Committee on 27 April 1972, but withdrew it in the 
light of reservations expressed by members (254). He 
presented a revised version to the Committee meeting on 2 
June, with the proposal that co-ordination should be split 
between two roles. The administrator at each level would 
have a "general" co-ordinating responsibility, and the 
chairman of the team of chief officers (who might be 
elected or appointed by the chairman of the health 
authority) would have the responsibility of ensuring that 
the work of the team went ahead effectively. This revised 
version was accepted (255). 
On 3 July a draft chapter of the Study Group's report was 
sent to Joseph, including the view that "a single hierarchy 
controlled by a chief executive is not appropriate. The 
appropriate structure at all levels will be multi-
disciplinary teams through which the managers and 
representatives of the relevant professions can corne 
together to make decisions" (256). A week later, Joseph was 
advised that the draft chapter had been "substantially 
approved" by the steering committee (257). 
(254) 
(255) 
(256) 
(257) 
One Problem of Managemen t in the Na tional Heal th 
Service, discussed at SCM(72)5th meeting, paper and 
minutes on PRO MH 159/386. 
rev i sed paper discus sed at SCM ( 72) 7 th mee t i ng, paper 
and minutes on PRO MH 159/387. 
under cover of minute from FDK Williams (DHSS 
Chairman of the management Study Group), 3/7/72, PRO 
BN 13/169. 
Williams/Joseph, 10/7/72, PRO BN 13/170. 
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The proposals for management arrangements were trailed in 
an appendix to the White Paper published on 1 August 1972 
as "some ideas being developed in the [management study] 
(258), and were set out in full in the Grey Book published 
in September. The latter contained a brief reference to a 
chief executive role, asserting that the complexity of the 
NHS made it inappropriate. Instead, "consensus-forming 
group[s] of equals" at all levels were proposed, with the 
relevant administrator (regional, area or district 
administrator) providing "general administrative co-
ordination" (259). 
The issue had the potential to re-surface in January 1973, 
when the results of consultation on the Grey Book proposals 
were reported to Joseph. Several of those who had commented 
were critical of the idea of management through consensus 
teams: the BMA, for example, thought that "a medically 
qualified Chief Executive of each authority" would be 
preferable (260). Rogers did not refer to this issue in his 
covering minute to Joseph who, although picking up a large 
number of issues, made no reference to it himself (261). 
(258) 
(259) 
(260) 
(261 ) 
Cmnd. 5055, 1972, pp. 57/62. 
Management Arrangements for the Reorganised National 
Health Service, 1972, p. 15 (reference to chief 
executive role; p. 42 ("group[s] of equals"); pp. 
35, 39 and 43 (general administrati~e co-ordination 
at district, area and reglonal levels, 
respectively). , 
submission sent under cover of Rogers minute of 
2/ 1 /73 , PRO BN 1 3/ 1 7 1 . 
ibid. (Rogers); Joseph's response, 3/1/73, ibid. 
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How is Joseph's acceptance of the co-ordinating role to be 
understood, given his early enthusiasm for the 
establishment of the chief executive role, and the support 
he received in January 1971 from Meyjes? 
The evidence suggests that on this specific issue both 
Joseph and Meyjes were largely, if not wholly, convinced 
by the analysis offered by Marre and Rogers. Joseph clearly 
accepted the right of doctors to exercise their personal 
clinical judgements in advising and treating their patients 
which, as noted in the Introduction, had been one of the 
basic principles, and therefore part of the form, of the 
NHS since its inception (though, as noted above, he wanted 
to find "ways of breaking down consultants' autonomy in 
resource allocation and utilisation"). He also accepted, 
early in the Departmental discussions, that a chief 
executi ve could only manage "by persuasion wi thin the 
professional areas". Gi ven both of these, a chief executi ve 
with full authority over all other staff was, by 
definition, not feasible, and Rogers' strong co-ordinating 
role seemed a practicable alternative. 
The outcome of the discussions over the chief executive 
role meant that Joseph was unable to see carried through 
into the reorganised Service two of the three elements of 
his vision of how to improve the efficiency of the NHS that 
proved contentious. From Joseph's point of view, on the 
positive side was the fact that, despite the opposition of 
some Conservative backbenchers, his proposal in respect of 
RHAs was enacted. However, he was forced by differences of 
view in Cabinet to modify his view that AHAs should be 
constituted on what he regarded as "the principle of sound 
management rather than participation", and was persuaded 
from pursuing his proposal for chief executives. 
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5.8 The oversight of the NHS nationally 
Joseph's sense of the NHS organised on sound management 
principles included oversight at national level by the 
Secretary of State, supported by are-orientated DHSS. Re-
orientation was necessary because Joseph regarded the 
Department as "not organised to manage" (his underlining). 
In his view, it was "organised to set policy, but that is 
not the same thing as active management" (262). 
Although Joseph envisaged the RHAs as having a key role, 
some reorganisation of the Department was required, the 
better to fit it for its contribution to "active 
management" of the NHS. Even before detailed work on the 
proposed new NHS structure was put in hand, McKinsey and 
Co. was commissioned to review the organisation of the 
DHSS. As a result, a new division was created within the 
Department, with (London-based) sections responsible for 
liaison with each of the proposed fourteen regions. 
Joseph's intentions as regards the Department generated 
Ii ttle specific parliamentary interest, though the 
Opposi tion and some Conservati ve backbenchers expressed 
concerns about centralisation (263). They did, however, 
come under criticism from two of the sources of non-DHSS, 
non-NHS organisational expertise involved in developing the 
arrangements for the reorganised NHS - Meyjes and Jaques. 
(262) 
(263) 
Joseph/Dodds, 8/8/70, PRO MH 166/125. 
for example, John Silkin referred to the NHS under 
the proposed new structure as "firmly under his [the 
Secretary of State's] control" (Commons Hansard, 
vol. 853, col. 943; Pavitt (Labour) rejected "the 
whole managerial hierarchical structure which the 
Secretary of State makes the basis of his approach 
and the concentration of absolute power in his own 
hands" (ibid., col. 952); and in Vaughan's view the 
proposals offered Ita very large dose of line 
management a major tightening of executive 
authority" (ibid. col. 1142). 
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In Opposition the Conservatives had enlisted the help of 
a number of businessmen, and in Government several were 
seconded to the CSD and deployed on a wide range of 
projects (264). After some early confusion, referred to 
above, Meyjes became an adviser on NHS reorganisation and 
a member of the Steering Commi ttee for the management 
study. 
Jaques was the head of the School of Social Sciences at 
BruneI University, and Director of both the BruneI 
Institute of Organization and Social Studies (BlOSS) and 
the HSORU, a unit almost wholly funded by the DHSS. The 
HSORU was thus a natural source of advice to which the DHSS 
could turn. 
In April 1971, officials sought Joseph's agreement that 
McKinsey and Co., already contracted to work on the review 
of the DHSS, be engaged on the NHS reorganisation 
management study. In addition, his agreement was sought for 
Jaques to be appointed to the Steering Committee (265). 
Joseph agreed to both, the latter after seeing some of 
Jaques' work (266). 
(264) 
(265) 
(266) 
a list for the period July 1970 to May 1972 is 
attached to a minute from D Hoskin (CSD)/Meyjes, 
27/4/72, CSD file MG 425/08. 
J Orme (DHSS)/Joseph, 8/4/71, Graham papers. 
Joseph, 22/4/71 and 2/5/71, ibid. 
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Before Jaques' appointment was effected, however, a 
difficulty had to be resolved between his unit, the HSORU, 
and McKinsey and Co. on how the two would work together. 
At one stage discussion on this seemed to be reaching "an 
impasse" (267) and that only one of the organisations would 
be able to be involved in the management study. At that 
stage Meyjes (and Rogers) "in the last resort 
prefer[red] to rely on McKinseys alone" (268). 
When Mey j es and Jaques found themselves members of the 
Steering Committee, they had no previous relationship (269) 
and, although wanting Jaques to be involved, "in the last 
resort" Meyjes regarded McKinsey's as more important than 
the HSORU. 
From his first contacts with DHSS ministers and officials, 
Meyjes had criticisms of the way Joseph was approaching the 
issue of NHS reorganisation, which he regarded as 
"basically ... an unco-ordinated "in-house" approach", when 
in his view a small expert team of individuals from inside 
and outside the DHSS/NHS should be established to make 
recommendations (270). 
During the course of his membership of the Steering 
Committee, Meyjes' concern about the way matters were being 
taken forward increased, and he came to the view that the 
structure Joseph was proposing (and within which the 
management study was constrained to work) was 
unsatisfactory. Jaques reached much the same conclusion. 
(267) 
(268) 
(269) 
(270) 
Meyjes/Rogers, 3/6/71, ibid. 
ibid. (Meyjes)i Rogers/Meyjes, 7/6/71 (Rogers), 
ibid. 
personal communication from Jaqu~s. 
Meyjes/Jellicoe, 14/12/70, CSD flle MG 281/16/01S. 
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Early in 1972 Meyjes and Jaques prepared a paper offering 
an alternative structure above AHA level, as by then their 
experience of trying to design "a unified NHS organisation" 
from Joseph's three tier structure had "forced [them] to 
the conclusion that it simply will not work" (271). 
Meyjes and Jaques' main cri ticism of Joseph's proposed 
structure was that it lacked "an NHS strategic planning 
top". As proposed, national level management was provided 
by a permanent secretary with other duties, assisted by a 
full time deputy secretary and other, less senior staff: 
"markedly insufficient strength for managing such a vast 
organisation. A full time Chief Officer of at least Second 
Permanent Secretary level is essential" (272). 
Instead of the traditional civil service staffing of the 
DHSS (albeit to be reorganised following the McKinsey and 
Co. review) and the fourteen RHAs, Meyjes and Jaques 
proposed a "national statutory health service authority, 
with the same relationship to the Secretary of State as 
that envisaged for the RHAs" with, as a Chief Officer at 
Second Permanent Secretary level as its senior member of 
staff. The national authority would relate directly to the 
AHAs which would be "full strength ... not squeezed down 
by an RHA between [them] and national level (273). 
( 271 ) 
(272) 
(273) 
A National Organisation Model for a Unified NHS, 
1971, p. 1. 
ibid., p. 2. 
ibid., pp. 3/5. 
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Meyjes and Jaques had the opportunity of discussing their 
paper with Joseph, accompanied by Rogers and senior 
officials, on 1 March 1972. Rogers regarded the proposed 
national health authority as an attempt "to separate policy 
and management in organisational terms", which he saw as 
"highly damaging"; both should be the responsibili ty of the 
DHSS. Joseph was unconvinced by the Meyjes/Jaques 
proposals, and regarded "the inclusion of regional 
authorities [as] a political imperative" (though the 
evidence suggests that it was he who made it so, and he 
would have received support from Conservative backbenchers 
such as Vaughan and Raison, and possibly the Opposition, 
had he jettisoned them). Nevertheless, Joseph offered a 
further meeting, for Meyjes and Jaques "to put their case 
more fully" (274). 
The further meeting was held on 6 March. At this, Joseph 
concluded that the "proposed national NHS authority would 
not be viable politically or operationally" and could not 
agree to the issue being discussed by the Steering 
Committee (275). 
It is open 
of Joseph 
reporting 
to question whether there was any possibility 
being persuaded by Meyjes and Jaques. In 
on these meetings to Aberdare, who attended 
neither, his private secretary wrote "I understand that the 
meetings were in no way consultative. Secretary of State 
had already decided, on the basis of the papers presented, 
that the proposals they contained were not acceptable. 
There were two meetings ... only in order to cushion the 
blow of what was to be a negative reply" (276). 
(274) 
(275) 
(276) 
meeting note 72/35, PRO BN 13/158. 
meeting note 72/39, ibid. 
E Weeple/Aberdare, 7/3/72, PRO BN 13/167. 
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Why did Joseph reject Meyjes and Jaques' advice? On the 
basis of the views he expressed at the outset of the 
development of the NHS reorganisation proposals, they might 
have been expected to have been well recei ved. For, as 
noted above, Joseph regarded the DHSS as organised to set 
policy rather than to manage, and had positively wanted 
Meyjes' management advice recognising, perhaps, the 
limitations of his officials in that regard (277). 
In understanding Joseph's decision, it is of course quite 
possible that he was intellectually unconvinced by the 
Meyjes/Jaques analysis, which is hinted at in his view that 
the national health authority would not be viable 
organisationally as well as politically. Other 
considerations were concern over what by March 1972 was 
becoming a tight timetable if work was to be completed in 
time for legislation to be prepared and enacted in the 1970 
Parliament and, possibly, the growing influence of Rogers, 
who disagreed with the Meyjes/Jaques proposal (278). 
For Meyjes, Joseph's decision on 6 March marked the end of 
what he had found to be a generally unsatisfactory 
involvement with NHS reorganisation. He wrote to Joseph on 
9 March, informing him that he was discontinuing his 
consultancy role to the DHSS and NHS including resigning 
from the Steering Committee (279). 
(277) 
(278) 
(279) 
Joseph/Rogers, 28/9/70 (re Meyjes), PRO BN 13/165; 
"The Department [is] full of talent but not 
necessarily [management] talent", Joseph/Dodds, 
8/8/70, PRO MH 166/125. 
Joseph evidently valued Rogers' advice highly. After 
Rogers retired, Joseph sought it when in Opposition, 
even to the point where Rogers became a member of 
the Party's Public Sector Policy Group and its 
Manpower Sub-group - see chapter 5. 
Meyjes/Joseph, in the currently closed PRO CAB 157 
(Webster, 1996, p. 922). Author supplied with a copy 
by Jaques. 
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In this letter, Meyjes expressed his conviction that the 
Steering Committees (for the DHSS and NHS studies) were 
viewed by Rogers and Godber as "little more than elaborate 
and increasingly tiresome pieces of window dressing to lend 
credence to a pre-determined solution ll ; criticised Rogers 
"desperate attempts not to make constructive criticisms of 
our proposal but to suppress it altogether and thus 
prevent its wider consideration by the Steering Committees 
and other interested parties; and commented that he had 
been "astonished at the superficiality and lack of 
sophistication in the discussion" of the proposal with 
Joseph and senior officials. He repeated his view that 
Joseph's scheme would not work: "I am sure we are moving 
in the wrong direction towards a bad solution thus 
missing a unique opportunity for positive and much needed 
reform" (280). 
5.9 Conservative views on the NHS's structure and 
management arrangements 
The Government's decision to unify the NHS provided a focus 
for reflection on the structure and management arrangements 
of the Service, and among Conservative responses various 
views can be discerned. 
At what might be regarded as the two poles were Joseph's 
initial vision of a central government service organised 
on what he regarded as the "principles of sound 
management", and Arthur Jones' preference for integrating 
the NHS into the reformed local government structure. 
(280) ibid. 
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Between the poles was a variety of positions. Some 
Conservatives, such as Raison, shared the views expressed 
by Brooke and Balniel in Opposition and looked to see the 
NHS part of local government in the longer term. They 
clearly favoured organisational arrangements without the 
degree of central control envisaged in Joseph's proposals, 
and reflected on specific issues, such as the regional 
role, from this perspective. It seems likely that Cabinet 
ministers such as Walker shared this longer term view, 
which would make understandable their sustained campaign 
to give local authorities the right of appointment to AHAs. 
Other Conservatives who did not look to the NHS becoming 
part of local government in the longer term, also regretted 
what they saw as the centralising aspect of Joseph's 
proposals. In Opposition, Balniel and others had argued 
against undue centralism (for example, during the debate 
in March 1970 on then Labour Governmen t 's second Green 
Paper, see chapter 2, section 5.4). This was certainly the 
case with Powell, for whom the financing arrangements of 
the Service precluded a local government solution (281), 
but who regarded the transfer of the local authority health 
services to central government as creating a monopoly of 
sources of initiative rather than what he regarded as a 
more desirable plurality. It was probably also the position 
of Vaughan and Stuttaford, both of whom cri ticised Joseph's 
proposals as unduly "managerial". 
(281) Commons Hansard, vol. 853, cols. 1121/2. 
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Joseph may have felt ambivalent about the outcome of 
discussions on his reorganisation policy. He started with 
a clear vision, much of which was widely supported. There 
was almost universal support for bringing the three 
branches of the NHS together and, given unification outside 
local government, for coterminosity of boundaries for 
health and social services authorities. Within Conservative 
ranks (Arthur Jones excepted) there was support for the NHS 
being, for the present at least, a central government 
service, though some concern about transferring the local 
government health services to central government. 
It was in respect of Joseph's sense of a Service based on 
the "principles of sound management" that he encountered 
most opposition and had to modify or abandon aspects of his 
initial plans. The three elements discussed above proved 
the most contentious. On one, the appointment basis of the 
AHAs, Cabinet concerns led to compromise. On a second, the 
chief executive role, he seems to have been persuaded from 
his initial plan by the arguments of his civil servants. 
He succeeded in securing enactment of the third, RHAs in 
line relationship between the DHSS and the AHAs, but did 
so in the face of some unease among Conservative 
backbenchers, and the unambiguous advice from two of his 
sources of independent management expertise that the RHAs 
and the Departmental organisation together were a "markedly 
insufficient" top to such a major organisation which 
"simply would not work". 
As a result, the NHS became a wholly central government 
based service, consciously managerial in style though less 
so in substance than Joseph initially proposed. As such, 
the changes enacted in the NHS Reorganisation Act 1973 
marked a significant shift from the arrangements 
implemented in 1948 and essentially extant until 1974. 
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6. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT 
been given of In the previous sections an account has 
Conservati ve policy thinking on the 
arrangements of the NHS, within the 
organisational 
context of the 
Government's policies for public expendi ture and a "new 
style of government". In this section interpretations of 
the Heath Government will be considered, with a view to 
reaching conclusions as to their relevance to the account 
given of thinking in respect of the NHS. 
studies of the Heath Government have covered a wide range 
of facets (282). In the main, however, they have focused 
on its economic and industrial policies, with much 
attention to the degree of success enjoyed and, where 
(usually) the authors' verdict was one of failure, 
interpretation of that failure (283). 
That is understandable as economic and industrial policies 
were central concerns of the Government, and the subject 
of "u turns" in policy from the apparently less 
interventionist approach signalled by the 1970 general 
election manifesto to a more interventionist one which 
Thatcher later described as "the most radical form of 
socialism ever contemplated by an elected British 
government" (284). And reaction to these policies led Heath 
to decide to seek a dissolution well before required under 
the Parliament Act, the consequent general election 
resulting in the fall of the Government. 
(282) 
(283) 
(284) 
for example, those covered in the contributions to 
Ball S and Seldon A, The Heath Government 1970-1974, 
1996, London, Longman. 
various interpretations are conveniently summarised 
in Seldon A, "The Heath Government in History", 
ibid., p. 2. 
Thatcher M, The Downing street Years, 1993, London, 
Harper-Collins, p. 7. 
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Among the general surveys of the Heath Government, the 
issues discussed in this Chapter feature, if at all, at the 
very margin. There are usually (though not invariably) 
references to the Government's reorganisation of central 
government (and espeCially the creation of the CPRS), but 
rarely more than a sentence or two on either NHS or local 
government reorganisation (285). Even in works taking an 
historical view of the NHS, reorganisation tends to be 
treated briefly, the Official History being by far the most 
noteworthy exception (286). 
In respect of the reorganisation of the NHS, commentators 
have tended to focus on the basic facts, and to expressions 
of opinion on its success or otherwise (287). The Official 
History is, again, the clear exception. 
(285) 
(286) 
(287) 
for example, taking central and local government and 
NHS reorganisation together, in Blake, 1985 (one 
sentence in eight pages, p. 315); Butler D and 
Kavanagh D, The Bri tish General Election of February 
1974, 1974, London, Macmillan (two lines in 17 
pages, p. 11); Charmley J, A History of Conserva ti ve 
Politics 1900-1996, 1996, London, Macmillan (no 
reference in 14 pages); Holmes M, The Failure of the 
Heath Government, 2nd ed., 1997, London, Macmillan 
(no reference in 149 pages); Kavanagh D, "The Heath 
Government 1970-1974" in Hennessy P and Seldon A 
(eds.), Ruling Performance", Oxford, Blackwell, 1987 
( two par as. in 2 1 pa g e s , pp . 2 2 3 / 4 and 2 3 3 ) ; 
Ramsden, 1996, (2.5 pages in 65 pages). 
for example, in Klein R, The New Politics of the 
NHS, 3rd ed., 1995, London, Longman, (five pages, 
pp. 84/90); Lowe, 1989, (two pages, pp. 189/90); 
Raison, 1990, (four pages, pp. 79/82). By contrast, 
Webster, 1996 (128 pages, pp. 451/579). 
for example, Campbell, 1993, p. 384 ("disaster"); 
Klein, 1995, p. 90 ("satisfied no one"); Lowe, 1989, 
p. 190 (Ita disaster"); Raison, 1990, pp. 81/2 
("over-elaborate" and "flabby"). 
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Some commentators have shared the sense that, though not 
ini tially and never formally part of the "new style of 
government" approach, NHS reorganisation was in keeping 
with the general approach of the Heath Government, 
characterised by one as being "optimistic about the 
benefi ts of structural and insti tutional change" (288). The 
account given in this Chapter supports this view. (It is 
perhaps worth noting that, while there indeed seems to have 
been optimism at the outset, despite the scepticism that 
Heath personally had expressed at the Selsdon Park 
conference, noted in Chapter 2, there is some evidence 
that, by 1972, this was diminishing (289).) 
Also shared by some commentators is the view that the 
outcome represented something of a compromise from Joseph IS 
initial sense of what was needed. Thus the development of 
policy has been described by Klein as "a poli tical exercise 
in trying to satisfy everyone" (290), while in Lowe's view 
the outcome wi th regional, area and district 
administration - was "largely a resul t of lobbying by 
vested interests" (291). 
(288) 
(289) 
(290) 
(291 ) 
Kavanagh, in Hennessy P and Seldon A (eds.), 1987, 
p. 223. Others who have made essentially the same 
point are Campbell, 1993, p. 384; Raison, 1990, p. 
73. 
see remark reportedly made by Heath at a dinner with 
the Business Team cited by Theakston K, "The Heath 
government, Whi tehall and the ci vi I service" in Ball 
S and Seldon A (eds.), 1996, p. 104. It is the case 
tha t Mey j es and some other members of the Team 
members returned to their private sector employers 
shortly afterwards (Pollitt, 1984, p. 103). 
Klein, 1995, p. 90. 
Lowe R, "The social policy of the Heath government" 
in Ball S and Seldon A (eds.), 1996, p. 206. 
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As the account given of the discussions between ministers 
on AHA membership shows, there is no doubt that Joseph 
compromised on his original proposals on this issue. It is, 
however, open to question whether, on the main elements of 
the reorganisation, the end result was quite such a 
compromise with vested interests as Klein and Lowe imply. 
Once unification outside local government had been agreed, 
the main structural decisions - the basic tier of authority 
to be at area level with a regional tier between area and 
the Secretary of State - seem to have been determined, 
respectively, by what at the time was the shared political 
view about the need for coterminosi ty, and by Joseph's 
sense that it would be "hubristic madness" for the DHSS to 
try to relate to ninety AHAs. In the latter case, 
alternatives were available and discussed - Joseph's early 
idea of a National Corporation and later the not wholly 
different proposal from Meyjes and Jaques. The choices made 
in September 1970 (the National Corporation) and March 1972 
(the Meyjes/Jaques proposal) not to pursue the alternatives 
seemed to owe nothing to "lobbying by vested interests" as 
the discussions never came into the public domain. 
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Overall, in the author's view the evidence suggests that 
Joseph personally was absolutely central to the policy to 
reorganise the NHS. It was Joseph who decided, from a 
position of initial caution, perhaps even scepticism, to 
propose the policy to ministerial colleagues (there was no 
imperative for him to do so, as there was no specific 
general election manifesto commitment to be discharged). 
It was Joseph who had a vision of unification with emphasis 
on better management, flowing from his conviction that 
improvements in the Service must in part corne from the 
better use of resources: a vision arguably at odds with the 
emphasis of Balniel and others in the late 1960s on 
avoiding centralisation. And, apart from the issue of AHA 
membership, where arguably he had no realistic alternative 
but to compromise in the face of sustained ministerial 
disagreement, it was Joseph who, after exposure to the 
arguments, took the key decisions, for example to accept 
the Grey Book management arrangements instead of a chief 
executive model, and to reject the Meyjes/Jaques proposal. 
7. ARRANGEMENTS FOR POLICY MAKING, 1970-1974 
Once in office, the focus for policy making shifted from 
Party arrangements such as the HPG to the procedures of 
cabinet government. 
On the both the major issues examined above, the initial 
consideration was kept within Whitehall: first, discussion 
between Joseph, ministerial colleagues and DHSS civil 
servants; then inter-departmental discussions, in the case 
of aspects of the reorganisation of the NHS, ultimately at 
cabinet level. 
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In the case of possible alternative financing arrangements, 
the issue did not go beyond Whitehall to became a matter 
of public discussion. In the case of the reorganisation of 
the NHS, a formal consultation paper was issued, and many 
NHS and local government interests responded. But the 
consultation was in practice on very circumscribed matters: 
on key issues, such as unification outside local 
government, the possible chief executi ve role, and the 
possible "top" level of the NHS, there was no public 
consultation and little public debate. 
The evidence suggests that, on the issues relating to the 
reorganisation of the NHS examined in this Chapter (apart 
from that of the membership of AHAs, which became a cabinet 
decision), Joseph was most influenced by his senior DHSS 
officials, especially in respect of the need for 
administrative unification of the NHS and the management 
arrangements for the new health authorities. However, in 
both these respects it seems clear that officials were 
often representing what they knew to be the views of key 
NHS interests such as the BMA, as they had had the benefit 
of their views by way of response to the Labour 
Government's two Green Papers. This is perhaps particularly 
clear in the case of the discussion on the possible chief 
executive role, where officials drew attention to the 
opposition of the medical profession to non-medical chief 
executives. Although, as noted above, Joseph discussed 
issues with his expert advisers (Meyjes and Jaques), and 
with backbench Conservative MPs, he never seemed to accept 
their views in preference to those of his senior civil 
servants. 
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To the extent that DHSS civil servants were often 
reflecting the views of key NHS interests such as the 
medical profession, it can be argued that Conservative 
policy making on issues of the form of the NHS was more 
pluralistic in nature in government than in opposition, 
even though in both cases most of the discussions were 
between the responsible minister or LCC spokesman and a 
relatively small number of officials and advisers. 
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CHAPTER 4 - ELECTION DEFEAT AND OPPOSITION, 1974-75 
1. PREPARATIONS FOR THE FEBRUARY 1974 GENERAL ELECTION 
In September 1971 senior Party officials began discussions 
about the manifesto for the next election. Fraser, who 
chaired what was known as the Official Group (OG), 
suggested that the aim should be to produce a draft for 
Autumn 1973, as "the possibility of a 1973 Election could 
clearly not be ruled out" (1). 
A draft was prepared by late 1972, and refined in early 
1973, in which the section on the NHS referred to the 
"improved administrative structure" that was being 
introduced, and committed the next Conservative Government 
to "vigorously press ahead with the improvement of 
Britain's health services" (2). 
During 1973 ministers became actively involved, and in 
July, responding to Heath's invitation to suggest suitable 
items for the manifesto, Joseph identified seventeen 
possibilities. Consistent with Joseph's position on what 
he saw as the inadequate resourcing of the NHS, these 
included "Provide increasing resources of capi tal and 
revenue" (3). 
In the deteriorating economic circumstances of 1973, 
however, it is understandable that Joseph's proposal did 
not find place in successi ve drafts of the mani festo, 
though the section on the NHS was expanded to include 
reference to the addi tional funding that had been made 
available since 1970 (4). 
(1) OG/71/90, 9/9/71, CPA OG box 28-48. 
(2) OG/72/112 and OG/73/114, ibid. 
(3) Joseph/Heath, 26/7/73, ibid. 
(4) Preliminary Draft Manifesto, OG/73/132, ibid. 
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In the light of the economic and industrial circumstances 
of Autumn 1973, with increasing oil prices consequent to 
the war in the Middle East and strains developing in the 
statutory wages policy the Government had introduced, 
Fraser judged that the political situation was such that 
it was necessary to prepare manifestos for an election 
"fought more or less in the normal way" and against "the 
possibili ty of a snap election forced in a particular 
situation". He had asked Nigel Lawson, the future 
Conservative minister but then "a friendly journalist" 
brought in for the purpose, to prepare a draft for the 
lat ter (5). 
From mid-December 1973, therefore, two draft general 
election manifestos were under consideration. A lengthy 
version, covering all the main areas of policy, for a 
"normal" election, and Lawson's much shorter version for 
a "snap" election. The shorter version focused solely on 
the economic and industrial situation and was an appeal for 
"A MANDATE FOR STAGE THREE" [of the pay policy] (6). 
The two versions were discussed by the OG on 12 December 
and by the Strategy Committee of senior ministers, chaired 
by Heath, on 20 December. At the latter meeting Heath asked 
for the Lawson version to be redrafted in the light of the 
ministerial discussion {where the principal concerns were 
what was perceived as its confrontational language, and 
focus on the mechanism (Stage 3) rather than the objective 
of countering inflation). However, Heath also asked that 
ministers be consulted on those sections of the "normal" 
manifesto relating to their responsibilities (7). 
( 5 ) 
( 6 ) 
( 7 ) 
OG / 7 3 / 1 35, 29 / 1 1 / 7 8 , i bid. 
OG/73/134 ("normal" manifesto) and OG/73/136 
(Lawson's alternative, dated 7/12/73), ibid. 
Ramsden, 1996, p. 329; SC/73/25, CPA, unnumbered 
folder. 
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In the event, despi te the fact that Heath secured a 
dissolution for a "snap" election, it was decided to issue 
a "normal" type of manifesto. 
Heath had asked on 20 December that ministers be given the 
chance to comment on relevant sections of the "normal" 
draft manifesto. It is, however, unclear from the CPA 
papers exactly how much input Joseph had into the NHS 
section of the published version. 
This emphasised what the Party saw as the achievements 
since 1970 - the increase in resources and the "reform" of 
the NHS's administration. It promised further improvements 
in services, as well as "a network of community hospitals" 
to supplement the general hospi tals. It also rejected 
"Labour's proposal to abolish private practice and private 
provision in association with the National Health Service" 
( 8) . 
In terms of the form of the NHS, the manifesto for the 
February 1974 general election was thus essentially 
conservative: no further change was proposed. 
( 8 ) Craig, 1975, p. 385. The Conservative rejection of 
Labour's proposal on private practice was not added 
directly in response to Labour's manifesto (published 
two days before the Conservatives). It had been 
anticipated, and included in drafts from mid January 
(OG/74/139, CPA OG box 28-48). 
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2. THE FEBRUARY 1974 GENERAL ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
The events which led to Heath's decision to seek a 
dissolution on 7 February 1974 have often been described 
(9), and their detail is incidental to this thesis. Having 
failed to reach a settlement with the National Union of 
Mineworkers on pay, the Government sought "a new mandate 
and five years of certain authority" in the hope that this 
would put it in a good position to reach such a settlement" 
(10). In the event, despite gaining marginally more votes 
than Labour, the Conservatives won four fewer seats in the 
Commons (11). An attempt at securing the support of the 
Liberal Party having failed, on 4 March Heath resigned and 
a minority Labour Government was formed. 
The situation facing the Conservatives was, in electoral 
terms, not dissimilar to that of October 1964, with a 
further election likely in the near future. 
Following the election Joseph, perhaps disappointed at not 
being invited to become shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
asked for, and was given, "a non-specific role in which he 
could concentrate on studying the reasons for Britain's 
long-term relative economic decline" (12). 
(9) for example, Butler and Kavanagh, 1974, 
Ramsden, 1996, pp. 368/75; Campbell, 
555/97. 
(10) Craig, 1975, p. 375. 
(11) Butler and Kavanagh, 1974, pp. 275/6. 
(12) Heath, 1998, p. 520. 
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pp. 27/44; 
1993, pp. 
Heath appointed Howe to be the LCC spokesman on social 
services, including the NHS (13), whether or not realising 
that in so doing he was appointing the senior Conservative 
who had most fully articulated the case for change in the 
form, particularly the financing arrangements, of the 
Service. For, as noted in previous chapters, Howe was 
sympathetic to the economic liberalism of the IEA and, 
unlike Powell, thought that radical change in the NHS was 
practicable in the longer term. He had been a member of the 
BMA's Advisory Panel which had proposed alternative 
financing arrangements for the Service, and shortly before 
the 1970 election had set out his views in a speech to the 
Fellowship for Freedom in Medicine which Joseph had 
commended to officials. Raison was appointed as Howe's 
junior frontbench spokesman (14). 
3. POLICY ISSUES MARCH - OCTOBER 1974 
With the formation of the new Government, the initiative 
on NHS matters passed to Labour. The Party's manifesto had 
included only a brief passage on the NHS, but one tha t 
contained several specific commitments. Two of these 
commitments were in respect of aspects of the form of the 
Service considered in previous chapters to abolish 
prescription charges and "transform the area health 
authori ties into democratic bodies" (15) . A third 
commitment, to phase out "private practice from the 
hospi tal service", brought into the poli tical arena the 
prospect of change in a further aspect of the form of the 
Service. 
(13) Times, 12/3/74, p. 1. col. a. 
( 1 4) Times, 21 /3/74, p. 4. col. a. 
(15) Craig, 1975, p. 404. 
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As noted in the Introduction, from the inception of the 
Service it had been open to senior doctors who wished to 
work for the NHS to do so full-time, or part-time. Those 
doctors who chose to work part-time had the right to 
undertake private practice, and indeed to see their fee 
paying patients in NHS pay beds. Bevan had accepted this 
reluctantly, to avoid a situation in which "there will be 
a rash of [private] nursing homes allover the country ... 
[and] we will lose many specialists from the public 
hospitals for they will go to nursing homes" (16). 
The ability to see NHS and private patients in the same 
hospital was often a convenience to the doctor responsible 
for their care, compared with seeing patients in separate 
NHS and private hospitals. There were also, arguably, 
benefi ts to the NHS both through the income raised in 
charging for pay beds (17), and in having the doctor on 
site throughout his or her working day and therefore in 
principle readily available to deal with NHS emergencies 
as they arose. 
The practice of having private patients within NHS 
hospitals was, however, opposed within the Labour Party and 
trade union movement. The principal concern was probably 
that pri vate patients were percei ved as buying earlier 
admission for treatment, and other advantages such as more 
of a consultant's personal attention and single rooms. The 
separation of NHS and private practice by phasing out pay 
beds from the NHS became a formal part of Party policy by 
its inclusion in the manifesto for the February 1974 
election, thus potentially re-opening a matter many in the 
medical profession regarded as a founding feature of the 
Service, long settled. 
(16) Commons Hansard, 30/4/46, vol. 422, col. 57. 
(17) a private patient treated in NHS pay bed paid a fee 
to his or her doctor, and a bed charge to the NHS. 
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3.1 The Government's position 
Of the NHS issues on which there were manifesto 
commitments, the Government decided that, in the economic 
circumstances, it could take only limited immediate action 
on one, prescription charges. Within the social services 
the Government's immediate priority was "a big improvement 
in pensions" (18). While the goal remained "a free health 
service", to abolish prescription charges outright was 
estimated to cost £50 million per annum, which was "just 
... not within our resources at present" (19). Two minor 
changes were, however, made in the age limits for 
exemption, and charges for family planning services were 
removed (20). 
On the second issue, the structure of the Service, in 
opposition Labour had criticised aspects of the 
Conservative proposals. Its main concern, as summarised by 
the new Labour Secretary of State for Social Services, 
Barbara Castle, was that a system had been created that was 
"undemocratic and out of tune wi th the needs of local 
communities" (21). 
( 18) Commons Hansard, 15/3/74, vol. 870, col. 530. 
( 1 9 ) Commons Hansard, 28/3/74, vol. 871 , col. 650. 
(20) ibid. , eols. 650/2. 
(21 ) Commons Hansard, 15/3/74, vol. 870, col. 530. 
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The timing of the election meant that the new Government 
had in principle the opportunity to seek to postpone or 
abort implementation of the new NHS structure, due on 1 
April. With less than a month to go, however, ministers 
judged that this was not practicable. In the Queen's Speech 
it was announced that the Government would "rev i ew the 
working of the reorganised National Health Service" (22), 
clearly implying that the implementation would continue as 
scheduled. 
In the Debate on the Address Castle confirmed that the 
Government would not be seeking "to postpone or to 
disrupt" the arrangements by then well advanced. To do so 
would, in her view, have been "to run very serious risks 
with the health of individuals and communities" (23). 
Further, the Government went as far as to rule out "any 
fundamental changes in the structure of the reorganised 
service now", ins tead undertaking to keep matters under 
review and be ready to propose "in the long term 
whatever changes seem to be desirable in the light of 
experience". What Castle referred to as "minor alterations" 
were not, however, ruled out (24). 
Howe welcomed Castle's statement in respect of NHS 
reorganisation and, anticipating one aspect of the "minor 
alterations" the Government was to propose in May 1974, 
argued against the idea of adding further local authority 
representatives to health authorities, on the ground that 
councillors were "already heavily burdened with the 
administration of our new large [local] authorities" (25). 
(22) ibid., col. 46. 
(23) ibid., col. 531. 
(24) ibid. 
(25) ibid., cols. 536/7. 
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The Government issued proposals for "minor alterations" in 
a consultative paper published on 30 May 1974, which 
focused on the membership of AHAs (26). Its objectives were 
to make the Service "more responsive to the views of the 
people it serves" and to take "greater account of the 
contribution which all of those who work in the Service can 
make to its management" (27). 
To achieve these objectives the Government proposed that 
the membership of each AHA should include four members 
nominated by communi ty heal th councils and two members 
drawn from NHS staff other than doctors and nurses (there 
were already medical and nursing members on each AHA), and 
that a third of the members should be "councillors drawn 
from local authorities matching the AHAs" (28). 
In the longer term, the Conservatives criticised these 
proposals. Prior to the October 1974 general election, 
however, the proposals were not a matter Howe and his 
frontbench colleagues sought to place in the front line of 
issues between the two major parties, and there was no 
reference to them in the Conservative manifesto for that 
election (29). 
It was in respect of the third of Labour I s manifesto 
commi tments to phase out pri vate practice from the 
hospital service - that there was political controversy 
prior to the October election. 
(26) Democracy in the National Health Service, 1974, 
London, HMSO. 
(27) ibid., p. 5. 
( 28) i bid., pp. 9/' 0 . 
(29) Craig, 1975, p. 440. 
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In the Debate on the Address, Castle announced that she 
would be accepting an invitation put by the BMA to Joseph 
to establish a joint working party to examine the form of 
contracts of senior hospital medical staff, and that this 
examination would cover the "place that private practice 
should have in the National Health Service" (30). 
A working party was duly established, under the 
chairmanship of Castle's Parliamentary Secretary, Dr David 
Owen. Any political controversy might have been expected 
to have arisen only when the working party's work had been 
concluded, which had initially been expected to be late in 
1975 (31). 
Early in July 1974, however, union activists at the Charing 
Cross Hospital threatened not to help treat patients in the 
private wing, and there was similar action elsewhere. The 
Charing Cross dispute led to a negotiation between 
ministers, union leaders, the BMA (and the separate 
Hospital Consultants and Specialists Association (HCSA), 
the AHA responsible for Charing Cross and local union 
representatives (32). Central to its resolution was 
agreement that the work of the Owen working party would be 
speeded up, with a view to completion by November, a year 
earlier than originally expected (33). 
Thus through the Charing Cross dispute the procedure by 
which the Government hoped to be able to take forward its 
policy of phasing out pay beds had become much accelerated, 
and the issue had become one of significant public profile. 
(30) Commons Hansard, vol. 870, col. 532, 
(31) Castle B, The Castle Diaries 7974-76, 1980, London, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 135. 
(32) described, ibid., pp. 131/8. 
(33) printed in Commons Hansard, vol. 876. cols. 950/1. 
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3.2 The Conservative response 
Within a month of his appointment, Howe told his colleagues 
on the LCC Steering Committee (LSC), a sub-group of senior 
LCC members, that he was proposing to set up "three or four 
small groups" chaired by officers of the parliamentary 
Health and Social Security Committee (34). A month later 
he reported to the LCC that six groups had already 
established, with two more planned. Two of these related 
directly to aspects of the form of the Service, those on 
NHS finance and the private sector in health, the latter 
chaired by Dean (35). The existence of these groups (by 
then expanded to nine) was made public at a speech to the 
Conservative Women's Conference on 21 May 1974 (36). 
While the groups were announced as in existence by late 
May, within the CPA there is little evidence of their work. 
For example, Raison, who chaired one group, wrote to Howe 
explaining that three proposed meetings had fallen through 
because of diary problems, and offering a suggestion for 
the manifesto for the next election arising from the one 
meeting that had proved practicable (37). 
Given the very limited time between the establishment of 
these groups - April 1974 at the earliest - and the Summer 
Recess, it is understandable that Ii t tIe of substance 
should have resulted prior to the October 1974 election. 
In advance of any conclusions that the group chaired by 
Dean might reach, Howe had responded on the issue of pay 
beds once it had been brought into the public arena by the 
Charing Cross dispute. 
(34) LSC/74/5, 8/4/74, on CPA LCC 1-13. 
( 35) LCC ( 74 ) 1 3 t h , 1 3/5/74 , i bid. 
(36) Conservative Party press release 177/74. 
(37) Raison/Howe, 26/7/74, CPA CRD 5/27. 
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He brought the matter to the LSC on the same day that he 
tabled a Private Notice Question to Castle on the dispute 
(38). The discussion focused on the financial loss both to 
the NHS and consultants if pay beds were phased out. Howe 
advised that the private sector "currently spent £27 
million a year of which about £10 million went to 
consultants" (though not all in respect of pay bed 
patients), and this accounted for "about half the money 
they recei ved". Joseph agreed that "there would be very 
large claims [for extra remuneration] from consultants" if, 
due to the loss of pay beds, they were in practice unable 
to have private patients. Heath commented that, in addition 
to the financial considerations, "freedom of choice was 
also a powerful general argument and was basic to our 
thinking in this and other fields such as education" (39). 
The Conservative stance on the pay bed issue was thus given 
specific consideration at the highest level within the 
Party, and confirmed as the basis for the next election 
manifesto. 
During the Summer Howe also took the opportunity of 
defending the reorganisation of the NHS against early 
critics of the disruption some judged it was causing. At 
a conference in Manchester he acknowledged that 
reorganisation was disturbing, but was in its essence a 
consensual policy. He had "little respect for those who now 
complain" (40). 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
Commons Hansard, 8/7/74, vol. 876, col. 946. 
LSC/74/11, 8/7/74, CPA LCC 1-13. 
speech to joint National Association, for 
Health/British Association of Soclal 
conference, 18/7/74, Conservative Party press 
318/74. 
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3.3 The Conservative manifesto for the October 1974 
general election 
Work on the Party's next manifesto began almost immediately 
after the February election. The first substantial draft 
was circulated at the end of April. Following revisions, 
the LCC considered the fourth draft at its meeting on 21 
June. At that stage there was only one sentence on the NHS, 
committing a new Conservative Government to "build on the 
improvements" made by the last one, with "special emphasis 
on what had previously been the neglected services for the 
old, the disabled, the mentally ill and the handicapped" 
( 41 ) . 
Howe was unable to attend the LCC meeting on 21 June but 
wrote to Heath the day before suggesting that there was a 
number of omissions, including "a promise to review the 
financing of the Health Service, including the machinery 
for settling pay. (The Whitley Councils [the machinery used 
to settle the pay of most NHS employees except doctors] are 
immensely criticised for delay)" (42). 
Howe made further suggestions on 8 July, proposing that the 
development of community hospitals; the retention of 
private practice within the NHS; a review of pay machinery, 
especially the Whitley arrangements; a search for further 
sources of NHS finance, and a commitment to no further 
reorganisation until the one implemented on 1 April had 
settled down, should be included (43). 
(41) paper LCC(74)22, 19/6/74, considered at LCC(74)22nd, 
CPA LCC 14-24. 
(42) Howe/Heath, 20/6/74, on CPA LCC 14-24. 
(43) Howe, 8/7/74, CPA, CRD 5/27. 
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The LCC meeting minutes do not indicate whether Howe's 
proposal for a review of NHS financing was discussed, and 
the fifth draft, dated 27 July, reflected little of his 
suggestions. To the sentence on the NHS in the fourth draft 
was added, in parentheses "and will encourage people to 
take out insurance for medical treatment. This is one way 
of channelling additional resources into Britain's health 
services" (44). 
At this stage Howe seems to have taken responsibility for 
redrafting the NHS section as it eventually appeared in the 
final version (45), published as Putting Britain First on 
10 September (46). 
The principal theme of the manifesto as a whole was the 
need for "the Government and the people" to uni te on a 
national policy to defeat what the Party saw as the 
economic and poli tical dangers facing Bri tain, "greater 
than any we have seen since the last war" (47). With this 
in view, the Party undertook not to re-introduce what had 
proved to be controversial legislation or "govern in a 
narrow partisan spirit", and came close to proposing a 
government of national unity. If elected, the Party would 
"consult and confer with the leaders of other parties and 
the great interests in the nation" with a view to 
securing "the consent and support of all men and women of 
good will", and "invite people from outside the ranks of 
our party to join us in overcoming Britain's difficulties" 
( 48 ) . 
(44) ibid. 
(45) Howe/Fraser, 20/8/74, ibid. 
(46) Times, 11/9/74, p. 1, col. a. 
(47) Craig, 1975, p. 425. 
(48) ibid., pp. 425/7. 
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In the context of the economic crisis, the mani festo 
suggested that it would not be easy to "maintain existing 
standards" in the NHS. For this reason, in the Party's view 
it was "so wrong to reject any acceptable method of 
channelling additional resources" into the Health Service, 
and inappropriate to lose the £100 million a year generated 
through charges or the nearly £30 million a year by phasing 
out pay beds. In addition to the wish to retain the income 
generated, phasing out pay beds was "unacceptable in 
principle" and would "reduce the skills available to 
patients generally" (49). 
Whether the Party leadership envisaged a substantive review 
of alternative financing arrangements for the NHS is 
unclear, though such a review would not have been 
inconsistent with the wording of the manifesto. What is 
clear is that no further significant change in the 
Service's structure or management arrangements was 
intended. In the Party's view, "what is now needed ... is 
a period of comparative stability, founded upon the 
reorganisation that we carried through, which must now be 
allowed to settle down" (50). 
other manifesto commitments, with less potential impact of 
the form of the NHS, included the promise of priority for 
services for the elderly, disabled, mentally ill and 
mentally handicapped, and Howe's proposal that the Whitley 
machinery should be reviewed (51). 
(49) ibid., p. 440. 
(50) ibid. 
(51) ibid. 
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4. THE OCTOBER 1974 GENERAL ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Following the February election, Labour lacked an overall 
majority in the Commons, and a further election 
future was likely. In the event, Wilson 
dissolution on 18 September 1974, with 10 
in the near 
sought a 
October as 
election day. At the outset of the campaign the opinion 
polls gave Labour a lead of between 4% and 14.6% (52). 
Butler and Kavanagh characterised the October election as 
"the quiet campaign" (53) which is understandable, in part 
at least, given the nature of the Conservative Party's 
appeal to the people. Even before the date of the general 
election had been announced, Heath had apparently briefed 
candidates to avoid "confrontation" (54). With the Party 
campaigning on a policy of building national unity so that 
what it perceived as the "economic and political" dangers 
could be successfully addressed, it would have been 
incongruous if candidates, especially the Party's leaders, 
had been overly critical of Labour's six months in office. 
(52) 
(53 ) 
(54) 
Butler 0 and Kavanagh 0, The British General Election 
of October 7974, 1975, London, Macmillan, pp. 190/1. 
ibid., p. 102. 
Heath to candidates, 12/9/74, quoted in Campbell, 
1993, p. 644. 
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As the campaign went on, Heath came to the view that "the 
real hope of the Bri tish people in this [crisis] si tuation" 
was "a National Coalition government, involving all the 
parties" (55). His attachment to this idea was not, 
however, so strong as to lead him to accept the advice of 
close colleagues that, as a possible impediment to the 
formation of a coalition government, he should announce his 
willingness to stand down as Conservative leader (56). 
The outcome of the election was that Labour secured 18 
additional seats, and an overall majority of three in the 
Commons (57). On the face of it this seemed slender but, 
partly wi th the assistance of a pact wi th the Liberal 
Party, the Labour Government survived until it lost a vote 
of confidence on 22 March 1979, and the consequent general 
election on 3 May. 
4.1 NHS policy October 1974 to February 1975 
Following the October election Howe remained as the LCC 
member with responsibility for social services. Raison was 
appointed to the LCC wi th responsibili ty for consumer 
affairs and succeeded as junior spokesman on social 
services matters by Cranley Onslow and Kenneth Clarke (58). 
(55) Heath, 5/10/74, quoted in Butler and Kavanagh, 1975, 
p. 129. 
(56) for example, ibid, pp. 124/7; Campbell, 1993, pp. 
649. 
(57) Butler and Kavanagh, 1975, p. 293. 
(58) Times, 19/11/74, p. 2. col. a. 
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In its manifesto, Labour had committed itself to continuing 
"the progressive elimination of prescription charges" and 
the phasing out of pay beds. It had also referred to the 
"published proposals for greater democratic participation" 
in the running of the Service, (those in Democracy in the 
National Health Service), without committing itself to 
their implementation (59). 
In the social policy element of the Debate on the Address, 
Castle, who remained Secretary of State for Social 
Services, mentioned only one of the three issues referred 
to above. She explained that, because of the general 
election, the Owen working party would now be reporting 
rather later than anticipated in her statement during the 
Charing Cross dispute (60). 
In his contribution to the Debate, Howe described the 
Government's proposals in respect of pay beds as "wholly 
misconceived", because the existence of private practice 
within the NHS "makes a contribution to the cost of that 
service" and it provided consul tants wi th a substantial 
proportion of their earnings. Taken together, Howe 
estimated that "these contributions amount to about £30 
million a year". He also argued that separating private 
hospi tal facili ties from the NHS "would waste time and 
resources on the part of consultants", risk the growth of 
medical emigration, and reduce the "personal freedom for 
the medical profession" and patients (61). 
(59) Craig, 1975, pp. 459/60. 
(60) Commons Hansard, vol. 880, col. 545. 
(61) ibid., cols. 561/2. 
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Howe noted that neither in the Queen's Speech nor Castle's 
contribution to the Debate had there been any mention of 
abolishing NHS charges, which he welcomed given the 
financial problems of the Service that had recently been 
highlighted in a statement by the Presidents and Deans of 
the Royal Colleges (62). This had referred to the "real 
danger of standards [wi thin the NHS] declining"; called 
upon the Government "to recognize, and remedy to the best 
of its ability, the serious under-financing from which the 
NHS is suffering"; and asserted that "the time had now come 
for a careful scrutiny of the funding" of the Service (63). 
Raison, still at that time the junior Opposition spokesman 
on NHS matters, had a history of favouring greater local 
authority control over the NHS, as noted in chapter 3. He 
used his speech in the Debate to question whether the 
proposals in Democracy in the National Health Service to 
increase the number of local authori ty members on AHAs 
would "genuinely extend local democracy", without giving 
any indication of whether the Conservati ve Party would 
oppose such a change (64). 
The following day an assessment of the financing needs of 
the NHS made by the BMA and professional organisations 
representing dentists, nurses and midwives was published. 
This had been prepared following a deputation to the Prime 
Minister on 31 July, and argued for a real terms increase 
in NHS funding of £900m in four years, to be achieved by 
annual increases of £225m. It also renewed the request the 
professional bodies had made for an independent inquiry to 
"examine whether the system of financing introduced in 1948 
is still entirely appropriate in 1974" (65). 
(62) ibid., cols. 560/1. 
(63) BMJ, 26/10/74, p. 237. 
(64) ibid., col. 625. 
(65) BMJ, 2/11/74, pp. 297/300 (quote from p. 299). 
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The growing concerns within the health professions about 
the state of the NHS seem to have been influential in the 
Conservative leadership's decision to instigate a debate 
specifically on the Service on 2 December. 
In the light of the difficulties facing the NHS, Howe 
advised Castle not to press ahead wi th "the so-called 
democratisation of the service" as further change may 
"threaten a serious organisational breakdown" (66). He 
repeated the Conservative Party's opposition to what he 
regarded as "the folly" of phasing out pay beds, and 
expressed concern about the new form of contract the 
Government 
consultants 
was seeking 
which, in 
to 
his 
negotiate for hospital 
view, threatened their 
"professional independence", a theme he had explored in a 
speech a week earlier (67). Finally, Howe asked whether the 
Government was prepared to set up "an independent re-
examination of alternative sources of finance of the NHS" 
(68) . 
In response, while noting that the Labour Government had 
been able to "restore some of the December [1973] cuts" in 
NHS funding made by the previous Government, Castle 
acknowledged that prospects for further increases were "not 
encouraging ... it will not be possible to maintain this 
increase in expenditure in real terms over the next few 
years" (69). 
(66 ) 
(67) 
(68) 
(69) 
Commons Hansard, vol. 882, cols. 1199/1200. 
ibid., cols. 1206/7. On 24/11/74 Howe had explored 
what he regarded as the linked issues of the doctor's 
independence in rna t ters of professional judgement, 
and private practice, in a speech to the National 
Federation of Self-Employed (Conservative Party press 
release 568/74). 
Commons Hansard, vol. 882, col. 1205. 
ibid., col. 1214. Neither Castle, nor Owen, responded 
to Howe's question as regards an independent review 
of alternative funding. 
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The medical profession was clearly not re-assured by what 
Castle was able to say about future resources. At the BMA 
Council meeting on 22 January 1975 the Chairman commented 
that it was "extraordinary that the view should be taken 
by the Government that there was not case to review the 
financial structure of the Service", and intimated that, 
in conjunction with the other health professions, an early 
meeting was being sought with Health ministers (70). 
Thus by early 1975 the Government had publicly stated that, 
in the prevailing economic circumstances, there might have 
to be a reduction of NHS resources in real terms over the 
coming years, while the major heal th professions were 
concerned that existing resources were inadequate for the 
demands they were currently facing, and wanted a review of 
funding. The Conservative Party was urging the Government 
not to proceed with its Democracy in the National Health 
Service proposals, in case they led to "organisa tional 
breakdown", or its proposal to phase out pay beds, partly 
on account of the revenue implications and partly because 
in its view the policy if implemented would severely limit 
doctors' freedom to practice privately. 
4.2 The Conservative Party leadership 
Important though the issues referred to in the previous 
section were, among most Conservati ves of much greater 
significance in the aftermath of the October election was 
the question of the Party leadership. 
(70) BMAA, minutes of Council, 22/1/75, doc. 22, p. 4. 
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Having lost successive general elections, and with 
continuing discontent within the Party at the policy 
reversals between 1970 and 1974, that there was immediate 
speculation about Heath's position was unsurprising (71). 
Possible alternative leaders were mentioned, including 
Joseph (72). As noted above, in the late 1960s Joseph had 
publicly identified himself as a believer in the beneficial 
effects for industry of market forces. Following the 
February election, he suspected that the Heath Government's 
difficulties, and indeed Britain's relative economic 
decline compared with other European countries, were in 
part at least due to ever increasing government 
intervention in economic and industrial matters. 
According to his biographer, Joseph quite consciously 
embarked on a period of "self-education", in the course of 
which he re-established links with the IEA (73). Still a 
member of the LCC, initially he asked not to have a shadow 
portfolio so that he could examine the reasons for 
Britain's economic decline, though in June he agreed to 
become spokesman on home affairs (74). 
To assist in his examination of Britain's economic decline, 
Joseph established the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), 
which supported him develop his analysis of previous 
economic policies, and proposals for the future (75). 
(71 ) 
(72) 
(73) 
(74) 
( 75) 
for example, Times, 12/10/74, p. 13, col. C; Daily 
Ma i 1, 1 2 and 1 4/1 0/74, p. 6 and pp. 1 and 6 
respectively; Daily Telegraph, 14/10/74, p. 1. 
for example, "Tory MPs back Sir Keith as next leader, 
headline, "Daily Telegraph, 14/10/75, p. 1. 
Halcrow, 1990, pp. 63/4. 
Times, 14/6/74, p. 1, col. a. 
on the CPS see Todd M, "The Centre for Policy 
Studies: Its Birth and Early Years", 1991, 
Colchester, Essex University; and Cockett, 1994, pp. 
236/86 
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Joseph tried to interest his LCC colleagues in his emerging 
conclusions: what Campbell has described as "the monetarist 
cri tique of the late Government's record" (76). Having 
apparently had little success, Joseph judged that the issue 
needed public discussion (77). In speeches during 1974 he 
argued that government intervention since the end of the 
Second World War had debilitated "our industry, economic 
life and society" and that inflation, caused by 
governments, was" sapping the vi tali ty of industry". In one 
speech in particular, shortly before the da te for the 
October election was announced, Joseph effectively 
repudiated the incomes policy approach adopted by the Heath 
Government, by arguing that the Party had known since the 
1960s that it offered "no cure" for inflation (78). 
Within days of the election, from this very different 
perspective to that of most of the LCC, Joseph confirmed 
his interest in standing for the leadership "if Ted does 
decide to resign" (79). 
(76) 
(77 ) 
(78) 
(79) 
Campbell, 1991, p. 631. 
ibid., pp. 631/2; also Anthony Seldon's interview 
wi th Joseph, Con temporary Record, vol. 1, no. 1, 
Spring 1987, p. 28. 
speeches on 22/6/74, 8/8/74 and 5/9/74, reprinted in 
Joseph K, Reversing the Trend, 1975, London, Rose, 
pp. 5/34. 
letter from Joseph, seemingly dated 16/10/74, quot~d 
in Halcrow, 1989, p. 79. Similar words are quoted in 
Ranelagh J, Thatcher's People, 1991, London, 
HarperCollins, attributed to a letter from Joseph to 
Ian Gow MP, dated 18/10/74. 
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Shortly afterwards, however, Joseph made a speech described 
by his biographer as "on the moral and spiritual state of 
the nation", which drew considerable cri ticism (80). It has 
been suggested that the reaction to this speech gave Joseph 
a sense of the publicity and criticism he would have to 
face if he sought to challenge Heath (81). 
On 21 November Joseph told Thatcher, who seemed to be the 
only other member of the LCC interested in the economic 
ideas he was exploring (82), and founding Vice Chairman of 
the CPS, that he would not stand for the leadership (83). 
She immediately decided to do so, and informed Heath of her 
intention (84). 
The leadership contest has been described in some detail, 
much of which is extrinsic to this study (85). Two aspects 
warrant mention, however, as they had continuing 
significance after Thatcher's success. 
(80) 
(81 ) 
(82) 
(83) 
(84) 
(85) 
ibid., p. 81. Even before the speech was delivered it 
had generated the newspaper headline "Sir Kei th in 
"stop babies" sensation" (ibid., p. 84). 
Cosgrave P, Margaret Thatcher: A Tory and her Party, 
1978, London, Hutchinson, p. 31; Thatcher M, The Path 
to Power, 1995, London, HarperCollins, p. 266. 
Campbell, 1993, p. 632. 
ibid., p. 663; Thatcher, 1995, p. 266. 
Thatcher, 1995, p. 267; Heath, 1998, p. 530. There is 
some disagreement over when Thatcher saw Heath. 
Cosgrave says the meeting was on the day Tha tcher 
decided to contest the leadership, 21 November 
(Cosgrave, 1978, p. 31). The two principals agree 
that it was four days later, on 25 November 
(Thatcher, 1995, p. 267; Heath, 1998, p. 530). 
for example, Campbell, 1993, pp. 663/74; Ramsden, 
1996, pp. 446/51; Thatcher, 1995, pp. 267/77; Heath, 
1998, pp. 530/4. 
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First, unlike that in 1965, when Heath and Maudling had 
been the principal contenders, in 1975 the leadership 
election offered, and was understood to be offering, a 
choice not just between personalities but between markedly 
different approaches. 
A flavour of the different approaches was given in the 
articles Heath and Thatcher (as well as other leading 
Conservatives, including Joseph) contributed to a Daily 
Telegraph series "My Kind of Tory Party", published in the 
fortnight prior to the first leadership ballot. 
In Heath's article there was no suggestion that his 
Government had made mistakes, except perhaps that of 
failing to re-engage disenchanted young people wi th the 
political process. The emphasis was the need to continue 
to find ways of "preserving an open and healthy society" 
and sustaining "harmony" within society, at which readers 
might or might not have regarded Heath as having a 
convincing record. In a clear reference to Tha tcher' s 
posi tion, concern was expressed about the Conserva ti ve 
Party taking on "the appearance of a purely business ... 
or middle class party, or one "that believes in a simple 
form of mechanistic economics instead of recognising all 
the complex interacting forces, both social and industrial" 
(86). It was an article whose unstated postulate was that 
the 1970/74 Government had been essentially right, which 
envisaged no particular change in policies, and which 
sought to criticise Thatcher's position as narrow in 
orientation and potential appeal and simplistic in its 
understanding of economic matters. 
(86) Daily Telegraph, 3/2/75, p. 12. 
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By contrast, in her article a few days earlier Thatcher had 
acknowledged (and accepted her share of the responsibility 
for) what she regarded as the failures of the Heath 
Government. In her view, "to deny that we failed the 
British people is futile, as well as arrogant". She 
identified as "perhaps the first essential" re-
connecting with the instincts of the people, some of whom 
believed that "too many Conservatives have become 
socialists". She implied a wish to lead a marked shift away 
from what she saw as the "socialist" approach of recent 
Conservative Governments (87). In so doing, she was picking 
up less directly a theme of Joseph's article in the same 
series two days earlier. In his view, "we have strayed from 
our principles and instincts, against the better judgement 
of our supporters, and taken to semi-socialism", but 
through" intellectual ... [and] moral courage, intellectual 
honesty, [and] willingness to acknowledge errors which 
are ... now obvious to all" it was possible "to reverse the 
trend" (88). 
Although neither Heath or Thatcher went into any detail on 
future policy, it was clear to Conservative MPs that the 
difference between the two principal leadership contenders 
was not simply over the conduct of the Heath Government. 
It was about what ought to be the broad policy stance of 
the Party. Heath and his supporters saw themselves as the 
heirs of those who, in the mid/late 1940s, accepted 
collectivist solutions to the problems of unemployment and 
poverty that had seemed intractable in the 1930s. Thatcher 
and her supporters believed that the collectivist solutions 
had created different and potentially more damaging 
problems, particularly inflation, and favoured a more 
limited role for government with greater reliance on 
individual effort and market forces. 
(87) ibid., 30/1/75, p. 16. 
(88) ibid., 28/1/75, p. 14. 
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This difference became an enduring feature of Conservative 
politics. Behrens has suggested that the adherents of the 
two broad positions might be termed "Diehards" (those who 
"viewed post-war Conservatism as merely an alternative form 
of socialism") and "Ditchers" (those who had "ditched" 
adherence to "the eternal principles of limi ted government, 
sound money and moral rectitude" and judged intervention 
by the state to be "unavoidable in a society determined not 
to return to inter-war maladies") (89). In popular usage, 
however, by the early 1980s the terms used were "dries" and 
"wets" respectively. 
The second aspect of the election contest of continuing 
significance, not unrelated to the first, was that it was 
acrimonious (90). Heath's supporters sought to characterise 
Thatcher as someone who would only appeal to the middle 
classes, compared with Heath's "One Nation" approach, and 
various "dirty tricks" were alleged to have been used to 
try to reduce her support (91). Thatcher and her supporters 
made increasingly explicit criticisms of the actions of the 
1970/4 Government of which some, notably Thatcher herself 
and Joseph, had been members (92) which, from his 
perspective, Heath must have found galling. Such 
animosities as the campaigning aroused were not reduced by 
the reaction of some Heath supporters after Thatcher's 
success in the first ballot (93). 
(89) 
(90) 
(91 ) 
(92) 
(93) 
Behrens, 1980, p. 7. 
see, eg, ibid., p. 40 and Thatcher, 1995, p. 282. 
Ramsden, 1996, p. 446. 
for example, ibid., and Thatcher's Daily Telegraph 
article, 30/1/75 ("To deny that we failed the people 
l's futile as well as arrogant. Successful 
, " ) Governments in elections ... We lost. 
examples quoted in Ramsden, 1996, p. 450. 
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In that ballot, held on 4 February 1975, Thatcher secured 
130 votes compared to Heath's 119 (94), at which point he 
resigned. A week later Thatcher was elected Leader ahead 
of Whitelaw, Howe, Prior and John Peyton (95), beginning 
a new phase in the Party's opposi tion to the Labour 
Government. 
The legacy of the leadership election was, however, a Party 
where many leading politicians saw themselves in one of two 
broad policy camps, and where there remained a considerable 
degree of continuing personal animosity most clearly 
exemplified in Heath's conduct. In Campbell's view, for 
over fifteen years Heath "remained adamantly unreconciled" 
to Thatcher or the economic and social policies her 
Governments pursued, and "regularly denounced her 
leadership in the strongest terms as a grotesque aberration 
from the true Conservative tradition represented by his 
predecessors and himself" (96). 
5. THE SITUATION BY FEBRUARY 1975 
5.1 Policy development 
In the year between the first election of 1974 and 
Thatcher's success in the Party leadership election, the 
responsibility for development of policy on the NHS lay 
with Howe. 
(94) Times, 5/2/75, p. 1, col. e. 
(95) Times, 12/2/75, p. 1, col. c. 
(96) Campbell, 1993, p. 679. 
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Howe sought to defend the restructuring of the Service 
initiated by Joseph, in the face of early criticisms, and 
indicated possible Conservative opposition to the proposals 
to change the composition of the new AHAs signalled in the 
Government's consultative paper, Democracy in the National 
Health Service. He also sought to explore with colleagues 
the possibility of opening up for consideration the issue 
of alternative financing arrangements, seemingly without 
success. However, the Labour Government had, in its 
proposals relating to pay beds, opened up a new issue 
relevant to the form the Service, and on that Howe sought 
and obtained the LCC's agreement to a policy of opposition, 
which was reflected in the manifesto for the October 1974 
general election. 
5.2 The arrangements for policy review 
During the twelve months for which Howe was the principal 
Opposition spokesman, there seems to have been very little 
active consideration of policy relating to the NHS's form, 
except in response to the Government's pay beds policy. 
Although Howe established some advisory groups, the author 
has been able to discover virtually no details of their 
composition or contribution to policy thinking. Indeed, it 
is open to question as to whether, with preparations for 
a coming general election, and then the Party leadership 
contest occupying much of the twelve months, any 
substanti ve work was undertaken by these groups (97). 
Neither, in the CPA or among Howe's papers, is there any 
evidence of other sources of advice to the Party on issues 
relating to the form of the NHS over this period. 
(97) at a meeting with the author on 16/12/1999, 
could not recall any substantive activity by 
groups relating to the form of the NHS. 
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CHAPTER 5 - THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN OPPOSITION, 1975-79 
1. APPOINTMENTS UNDER THATCHER 
Few members of Heath's LCC seem to have supported Thatcher 
during the leadership election (1), and it has been 
suggested that some believed for a long time after the 
election that "the party would eventually come to its 
senses" and recall Heath as leader (2). Heath is said to 
have described himself as "in reserve", presumably for such 
a recall (3). 
Against this background, and the division within the 
Conservative Party referred to in Chapter 4, it was 
understandable that Thatcher regarded it as necessary for 
there to be "sufficient continuity to keep the Party 
together" (4). Her first LCC appointments were "rightly 
seen as a compromise" (5). While some who shared her views 
were gi ven senior posi tions, she also included some of 
those who had supported Heath's re-election from whom, she 
later wrote, she "could not assume agreement - even on 
basic principles" (6). 
In Thatcher's view, however, she was able to "shift the 
balance of opinion within the Shadow Cabinet as a whole 
somewhat in my direction", partly by creating "a Treasury 
team that shared my and Keith's [Joseph's] views on the 
free-market economy" (7). 
(1) Behrens, 1980, p. 40; Ramsden, 1996, p. 453. 
(2) Campbell, 1996, p. 681. 
(3) Heath, quoted ibid., p. 675. 
(4) Thatcher, 1995, p. 282. 
(5) ibid., p. 290. 
(6) ibid., p. 291. 
(7) ibid., p. 290/1. 
252 
Howe, who from his longstanding attachment to the economic 
liberalism of the lEA noted in previous chapters, was 
sympathetic to Thatcher's approach, headed the Treasury 
team as shadow Chancellor. Joseph was given overall 
responsibility for policy and research (8). With Powell by 
now an Ulster Unionist MP, following his break from the 
Party in February 1974 (9), the two senior Conservatives 
who, arguably, had reflected most on the NHS over the 
previous ten years were thus in key positions and close to 
Thatcher. 
Howe's promotion meant that a new LCC spokesman on social 
services matters needed to be appointed, and Thatcher chose 
Norman Fowler, a former Times journalist who had 
specialised in home affairs, seemingly wi thout knowing 
where he stood "in relation to the balance of opinion 
between left and right of the Party" (10). Vaughan and 
Kenneth Clarke were appointed as junior frontbench 
spokesmen on social services (11). 
( 8 ) 
( 9 ) 
( 1 0 ) 
( 1 1 ) 
Times, 19/2/75, p. 1, col. a. 
see Heffer, 1998, pp. 698/70. 
Thatcher, 1995, p. 289. Thatcher's comment is 
understandable, gi ven Fowler's own account of his 
political position at the time. He has stated that he 
subscribed to RA Butler's view of Conservatism, yet 
after the October 1974 election he initially 
supported Joseph for the leadership as best 
representing that view. Given that, in his well-
publicised speeches in the Summer of 1974 referred to 
in Chapter 4, Joseph had cr it i c i sed the "soc,i al i sm" 
of the previous thirty years, which ,for h1~ most 
certainly included Butlerian Conservat1sm, th1s was 
an incongruous choice (Fowler N, Ministers Decide, 
London, Chapmans, 1991, pp. 9/10). 
Times, 25/2/75, p. 1, col. g. 
253 
Both Howe and Joseph occupied their positions until the 
1979 general election. Fowler was, however, replaced by 
Patrick Jenkin in January 1976 
throughout the period as the 
spokesman on NHS matters. 
(12). Vaughan continued 
main junior frontbench 
Although Thatcher's first appointments meant that her 
erstwhile opponents were well represented in the LCC, she 
was able to restructure the higher levels of the Party 
organisation so as to give substantial influence to those 
sympathetic to her position. Lord Thorneycroft, who as 
Chancellor in 1958 had resigned because of what he 
perceived to be the then Government's lack of will to 
control public expenditure, became Party Chairman. Joseph 
was appointed as Chairman of the ACP, and Angus Maude, one 
of Thatcher's closest supporters, was appointed Chairman 
of the CRD (13). Several of Heath's appointees were 
replaced, including Michael Wolff, the Director General of 
the Party's Central Office, who was believed to have worked 
actively against her election as leader (14). 
( 1 2 ) 
( 1 3 ) 
( , 4 ) 
Times, 16/1/76, p. 1, col. b. Jenkin had been a 
t d "old minister during the Heath Governmen , an was an 
friend" of Thatcher (Thatcher, 1995, p. 289). 
Ramsden, 1996, p. 455. Maude ha,? helped ~rite w~at 
Thatcher later described as the cruclal Dally 
Telegraph article "My Kind of Tory Party" 
(Thatcher, 1995, p. 273), referred to in Chapter 4. 
ibid., pp. 446 and 455. 
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2. THE POLICY REVIEW PROGRAMME 
As suggested in Chapter 4, Thatcher had offered 
Conservati ve MPs not just the opportuni ty to replace a 
leader who had proved electorally unsuccessful, but a 
different approach to policy. Through her own statements 
(15), and the speeches that Joseph had made during 1974 
which she was assumed to support, few could have doubted 
the broad nature of the approach she favoured, especially 
in the sphere of economic policy. What was not clear was 
the impact her election would have on Party policy across 
the board, which would need to be set out in the manifesto 
for the next general election. 
As noted above, Joseph was appointed to oversee policy 
development. He argued that it was necessary "to have ... 
an acceptable philosophy" and "clear policy" in respect of 
those subjects where it was needed "if we are to win the 
election and govern effectively" (16). To develop these he 
proposed a review programme between what he saw as the 
"impressionistic and highly selecti veil one undertaken after 
1945 and the "detailed and more comprehensive" one 
initiated in 1965 (17). 
( 1 5 ) 
( 1 6 ) 
( 1 7 ) 
for example, her "My Kind of Tory Party" article in 
the Daily Telegraph, 30/1/75, p. 16 and extract from 
letter to constituents, reproduced in the Sunday 
Times, 2/2/75, p. 1, col. c. 
Joseph's paper Policy-Making, 7975, 10/3/75, 
LCC/75/68, on CPA LCC 52-60. 
ibid. 
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Joseph's approach was agreed at the LCC meeting on 12 March 
1975, wi th the aim of completing the policy reviews so 
that, if desirable, a mid-term document could be produced 
for the 1976 Party Conference. In the event, policy groups 
were asked to provide interim reports by 23 July 1975, and 
more substantial ones by the end of May 1976 (18). 
Following the LCC discussion on procedural matters, Joseph 
produced a further paper, Notes Towards the Definition of 
Policy. That addressed substantive issues, suggesting "a 
new start" (asserting that recent Conservative Governments 
had, "by ignoring history, instincts, human nature and 
common sense intensified the very evils which we 
believed ... we could wipe out"); offering a vision of the 
sort of society to be promoted (one "embodied in social 
market policies, which recognise economic life as something 
organic but largely autonomous"); and proposing some 
general desiderata (eg "this time we must surely allow 
prices, subject to competition, and dividends to operate 
freely" and "cut government functions") (19). 
The paper also provided an opportunity for Joseph to move 
from his vision of "a new start" to set out some 
preliminary thoughts on a wide range of subjects, including 
the NHS, sometimes indicating where he thought a policy 
group should be established. 
( 18) 
( 1 9 ) 
LCC(75)53rd, CPA LCC 52-60; Joseph/Policy Group 
Chairmen, 15/7/75, CPA CRD 4/7/78. 
Notes Towards the Definition of Policy, 4/4/75, 
LCC/75/71, CPA LCC 52-60. 
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The LCC discussion of Joseph's paper on 11 April 1975 
demonstrated the strength of those within the LCC concerned 
about the notion of the "new start" he favoured. Some 
members thought the paper was "too critical of ... recent 
Conservative policy"; argued that "the Party should not 
repudiate its previous attempts to reach a national 
consensus", and asserted that "stability in approach was 
... important as people became more bewildered by events". 
Overall, "i t was generally fel t that the Conservati ve 
Government of 1970-74 had, on the whole, tried to do the 
right things, but had failed to explain its intentions 
adequately" (20). 
Against this background of differences both wi thin the 
Party and the LCC, numerous policy groups were established, 
including (rather later than most) one specifically on the 
NHS. It has been suggested that, "unlike the Heath groups 
[of the period 1965-70] they were not tightly controlled" 
(21), and there does not seem to have been a comparable 
process for the central approval of the membership of 
groups to that referred to in Chapter 1 in relation to the 
HPG. The LCC did, however, seek to ensure that the policy 
groups worked within the broad framework of the developing 
policy on public expenditure, something that was central 
to its thinking on economic matters. 
(20) LCC(75)57th meeting, CPA LCC 52-60. 
( 21) Nor ton, 1 996, p. 56. 
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2.1 Policy on public expenditure 
Two of the first policy groups established were those on 
Economic Reconstruction (ERPG) chaired by Howe, and Public 
Sector Policy (PSPG) chaired by John Nott, a shadow 
spokesman on Treasury and Economic Affairs (22). It was the 
work of these two groups that provided the basis for the 
LCC's policy on public expenditure. 
The ERPG met for the first time on 20 June 1975 and 
discussed a paper prepared by Adam Ridley of the CRD. This 
suggested five "basic principles of our economic policy" 
which "probably command widespread if not unanimous support 
and agreement", including that "public expenditure is too 
high both in the short and long run, and must be cut in 
both cash and resources terms" (23). 
The putative "widespread ... support" attaching to this 
proposition among Conservatives was in practice confirmed 
by the agreement to it, with the modification (proposed by 
David Howell) that within an overall reduction some 
elements of public expenditure might have to rise, by the 
ERPG, among whose members was Ian Gilmour (24). Gilmour 
viewed himself as in "the main Tory tradi tion" (25), at the 
time of Thatcher's election as leader was known to have 
been particularly concerned at what he anticipated as the 
consequences (26), and came to be regarded as a leading 
"wet". 
(22) Times, 25/2/75, p. 1, col. h. 
(23) PG/10/75/1, undated but pre 20/6/75, Lord Joseph 
Archive (LJA) KJ 10/6. 
(24) note of first meeting, ERPG, 20/6/75, as amended by 
note of second meeting, 27/6/75, LJA KJ 10/6. 
(25) Gilmour I, Dancing with Dogma, 1992, London, Simon & 
Schuster, p. 3. 
(26) Ramsden, 1995, p. 446. 
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The day after the first EPRG meeting, Howe gave a speech 
in respect of which the Party issued an extensive press 
release. This sought to explain why a reduction in public 
spending was essential and where spending could be reduced 
(27) . 
Howe pointed out that the public sector borrowing 
requirement (PSBR) (28) was, on the Government's estimates, 
running at 10% of the gross national product, a situation 
he regarded as "frightening", particularly in view of its 
signi ficance for inflation. In his view, this could be 
remedied by abandoning proposed nationalisations; reducing 
subsidies (on i terns such as bread, railway fares and 
council house rents, as well as industry); bringing forward 
reductions the Labour Chancellor had already proposed for 
future years; curbing "extravagant council housing costs"; 
and possibly through "reductions in expendi ture on the 
investment programmes of the nationalised industries and 
on education, health and other parts of the social 
services" (29). 
Howe circulated his speech to LCC colleagues in July with 
the hope that "you will ... be able to conduct your own 
policy reviews within this tentative framework" (30). This 
was emphasised by Joseph when, on the same day, he sent 
policy group chairmen "a handful of guiding requirements, 
priorities and themes which should be taken into account". 
The first of these was the "paramount need to cut public 
spending ... The Shadow Cabinet will look to policy groups 
to make considered proposals to this end" (31). 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
( 30) 
( 31 ) 
Conservative Party press release 625/75, 21/6/75. 
essentially, total public expenditure less revenues 
such as the product of taxation. 
Conservative Party press release 625/75, 21/6/75. 
LCC/75/81, 15/7/75, CPA LCC 61-72. 
LCC(75)53rd, CPA LCC 52-60; Joseph/Policy Group 
Chairmen, 15/7/75, CPA CRD 4/7/78. 
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The PSPG presented its initial analysis of public 
expenditure to the LCC on 28 July 1975. In the Group's 
view, "to avoid the acute inflationary dangers which arise 
from a borrowing requirement at present levels", the PSBR 
needed to be reduced by about £3 billion a year to 1978 
(32). The LCC agreed that the objective should be "no 
further increases in overall public expenditure and 
substantial cuts wherever possible" . The PSPG was 
authorised to discuss with other policy groups what cuts 
could be achieved, and LCC members were asked to find means 
of fixing cash and manpower ceilings and ensuring value for 
money in respect of their areas of responsibility (33). 
The importance attached to the broad framework of policy 
on public expenditure was underlined a week later when, 
during a LCC discussion of the work of policy groups, "Mrs 
Thatcher and Sir Geoffrey Howe stressed once again the 
importance of restraining public expenditure and shedding 
some functions at present carried out by government" (34). 
The PSPG sent Thatcher and William Whitelaw, the Deputy 
Leader, an interim report in December 1975, reiterating its 
conclusions (35), and a substantive one was prepared in 
July 1976. In this latter report, the Group suggested 
reductions in spending programmes of about £2 billion in 
the first full year, rising to £4.5 billion in the fifth 
year; noted that this would not reverse what it regarded 
as the "excesses of Labour's spending ... which have added 
£6 billion or so" to the plans put forward by the 
Conservative Government in 1973; and drew attention to the 
fact that the discussions with "spending" policy groups 
held so far had identified "economies [which] fall far 
short of the minimum required" (36). 
(32) PG/ll/75/5, 22/7/75, LJA KJ 10/16. 
(33) LCC(75)73rd meeting, 28/7/75, CPA LCC 73-76. 
(34) LCC(75)75th meeting, 4/8/75, ibid. 
(35) PG/ll/75/24, 10/12/75, LJA KJ 10/17. 
(36) LCC(76)/124, July 1976, CPA LCC 113-123. 
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Nott attended the LCC discussion and afterwards minuted 
PSPG members that "in general terms, our proposals for 
individual programmes were accepted". However, in his view 
"there was a considerable sense of shock that in spite of 
the substantial cuts in programmes proposed, there still 
did not seem room for major tax cuts" (37). The formal LCC 
minutes recorded that the figures in the PSPG report could 
not yet be "agreed", that the Labour Government should be 
pressed to make further reductions "as this would make our 
own task on obtaining power easier", and that more work 
should be done on such matters as ways of reducing over-
manning in the public sector and legislative changes needed 
to implement the cuts that had been identified (38). 
Against this background, and Thatcher's view that "it was 
wrong to publish in too much detail ones policies before 
the election ... [because] that put the Opposition party 
into the position of having to defend its policies instead 
of attacking the Government" (39), it was understandable 
that the major mid-term policy statement The Right 
Approach, published prior to the 1976 Party Conference, 
addressed the issue of public expenditure in fairly 
generalised terms. 
The Right Approach set out explicitly the Party's view that 
"public spending cuts are essential if we are to bring the 
economy back into balance", and indicated three means of 
doing so - reversing a number of "identifiable Socialist 
policies", reducing subsidies, and more effective control 
of costs (40). 
(37) 
(38 ) 
(39) 
(40) 
PG/11/76, 29/7/76, CPA CRD 4/13/10. 
LCC(76)123rd, 12/7/76, CPA LCC 113-123. 
note of Thatcher's address to the ACP, 7/4/76, 
ACP(76)144th, CPA ACP 2/4. 
The Right Approach, 1976, London, Conservative Party, 
pp. 24/5. 
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This approach was continued in later policy documents, 
notably The Right Approach to the Economy, published in 
October 1977, and the manifesto for the 1979 general 
election. The former restated as the Party's view "that 
public spending cuts are essential if we are to bring the 
economy back into balance", and repeated the three areas 
for achieving economies referred to in The Right Approach 
(41). In the manifesto, the commitment was to "a gradual 
reduction in the size of the Government's borrowing 
requirement", in part through "substantial economies" 
including "the reduction in waste, bureaucracy and over-
government" (42). 
In pri vate, however, Joseph sought to achieve greater 
specificity as regards reductions that would be 
practicable. Nott was appointed LCC spokesman on trade in 
December 1976 (43), and was succeeded as chairman of the 
PSPG by Howell. Joseph wrote to LCC members, including 
Jenkin who had recently become social services spokesman, 
advising them of the change, and saying that Howell and he 
would like to meet them individually ("with any colleagues 
you wish from your team"), "to discuss proposals for 
reducing Government spending when we come to off ice" (44). 
This approach led to a series of "bilaterals" between March 
and May 1977, though there seems to be no evidence that one 
was held with Jenkin in respect of social services (45). 
(41 ) 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
The Ri gh t Approach to the Economy, 1 977, London, 
Conservative Party, pp. 24/7. 
Craig F, Bri tish General Election Mani festos 7,959-87, 
3rd ed. 1990, Aldershot, Dartmouth PublishIng, p. 
269. 
Times, 10/12/76, p. 2, col. d. 
Joseph/LCC members, 27/1/77, LJA KJ 19/4. 
the CPA contains notes of meetings with LCC spokesmen 
on foreign and Commonwealth matters (14/3/77), home 
affairs (14/3/77), agriculture (15/3/77), trade and 
industry (18/3/77), energy (28/3/77) and 
environmental and local government matters 
«16/5/77). CRD 4/13/11. 
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If, indeed, there was no social services bilateral, the 
reason may have been that, from its inception, Jenkin had 
been a member of the PSPG, and able therefore to discuss 
the NHS authoritatively in Group meetings. The possibility 
of cost reductions at the DHSS was indeed discussed at a 
meeting of the PSPG on 5 May 1977 - within the period of 
the bilaterals - at which Sir Philip Rogers, the former 
Permanent Secretary of the Department, was present (46). 
Thus not only were LCC members asked at the outset to 
examine closely the scope for reductions in spending in the 
areas for which they were leading policy reviews, initially 
through the PSPG, and later through Joseph and Howell, they 
were pressed to keep the objective of an overall reduction 
in public spending in mind. Effectively, as Howe had 
indicated to his LCC colleagues in his memorandum of July 
1975, the Party had established "(so far as is possible for 
an opposition) a PESC exercise" (47). 
The machinery for considering public expenditure issues -
the ERPG, the PSPG and the PSPG's Manpower Sub-group - not 
only sought to contribute to an overall target for 
reductions in public expenditure, and targets for main 
sectors, but also produced policy suggestions for sectors. 
The contributions of, particularly, the PSPG and its 
Manpower Sub-group in this regard will be examined below. 
(46) 
(47) 
PG/11/77, minutes of meeting held 5/5/77, CPA CRD 
4/13/11. 
LCC/75/81, 15/7/75, CPA LCC 61-72. "PESC',' stood for 
Public Expendi ture Survey Commi ttee, WhICh oversaw 
the annual bilateral discussions between the Treasury 
and individual government departments over future 
levels of public spending. 
263 
2.2 The policy review machinery for the social services 
A Social Services General Policy Group (SSPG) was 
established under Fowler's chairmanship and held its first 
meeting on 25 September 1975 (48). Jenkin became chairman 
when he succeeded Fowler. The Group met seven times between 
September 1975 and February 1978 (49) and it appears to 
have been discontinued as a result of the LCC's decision 
in June 1978 that "the remaining policy groups should be 
wound up as soon as possible" (50). 
Throughout its life, the SSPG seems to have consisted 
solely of Conservative parliamentarians (51), and to have 
been concerned with reaching an overview of social services 
policies, often in the light of the work of policy groups 
on particular issues. It was sometimes referred to as the 
Social Services (or DHSS) Steering Group (52). 
Several groups on more specific issues were established, 
three on aspects of social security policy, one on 
voluntary organisations and three relating to health 
issues. Of these "health" groups, two were on specific 
services, for the deaf and the mentally ill. The third 
(chaired by Vaughan) was on the NHS (53). 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
(51 ) 
(52) 
(53) 
PG/60/75/1, minutes of meeting on 25/9/75, CPA CRD 
4/7/78. 
on 25/9/75, 
13/2/78 and 
consecutively 
ibid. 
10/2/76, 19/10/76, 30/6/77, 3/10/77, 
28/2/78. Minutes of these meetings, 
numbered from 1 to 7, are in the CPA, 
LCC/78/208th, 7/6/78, CPA LCC 194-215. 
the initial members, apart from the Chairman, were 
Gerard Vaughan, Kenneth Clarke, Jill Knight, Lynda 
Chalker Sir George Young, Robert Boscawen, Robert 
McCrindle and Tony Newton. Later meetings were 
attended by Cecil Parkinson, Paul Dean, Lady Young, 
Peter Bottomley and Robin Hodgson. 
eg CRD list dated 3/2/76, LJA KJ 26/2. 
ibid. 
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The view that a policy group on the NHS was necessary seems 
to have been reached very early in Thatcher's leadership. 
On 22 April 1975 the Party's Health and Social Security 
Committee resolved that such a group should be set up, with 
Vaughan as chairman (54). In practice, however, the Group 
was not established for nearly a year. A CRD list of policy 
groups dated 3 February 1976 included the NHS Group (number 
65 on the list) as "planned or expected" (55). A week 
later, at a meeting of the SSPG, it was "agreed that ... 
Dr Vaughan should go ahead with his policy group as soon 
as possible" (56). 
An embryo NHS Policy Group (NHSPG), consisting of Vaughan 
and Sir George Young, together with two CRD officers (Biddy 
Passmore and Christopher Mockler) seems to have met for the 
first time in March 1976 (57). By May 1976 the Group had 
been expanded. Vaughan wrote to Jenkin referring to it as 
"quite ... large and loose", enclosing a list of members 
which should be treated "as private because some of them 
feel very strongly that they do not want to be openly 
associated with a political party". Vaughan made it clear 
that the Group would work "wi thout overall meetings": 
instead, he would "obtain the indi vidual's views personally 
. .. and would then prepare a working paper which could then 
be circulated for comment" (58). 
(54) 
(55) 
(56) 
(57) 
(58) 
CRD memorandum, doc. 83 in CPA CRD 4/7/22. 
LJA KJ 26/2. 
PG60/75/2, 10/2/76, CRD 4/7/78. 
a note of a meeting dated 23/3/76, is referenced 
PG/65/71/1 which clearly implies it was the first 
document o'f that group's series. The si tuation is 
confused because the note gives "23 March 1 9 7 6" as 
the date of the next meeting. CPA CRD 4/7/55. 
vaughan/Jenkin, 25/5/76, ibid. 
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Attached to Vaughan's letter to Jenkin was a list of the 
NHSPG's members but this was not enclosed with the copy 
sent to the CRD (and now included in the CPA), as a 
manuscript note by Vaughan on that copy makes clear (59). 
Research to date has yielded only incomplete information 
about the composition of this "quite ... large" Group. In 
addition to Vaughan, members seem to have included Alan 
Maynard, an economist who had been one of those 
commissioned to undertake research for the BMA Advisory 
Panel; Dr Paul Vickers, a consul tant in accident and 
emergency care working in Gateshead; Dr David Tod, a GP and 
initiator of the Conservative Medical Society (see below); 
and George Bunton, a London-based consultant surgeon (60). 
Other names were mentioned to the author as Group members, 
but enquiries of the individuals concerned have failed to 
establish that they were indeed members. 
(59) 
(60) 
ibid. 
Maynard and Tad confirmed their membership to the 
author at meetings on 8/4/99 and 19/10/00, 
respectively. Vickers (whom the author has been 
unable to trace) and Bun ton (deceased) were 
remembered as members by at least two of the those to 
whom the author has spoken (Maynard, Tad and 
Vaughan) . 
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While there is evidence that at least two meetings of the 
Group were held (61), there seem to have been no notes of 
the meetings, nor any records in the CPA which would 
provide a basis for a more definitive statement about the 
Group's contribution (62). Much of the Group's business 
seems to have been undertaken by Vaughan through individual 
consultations and meetings with perhaps one or two others 
present, as envisaged in his letter of 25 May to Jenkin. 
Thus individuals whom Vaughan regarded as Group members may 
well have thought of themselves as experts occasionally 
consulted, and not as members of a formal Party working 
group. 
In the absence of meeting notes, the work of the NHSPG can 
only be described in a very incomplete fashion. In his 
letter of 25 May 1976 to Jenkin, referred to above, Vaughan 
said that a general paper "with some overall points which 
can if required go into a manifesto" could be ready 
"whenever you want it", with "a more detailed paper with 
options" before the Summer Recess, though he warned that 
the pay-beds issue "may set us back a little" (63). 
(61 ) 
(62) 
(63 ) 
a CRD note dated 14/6/77 referred to a meeting of the 
Group, attended by Maynard, on 9/2/77 (CPA CRD 
4/7/55). Tod's diary for 1977 includes an entry for 
a Group meeting on 24/5/77, which he recalls as bei~g 
disputatious (meeting with author, 19/10/00). ThlS 
latter date and Tod's memory of the character of the 
meeting ti~ in with the minutes of the SSPG meeting 
on 30/6/77 which record that "Dr Vaughan said that 
there were'serious differences of opinion in the NHS 
Policy Group" (PG/60/77/4, CRD 4/7/78). 
there are no copies of NHSPG meeting minutes - apart 
from the embryonic one - in the CPA, and Tod cannot 
recollect there being any (meeting with author, 
19/10/00). 
vaughan/Jenkin, CPA CRD 4/7/55. 
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That warning proved to be well judged, for in mid October 
1976 Vaughan was anticipating "a document for the social 
services team [by which he almost certainly meant the SSPG] 
by the end of November" (64). 
There seems to be no evidence in the CPA that such a 
document was discussed by the SSPG, though there is an 
undated and unsourced paper Proposals for Health Services 
in Great Britain which may well have been a draft (65). 
A memorandum from Mockler to SSPG members in June 1977 
noted that a NHSPG report was "planned" (66). At the SSPG 
meeting on 30 June, Vaughan reported "serious differences 
of opinion in the NHS Policy Group", sought a full SSPG 
meeting discussion on them which was agreed for 11 July, 
and promised to "circulate a paper beforehand" (67). 
Following that meeting Jenkin advised Joseph that "our 
Policy Paper on the National Health Service will be ready 
within a fortnight" (68). 
Although the CPA seems not to contain either a copy of the 
paper or a note of any SSPG discussion of it (69), a CRD 
memorandum dated 25 July 1977 recorded that "the report of 
this [NHS] group is currently being re-written by request 
of the general policy group on Social Services" (70). 
(64) PG60/76/3, 19/10/76, CPA CRD 4/7/78. 
(65) on CPA CRD 4/7/55. In meetings with the author on 
8/4/99 and 20/1/00 Maynard and Vaughan respectively 
thought that the paper in question was indeed a draft 
of the document. 
(66) Mockler, 17/6/77, CPA CRD 4/7/78. 
(67) PG60/77/4, 30/6/77, ibid. 
(68) Jenkin/Joseph, 1/7/77, LJA KJ 29/6. 
(69) There may have been no note of whatever SSPG 
discussion took place. The note of the meeting on 
30/6/77 was numbered PG60/77/4. A SSPG meeting on 
3/10/77 "to discuss the family policy debate at the 
Party Conference on 12 October" was numbered 
PG60/77/5. 
(70) John Houston/James Douglas, 25/7/77, LJA KJ 18/2. 
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Whether there ever was a final report of the NHSPG is open 
to doubt. There is an undated and unsourced document within 
the CPA which could be a late draft of such a report (71). 
However, in the extensive briefing pack prepared by the CRD 
in 1979 for incoming ministers to present to DHSS civil 
servants, the reports of nine policy groups were included 
or listed, but not one from the NHSPG (72). 
As noted above, the original intention was that the work 
of the numerous policy groups should be completed in time 
to contribute to a mid-term policy statement. Much was duly 
completed and reflected in The Right Approach. (The 
chairman of the policy group on housing has, for example, 
commented that the social policy sections of The Right 
Approach "by and large reflected the policy work of the 
previous year" (73).) Plainly, however, this was not the 
case with the NHSPG, which began its work a year or more 
later than many groups and did not present its conclusions 
until the second half of 1977 at the earliest. Rather than 
being central to the Party's deliberations on the NHS as 
presumably envisaged, the NHSPG seems to have been just one 
contributor to policy thinking that drew on a wide range 
of sources, as discussed below. 
(71) Proposals for Health Services in Great Britain, CPA 
CRD 4/7/55, thought by Mockler, Maynard and Tod 
(meetings with author 6/4/99, 8/4/99, and 19/10/00 
respectively) to be a draft of the NHSPG's report. 
Vaughan told the author at a meeting on 20/1/00 that 
he thought there had been a final report, ~nd offe~ed 
to check his files as time allowed. Desplte sendlng 
a reminder in August 2000, at the time of writing 
(February 2001) the author has received no more 
definite information. 
(72) appendix II to the brief, a copy of which is on CPA 
CRD 4/7/89. 
( 73) Ra i son, 1 990, p. 99. 
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2.3 The Conservative Medical Society 
Although not part of the formal Party policy review 
machinery, the formation of the Conservative Medical 
Society (eMS) provided frontbench spokesmen on NHS matters 
with a source of advice which, in the period to the 1979 
general election, was perhaps as influential as the NHSPG. 
The idea that there should be an organisation for 
Conservative-supporting health professionals, parallel to 
the well established Society of Conservative Lawyers, was 
suggested to successive ministers and shadow ministers by 
Dr David Tod, a London-based GP, Conservative councillor 
and parliamentary candidate. 
Tod first made his proposal in a discussion with Maurice 
Macmillan in the late 1960s, and in 1973 he had put it to 
Joseph whilst the Secretary of State for Social Services. 
Neither saw sufficient advantage in the idea to be 
encouraging (74). 
However, Tod continued to see merit in his idea and in July 
1974 he approached Howe, with more success. Howe agreed 
that it might be useful to establish such an organisation 
after the election widely regarded as imminent, and passed 
the correspondence to Vaughan (75). 
(74) Tod, meeting with author, 19/10/00. 
(75) Tod/Howe, 16 & 23/7/74, Howe/Tod, 23 & 29/7/74, Tod 
papers. 
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Tod and Vaughan met on 19 September 1974 (76). Vaughan was 
interested in Tod's proposal, but matters went into 
abeyance for several months, first due to the general 
election and then the Party leadership election (77). 
A further meeting between Tod and Vaughan took place on 16 
April 1975 (78), by which time Vaughan had sounded Fowler, 
who had succeeded Howe, and found him supportive of the 
idea. The intention to found the CMS was announced by 
Fowler on 21 May (79), and at an LCC meeting that day he 
invited colleagues to bring its existence to the attention 
of "medical practi tioners who might be interested in 
joining" (80). 
During the Summer several meetings were held under 
Vaughan's chairmanship to plan the development of the 
Society, and on 5 August a meeting open to potential 
members was held at the House of Commons (81). "Over 100 
persons" attended the meeting and, gi ven the level of 
support, it was clear that the Society would be viable. The 
meeting appointed a steering committee chaired by Vaughan 
to draft a constitution (82). 
(76) 
(77) 
(78 ) 
(79) 
(80) 
(81 ) 
(82) 
Tod's diary for 1974, Tod papers. 
Tod, meeting with author, 19/10/00. 
Tod's diary for 1975, Tod papers. 
Conservative press release 495/75. 
LCC(75)63rd, CPA LCC 61-72. 
Tad's diary for 1975, Tod papers. 
"The Origins of the Conservative Medical 
The Conservative Medical Society 
Brochure, 1995, London, CMS. 
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Society", in 
Anniversary 
The formation of the Society was confirmed at its inaugural 
annual general meeting on 27 March 1976, when the proposed 
name and draft consti tution were formally adopted and 
officers were elected (83). 
Thus although matters were not formalised until March 1976, 
from May 1975 an embryonic eMS existed and was available 
as a source of advice to the Party's frontbench spokesmen, 
especially Vaughan who was intimately involved in the early 
stages of setting up the Society. The eMS's contributions 
to the Party's policy considerations will be noted below. 
2.4 NHS policy issues from February 1975 
Despite the apparently rather limited contribution the 
NHSPG, the body formally appointed for the task, seems to 
have made to the Party's policy review programme instituted 
in April 1975, extensive consideration was given to issues 
relating to the form of the NHS, especially following 
Jenkin's appointment as Lee spokesman on social services. 
(83) ibid. 
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Three main issues were considered. The first, the future 
of private practice within the NHS, had been brought into 
poli tical controversy by what Powell described as the 
Labour Government's "reopening of the compromise between 
the public and private practice of medicine ... embodied 
in the founding Act of 1946" (84). The second, financing 
the NHS, was an issue which, as noted in previous chapters, 
had been under consideration by the Conservati ve Party 
since the 1940s. In the period 1975 to 1979 it came into 
public prominence due to the concern of the medical 
profession at reductions in resourcing from 1974. The third 
issue was the structure of the NHS, which became an issue 
as widespread concern developed about aspects of the 
reorganisation enacted during the period of the Heath 
Government. 
3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 
As noted in Chapter 4, at the October 1974 election the 
Labour Party had committed itself to the phasing out of pay 
beds from the NHS, while the Conservative Party had made 
it clear that it opposed such a policy, both on grounds of 
principle and practice. 
The intention to phase out pay beds was confirmed by the 
Government in the Debate on the Address (85). The vehicle 
for the exploration of the issue with the medical 
profession remained the working party chaired by Owen. 
(84) Powell E, Medicine and Politics: 1975 and After, 
1976, London, Pitman, p. 79. 
(85) Commons Hansard, 1/11/74, vol. 880, col. 545. 
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The Conservati ve posi tion prior to the change in Party 
Leader was to oppose the Government's policy, as noted 
above. This posi tion was maintained, for example in a 
Commons debate he initiated in May 1975, Fowler said that 
the Conservatives would oppose the policy "at every stage", 
characterising it as one which "threatens to increase the 
disillusion which many doctors already feel, throws 
away resources at a time when the National Health Service 
needs every penny it can get ... and ... brings no benefit 
to the National Health Service" (86). 
In parallel with the proposed phasing out of pay beds, the 
Government announced in the 1975 Budget that "for social 
reasons" all those who benefited from private medical 
insurance schemes where the premiums were paid by their 
employers would be taxed on the benefi t (87). This was 
opposed by Howe in his capacity as shadow Chancellor as "a 
mean piece of discrimination" (88), but the measure was 
enacted (89). 
On 11 August 1975 the Government issued a consultative 
paper on phasing out pay beds, which also proposed 
licensing arrangements for private hospitals, both to 
ensure minimum standards of quality and control the size 
of the private hospital sector (90). 
The consultative paper proposals were criticised as 
"dangerous and irrelevant" by Fowler. In his view they 
would "encourage emigration of doctors, already at a 
dangerously high ra te, and did nothing to tackle the 
desperate lack of hospital resources" (91). 
(86) 
(87) 
(88) 
(89) 
(90) 
(91 ) 
Commons Hansard, vol, 891, col. 1092. 
Commons Hansard, 15/4/75, vol. 890, col. 312. 
Commons Hansard, 8/5/75, vol. 891, col. 1654. 
as section 35 of the Finance (No.2) Act 1975 
The Separation of Private Practice from 
Hospitals, 1975, London, DHSS, paras. 4 (phasing 
and 8/10 (licensing arrangements). 
Daily Telegraph, 12/8/75, p. 1, col. 6. 
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NHS 
out) 
There was also a very critical response to the consultative 
paper by representatives of the BMA and the HCSA. Both saw 
the proposals as evidence of the Government's wish to 
abolish private practice altogether (92). A month later the 
recently formed CMS issued a statement cri ticising the 
proposals for the loss of revenue to the NHS, and as an 
interference "with the professional and personal freedom 
of the caring professions and of the public" (93). 
These reactions from the BMA and HCSA were but the opening 
shots in a sustained campaign of opposition by many within 
the medical profession, which Webster has characterised as 
" . t . l' Vl rlO lC ... backed up by a threat of industrial action, 
including mass resignation from the NHS" (94). 
Despite the statements of Conservative spokesmen and the 
CMS, Vaughan, who attended meetings of the BMA and Royal 
Colleges group co-ordinating the campaign "as an observer", 
reported to the SSPG in September that "the doctors felt 
that the Tories were very weak and might not support them 
in opposing Mrs Castle" (95). Perhaps in part by way of 
response to Vaughan's report, in his Party Conference 
speech two weeks later Fowler said that the Party would 
"fight [Mrs Castle] all the way on her pay beds policy ... 
on the ground of principle and on the ground of common 
sense. We fight for freedom for the medical profession; we 
fight for choice for the patient; and we fight for 
resources for the Heal th Service" (96). Thatcher also 
referred to the issue in her Conference speech, undertaking 
that "when we return to power we shall reverse Mrs Castle's 
stupid and spiteful attack on hospital pay beds" (97). 
(92) 
(93) 
(94) 
(95) 
(96) 
(97) 
Times, 12/8/75, p. 3, col. a (BMA); 
col. c (HCSA). 
Conservative press release 800/75. 
13/8/75, p. 2, 
Webster, 1998, p. 623. 
minutes, 25/9/75, PG/60/75/1, CPA CRD 4/7/78. 
Conservative Conference Report 7975, London, 
Conservative Party, p. 123. 
ibid., p. 151. 
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On 20 October 1975 the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, 
announced the setting up of a Royal Commission on the NHS 
(the background to which is considered below), making it 
clear that the implementation of the pay beds policy was 
not to be suspended while the Royal Commission deliberated. 
Rather, Wilson emphasised that the Government's commitment 
to phasing out pay beds remained unchanged and that 
legislation would be introduced as soon as the 
parliamentary timetable allowed (98). This opened up 
another line of argument for the Conservatives, and in her 
response Thatcher suggested that the Commission would be 
unlikely to "command the co-operation and respect of the 
medical profession" if the Government went ahead with its 
pay bed policy before it had reported (99). 
A week after the Royal Commission had been announced, 
Fowler opened a Commons debate on the NHS, pursuing 
Thatcher's argument that the phasing out of pay beds should 
be postponed while the Royal Commission deliberated (100). 
Castle rejected this on the ground that the policy 
reflected a point of prinCiple, which "must be decided by 
Parliament and not by the Royal Commission" (101). 
Legislation to "phase out private practice from National 
Health Service hospitals" was included in the Queen's 
Speech on 19 November, and in the Debate on the Address 
Fowler pursued the same line as in the October debate. 
Referring to the "strife" within the NHS, over doctors' pay 
and conditions as well as the pay bed policy, Fowler argued 
that "it was ludicrous to set up a Royal Commission but not 
allow it to consider [what he regarded as] the problem 
causing most trouble in the Health Service" (102). 
(98) 
(99) 
( 1 00 ) 
( 1 01 ) 
(102) 
Commons Hansard, vol. 898, cols. 35/7. 
ibid., cols. 37/8. 
ibid., cols. 1039/40. 
ibid., col. 1058. 
'b'd I 901 I 8 (Queen's Speech) and 361/2 1 1 ., vo. , co s. 
(Fowler) . 
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At the beginning of December the LCC decided to continue 
to "urge the Government to refer the pay beds issue to the 
Royal Commission" (103). However, by then Wilson shared the 
doubts about the pay bed policy that others wi thin the 
Cabinet had expressed earlier (104). At a meeting wi th 
representatives of the medical and dental professions on 
the same day a compromise on the substanti ve issue was 
identified and, over the next few days, developed into a 
basis for a provisional agreement which was announced on 
15 December (105). 
Thi s compromi se, which Cas tIe accepted onl y wi th grea t 
reluctance (106), involved the Government expressing "its 
commi tment to the maintenance of private practice", and 
agreement that, after an initial reduction of 1,000 pay 
beds, the remainder would be phased out only as "the 
reasonable availability of alternative facilities for 
private practice" allowed (107). 
A Bill incorporating the provisional agreement was drafted 
during the early months of 1976 but before it was presented 
to Parliament Wilson had resigned as Prime Minister and 
been succeeded by James Callaghan. A few days before the 
Health Services Bill was due to be introduced, Callaghan 
dismissed Castle and appointed David Ennals as her 
replacement 
appointment 
(108) . In Webster I s judgement, Ennals I 
produced "a much bet ter atmosphere of co-
operation with the medical profession" (109). 
( 1 03) 
( , 04 ) 
(105) 
( 1 06) 
( 1 07 ) 
( 1 08) 
( 1 09 ) 
LCC(75)86th, 3/12/75, CPA LCC 77-94. 
Webster, 1996, pp. 623/5 
Commons Hansard, vol. 902, cols. 971/3. 
Webster, pp. 625/6. 
Commons Hansard, vol. 902, col. 972. 
Times, 9/4/76, p. 1, col. a. 
Webster, 1996, p. 627. 
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The Health Services Bill passed its Second Reading in the 
Commons on 27 April, and was enacted in November 1976, 
largely free from the "vitriolic campaign" that had 
followed publication of the consultative document (110). 
The Conservative Party opposed the Bill on Second Reading, 
arguing that it was "wholly irrelevant to the real problems 
of the Health Service", would cost the NHS "millions of 
pounds a year", and would make "no contribution to 
restoring the morale of the medical profession" (111). In 
June 1976 the LCC explicitly agreed 
services needed to be integrated into 
isolated from it", a policy which 
October 1976 policy document (112). 
that "private health 
the NHS, and not kept 
found place in the 
From Autumn 1976 Jenkin regularly made it clear that the 
next Conservative Government would reverse Labour's policy 
(113), though without any very specific description of the 
form the reversal would take, given that the number of pay 
beds was being reduced under the provisions of the Health 
Services Act (114). 
( 11 0 ) 
( 11 1 ) 
( 11 2 ) 
( 11 3 ) 
( 11 4 ) 
though not without some acrimony. For example, on 16 
Jul y 1 976 the BMA ARM resolved to "invoke the 
intervention of the Prime Minister" about, inter 
alia, the proposed guillotining of discussion on the 
Bill, as a result of which a meeting with Callaghan 
was held on 26/7/76. BMAA, minutes of ARM 15-
17/7/76, minute 182. 
Commons Hansard, vol. 910, col. 234. 
LCC(76)117th, 21/6/76, CPA LCC 113-123; The Right 
Approach, 1076, p. 60. 
for example, in his speech to the annual conference 
of the Association of Heal th Service Treasurers, 
26/3/77 (Conservative press release 352/77); his 
Nursing Times article (3/11/77 edition, p. 1701), 
and his speech in the Commons, 20/4/78, when he 
referred to "the system of medical apartheid 
embodied in the foolish Health Services Act 1976. We 
are commi t ted to reversing it" (Commons Hansard, 
vol. 948, col. 690). 
from about 4,500 in 1974 to about 2,800 by the 1979 
general election, Webster, 1996, pp. 620 and 627. 
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Reversal was included in the Party's 1979 election 
manifesto, where the commitment was to "allow pay-beds to 
be provided where there is a demand for them; [and] end 
Labour's vendetta against the private health sector", the 
latter a reference to the controls established by the 
Health Services Act over private hospitals. A commitment 
was also made to restore income tax relief on employer-
employee medical insurance schemes, thus reversing the 
decision enacted as Section 35 of the Finance (No.2) Act 
1975 (115). 
4. THE FINANCING OF THE NHS 
4.1 Health Service resources and the establishment of the 
Royal Commission on the NHS 
As noted in Chapter 3, in the last weeks of the Heath 
Government some reduction in the planned level of spending 
on the NHS was announced as part of the measures taken to 
address the deteriorating economic situation. 
In the economic circumstances of 1974 and early 1975, the 
Government judged that it was not possible to restore the 
levels of NHS expenditure planned by the Heath Government 
prior to the December 1973 reductions (116). With further 
deterioration in the economic situation, including the need 
to seek a loan from the International Monetary Fund, 
substantial reductions in planned levels of NHS expenditure 
from 1976/7 were announced in February 1976 (117). 
( 11 5 ) 
( 11 6 ) 
( 11 7 ) 
Craig, 1990, p. 280. 
Public Expenditure to 7978/79, Cmnd. 5879, 1975, 
London, HMSO, pp. 106/7. 
Public Expenditure to 7979/80, Cmnd. 6393, 1976, 
London, HMSO, p. 141. 
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Against the background of increased pressure on constrained 
services that the reductions in planned spending that 
started in December 1973 implied for a Service which many 
health professionals regarded as already inadequately 
funded, as early as July 1974 representatives of the 
medical, dental, nursing and midwifery professions sought 
a meeting with Wilson. At that meeting, on 31 July, the 
representatives sought an independent enquiry into the NHS, 
a request repeated in a document prepared by the 
professions as a follow up, and at a further meeting 
between the BMA and Castle on 2 July 1975 (118). 
Following her meeting with the BMA on 2 July 1975, Castle 
wrote the Association a letter that was discouraging both 
about the prospects about additional resources for the NHS 
("We cannot look forward to the regular annual growth that 
we have been accustomed to") and the establishment of an 
independent enquiry, though in a manuscript final sentence 
she undertook "to keep your proposal for an enquiry under 
review" (119). The BMA responded on 24 September, arguing 
that nineteen years after the Guillebaud Report a further 
enquiry was fully justified, and that the main health 
professions "all feel that the case for an impartial 
enquiry into the financing of the Service is overwhelming 
... to provide a sounder basis for the future" (120). 
( 11 8 ) 
( 11 9 ) 
(120) 
Castle, 1980, pp. 161/3 (31/7/74 meeting); BMJ, 
2/11/74, pp. 297/300 (follow up document); Castle, 
1980, pp. 443/4 (2/7/75 meeting). 
Castle/BMA, 5/7/75, BMAA, file 3/53/11. 
ibid. 
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While concerns about the resourcing of the Service were 
central to the health professions' request for an enquiry 
(121), deteriorating relationships between the Government 
and the medical profession over aspects of terms and 
conditions of employment within the NHS, and the proposed 
phasing out of pay beds, meant that during the Summer and 
early Autumn of 1975 a cluster of issues about the NHS was 
under public discussion. 
It seems to have been the extent of the concerns about the 
NHS, and the publicity that they were receiving, that led 
the Government to meet the professions' request. For, 
summarising an as yet not publicly available letter from 
Wilson to Castle on 14 October 1975 signalling his view 
that an enquiry should be established, Webster noted 
Wilson's intentions as being to "improve rela tions wi th the 
medical profession and take the NHS out of the headlines" 
(122). 
The enquiry, in the form of a Royal Commission on the 
National Health Service (RCNHS), was announced on 20 
October 1975, with the remit "to consider ... the best use 
and management of the financial and manpower resources of 
the National Health Service" (123). This was welcomed by 
Thatcher (124), with the reservation about proceeding with 
the implementation of the pay beds policy referred to 
above. 
( 1 21 ) 
( 1 22) 
( 1 23) 
( 1 24) 
see BMJ, 2/11/74, pp. 297 and 300, and Castle, 1980, 
p. 444, as well as the BMA'S letter of 24/9/75. 
Webster, 1996, p. 616. 
Commons Hansard, vol. 898, col. 35. 
ibid., col. 37. 
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The RCNHS's chairman (Sir Alec Merrison, Vice Chancellor 
of Bristol University) was announced in January 1976, and 
it members in May (125). The Commission deliberated 
throughout the remaining lifetime of the 
Government, and reported in July 1979 
1974 Labour 
(126). Its 
conclusions are thus outside the scope of this study. 
4.2 Conservative policy thinking 
establishment of the RCNHS 
prior to the 
In his paper Notes Towards the Definition of Policy put to 
the LCC in April 1975, Joseph had identified moving NHS 
financing to a system involving an element of insurance as 
a possible means of easing what he referred to as the 
"present strains" in the Service (127). Al though the 
minutes of the LCC meeting record no specific discussion 
on the NHS, gi ven Joseph's role and known closeness to 
Thatcher it would not have been surprising if Fowler, 
present as social services spokesman, gave the idea serious 
consideration. 
Whether or not he was influenced by Joseph's views, when 
Fowler presented his ideas to Joseph and Maude in their 
roles of overseeing the Party's policy review and Chairman 
of the CRD, respectively, he included "re-examin[ing] NHS 
finances" with continuing "to fight against the abolition 
of NHS pay beds", as his two NHS priorities (128). 
( 1 25) 
( 1 26 ) 
( 1 27 ) 
( 1 28) 
Commons Hansards, vol. 904, col. 126 (questions) 
(Chairman) and vol. 910, eols. 377/8 (questions) 
(members) . 
Cmnd 7615, 1979, London, HMSO. 
Notes Towards the Definition of Policy, 1975, pp. 
14/5. CPA LCC 52-60. 
note of meeting, 23/6/75, CPA CRD 4/7/78. 
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No immediate action seems to have been taken to get such 
a re-examination under way, though in July Joseph wrote to 
Fowler confirming the latter I s agreement "to talk to Norman 
Lamont [by then an Opposition spokesman on prices and 
incomes] about help from him in studying alternative 
finances for the NHS - starting, perhaps, wi th the BMA 
study" [presumably the Advisory Panel report] (129). 
The LCC endorsed the idea of an examination of the 
financing of the NHS, but it was argued that "we should be 
careful to avoid publicising any proposals for radical 
change until the subject had been fully considered" (130). 
Following the LCC meeting, Fowler responded to Joseph that 
he had "seen Norman Lamont and the result is that he and 
Gerry Vaughan will be heading an inquiry into financing the 
National Health Service. I will give you further details 
of this when they are settled" (131). 
The LCC's view that caution should be exercised in making 
public any proposals for radical change in financing 
arrangements was not altogether heeded. On 8 October the 
Evening Standard is said to have reported Vaughan as saying 
that "the next Tory Government would also aim for a mixed 
public and private financing of the NHS, channelling a 
large proportion of funds from private sources on the lines 
of the French Health Service" (132). 
(129 ) 
( 1 30 ) 
( 1 31 ) 
( 1 32 ) 
Joseph/Fowler, 23/7/75, LJA 29/1. 
LCC(75)76th meeting, 6/8/75, CPA LCC 73-76. 
Fowler/Joseph, 18/8/75, LJA 29/1. 
the CRD noted and dated the quotation in its list of 
"pledges" by Party spokesmen (in paper PI(77)9, 
21/11/77, CPA CRD 4/7/78). The author has, however, 
been unable to trace it in the Evening Standard of 
8/10/75 (or in the days immediately before and 
after). The explanation may be tha~ the pa~er 
printed several edi tions each day, W1 ~h chang1~g 
contents. The quotation may have been lncluded 1n 
early editions but left out of the "Closing ~rices" 
edi tion stored wi thin the Bri tish Newspaper Llbrary. 
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Shortly after the Conference the establishment of the RCNHS 
was announced, and there seems no evidence to suggest that 
the planned Vaughan/Lamont re-examination was under way at 
that stage, though there is evidence that some work was 
undertaken later (see below). It seems probable that, late 
in 1975, the opportunity for a review of NHS financing by 
the RCNHS was judged to render a specific Party enquiry 
unnecessary. 
4.3 Conservative policy alternative financing of the NHS 
following the establishment of the Royal Commission 
From June 1975 Joseph and Maude met on a fortnightly basis 
to discuss the development of Party policy. At a meeting 
shortly after the decision to establish the RCNHS was 
announced, they agreed "that it would be worth encouraging 
the lEA, BMA et al to submit evidence on alternative means 
of financing the NHS. (Action - KJ)" (133). (It was not the 
Conservatives' practice to submit evidence to Royal 
Commissions, something the Party Chairman confirmed to the 
Secretary of the RCNHS in June 1976 (134).) 
Within the lEA, Seldon, a member of the BMA Advisory Panel 
chaired by Jones, had been particularly interested in 
alternatives to taxation for funding health services. As 
noted in Chapter 3, Seldon had been in correspondence with 
Joseph on the issue in 1965, and again when Joseph was 
Secretary of State for Social Services. 
( 1 33) 
( 1 34) 
note of meeting 6/11/75, LJA KJ 18/1. 
Thorneycroft/de Peyer, 8/6/76, PRO BS 6/1115. 
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In Opposition Joseph had re-established links with the lEA, 
and clearly followed up the meeting with Maude by making 
contact with Seldon. For explicitly at Seldon's suggestion, 
Joseph wrote to George Bunton (who was to become a member 
of the NHSPG), asking whether proposals for new financing 
arrangements were "going to be prepared and tabled" (135). 
By this time Jenkin had succeeded Fowler. Like Thatcher, 
Joseph and Howe, Jenkin had been one of a relatively small 
number of Conservative politicians "of a free-market 
inclination [who] ... had sought intellectual support and 
encouragement from the lEA during the 1960s" (136). It was 
therefore not surprising that, early in his period as LCC 
social services spokesman, Jenkin expressed interest in 
exploring alternatives to taxation-based finance for the 
NHS (137). In an interim report to the LCC, the SSPG, which 
Jenkin chaired, stated that it was examining "continental 
systems of health finance" and, like Joseph and Maude, 
"probably through the favoured encouraging others, 
Conservative Medical Society", to put submissions to the 
RCNHS (1 38 ) . 
The LCC agreed that "we should encourage BUPA, etc, and the 
doctors to give evidence to the Royal Commission on the 
case for increasing health insurance, with, as a long term 
aim, the possibility of raising 20 per cent to 25 per cent 
of the NHS costs via insurance" (139). 
( 1 35 ) 
( 1 36) 
( 1 37) 
(138) 
( 1 39 ) 
Joseph/Bunton, 24/2/76, LJA KJ 19/1. 
Cockett, 1994, p. 176. 
eg the minutes of the PSPG meeting on 19/5/76 record 
tha t "Mr Jenkin thought There should be a 
systematic shift in the way the NHS is financed: 
from taxation to insurance" (PG/11/76/38, CPA CRD 
4/13/10). 
LCC/76/117, CPA LCC 113-123. 
LCC(76)117th, 21/6/76, CPA LCC 113-123. 
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The early indications were that alternative financing would 
indeed be one of the issues proposed to the RCNHS for 
consideration. In July 1976 the BMA's ARM called upon the 
inter alia, Association's 
"alternative 
Council to press for, 
and supplementary methods and sources of 
finance to be urgently considered" by the RCNHS (140). In 
August 1976 An Analysis of Preliminary Evidence prepared 
by David de Peyer, a DHSS ci viI servant acting as the 
Commission's Secretary, stated that the Commission had 
received "approaching 900 letters" and, among the subjects 
covered, there were four "high scorers", one of which was 
"alternative methods of finance", which had been mentioned 
in 81 letters (1 41 ) . 
The Conservative Party's hope that the RCNHS would indeed 
examine alternative financing 
in The Right Approach 
options 
in early 
was expressed 
October: the publicly 
Commission "should be looking at other ways of increasing 
the funds available to the [NHS], including the systems of 
health finance that exist in other countries" (142). 
Shortly after publication of The Right Approach, the RCNHS 
issued The Task of the Commission, a list of topics to be 
considered, which included "what methods there are of 
financing the NHS other than from direct taxation" (143). 
Joseph, invited to give personal evidence to the RCNHS at 
the end of November, reported to Jenkin that he had "begged 
them to examine the varying services abroad most of which 
are at least as good, if not better, than ours though no 
one of them is all financed as ours is by the taxpayer". 
The Commission's note of the meeting confirmed this (144). 
(140) 
( 1 41 ) 
(142) 
(143) 
( 1 44) 
BMAA, minutes of ARM 15/7/76 - 17/7/76, pp. 16/7. 
PRO BS 6/2513. 
The Right Approach, 1976, p. 60. 
1976, London, HMSO, p. 8. 
Joseph/Jenkin, 8/12/76, LJA KJ 29/6; RCNHS note of 
meeting, 30/11/76, PRO BS 6/3222. 
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In the event, those whom the Conserva t i ves hoped would 
submitted evidence to the RCNHS on alternative financing 
arrangements - the BUPA, the lEA (at least Ralph Harris and 
Seldon, the Institute's Directors, in their personal 
capacities) and the BMA - did so. 
The BUPA argued that "the encouragement of independent 
medicine to playa larger part ... would be helpful to the 
state of the public health"; noted recent Government 
initiatives which had the opposite effect (such as making 
taxable the benefi t of employer-provided pri vate heal th 
insurance schemes); and drew attention to ways in which 
other countries encouraged private finance in health care 
( 1 45) . 
Harris and Seldon of the lEA submitted evidence jointly, 
offering an economic analysis to support their urging of 
the Commission "to take a longer view than many of its 
predecessors by making clear the logical shortcomings of 
the dependence of the NHS on public finance that now seems 
to be running out" (146). 
The BMA proposed that in future NHS revenue should come 
from two sources - a basic compulsory contribution paid by, 
or on behalf of, every member of the popula tion, and 
charges for using services, including increased 
prescription charges and "a substantial contribution" to 
hotel costs in hospital" (147). 
( 1 45 ) 
( 1 46 ) 
( 1 47) 
PRO BS 6/489, pp. 19/29. 
PRO BS 6/1898, p. 38. 
PRO BS 6/253, p. 24. 
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The CMS recommended that in the longer term "an item of 
service payment ... with appropriate exemptions, and re-
imbursement for those in need", should be introduced, 
together with "the encouragement of tax deductible private 
insurance schemes for those not qualifying for full re-
imbursement" (148). In February 1976 the SSPG had agreed 
that, if the CMS was to give evidence to the RCNHS, "there 
should be proper liaison, via Doctor Vaughan, with Patrick 
Jenkin" (149), and at the time the Society developed and 
submitted its recommendations on financing Vaughan was its 
Pres iden t and a member of its Execu t i ve (1 50). I t thus 
seems likely that the Party leadership would have been 
comfortable with the CMS's recommendations, though in the 
press release Jenkin issued, welcoming the Society's 
evidence on organisational and financial matters, he did 
not explicitly refer to the recommendations on financing 
arrangements (151). 
And these four were not alone. For example, in a submission 
that was trailed in the Times (152), McKinsey & Co. 
proposed a "properly funded Social Insurance scheme" as the 
long term solution (153). 
( 1 48) 
( 1 49 ) 
( 1 50 ) 
( 1 51 ) 
( 1 52) 
( 1 53) 
Evidence of the Conservative Medical Society, Part 
I, London, CMS, p. 1 2, BMAA box 3/1 77 /9 ( da ted 
December 1976 but submitted to RCNHS under cover of 
a letter dated 25/7/77, PRO BS 6/341). 
minutes of SSPG meeting 10/2/76, PG60/75/2, CPA CRD 
4/7/78. 
Evidence of the CMS, Part I, p. 13 
Conservative Party press releases 778/77 (CMS 
evidence) and 783/77 (Jenkin's statement), both 
dated 28/7/77. 
Times, 24/1/77, p. 3, col. a. 
Realising the Promise of a National Health Service, 
January 1977, PRO BS 6/985. 
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By mid 1977 the Party could thus be certain that the RCNHS 
was receiving proposals for alternative financing 
arrangements for the NHS some, at least, of which were 
probably supported by the frontbench social services 
spokesmen. 
In parallel with the submissions to the RCNHS being made 
by the CMS and others, there is some evidence that the 
al ternati ve financing options were explored wi thin the 
Party's policy machinery (probably by the NHSPG), as Jenkin 
had indicated they would be, both to the LCC in June and 
the ACP in November (154). 
The CPA contains two undated and unsourced documents, one 
of which, Proposals for Health Services in Great Britain, 
may well be a draft of the NHSPG's report (155), as noted 
earlier in this Chapter. The other, a two page note, 
entitled Health Services in Britain, seems to be a summary 
prepared by Vaughan (156). 
The former described a number of alternative financing 
options considered (157), indicating a preference for an 
insurance system, an option listed as a "longer term 
option" in "Vaughan's" note. 
( 1 5 4 ) 
( 1 5 5 ) 
( 1 5 6 ) 
( 1 5 7 ) 
Social Services Policy Groups' Report, June 1976, 
CPA CRD 4/13/10; Social Services Policy, October 
1976, ACP(76)4, CPA ACP 3/21. 
see note 65 above. 
CPA CRD 4/7/55. At a meeting with the author on 
8/4/99 Mockler, in whose writing the note is 
annotated "GV", thought it likely that the note had 
been drafted by vaughan. 
"insurance cover for all with incomes over £3,000 
pa, with free services for those below this lev~l"; 
"all minor illnesses should be free, [WI th] 
compulsory insurance for major illness"; "a Voucher 
system"; "the points system"; and "a range ~f 
insurance cover linked to income with a claw-back . 
With the lack of any supporting papers in the CPA, 
it is impossible to be sure of the exact nature of 
some of these options. 
289 
There seemed, however, to be no intention of making any 
substantive policy announcement on alternative financing 
in advance of the report of the RCNHS. 
In February 1978, that "additional or alternative forms of 
finance should await the report of the Royal Commission 
which is currently examining these matters" was added to 
the SSPG's note of points for the manifesto for the next 
general election (158), and survi ved unchanged to the 
version considered by the LCC in May (159). From there it 
found place, in slightly redrafted form, in the second 
draft of the full manifesto considered by the LCC in 
September 1978 (160), and into the manifesto itself, thus 
becoming the Party's formal policy. The manifesto wording 
was that "the Royal Commission on the Health Service is 
studying the financing of health care, and any examination 
of possible longer term changes - for example greater 
reliance for NHS funding on the insurance principle - must 
await their report" (161). 
The manifesto wording was ambiguous, in that it was not 
clear if an incoming Conservative Government would examine 
"the financing of health care" after the RCNHS had 
reported, or only if the Commission recommended that it 
should be explored. 
( 1 58 ) 
( 1 59 ) 
( 1 60) 
( 1 61 ) 
minutes of SSPG meeting, 28 & 29/2/78, PG/60/78/7, 
CPA CRD 4/7/78. 
Draft Notes for the Manifesto and minutes of 
LCC(78)203rd meeting, 8/5/78, CPA LCC 194 - 213. 
LCC(78)186, second draft, considered at LCC/78/219th 
meeting, 4/9/79, CPA LCC 16a. Regrettably, the CPA 
seems not to contain the first draft, LCC(78)183, 
discussed at the LCC/78/216th meeting, 19/7/78, 
which probably also included the reference to 
awaiting the RCNHS's report. 
Craig, 1990, p. 280. 
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Initially, Jenkin seemed to suggest the latter. At a CMS 
symposium on health care finance in October 1977, he 
"confidently" stated that a future Conservative Government 
"would be prepared to consider positively and 
sympathetically any proposals put forward by the Royal 
Commission for transferring some of the cost of health care 
from tax to insurance" (162). In a Commons' debate in April 
1978, Jenkin said that the Party would wait for the RCNHS's 
report as "it would be very unwise for any party to commit 
itself in advance either way" (163). 
By March 1979, however, Jenkin referred to the decision to 
adopt a tax-financed NHS in 1946 as "the wrong turning" 
(164). In a Conserva ti ve News article in April 1979 he 
stated that a Conservative Government "will undertake a 
thorough study of the pros and cons of a switch to [an 
insurance] system as part of the longer-term reform of the 
NHS" (165) (author's underlining). 
While Jenkin seemed clearly to favour an examination of 
alternative financing if the Conservatives were elected 
(166), others, including Joseph, may have been more 
doubtful about pursuing that course. 
( 1 62) 
( 1 63 ) 
( 1 64) 
( 1 65 ) 
( 1 66) 
Conservative Party press release 1078/77, 29/10/77. 
Jenkin used similar terms in his Nursing Times 
article, 3 November 1977 edition, p. 1701. 
Commons Hansard, 20/4/78, vol. 948, col. 691. 
Jenkin's speech at Louth, 2/3/79, Conservative press 
release 304/79. 
Conservative News, April 1979, p. 4. col. f., did 
and as Secretary of State from 1979, Jenkln 
ind~ed establish such an examination (Webster C, The 
National Health Service, 1998, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, p. 154. 
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As noted in previous chapters, Joseph had a history of 
seeming to favour such an examination, and indeed was 
instrumental in setting one up in 1970, seemingly only to 
decide against seeking to make any change. In 1974 he had 
again floated the prospect of radical change in his Notes 
Towards the Defini tion of Policy. A year later he had 
determined to prompt the lEA to present ideas to the RCNHS. 
And in April 1978, he was reported as expressing to a CMS 
conference the hope of seeing a more extensi ve pri vate 
health sector in the very long term (167). 
As work on drafting the manifesto for the next election got 
under way in earnest, however, Joseph's cautious side came 
to the fore. The manuscript note of a meeting of the 
Party's strategy and Tactics Commi ttee on 13 June 1978 
recorded him as commenting that "we haven't got 
intellectual backing in the country on certain areas: NHS 
above all. Country not ready for any shift towards a non 
tax-borne service" (168). The wording of the mani festo was, 
however, sufficiently imprecise to accommodate both 
Jenkin's enthusiasm and Joseph's caution (the latter, on 
past history, perhaps only temporary). 
The Party's policy in respect of longer term funding 
possibilities did not, however, preclude it from 
considering changes within the existing financing 
framework, and its deliberations on these are considered 
in the following section. 
( 1 67) 
( 1 68) 
Sunday Times 16/4/78, p. 2, col. d; Sunday 
Telegraph, 16/4/78, p. 40, col. 6; Times, 17/4/78, 
p. 2, col. c; 
CPA LT 6/2. 
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4.4 Conservative policy on financing of the NHS in the 
short term 
Both Fowler and Jenkin were explicit that it was 
unrealistic to expect to see the NHS's funding situation 
eased through significant real increases in tax-based 
funding until the economy improved (169). 
While not envisaging any increases in tax-based funding 
beyond the plans announced by the Government in successive 
public expendi ture statements, after ini tial but short-
lived reluctance by Thatcher (170) a commitment not to make 
any further reductions in planned NHS spending was included 
in the early drafts of the manifesto for the next election 
and the manifesto itself. It was emphasised during the 
election campaign by Thatcher (171). 
Recognising that NHS funding was likely to be constrained 
until the economic situation improved significantly, and 
that any shift to an alternative funding basis was, even 
if practicable, a relatively long term matter, Conservative 
spokesmen addressed themselves to what could be done in the 
short term within the planned levels of tax-based funding. 
Three areas of thinking can be identified: sustaining, 
indeed increasing, existing non tax-based sources of NHS 
revenue; finding new sources; and making better use of 
resources. 
( 1 69 ) 
( 1 70) 
( 1 71 ) 
for example, Commons Hansards vol. 898, col. 1031 
(Fowler, 27/10/75) and vol. 948, col. 689 (Jenkin, 
20/4/78) . 
Mockler recorded that, at a meeting with the social 
services spokesmen the previous day, "Mrs T was not 
willing for us to make a public commitment not to 
reduce NHS expenditure below what is cur~ently 
spent. Despite some protests, she was very flrm on 
this point" (Mockler/Patten, 14/7/78, CRD 4/7/78.) 
the second draft LCC(78)186, considered by the LCC 
on 4/9/78, LCC(78)219th, CPA LCC 16a; t~e manifesto 
itself, Craig, 1990, p. 280; Thatcher s speech at 
Beeston, 18/4/79, Conservative press release 
GE588/79. 
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The Conservative manifesto for the October 1974 election 
had identified two non tax-based sources of revenue that 
Labour's policies would have reduced or eliminated - income 
from prescription charges and pay beds. As noted in Chapter 
4, the Conservative view was that, with NHS resources under 
pressure, it was inappropriate to lose the £130m a year 
secured from these sources (172). 
As it became clear that, in current economic circumstances, 
Labour was not in a position to propose the abolition of 
prescription charges, the Conservati ve argument became that 
there was no case for holding such charges down, with the 
implication that the Party would raise them at least in 
line with inflation. Both this and the argument that the 
Service could ill afford the loss of income from pay beds 
regularly featured in Conservative publications and 
speeches (173). 
While both the continuation of pay beds (and therefore of 
pay bed income) and increasing prescription and other 
charges were included in the notes on possible NHS items 
for the manifesto considered by the LCC in May 1978 (174), 
only the former found a place in the full drafts considered 
during the Summer and the general election manifesto 
itself. 
( 1 72) 
( 1 73) 
( 1 74) 
Craig, 1975, p. 440. 
for example, The Right Approach, ~976, p. 60 and 
Jenkin's articles in the Nursing TImes (3 November 
1977, p. 1701) and Audit, Finance and Accountancy 
(February 1978, vol. 5, no. 2, p. 70). 
Draft Notes for the Manifesto, May 1978, CPA LCC 
194-213. 
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Throughout 1978 the Treasury, which monitored speeches and 
articles by Conservati ve frontbench spokesmen, was assuming 
that the Party would propose a 50p increase in prescription 
charges which, on Treasury estimates, would have generated 
an additional £50m a year (175). This would have compared 
favourably to the potential income from pay beds - the £30-
40m pa often referred to in Jenkin's speeches and articles. 
It is not clear from the papers in the CPA why raising this 
potential addi tional £50m pa was not included in the 
manifesto; the obvious presumption is that it was viewed 
as likely to be electorally damaging. 
Consideration was also given to the possibility of 
introducing new charges, particularly a hospital bed charge 
which, as noted in previous chapters, had been regularly 
considered (and rejected) since the 1950s. 
At an early meeting with Fowler, Joseph suggested that it 
would be necessary to look again at the question of 
"boarding charges", but that the most that could be raised 
was about £ 100m pa and "the question was whether it was 
worth it" (176). Fowler, too, was sceptical, the minutes 
recording that in his judgement "this policy could prove 
very unpopular and we should proceed cautiously" (177). 
Nevertheless, "NHS New Charges Bill?" was a provisional 
item on a list of "essential legislation for incorporation 
in first few Queen's speeches" being compiled by the CRD 
(178). 
( 1 75) 
( 1 76) 
( 1 77) 
( 1 78) 
submission to Chief Secretary, 20/3/79, Treasury 
file 2SS 199/462/02A. 
note of meeting, 23/6/75, CPA CRD 4/7/78. 
ibid. 
CRD paper, 23/7/75, LJA KJ 18/1. 
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There seems to be no evidence that new charges such as for 
boarding were seriously considered by the Opposition social 
services team under Fowler, or in the early days of 
Jenkin's period as frontbench spokesman. The issue of 
charges was, however, raised in a paper for the PSPG by 
Nicholas Ridley, a keen supporter of Thatcher who had 
resigned as a minister during the Heath Government. Ridley 
estimated that £530m pa could be raised by introducing 
board and lodging charges for hospital stays, and £200m pa 
through charges for visiting GPs (179). 
The paper was discussed by the PSPG in April and May 1976, 
wi th Jenkin present. From the minutes, it is clear that 
Ridley's estimate of the potential income was regarded as 
unrealistic. The general view was that, "after 
administrative costs, Government help for the poor and 
above all bad debts", the yield would be "very low" (180). 
Given the difficulty, noted above, that the PSPG had found 
in identifying scope for reductions in public spending, it 
is understandable that, in presenting its proposals to the 
LCC in July 1976, the introduction of boarding charges (at 
£2 a day) was included, with an estimated yield of £50m in 
a full year (181). However, the PSPG paper made it clear 
that this charge was not proposed by those responsible for 
NHS policy, wi th the implication that, at that stage, 
Jenkin was opposed to such a charge (182). (This is 
supported by the fact that in the section on "Prescription 
and other health services charges" in the SSPG's report to 
the LCC a month earlier there had been no reference to the 
possible introduction of new charges (183).) 
( 1 79) 
( 180) 
( 1 81 ) 
( 182 ) 
( 1 83) 
The National Health Service, 27/4/76, CPA CRD 
4/13/10. 
minutes of meetings 28/4/76 and 19/5/76, ibid. 
paper LCC 76/124, pp. 11 and 13, considered at 
LCC(76)123rd, 12/7/76, CPA LCC 113-123. 
LCC 76/124, p. 12, ibid. 
LCC /76/11 7, 1 6/6/76 , ibid. 
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There was no specific reference to the PSPG's 
recommendation for boarding charges in the minutes of the 
LCC's discussion of the Group's report in July 1976, though 
a later PSPG paper, while continuing to include the 
estimated yield from a bed charge, identified it as one of 
"the cuts proposed in the original report [which] 
encountered strong opposition in Shadow Cabinet" (184). 
Given this "strong opposition", it was not surprising that 
the mid term policy document The Right Approach published 
three months after the LCC' s discussion of the PSPG' s 
report contained no reference to new NHS charges. 
If Jenkin was initially opposed to new charges, his 
position seems to have changed during 1977. In a speech to 
NHS treasurers in March 1977, Jenkin acknowledged that the 
Service "needs more money" and that one possibility was to 
charge for certain services. Specifically, he asserted that 
"it cannot be right that the only people who have to pay 
for their keep in hospital are pensioners" (185), a view 
he expressed, almost word for word, in a speech to a CMS 
symposium on health care finance in October 1977 and his 
Nursing Times article the following month (186). (Jenkin's 
reference was to the fact that, after a pensioner had been 
in hospital for a certain period his or her old age pension 
was reduced for the duration of the stay in hospi tal, 
reflecting that food etc. was being provided by the NHS.) 
( 184) 
( 185) 
( 186) 
PG/l1 /77, 1/6/77, p. 1, CPA CRD 4/13/11. 
Conservative press release 352/77. . 
Conservative press release 1078/77; Nurs~ng Times, 
3/11/77, p. 1701. 
297 
By the time Jenkin addressed its symposium on health care 
finance, however, the CMS itself had presented its views 
on financing to the RCNHS. Having "examined the question 
of hotel charges ... we have rejected them on the grounds 
of administrative cost" (187). Possibly lack of support by 
the CMS may have contributed to what seems to have been a 
slight shift in Jenkin's position in 1978. For although in 
his Audit, Finance and Accountancy article in February he 
raised the issue, he added that "the Royal Commission on 
the NHS will give us helpful guidance on this thorny 
problem" (188), indicating that, as with longer term 
alternatives to tax-based funding, the Conservatives would 
not be making any firm proposals until the RCNHS reported. 
Consistent with this, no proposals for a boarding charge, 
or any other new charge, were considered during 1978 in the 
process of drafting the manifesto for the forthcoming 
general election, or included in the manifesto itself. 
In the light of Jenkin's speech to the CMS symposium in 
October 1977, however, there was a basis for expecting that 
the Conservatives would introduce such a charge, and 
possibly a charge for visi ting GPs. For example, the 
parliamentary correspondent of the Lancet commented in July 
1978 that "Conservative Party plans for increasing existing 
health charges and levying new ones are likely to be the 
most controversial health issue at the General Election" 
( 1 89 ) . 
( 187 ) 
( 188) 
( 189 ) 
CMS evidence, pt. 1, p. 7, BMAA box 3/177/9. 
Audit, Finance and Accountancy, February 1978, p. 
70. 
Lancet, 29/7/78, p. 274. 
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The issue was raised during the election campaign in April 
1979. In response, Thatcher gave an undertaking that was 
often to be cited during her period as Prime Minister, that 
"the Conservative Party has no plans for new NHS charges: 
no plans to make people pay to visit their doctor, no plans 
to introduce hotel charges for those in hospital" (190). 
In a CRD brief for DHSS ci viI servants following the 
Conservative electoral success, Thatcher's statement was 
referred to as "a firm commitment" (CRD underlining) (191). 
In parallel with expressing concern not to lose revenue 
from existing sources, and giving some consideration to 
alternatives to tax-based funding and new changes, 
Conservative frontbench spokesmen addressed the question 
of the efficiency within the NHS. 
As early as November 1975, Fowler drew attention to 
possible savings to be achieved through preventive medicine 
and greater emphasis on community, rather than hospital, 
care (192). Jenkin shared Fowler's concern to use NHS 
resources to best effect, though in his view "the best 
approach should be to try to devise administrative and 
organisational machinery to improve efficiency" (193). 
In contrast to Joseph, who drew upon his own business 
experience and advice from experts (such as Hamilton and 
Payne in the days of the HPG, and Meyjes when Secretary of 
State), Jenkin developed a wide range of contacts among 
those with intimate knowledge of the NHS, mainly 
administrators. 
( 190) speech at Beeston, 18/4/79, Conservative press 
release GE588/79. 
( 1 91 ) CPA CRD 4/7/89. 
( 1 92) Commons Hansard, vol. 901 , col. 364. 
( 1 93) minutes of PSPG meeting, 19/5/76, G/11/76/38, CPA 
CRD 4/13/10. 
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One was Brian Edwards, a senior NHS administrator, who 
subsequently wrote that in Opposition, Jenkin "had worked 
hard wi th many of the leading figures in the NHS" 
(194). In his early years as social services spokesmen, in 
addition to meeting Edwards (195) and other administrators, 
Jenkin established a relationship wi th Roger Dyson, an 
academic specialising in NHS industrial relations. Dyson 
had offered his services to the Party and, after "vetting" 
by Chris Patten, Director of the CRD, was introduced to 
Vaughan and Jenkin (196). 
Perhaps through discussions wi th Dyson (who would have 
known a great deal about NHS working practices), and NHS 
administrators (who had to observe procedures not conducive 
to efficiency, such as spending allocations by the end of 
a financial year, even if this meant the money was spent 
on less essential items (197», Jenkin became convinced 
that "there is a great deal of waste" in the NHS (198). 
( 194) 
( 1 95) 
( 196) 
( 197 ) 
( 198) 
Edwards B, The National Health Service - A Manager's 
Tale, 1995, London, Nuffield Provincial Hospitals 
Trust, p. 55. 
Edwards had been a District Administrator in Leeds 
from 1974 and in 1976 became Area Administrator, 
Cheshire AHA. Edwards' diary for 1976 records a 
meeting with Jenkin and Vaughan on 16/7/76, Edwards' 
papers. 
Dyson/Thatcher, 20/2/75 (KJA KJ 18/1)i 
Patten/Fowler 12/5/75 and Mockler/Dyson, 17/10/75, 
CPA CRD 4/7/23, doc. 143). Dyson became a special 
adviser to Jenkin on his appointment as Secretary of 
state for Social Services in 1979. 
Jenkin later tended to refer to this as the "colour-
televisions-in-March syndrome" (speeches to the 
IHSA, 7/6/78, as reported in Hospi tal and Heal th 
Services Review, August 1978, p. 273, and the Party 
Conference, 13/1 0/78, Conserva t i ve press re lease 
1306/78). 
speech to CMS symposium, 29/10/77, Conservative 
press release 1078/77. 
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As a former Chief Secretary, Jenkin may even have been 
aware that the Treasury had longstanding concerns about the 
efficiency of the NHS (noted in Chapter 3), concerns which 
apparently remained long after the reorganisation of the 
NHS (199). 
Jenkin's proposals for achieving greater efficiency, like 
Joseph's in 1970, included further change to the structure 
of the NHS, examined below. However, he also emphasised 
improving efficiency by changing financial practices. 
First, as a response to what he termed the "colour-
televisions-in-March syndrome" (see note 197 above), Jenkin 
proposed to change the rule requiring financial allocations 
to be spent by the end of the year for which they were 
made. In a note to George Cardona in the CRD, he reported 
agreement on this with Howe, the shadow Chancellor. The 
rule on carry-over related "not to the management of the 
NHS, but to the management of public expenditure by the 
Treasury". Given the margins of error in overall Treasury 
control of public spending and the small sums "likely to 
be at issue within the NHS as carry-over", the rule could 
safely be ended. Jenkin was clear that this would be 
popular within the NHS: "few of the proposals which I make 
gain wider acclaim among my audiences than the pledge to 
end the rule" (200). 
( 199 ) 
(200) 
Webster, 1996, p. 602. 
Jenkin/Cardona, 16/3/79, CPA CRD 4/7/78. 
301 
Jenkin's second principal idea for improving efficiency was 
through incentives, which stressed in speeches and articles 
throughout 1978, though without offering any indication of 
the value of the improvement in efficiency he expected to 
see as a result (201). 
Overall, therefore, while retaining 
prescription charges in line with 
latter was not a commitment in 
pay beds and increasing 
inflation (though the 
the general election 
manifesto) would have increased the NHS's revenue, is seems 
unlikely that the aggregate impact of the various measures 
favoured by Jenkin would have had a substantial effect in 
relieving the pressures on the Service. As had Joseph in 
1970, Jenkin believed that structural change offered a 
perhaps more substantial means of improving efficiency. 
(201 ) for example, Commons Hansard, 20/4/78, vol. 948, 
col. 693/5; Hospital and Health Services Review, 
August 1978, p. 273; "A Conservative Look at the 
Health Service", contemporary Review, September 1978 
(vol. 223, no. 1352, p. 125); Conservative press 
release 1416/78, 10/11/78. 
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5. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NHS 
The third issue of form addressed from 1975 to 1979 was the 
Service's structure which, as implemented on 1 April 1974, 
was that developed by Joseph as secretary of State and 
enacted under the Heath Government in the face of Labour 
opposition. 
As noted in Chapter 4, the Labour Government had decided 
it had no option but to implement its predecessor's 
structure. However, ministers never sought to disguise 
their cri ticisms (202), which did not provide the most 
favourable circumstances for the new arrangements to become 
established (203). 
Howe had initially argued that the reorganisation needed 
time to settle down (see Chapter 4). However, before the 
structure had been in place for a year, criticisms were 
beginning to appear (204), and were monitored by the CRD. 
In a policy paper in June 1975 Mockler noted that "the 
reorganisation ... has recently given rise to a whole range 
of teething troubles, of which the most usually quoted is 
the difficulty of getting decisions made" (205). 
(202) 
(203) 
(204) 
(205) 
eg Castle's speeches during the 1975 Debate on the 
Address (Commons Hansard vol. 870, cols. 530/1) and 
to the National Association of Health Authorities, 
11/7/75 (copy in BMAA file 3/53/11). 
in a private memorandum to Joseph dated 28/4/76, 
Rogers, the DHSS Permanent Secretary during the 
first seven months of the new structure, commented 
"it really was most difficult with an incoming 
government, which openly disapproved of the re-
organisation". LJA KJ 19/3. 
eg in the Health and Social Services Journal 
editions of 4/1/75 (p. 15), 18/1/75 (p. 128) and 
15/2/75 (p. 351). 
Conservative Social Services Policy, 9/6/75, CPA CRD 
4/7/88). 
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Mockler's view was that the "new structure should be given 
2/3 years to settle down", and only "if there are still 
widespread complaints" should a Conserva t i ve Governmen t 
undertake a "limited re-appraisal and iron out the 
difficulties" (206). 
Fowler identified one possible change - cutting out one of 
the tiers of the NHS structure - in his paper on Social 
Services Policy in July 1975. He concluded, however, that 
given "the obvious political point that we carried out the 
reorganisation, and the practical point that it has hardly 
been given time to settle down", the option of giving a 
commitment to cutting out a tier should be left open (207). 
The minutes of the LCC meeting at which Fowler's paper was 
considered do not indicate that the issue of the NHS' s 
structure was discussed. In the absence of any clear 
expression of LCC policy Vaughan who, as noted in Chapter 
3, had had reservations about the need for the regional 
tier, went on record proposing that one tier, probably the 
region, should be abolished (208). 
The establishment of the RCNHS provided the Government with 
a vehicle through which an assessment of the working of the 
NHS structure, and any recommendations for change felt 
appropriate, could be expected. 
(206) 
(207) 
(208) 
ibid. 
Social Services Policy, 24/7/75, CPA CRD 4/7/78. 
Hospital Life, August 1975, quoted in Commons 
Hansard, vol. 898, col. 1053. 
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In a Commons debate a week after the intention to establish 
the Commission had been announced, Castle implied that no 
substantial change in the structure would be made until 
after it had reported (209). Although some changes were 
made in the membership of health authorities following 
consultation on Democracy in the NHS, and some merging of 
heal th districts wi thin AHAs was approved, "wai ting for the 
Royal Commission to report" became Labour's posi tion in 
respect of significant structural change, albeit not 
without some strains among ministers (210). 
To adopt a similar "wait for the Royal Commission" policy 
was clearly a possible option for the Conservatives. As 
noted above, it was the posi tion taken in respect of 
alternative financing, and in the short term it would have 
avoided the potential embarrassment of proposing 
modifications so soon to a structure put in place by the 
recent Conservative Government and so personally identified 
with Joseph. Early in 1976, it seemed possible that the 
Party would adopt just such a policy. 
(209) 
(210) 
27/10/75 Commons Hansard, vol. 898, col. 1054. In 
an effort to re-assure NHS staff, on 31/10!75 a DHSS 
press notice (75/2207) was issued, settlng ou~ a 
letter from Rogers to RHA Chairmen, drawlng 
attention to Castle's statement. 
Webster, 1996, pp. 728/730, records differences of 
view among the Cabinet in the Autumn of 1978. 
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A CRD memorandum identified "the future of the NHS" as an 
"area of apparent neglect within the Party", but suggested 
that "perhaps we should be cautious and hide behind the '" 
Royal Commission?" (211). Two days later, Joseph wrote to 
a parliamentary colleague suggesting that the RCNHS' s remi t 
was sufficiently wide "to cover the administrative reforms 
that may be needed when the new structure has settled 
down", implying no action before the Commission reported 
(212). A month later, Joseph advised the ACP that "it was 
too early to say how the re-organisation was going to turn 
out. He had heard that the single and multi-district areas 
[AHAs] were working qui te well, but the two and three 
district areas were not so successful". (213). 
In the early days of his period as LCC spokesman on social 
services, Jenkin defended the re-organisation against the 
charge that it had led to higher numbers of administrators. 
While there were "just 921 more support staff" than prior 
to the re-organisation, "there were 100 fewer" senior 
administrative staff (214). However, there continued to be 
evidence of concern about the new structure. McKinsey & Co. 
had, as noted in Chapter 3, been contracted to help develop 
the structure, and in January 1976 John Banham of McKinsey 
was instrumental in preparing an early appraisal of how it 
was settling down. While the author has been unable to 
trace a copy (215), Rogers prepared a detailed commentary 
on it for Joseph, from which it is possible to identify 
some of the findings of Banham's fieldwork. These included 
the perception that there was an "over-elaborate statutory 
framework", within which was included difficulties due to 
the distinction made between districts and areas (216). 
(211 ) 
(212) 
(213) 
(214) 
( 21 5 ) 
( 21 6 ) 
Forman/Joseph, 6/1/76, LJA KJ 18/4. 
Joseph/Sir Edward Brown MP, 8/1/76, LJA KJ 29/1. 
ACP(76)143rd meeting, 18/2/76, CPA ACP 2/4. 
28/2/76 Conservative press release 209/76. 
sources' approached have included Sir John Banham, 
and McKinsey & Co. 
28/4/76, LJA KJ 19/3. 
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Joseph edited many of Rogers' views into a letter to Jenkin 
(217) who, in addition had available some feedback from 
local Conservative groups, as well as published academic 
studies (218). 
In the light of this material, Jenkin seems to have reached 
the conclusion that neither a policy of allowing the re-
organised structure the "2/3 years" to settle down before 
re-appraising the situation (the CRD in Summer 1975) or 
"waiting for the Royal Commission" (as implied in the CRD 
memorandum in January 1976) seemed adequate. 
At a PSPG meeting in April 1976, Jenkin was reported as 
commenting that "it was not really possible to decide which 
tier of administration could be abolished" (219). Given 
that the issue seemed to be "which", rather than "whether" 
a, tier needed to be abolished, the implication is he was 
moving towards favouring substantial change of the kind 
Vaughan had proposed the previous August (220). 
(217) 
(218) 
(219) 
(220) 
Joseph/Jenkin, 4/5/76, ibid. 
in October/November 1975, as part of the "Three Way 
Contact programme referred to in chapter 3, local 
Conservative Groups had been asked for views on 
several NHS issues. In the summary of comments 
received from 612 groups, the Central Office noted 
concern about "the reorganisation of the NHS, which 
had proved disastrous", and instanced specific 
criticisms such as that the AHAs were "too remote". 
(Undated summary, CPA CC04/10/81). Among academic 
appraisals were Brown R, Haywood S and Griffin S, 
The Shadow and the Substance, 1974 and New Bottles: 
Old Wine, 1975, both Institute of Health Studies, 
University of Hull. 
28/4/76, PG/11/76/34, CPA CRD 4/13/10. 
the word "tier" was seldom used with precision in 
discussions of NHS structure, ei ther wi thin the 
Conservati ve Party or generally. As noted above, 
there were three statutory levels - the Secretary of 
State, RHAs and AHAs, the majority of AHAs being 
divided into two or more geographical districts. 
Some seem to have used "tier" to denote the three 
statutory levels; others to include the distr~cts as 
a tier. Unless the specific context was unambIguous, 
it is impossible to be certain what was intended in 
phrases such as "abolishing a tier". 
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This inference is supported by the fact that in June the 
SSPG reported concerns about the working of the new 
structure to the LCC, "on balance" recommending, subject 
to "more consultation", a policy of piloting the removal 
of AHAs in one NHS region (221). The SSPG was probably 
aware, through Vaughan, that the CMS was about to recommend 
to the RCNHS that AHAs, "and probably the Region" should 
be abolished, "both for efficiency and economy" (222). 
The minutes suggest that the LCC was sympathetic to this 
view, as the conclusion was that "we should encourage the 
Regions to experiment on what administrati ve structures 
best met their particular needs" (223). 
In September 1976 Jenkin set out (though without specific 
attribution) the LCC's policy in a speech to health service 
administrators. In giving examples of possible local 
solutions he suggested that "in some parts of the country, 
it may be possible to eliminate a management tier, or to 
break down an area into smaller district tiers" (224). 
By Summer 1976 problems perceived as arising from the re-
organised structure were of concern much more widely than 
in Conservative circles. For example, the BMA's ARM had 
resolved that among the matters the Council should press 
on the RCNHS was for "the administrative channels to be 
streamlined - for example, by pruning of committees, by 
rationalisation of tiers, and maximum delegation from DHSS 
to the Service" (225). And the summary made by de Peyer, 
referred to above, identified "structure and tiers" as the 
issue which had been mentioned most frequently in letters 
to the RCNHS (226). 
( 221 ) 
(222) 
(223) 
(224) 
(225) 
(226) 
16/6/76, PG/60/76/3, CPA LCC 113-123. 
24/6/76, CMS/RC, PRO BS 6/341. 
LCC/76/117th, CPA LCC 113-123. 
18/9/76, Conservative press release 878/76. 
BMAA minutes of ARM 15/7/76 - 17/7/76, pp. 16/7. 
PRO BS 6/2513. 
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In the light of the extent to which the issue was 
mentioned, it was not surprising that NHS structure was 
included in the RCNHS's list of topics on which evidence 
would be welcomed, published in October 1976 (227). 
The RCNHS invited a number of people, including Joseph and 
Heath, to meet them privately to discuss the NHS. Joseph's 
report to Jenkin of his meeting did not mention discussion 
of the re-organised structure, though the RCNHS' s note 
recorded him as offering essentially the same comment he 
had made to the ACP meeting in February (228). Heath told 
the RCNHS members that "the Conservative Cabinet had been 
divided in its views on NHS Reorganisation between those 
who advocated efficiency and those who advocated a system 
which provided for the consumer to be represented: the 
compromise reached had satisfied nei ther party", but in his 
view "the problems of the NHS could probably not be solved 
by changes in its organisation: the main need was for 
addi tional resources, and that depended on an improved 
performance by the national economy" (229). 
Late in 1976 and early in 1977, ideas about changes in the 
structure of the NHS were legion as individuals and 
professional bodies prepared evidence for the RCNHS. 
(227) 
(228) 
(229) 
The Task of the Commission, 1976, pp. 6/7. 
Joseph/Jenkin, 8/12/76, LJA KJ 29/6; RCNHS note of 
meeting, 30/11/76, PRO BS 6/3222. 
RCNHS note of meeting, 16/12/76, PRO BS 6/3220. 
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The BMA's draft evidence, published in the BMJ in January 
1977, was very critical. After making due allowance for 
"teething troubles", the Association concluded that 
"reorganisation (particularly as it affects England) has 
proved to be extravagant and inefficient". Echoing the 
views the CRD had picked up by mid 1975, in the 
Association's view "since reorganisation ... it has become 
increasingly difficult to get matters dealt with 
satisfactorily and speedily and for problems to be solved 
"on the spot" wi thout the need for reference upwards or 
downwards" (230). 
Among the BMA's recommendations to remedy the problems as 
it saw them was that "below the regional level there should 
be only one administrative and functional unit" (231). At 
a SRM on 9 March 1977 that recommendation was amended, "by 
a large majority", by one which explicitly proposed "the 
removal of Area Health Authorities" (232). 
The CMS broadly shared the BMA' s view. It judged that 
between the existing district level and the DHSS, only one 
level of management was needed, having "the functions of 
the present areas and many of the functions of the present 
regions ... [including responsibility] for planning, co-
ordination, and financial control" (233) 
(230) 
(231 ) 
(232) 
(233) 
BMJ, 29/1/77, pp. 311/4. 
ibid. 
BMAA, minutes 31-33 of SRM, 9/3/77. 
Evidence of the eMS, Part I, p. 2. 
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McKinsey's evidence to the Commission, which Banham had 
been instrumental in drafting, trailed in the Times and 
sent to the Commission within days of publication of the 
BMA's draft evidence, was clear that "there is at least one 
management tier too many" (234). The Association of Chief 
Officers of Health Authorities' evidence was published 
later in the same month, also proposing essentially the 
establishment of a single tier at local level (235). 
In addition to access to the publicly available evidence, 
Conservative social services spokesmen were the recipients 
of private advice, not all proposing the same solution. In 
December 1976 Joseph passed on to Jenkin a personal letter 
he had received from Norman Lamb, an NHS Regional 
Administrator, clearly favouring "having only one lower 
tier below Region, based on in the present health district" 
(236). At a PSMPG meeting in February where Rogers and Tony 
Kember, an Area Administrator (237), attended, their advice 
seemed to be to retain all the existing tiers, although to 
have "as many single-district AHAs as possible" (238). 
The draft report of the PSMPG, circulated on 18 March 1977, 
reflected the advice seemingly given by Kember and Rogers. 
The report recommended that" as many Area Heal th 
Authorities as possible should be single district AHAs, but 
there can be no single rule for all the country" (239). 
(234) 
(235) 
(236) 
(237) 
(238) 
(239) 
T ' 24/1/77 P 3 col. a,· PRO BS 6/985, para. ~mes, ,., 
2 . 8 . 
BMAA file 3/177/18. 
Lamb/Joseph, 30/11/76, enclosed with Joseph's letter 
to Jenkin, 8/12/76, LJA KJ 29/6. . 
Kember Area Administrator of the Kenslngton, 
Chelse~ and Westminster AHA, was invited by Baker, 
having previously been Secretary of the 2000 Club, 
a non-Party discussion group chaired by Baker, based 
in Acton (conversation with Kember, 19/10/00.) 
minutes of PSMPG meeting, 9/2/77, CPA CRD 4/13/77. 
CPA CRD 4/13/12. 
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In a speech on 26 March Jenkin went beyond the position 
proposed in the draft PSMPG report. While arguing that the 
1974 re-organisation "was not the starting pOint" for the 
seemingly inexorable growth in bureaucracy, he said that 
change was clearly needed, and that he had two 
"watchwords". 
The first watchword was "simplicity": what was needed was 
"a simpler administrative structure with one tier of 
management removed". Below the DHSS, "there need be only 
two tiers, a Regional tier ... [and] a local tier, perhaps 
called a District Health Authority". The second watchword 
was "decentralise", by which he meant that "as many as 
possible of the day to day decisions on health care 
[should] be taken at the point where health care is 
deli vered" , rather than drawn up to higher levels of 
authority within the structure. In relation to 
decentralisation, Jenkin found himself "much attracted by 
the concepts and reasoning of last year's report by the 
three Regional Chairmen" (240). 
(240) Conservative press release 352/77. The Three 
Chairmen's Report was published in December 1976, 
following an enquiry by three RHA Chairmen~ at the 
invitation of the Minister of Health, Dr Davld Owen, 
into "the functions of the Department of Health and 
Social Security in its relations with RHA~" with a 
view to seeing whether "economies of operatlon co~ld 
be effected by means of a transfer and/or reductlon 
in the scale of functions as between the Department 
and Regions". (Regional Chairmen's Enqu~ry into the 
working of the DHSS in relation to Reglonal Health 
Authorities, 1976, London, DHSS.) 
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By late March 1977 Jenkin had thus indicated that the Party 
was in favour of a considerable modification of the 
arrangements introduced in 1974, and in so doing had 
established addi tional common ground wi th the BMA (the 
other key area of agreement being in relation to the 
retention of pay beds). Further, an analysis of responses 
to the RCNHS prepared in May 1977 by its secretariat 
suggested that the position Jenkin had taken in March in 
relation to simplifying the structure was widely shared. 
In a paper entitled One Tier too Many?, it was reported 
that "the weight of argument in the evidence is that there 
is a need for a regional organisation below which there 
should be one operational level of management (the single 
district area pattern)", though with the possibility of 
local variations (241). 
Jenkin re-iterated the two themes of simplification and 
decentralisation in speeches and statements from Spring 
1977 right up to the 1979 general election (242), though 
without setting out exactly how 
(especially decentralisation) would 
achieved. 
these objecti ves 
in practice be 
Possibly it was the wish to explore practicalities which 
led Jenkin into perhaps the most extensive of his various 
consultations with NHS administrators, that with a group 
he was later to refer to as "the Weaver Group" (243). 
(241 ) 
(242) 
(243) 
PRO BS 6/2586. 
for example, 1977: 16/5, 28/7, 29/10, 1/12; 1978: 
26/1,3/3, 16/5,7/6,2/9, 28/10, 10/11; 1979: 25/4 
(Conservative press releases 538/77, 783/77, 
1078/77,1267/77,92/78,308/78,667/78,751/78, 
1134/78, 1370/78, 1416/78, GE668/79). 
Jenkin/Robert Nicholls (a Group member), 6/6/79, 
Weaver papers. 
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This was a loose-knit group of NHS administrators (244), 
brought together by Nigel Weaver, the District 
Administrator of the South Hammersmi th Heal th District, 
following a chance conversation he had had wi th Jenkin 
(245). Weaver and those he invited to attend meetings saw 
themselves contributing in a professional capacity, and in 
no sense as Conservatives (246). 
At Jenkin's suggestion, several of his articles were 
circulated to those invited to the meetings to, in Weaver's 
phrase, "indicate the skeleton that we have got to clothe 
if we are to do anything worthwhile" (247). 
After an initial meeting with Jenkin on 25 April 1978, 
there was one, and probably two, further meetings in the 
Summer (248). With the general election widely expected in 
the Autumn until Prime Minister James Callaghan's 
announcement on 7 September (249), there was a hia tus 
before a further meeting in January 1979, and possibly up 
to two others prior to the election (250). 
(244) 
(245) 
(246) 
(247) 
(248) 
(249) 
(250) 
those who attended included five Area Administrators 
(Robert Nicholls, Newcastle; Duncan Nicol, Salford; 
Brian Smith, Lincolnshire; John Spencer, 
Oxfordshire, and Kenneth Walker, Buckinghamshire) 
and four District Administrators, (David Knowles, NE 
District of Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster; 
Andrew Wall, Bath; Nigel Weaver, and Christopher 
Velloneweth, Eastern District of Liverpool). Minutes 
of meetings with Jenkin and Vaughan, 16/5/78 and 
30/1/79, Weaver papers. 
as explained to the author by Weaver, 9/2/00. 
ibid. 
Weaver/Group members, 29/3/78, ibid. 
Notes of Discussion of a meeting at the Commons on 
76/5/78; Accountabili ty in the NHS, "a discussion 
paper for meeting with Mr Patrick Jenkin ... June 6 
1978", Weaver papers. 
Times, 8/9/78, p. 1, col. a. 
Notes of a Meeting 30th January 7979; An 
Administrative structure for the Unitary Authority, 
"for meeting with Mr Patrick Jenkin ... on 13 March 
1979"· Weaver/Group members, 15/3/79, referring to 
"our ~ext meeting with Mr Jenkin ... will be on 10 
April". Weaver papers. 
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In the year or so during which meetings took place, members 
of the Group produced at least a dozen papers to aid 
discussion, most of which addressed the practical problems 
of implementing the kind of "simplification" Jenkin clearly 
favoured. For example, papers addressed such issues as the 
cri teria for determining the geographical areas to be 
served by health authorities at the operational level; the 
process of moving from the present structure to the 
"simplified" one; the composition and accountability of the 
proposed new authorities; and the pros and cons of 
establishing a chief executive role at the operational 
level (251). 
It is likely that Jenkin found the detailed attention paid 
by senior NHS administrators to such practical issues a 
useful complement to the various other sources of advice 
available to him (252). The papers and the discussions (as 
judged by the notes of two of them) would have confirmed 
not simply that the approach he had outlined in March 1977 
was in sympathy with the views of a number of senior NHS 
administrators, as well as doctors (as reflected in the 
BMA's evidence to the RCNHS), but seemed practicable. 
(251 ) 
(252) 
papers by Group members, Weaver papers .. 
this impression is clearly conveyed In letters 
Jenkin wrote to two Group members shortly after the 
general election. To one he wrote "I found the 
discussions I had with yourself and your colleagues 
of enormous value in helping us to put some flesh on 
the bones of our ideas" (Jenkin/Walker, 1/6/79). To 
another he wrote that "it is satisfactory that we 
may have the chance of putting into practice some o~ 
the ideas which we discussed over so many months 
(Jenkin/Nicholls, 6/6/79). Copies in Weaver papers. 
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One of the difficul ties wi th the proposals Jenkin had 
outlined in March 1977 was that they involved a 
considerable re-casting of those developed by Joseph as 
Secretary of State and implemented less that three years 
previously. 
As noted above, during 1976 Joseph was of the view that it 
was too early to judge the structure implemented on 1 April 
1974, though he had expressed worries about how the 
situation was working out in two and three district areas. 
By April 1978, he had reached a fuller judgement, 
describing the reorganisation as "in part patchy, in part 
awful, in part not bad and in part curable" (253). 
This acknowledgement by Joseph would have made it easier 
for Jenkin, a few days later, to state during a Commons 
debate that the "reorganisation has not fulfilled the hopes 
of its progenitors" and to set out his proposals, 
essentially as in his March 1977 speech (254). Thereafter, 
he submitted them for consideration for inclusion in the 
manifesto for the coming general election. 
In a note for an LCC meeting in May 1978, Jenkin proposed 
that "in many areas ... Area Health Authorities [should be 
merged] into local District Health Authorities, with lay 
representatives at that level", as the means of reducing 
[NHS] bureaucracy, simplifying administration and ensuring 
that more decisions on health care were taken at local 
level (255). 
(253) 
(254) 
(255) 
quoted in Commons Hansard vol. 948, col. 691. Jenkin 
s ta ted tha t Joseph had made the commen t " 1 as t 
Saturday", 15/4/78, presumably at a CMS conference 
he addressed, which was reported in respect of 
remarks on future financing (see note 167 above). 
The author has yet to trace a newspaper report of 
the comments on NHS reorganisation. 
ibid., vol. 948, cols. 691/3. 
Draft Notes for the Manifesto, sent under cover of 
Jenkin's letter to Maude, 6/3/78, CRD 4/7/78. 
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Jenkin's note was not unambiguous, but the essence of his 
proposal seems to have been generally to replace those AHAs 
with two or more districts by a new set of authorities each 
covering the geographical area of an existing district. 
The LCC accepted the proposal, and in meetings with 
Thorneycroft and Thatcher in July it was agreed that, if 
the proposals for structural change came under criticism 
for anticipating the report of the RCNHS, "we should answer 
that there is now wide agreement among experts on the 
necessity of doing what we propose" (256). 
Following these meetings, Jenkin's proposals on structural 
change were included in the second draft of the manifesto 
in the following terms: 
"We must see that the resources we have are more wisely 
spent. We will therefore simplify and decentralise the 
Service and cut back bureaucracy. Central government 
should interfere less in the details of NHS 
administration and leave as many as possible of the 
day-to-day decisions to be taken locally. We will 
retain the Regional Health Authorities in England and 
Wales as a co-ordinating and planning tier, but below 
that there should in most cases be only one tier 
responsible for the actual provision of health care. In 
many places, this will involve merging the Areas and 
Di s tr i c ts to create trul y local heal th au thor it i es" 
(257). 
(256) 
(257) 
LCC(78)203rd meeting, 8/5/78, CPA LCC 194-213; 
meetings with Thorneycroft, 12/7/78, and 
Thorneycroft and Thatcher, 13/7/78, CPA CRD 4/7/78. 
LCC(78)186, discussed at LCC(78)219th meetlng, 
4/9/78, CPA LCC 16a. The wording may also have been 
included in the first draft - see note 160 above. 
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In the published version, this draft was shortened to the 
less specific " ... we intend to make better use of what 
resources are available. So we will simpli fy and 
decentralise the service and cut back bureaucracy" (258). 
6. THE CONSERVATIVE POSITION AT THE 1979 GENERAL ELECTION 
6.1 NHS policies 
On the three issues relating to the form of the NHS 
examined by the Party in Opposi tion, two resul ted in 
general election manifesto commitments. 
On private practice, there were commi tments to "restore tax 
relief on employer-employee medical insurance schemes", and 
that pay beds would continue to be provided where there was 
a demand for them. 
On structure, Jenkin's two watchwords from his May 1977 
speech were incorporated into the commitment to "simplify 
and decentralise the service and cut back democracy", again 
without any specific indication of how in practice that 
would be achieved. 
On the issue which, more perhaps that the other two, might 
have led to substantial change to the form of the NHS, a 
move from tax-based funding to alternative arrangements, 
it was clearly felt inexpedient to go beyond acknowledging 
that it was under study by the RCNHS and "any examination 
of possible longer term changes" must await that report. 
(258) Craig, 1990, p. 280. 
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As this set of policies took shape, Jenkin clearly regarded 
it as potentially popular. In March 1978 he advised 
Thatcher that "attitudes which we have been taking in 
public in speeches up and down the country and in Press 
articles have won a wide measure of support wi th their 
emphasis on making the Service more local, getting rid of 
bureaucracy, cutting out waste, making patient care the 
main concern and generally "stopping the rot" (259). 
In November 1977, the LCC Policy sub-committee had agreed 
that The Right Approach and The Right Approach to the 
Economy should be followed by a series of "Right 
Approaches", including one on social policy (260), but the 
draft was not regarded as satisfactory and in June 1978 it 
was decided not to proceed (261). As an alternative in 
respect of the NHS, Jenkin saw "considerable advantage" in 
publishing a paper specifically on the Service, as "there 
are a great many NHS interests which would be very anxious 
to see such a document and we do not feel that there need 
be hostages to fortune in it" (262). Joseph agreed, and 
Vaughan was commissioned to produce a draft which Jenkin 
would "look over" (263). 
By late July 1978 "Dr Vaughan was rumoured to have 
submi tted a draft to Patrick Jenkin" (264), but in November 
the decision was taken that "Dr vaughan's ... paper should 
not be revived", with no reason recorded (265). 
(259) 
(260) 
(261 ) 
(262) 
(263) 
(264) 
(265) 
Jenkin/Thatcher, 17/3/78, CPA CRD 4/7/88. 
note of sub-committee meeting, chaired by Joseph, 
7/11/77, CPA CCO 20/31/5. 
note of meeting of Joseph's Policy Committee, 
21/6/78, LJA KJ 18/3. 
Jenkin/Joseph, 22/6/78, CPA CRD 4/7/72. 
note of meeting of Joseph's Policy Committee, 
5/7/78, LJA KJ 18/3. 
note of meeting of Joseph's Policy Committee, 
28/7/78, LJA KJ 18/3. 
note of meeting of Joseph's Policy Committee, 
22/11/78, LJA KJ 18/3. 
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No paper on Conservative policies for the NHS was therefore 
published prior to the 1979 election, when such issues were 
just one element among the Party's whole range of policies, 
so Jenkin did not have the opportuni ty of finding out 
whether, in aggregate, they "won a wide measure of support" 
within the Service. 
6.2 The general election manifesto as a whole 
On NHS matters, although the manifesto committed the Party 
to the reversal of two of the Labour Government's policies 
(on pay beds and taxing the benefit derived from employer-
employee pri va te heal th insurance schemes) it would be 
difficult to characterise it as radical. The two 
"reversals" were aimed at restoring what had long been the 
status quo. The proposed changes to the structure of the 
NHS were, judged by Jenkin's speeches, likely to reflect 
the developing consensus within the Service. And leaving 
"any examination of possible longer term changes" on forms 
of financing until the RCNHS had reported carried no 
commitment to radical change. Was this essentially 
conservative approach characteristic of the manifesto? 
The early Thatcher Governments have been characterised as 
having "completely transformed" Party policy (266) and "by 
post-war standards radical" (267). However, to the 
extent that those judgements might be considered to be 
well-founded, a matter outside the scope of this thesis, 
the 1979 election manifesto only anticipated part of that 
policy transformation and radicalism. 
(266) 
(267) 
Holmes M, The First Thatcher Government, 1985, 
Brighton, Wheatsheaf, p. 211. . . . . 
Kavanagh 0, Thatcherism and British PolItICS, 1987, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 316. 
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writing years after the 1979 general election, Thatcher 
herself emphasised the "mixed" nature of the Party IS 
manifesto. She described both the need to hold the Party 
together in Opposition which, she judged, involved the need 
to appoint to the LCC colleagues with whom she "could not 
assume agreement - even on basic principles" (268), and the 
compromises this required in the drafting of the election 
manifesto (269). 
According to Thorneycroft, the Party Chairman during the 
period Thatcher was Leader of the Opposi tion, "the key 
changes were to get a grip of the finances [and] a return 
to free collective bargaining but only with tough union 
legislation after the abuses of the last 10 years" (270). 
It was widely recognised that, compared with recent 
governments, the manifesto had a significantly different 
approach on 
includ[ing] 
economic policy, "the main proposals 
a strict control of the money supply and a 
reduction of both the government's borrowing requirement 
and the state's share of national income. Cuts in public 
expenditure were promised in almost every area" (271). 
Whether the approach on trade unions was as radical was, 
at that stage, less clear. The manifesto implied, but did 
not state, that the law would be used to place obligations 
on unions and curb picketing (272). 
(268) 
(269) 
(270) 
(271 ) 
(272) 
Thatcher, 1995, p. 291. 
ibid., pp. 436/9. 
quoted in Holmes, 1985, p. 8. 
Butler and Kavanagh, 1980, p. 156. The Daily 
Telegraph regarded the manifesto's economic 
proposals as "an advance on t?e last two 
Conservative manifestos, not to mentIon an advance 
on the last Conservative Government", leader, 
12/4/79, p. 18, col. a. Holmes, 1985, p. 13, put,the 
manifesto in a longer historical perspectIve, 
commenting that it included "a radical approach to 
economic policy compared to that of post-war 
Conservatism". 
Craig, 1990, p. 271. 
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The day after the manifesto was published, the Daily 
Telegraph, perhaps sensing tensions within the LCC (which 
Thatcher was later to describe (273», contrasted the 
"simply not specific enough" wording of the manifesto with 
Thatcher's "rather impressive ... speech last night [which] 
went further, emphasiSing the need for the unions to be 
subjected to "a legal framework". The Daily Telegraph went 
on to hope that Thatcher's speech, rather than the 
manifesto, "was a true guide to Tory policy" (274). 
In other respects, the manifesto has been described as one 
where "across the broad range of policies ... continuity 
was the order of the day" (275). Far from a wholesale shi ft 
away from the policies of pursued by the Heath Government, 
even on incomes policy (which, as noted above, had been one 
of Joseph's targets in the period after the February 1974 
general election (276», Thatcher described herself as 
scoring "no better than a draw", wi th a commi tment to avoid 
incomes policy in the private sector but not necessarily 
in the public sector (277). Indeed, so far was the 
manifesto from being a programme of what Gilmour has 
characterised as "Thatcherism nineteenth-century 
indi vidualism dressed up in twentieth-century clothes" 
(278), that Butler and Kavanagh were able to note "many 
points of continuity" with Labour's manifesto (279). 
(273) 
(274) 
(275) 
(276) 
(277) 
(278) 
(279) 
Thatcher, 1995, p. 436/8. 
Daily Telegraph, 12/4/79, p. 18, col. a. 
Behrens, 1980, p. 118. 
the section "Incomes Policy No Cure" in his Preston 
speech, 5/9/74, reprinted in Joseph, 1975, pp. 
19/32. 
Thatcher, 1995, pp. 438/9. 
Gilmour, 1992, p. 9. . . 1 
Butler D and Kavanagh D, The BrItIsh Genera 
Election of 7979, 1980, London, Macmillan, p. 161. 
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In its essentially conservative character, therefore, the 
NHS section of the Conservative Party's manifesto for the 
1979 general election was of a piece with many others. On 
the form of the NHS, radical pol icies, if they were to 
come, were to come later. 
6.3 Arrangements for policy review under Mrs Thatcher's 
leadership 
As had been the case between 1964 and 1970, from 1974 to 
1979 the Conservative Party social services spokesmen had 
groups examining policies on the NHS. In practice, however, 
it is open to question whether the groups had any 
substantial existence until the NHSPG was established under 
Vaughan's Chairmanship in the Spring of 1976, or whether 
the NHSPG had much impact on the Party's policy making. 
Rather, apart from on the issue of responding to the Labour 
Government's policy on pay beds, the evidence suggests that 
work in reviewing policies on the form of the NHS did not 
begin in earnest until Jenkin became the LCC social 
services spokesman, and that he personally took the lead 
in formulating the policy to modify the structure of the 
NHS that had been enacted under the previous Conservative 
Government. 
In reaching his views on structure, Jenkin seems to have 
involved many more "outsiders" than his predecessors 
between 1964 and 1970 - both regularly visiting hospitals 
and other NHS services to speak to staff, and forming close 
working relationships with a number of people with 
substantial experience of the NHS (for example, Dyson, and 
members of the "Weaver" group). He also had available as 
a source of advice the newly formed CMS. Again, though, it 
is notable that there seemed to be no on-going 
relationships with professional bodies, such as those 
representing doctors and NHS administrators. 
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There is clear evidence that the NHS was of concern at 
local level: in summarising the response to a consultation 
wi th local groups held in October and November 1975, 
Conservative Central Office reported that "a record number 
of groups" had met, with twenty percent more groups 
responding than had done so on the previous, and at the 
time controversial, issue of trade unions (280). Jenkin has 
confirmed, from his experience of talking to Conservative 
constituency groups, that there was indeed considerable 
local interest in NHS issues (281). (This provides a 
different perspective than might be gained from study of 
Conservative Annual Conference reports of the period. At 
the 1975 and 1976 Conferences there were just brief 
references to the Labour Government's pay beds policy. 
There was no discussion of the NHS at the 1977 Conference. 
Only at the 1978 Conference was there a wide-ranging, 
though brief, discussion on the Service.) 
Although the evidence is too limited to draw a firm 
conclusion, it seems possible that the views of local 
Conservatives had more impact on policy development from 
1975 than they had had in the 1960s. 
(280) 
(281 ) 
Summary of Reports on Topic Number 72: The National 
Health Service, undated, CPA CC04/10/81. . 
conversation wi th author, 19/11/99. The CPA Includes 
about 150 press releases of Jenkin's speeches and 
statements as LCC social services spokesman (not all 
on NHS matters), to which could be added numerous 
talks given for which there were no press releases. 
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CHAPTER 6 - FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
In this Chapter, the author has three main objectives: to 
comment briefly on the evidence upon which the account in 
the previous chapters is based; to summarise the 
conclusions he draws from the evidence; and to consider 
what light the study sheds on contentious issues of 
interpretation in recent Conservative Party history. 
1. THE EVIDENCE - STRENGTHS AND DEFICIENCIES 
Any study of past events necessarily depends for its 
evidence on what might be termed relevant survivals - those 
primary materials and subsequent commentaries which seem 
to its author to be relevant. 
This study is based in large part on archival research, 
mostly in the CPA (and the related Lord Joseph Archive), 
the PRO, and the BMAA. In addition, the author was granted 
access to papers held by the Treasury and Cabinet Office, 
due to be sent to the PRO in the fullness of time; lEA 
papers lodged in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution 
and Peace, and some papers in private hands listed in the 
Preface. The author also became aware of other papers 
likely to be relevant, which were not available to him (1). 
From the sources he was able to access, the author has been 
able to identify, and incorporate into this study, much 
that seemed to him to be relevant. In all cases his 
requests to be allowed to quote extracts from material in 
papers not open to the public were granted without 
qualification. 
( 1 ) late Enoch Powell 
transfer to Churchill 
Gerard vaughan (see 
especially those of the 
(unavailable while waiting 
College, Cambridge), and Sir 
Chapter 5, note 71). 
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There are some "gaps" in the evidence: instances where 
there is clear evidence that a potentially relevant paper 
had existed but could not be traced by the author (2). 
Whether this is because the papers no longer exist, or they 
exist but the author failed to locate them, is uncertain. 
Within the context of the relevant evidence identified, 
however, the "gaps" seem relatively minor. 
In addi t ion to the archi val and other wr it ten sources 
referred to above, the author had the opportuni ty of 
discussion wi th some of those directly involved in the 
events to which reference has been made. While these 
discussions were invariably useful, 
they related were typically twenty to 
relatively minor in the lives 
the events to which 
thirty years ago, and 
of those involved. 
Unsurprisingly, individuals' memories were often patchy, 
and sometimes recollections seemed clearly to be incorrect 
when checked against other sources. For these reasons, and 
with no disrespect to the individuals concerned, the author 
has sought not to rely upon recollections unsupported by 
other evidence. Where such evidence has not available, 
recollections have been used with caution (3). 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 
examples include: Joseph's copy of the report of the 
Working Party on NHS Finance (see Chapter 3, notes 
121 and 122), and the first full draft of the 1979 
general election manifesto (Chapter 5, note 160). 
see, for example, the material on the members of the 
NHSPG, Chapter 5, p. 264. 
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2. CONCLUSIONS 
seemed 
of the 
Conclusions on specific issues, such as why Joseph 
not to have taken any follow up action on the report 
WPNHSF, have been offered in chapters 1 to 5 as 
appropriate. In this section the author is concerned with 
conclusions on broader matters. 
2.1 Was the period one "rich in reflection"? 
The period examined in this study was chosen as one likely 
to be "rich in reflection about the form of the NHS" (4). 
As with any research endeavour, whether this would prove 
to be the case was necessarily uncertain at the outset. 
AS has been shown in the previous chapters, in opposition 
the NHS, and particularly issues about its form, featured 
explicitly in the major policy reviews initiated in 1964 
and 1975 (and not solely in the discussions of the groups 
established specifically with the NHS as their remit, but 
also in those of the ERPG and PSPG and its Manpower Sub-
group, for example). In government, two major issues of 
form - organisational arrangements and funding - were 
examined extensively, in the former case up to and 
including cabinet level. In both opposition and government, 
the discussions included a wide range of views on the 
issues. 
Overall, therefore, in the author's view the period studied 
was indeed as "rich in reflection" as he had thought likely 
although, naturally, reflection did not always lead to 
policy change. 
(4) Introduction, p. 2. 
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2.2 The extent to which policy changed 
In the author's view, the most striking finding of the 
study is how difficult the Conservatives found it to move 
away from the consensual posi tion on the NHS that had 
become apparent during the 1950s. And this is the more 
striking given the fact that, among those who contributed 
to thinking about NHS policy, were Joseph, Howe and Powell, 
widely regarded as among the more radical of Conservative 
politicians of the period. 
This conservatism was most evident in relation to the 
financing of the NHS. There is ample evidence that leading 
Conservatives were clear both that the NHS needed more 
resources to enable appropriate services to be provided, 
and about the difficulty of providing those resources when 
the great majority of funding was via taxation. Despite 
that clarity, whenever possibilities for change were 
considered, the potential pitfalls seemed always to loom 
much larger than the perceived benefits of moving to a more 
pluralistic funding base, as the Conservatives were aware 
applied elsewhere, for example in Australia (5). 
How is this to be understood? The evidence, right from 
Macleod's December 1948 memorandum (6), suggests that the 
Conservatives were aware that the NHS was very popular. It 
was therefore unsurprising that the Party was cautious 
about adopting policies that might be viewed as calling 
into question its commitment to the Service. 
(5) see, for example, Chapter 2, p. 84 (note 89) and p. 
11 2 . 
(6) Introduction, p. 31 (note 91). 
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Thus for potentially radical Conservatives such as Joseph, 
there was a constant tension between the belief that change 
would prove beneficial in the long run, and its possible 
short term consequences on public opinion. At times 
Joseph's radicalism seemed to be dominant (for example, in 
his response to Balniel's paper of September 1968 and his 
initiative in establishing the WPNHSF (7». At other times 
his doubts about how proposals for change would be received 
by the public were clearly dominant (for example, in his 
letter to Seldon of November 1965, and his June 1978 
comments on the draft of what became the Conservati ve 
manifesto for the 1979 general election (8». If these 
concerns about public reaction were so great for someone 
as potentially radical as Joseph, it is unsurprising that 
over the period as a whole no change in policy resulted. 
That the Party was able to adopt and implement major policy 
change in respect of the organisation of the NHS contrasts 
with the situation with respect to financing. But so, too, 
did the wider context. For, as made clear in the previous 
chapters, during the 1960s there was increasing support for 
the administrative unification of the NHS, both among 
heal th service interests and poli ticians. Al though, as 
noted, aspects of the precise proposals the Conservative 
Government sought to enact came under criticism from the 
Labour Opposition, the end - administrative unification -
was a consensual one. 
(7) Chapter 2, pp. 92/3 and Chapter 3, p. 152 
(8) Chapter 1, p. 43 and Chapter 5, p. 292. 
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Thus on organisational change the Party's position moved 
from apparent scepticism about administrative unification 
(when first considering the Porritt proposals (9», to one 
where by early in 1970 the Party's principal spokesmen had 
indicated broad support for the idea (10). In office after 
the 1970 general election, Joseph found the DHSS c i v i 1 
servants enthusiastic for unification, which then became 
arguably his major priority in relation to the Service. 
It is important to note the potential linkage between the 
two issues of financing and organisation for Joseph and, 
later, Jenkin. There is little doubt that both would have 
favoured a move away from the largely tax-based financing 
arrangement for the Service if they could have identified 
one free of what Joseph referred to as "political 
difficul ty" (11 ) . In the absence of such a way, 
organisational change at least offered the prospect of 
improved efficiency and thus enabling some of the pressures 
for more resources to be met wi thout the allocation of 
additional tax-derived funding. To that extent, the 
enthusiasm that both Joseph and Jenkin showed in 
organisational change can perhaps be viewed as compensating 
for their inability to see a satisfactory way forward as 
regards changing the financing basis of the Service. 
(9) for example, Chapter 1, p. 48 (Powell), and p. 
(Joseph) . 
(10) Chapter 2, pp. 119/120 
(11) Chapter 1, p. 43. 
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2.3 The significance of the NHS to the Party 
In the previous sections it has been suggested that, for 
the Conservative Party, the period 1964-1979 was one rich 
in reflection about the form of the NHS, but that 
reflection about changes that would have involved a shift 
from the consensual posi tion reached in the 1950s was 
simply too radical to lead to policy change. What can be 
inferred from this about the significance of the NHS for 
the Party? 
By way of context, what might be termed the adequacy of the 
NHS only began to surface as a public issue in the 1960s, 
and arguably did not become a significant one until the mid 
1970s. Thus concerns about the adequacy of the funding of 
the Service were initially raised by the medical profession 
at BMA ARMs in mid 1960s, and gave focus to the work of the 
Association's Advisory Panel (12). Those concerns were more 
muted during the Heath Administration, perhaps because of 
the increases in funding that were announced (13), but 
became more voluble with the economic difficulties from 
1973. By mid 1974 other health professions had joined the 
doctors in pressing publicly for an independent enquiry 
into the NHS (14), which the Government conceded in Autumn 
1975 with the setting up of the RCNHS (15). 
(12) Chapter 2, p. 86. 
(13) Chapter 3, pp. 136 and 139. 
(14) Chapter 5, p. 280. 
(15) ibid., p. 281. 
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The Conservative Party was, arguably, beginning to give 
consideration to the issue of the adequacy of the NHS 
before it had emerged as a public issue. Al though the 
decision to include the NHS in the policy review initiated 
in 1964 seems to have been a marginal one (16), from the 
time the HPG was established the NHS was under almost 
constant consideration by the Party, in opposition and in 
government. As noted above, a great deal of time was spent 
in exploring issues of funding and structure. 
Further, there is evidence that as the NHS became a matter 
of public concern, the Party gave it even greater 
attention. For example, recognising that aspects of the 
reorganisation effected while in Government were a cause 
of concern both in the Service and among Party members 
(17), Jenkin clearly put in a great deal of personal effort 
to explore matters within the Service and identify 
proposals for modification that would command wide 
supported. Indeed, there is evidence that Jenkin believed 
that he had been sufficiently successful in this to warrant 
publication of a Party policy paper specifically on the NHS 
( 1 8) . 
While not in any sense arguing that by 1979 the NHS had 
become a political issue of dominating importance, either 
for the electorate or the Conservative Party, there is thus 
evidence to suggest that it had become markedly more 
significant for both than it had been in 1964, and that 
throughout the period it had received close attention by 
the Party leadership. Further, simply by study of the 
relevant sections of the Conservative and Labour general 
election manifestos of the period, it is far from self-
evident that the NHS was any less significant to the former 
than to the latter. 
(16) Chapter 1, p. 34. 
(17) see, for example, Chapter 5, note 218. 
(18) Chapter 5, p. 319 
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2.4 The nature of Conservative Party policy making 
This study is primarily concerned with the reflection given 
to issues relating to the form of the NHS, on which 
specific conclusions have been presented in Chapters 1-5, 
and some conclusions on broader issues offered in sections 
2.1 to 2.3 above. Seeking the evidence necessarily involved 
studying the Party's policy making arrangements. What 
conclusions can be drawn about them? 
2.4.1 Policy making in opposition 
In 1964 and 1975, as described in Chapters 2 and 5, the 
Party leadership instituted wide-ranging formal policy 
review programmes, and in both cases the NHS was one of the 
subjects. The intention of the programmes was that policy 
groups would be established, their deliberations reviewed 
by the Party leadership and, if accepted, included in over-
arching policy documents such as Putting Bri tain Right 
Ahead or The Right Approach, prior to finding place in the 
general election manifesto. 
Both the HPG and the NHSPG were formed much later than most 
of the groups examining other pol icy areas, and it is 
arguable whether either fulfilled the hopes of the Party 
leadership. As noted in Chapter 2, after Balniel succeeded 
Pike the HPG was effectively allowed to lapse. As noted in 
Chapter 3, there is barely evidence that the NHSPG met, 
still less reported. 
Rather than being undertaken via the (broadly similar) 
models envisaged by the Party leadership in 1964 and 1975, 
in practice, for much of the time, the conduct of 
consideration of NHS policies in opposition seems to have 
become very much a matter for the individual frontbench 
spokesmen. 
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From 1967, Balniel and Macmillan personally carried forward 
the development of policies on structure and financing, and 
sought to agree these (with only limited success) with the 
LCC, for example at the Selsdon conference. There does not 
seem to have been any extensive consultation with either 
what might be termed the wider Party, or health interest 
groups such as professional associations and the 
pharmaceutical industry (this is discussed in section 2.4.3 
below) . 
As Opposition spokesman from 1976, Jenkin met regularly 
wi th colleagues in the SSPG, when sometimes NHS policy 
would be discussed, but he spent much time talking with 
people in the NHS, and seems to have formed his judgements 
as to what policy changes were necessary in the light of 
those discussions. There is no evidence he had any direct 
contact with the NHSPG as a group, or looked upon it as the 
primary means through which new policies would be 
developed, though discussions with Vaughan would have kept 
him abreast of any emerging conclusions. Although Jenkin 
spoke to many professional gatherings, and corresponded 
with, for example, the BMA, as with the period prior to 
1970 there is little evidence of any extensive 
relationships with such bodies. 
Overall, for the greater part of the periods of opposition, 
although notionally part of formal, systematic policy 
review procedures, the party's policy making on NHS matters 
seems to have been characterised more by what might be 
termed the personal approaches and proposals of the 
frontbench spokesmen than adherence to the policy group 
approach envisaged by the Party leadership. 
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2.4.2 Policy making in government 
In office from 1970 to 1974, there were the well-
established procedures of cabinet government for policy 
consideration, and these were followed in respect of the 
reorganisation of the NHS. 
Ini tially there was discussion between Joseph, as the 
Secretary of State, and DHSS officials. That was followed 
by inter-departmental consultations; the issue of a 
consultative document; meetings with key interests such as 
the local authority associations and the BMA; discussion 
and eventual agreement at cabinet level on policy; and 
publication of a White Paper setting out that policy. As 
aspects of the policy where contentious among ministers, 
the process included extensive discussions in cabinet 
committees and the cabinet itself, as documented in Chapter 
3. 
As the files in the PRO show, there were extensive 
discussions about NHS reorganisation with a wide range of 
professional bodies and other organisations concerned with 
the NHS, which would appear to be in marked contrast to the 
situation in opposition. However, as made clear in Chapter 
3, much of that was after key decisions had been taken 
within government, so the contrast is perhaps less marked 
than might initially be supposed. On the other hand, in 
these "wi thin government" discussions, it can be 
hypothesised that DHSS civil servants, knowledgeable about 
the views of professional and other bodies, were able to 
ensure that these were taken into account (19). 
(19) Chapter 3, p. 222. 
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2.4.3 Policy making - pluralist? 
The author's starting frame of reference was a pluralist 
one - the core assumption of which is that political power 
is widely distributed. 
The evidence set out in Chapters 1-5 suggests that policy 
review, especially in opposition but also to an extent in 
office, was an activity involving relatively few people. 
In opposition, for example, these included the relevant 
frontbench spokesmen, members of policy groups, and 
associated CRD officers - perhaps a dozen or so individuals 
at any point in time. 
As to the wider Conservative Party, the evidence is mixed. 
The Party's ACP discussed aspects of the NHS periodically, 
and a Parliamentary Party Health and Social Security 
Committee existed throughout the period. There is, however, 
little evidence that the PHSSC was particularly active 
though, as noted above, this may simply be a matter of 
written records not having been kept. The one clear 
initiative taken by the Committee was the preparation of 
the report put to ministers in Spring 1971, referred to 
briefly in Chapter 3. 
At local level, if judged by the contributions to the 
Party's Annual Conferences (and in some years the NHS was 
not specifically discussed), it would be difficult to 
conclude that NHS issues were regarded as of significance. 
Even when there was a discussion specifically on the 
Service, typically there were only about six speakers apart 
from the frontbench spokesman. This may, however, not give 
a realistic impression of the significance of NHS policies 
to local Conservatives, and owe more to the constraints on 
time at the Conferences given the range of subjects to be 
discussed. 
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As regards individuals and organisations outside the Party, 
to the author a surprising finding was how little contact 
frontbench spokesmen seemed, from the evidence, to have had 
with key professional bodies such as the BMA, Royal College 
of Nursing and those representing NHS administrators. There 
were few indications in the CPA of such contacts, and 
research in, for example, the BMAA provided little by way 
of addi tion. Rather, the evidence suggested that Party 
spokesmen sought advice from individuals, and on occasion 
from small, informal groups. 
Thus, as documented in Chapters 1-5, there were "outside" 
experts on policy groups, such as Wiseman and Freeman (HPG) 
and Rogers and Kember (the PSPG Manpower Sub-group); and 
contacts with individuals (for example Seldon and Dyson) 
and groups (the six GPs and Weaver's) knowledgeable about 
the NHS. In government, too, the Conservatives were able 
to draw on expert advice other than from the career civil 
service, for example Meyjes and Jaques. 
Overall, the Party's policy making was clearly pluralist 
in character, though the evidence suggests rather more 
limited in terms of the involvement of the wider Party and 
outside interests than the author had expected. 
2.4.4 Policy making - the contribution of "outsiders" 
Given that individuals and groups from outside the Party, 
exemplified above, seem clearly to have been part of the 
Party's policy consideration process, can any conclusions 
be reached as to the significance of their contributions? 
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From the available evidence - and particularly minutes of 
meetings where frontbench spokesmen discussed papers by, 
for example, Wiseman and, later, members of the "Weaver" 
group referred to in Chapters 1 and 5 respectively - there 
is no very clear indication that these discussions were 
major contributors to the development of policy. 
On the issue of financing, for example, Wiseman's ideas for 
moving aspects of the NHS to an insurance basis seem not 
to have been picked up at all, and his membership of the 
HPG was, as noted in Chapter 2 (20), rela ti vel y short-
lived, whether at his instigation or the Party's is 
unclear. Similarly, the lEA's involvement with Joseph, both 
in opposition and office, seems to have had little impact, 
as noted in Chapters 1 and 3, even if, as suggested, 
Cockett was incorrect in reporting a falling out between 
Joseph and Seldon (21). 
The situation seems to have been broadly similar in respect 
of NHS organisation. In office, expert advisers such as 
Meyjes and Jaques seem clearly to have had less impact on 
Joseph's thinking as Secretary of State than his civil 
servants. In opposition, although Jenkin, for example, had 
numerous contacts with outside experts such as Rogers and 
Kember, it is not at all clear from the available evidence 
that any played a major part in the development of his 
policy proposals. 
(20) p. 62 (note 20). 
(21) Chapter 3, p. 162 (note 126). 
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Why the various outside experts involved in Conservative 
thinking about the NHS in opposition and in government seem 
to have had only minor impact on the development of policy 
is far from fully clear. The basic presumption can only be 
that their ideas were out of line wi th the responsible 
minister or shadow minister's sense of what was politically 
desirable and/or feasible. And this was not always because 
they seemed too radical. For while Wiseman and Seldon's 
ideas in respect of NHS financing, and Meyjes and Jaques' 
in relation to NHS organisation, might be thought of as 
having been too radical for Joseph, the advice about 
organisational change from Rogers and Kember, for example, 
in the context of the PSPG Manpower Sub-group, was clearly 
more conservative than Jenkin thought was required 
adequately to address the difficulties being experienced 
with aspects of the reorganised NHS. 
2.4.5 Policy making - conclusions 
It has been suggested 
arguably in government, 
character, albeit 
Conservative Party 
with 
and 
above that, in opposition, and 
policy making was pluralist in 
less involvement of the wider 
outside interests by Party 
frontbench spokesmen than the author had expected. 
The evidence also suggests to the author that the potential 
significance of the individual in role as Party spokesman 
could be very great. Thus, while it is difficult to 
identify any of the party's policy changes - or decisions 
not to change policy - to some of those who were the 
principal frontbench spokesmen over the period (for 
example, Pike, Balniel and to a lesser extent Howe and 
Fowler), the personal contributions of others (Joseph and 
Jenkin) seem to have been substantial. 
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Joseph's principal contribution was in respect of the 
reorganisation of the NHS. In government from June 1970, 
the Party had no formal policy commi tment to uni fy the 
administration of the NHS. However, as described in Chapter 
3, Joseph, an initially sceptical Secretary of State, 
became personally committed to such a policy, was able to 
gain Cabinet agreement to it, and was central to the key 
decisions (22). 
Similarly, the evidence suggests that Jenkin, as LCC 
spokesman from 1976, can be identified as having made a 
significant personal contribution to the adoption of 
proposals to address difficulties experienced in practice 
with the re-organised structure; proposals that were more 
radical than that of the Labour Government, despite the 
concerns they had expressed in opposition; and proposals 
which he was later to carry forward into formal government 
policy. 
3. THE STUDY AND ISSUES OF INTERPRETATION IN RECENT 
CONSERVATIVE PARTY HISTORY 
There is agreement among commentators on the broad history 
of the development of what Lowe has termed the Conservative 
Party's political strategy, though there is considerable 
disagreement on some aspects. The broad history and areas 
of disagreement can be summarised as follows. 
a) During the 1940s (with disagreement over exactly 
when), the Party seemed to commit itself to a greater 
role for government than had hitherto been the norm 
in peacetime. Key elements of the enhanced role were 
the management of the economy to secure high and 
stable levels of employment, and to make Britain into 
a "Welfare state". 
(22) Chapter 3, p. 220. 
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b) That commitment was shown to be real when the 
Conservatives next achieved office, in 1951, and was 
sustained by successive Conservative Governments to 
1964. During this period of thirteen years there was 
broad consensus between the two major parties on the 
appropriateness of "the d " manage economy and the 
"Welfare state" (though the exact nature and extent 
of this consensus are matters of contention). 
c) At some point after the 1964 general election, 
(exactly when being another subject of contention), 
the interest of some within the Party in reducing the 
role of government called into question the nature of 
its commi tmen t to "the managed economy" and the 
"Welfare state" (the extent to which the commitment 
was called into question, and to which it was 
modified, being further issues of contention). 
The Introduction to this thesis offers some comments on (a) 
and (b) above suggesting, for example, that from the point 
of view of favouring a national health service, the 
Conservative commitment was a product of thinking during 
the Second World War, and owed nothing to the subsequent 
policy reviews associated with RA Butler. 
The body of the thesis covers the period relevant to (c) 
above, and it is to offer some tentative conclusions from 
the narrow perspective of the research summarised in this 
thesis that the remainder of this Chapter is concerned. 
To develop the thinking summarised in (c) more fully, there 
seem to be two main views. Some have seen the shift in the 
political strategy of the Conservative Party as dating from 
Thatcher's election as Leader in February 1975, while 
others date it up to ten years earlier. 
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As noted above, writing specifically about the Conservative 
approach to welfare (including the NHS), Lowe has 
characterised the political strategy of the Party from the 
1940s as "reluctant collectivism", an essentially pragmatic 
approach following the realisation in the 1940s that "for 
a variety of economic and political reasons, the market was 
no longer working in the ideal way assumed by classical 
economic theorists" and that "greater state regulation" was 
necessary to avoid "an unacceptable level of economic was te 
and social distress". Although renewed enthusiasm for 
markets (the basis of a different political strategy which 
Lowe has termed "the New Right") "temporarily influenced 
Conservative government policy between 1970 and 1972", 
"reluctant collectivism" as a political strategy "dominated 
the Party until Margaret Thatcher's election as leader in 
1975" (23). 
Behrens, writing about the Conservative political strategy 
generally, has taken broadly the same view. As noted in 
Chapter 4, he has characterised those taking part in 
"debate about what to conserve" after the loss of office 
in 1974 as "Diehards" and "Ditchers", the former favouring 
"the eternal principles of limited government", the latter 
(essentially Lowe's "reluctant collectivists") judging 
after the Second World War "that intervention by the state 
[was] unavoidable in a society determined not to return 
to inter-war maladies". In Behrens' view, "the Diehards 
viewed post-war Conservatism as merely an alternative form 
of socialism", and were only able to achieve some measure 
of change in the Party's policy strategy after Thatcher 
became leader (24). 
(23) Lowe, 1999, pp. 16/9 and 23/4. 
(24) Behrens, 1980, p. 3. 
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Among Conservative politicians, it is clear that both 
Thatcher and Joseph held views consistent with Behrens' 
interpretation. Before Thatcher succeeded Heath as Party 
Leader, both she and Joseph had publicly stated that, over 
the previous decade there had been too much "socialism" in 
Conservative policies (25). 
Lowe and Behrens share the view is that from the 1940s to 
1975 the dominant political strategy within the 
Conservative Party was essentially "reluctant 
collectivism", and that thereafter "the New Right" became 
influential, perhaps even dominant. 
A rather different view has been expressed by Blake, for 
whom the shift from "Butskellism, if it had ever existed", 
came after Heath was elected Party Leader. For Blake, the 
policy strategy Heath developed as Leader marked "a clear 
ideological cleavage", and Thatcher's strategy was 
essentially similar to Heath's in "content and theme". 
Blake has supported his view by specifying what he saw as 
the main themes of Heath's programme: "lower direct 
taxation; less governmental interference; reduction in 
public expenditure; selectivity in the social services and 
a shift in the burden from the Treasury to the employers; 
legislation to restrain the power of the unions; and entry 
to the EEC" (26). Wi th the exception of shi fting the burden 
of social service costs to employers, all of Heath's other 
themes were included in the first Conservati ve general 
election manifesto under Thatcher's leadership (27). 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
for example Joseph's speech at Upminster, 22/6/74 
(Joseph, 1974, pp. 5/10) and Thatcher's "My Kind of 
Tory Party" article, Daily Telegraph, 30/1/75. 
Blake, 1985, p. 301. 
1979 general election manifesto, Craig, 1990, p. 272 
(lower direct taxation); p. 267 (less governmental 
interference); p. 269 (re,du,ctior: in pub~ic 
expenditure); p. 268 (select1v1ty 1n the ~oc1al 
services); pp. 270/1 (legislation to restra1n, the 
power of the trade unions); pp. 281/2 (membershlp of 
the EEC). 
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Ramsden has broadly agreed wi th Blake's view. In his 
judgement, "Thatcher's rhetoric and programme in 1979 were 
not at all unlike that offered by Heath in 1970" (28). For 
Ramsden, what distinguished the programme developed under 
Heath's leadership from that developed under Thatcher's was 
not its content. Rather, it was that Thatcher I s "was 
underpinned by an intellectual and media consensus ... that 
Heath never enjoyed in his first two turbulent years in 
office", which enabled the Thatcher Government to stick 
with policies rather than bend to criticism (29). 
Among poli ticians, Tebbi t seemed to share the Blake/Ramsden 
view. As noted in Chapter 2, he referred to the programme 
adopted at the LCC weekend at Selsdon as "the Tory Party's 
first repudiation of the post-war Butskellite consensus 
[a commitment] to the new liberal economics" (30). 
Thus there would seem to be broad agreemen t tha t the 
dominance of the poli tical strategy of "reluctant 
collectivism" was challenged by those who favoured an at 
least partial drawing back from what some have referred to 
as "socialism". The disagreement is over when the challenge 
impacted. 
Does the research summarised in Chapters 1 to 5 throw any 
light on these matters? In the author's view, the answer 
has to be "only to a very limi ted extent". From 1 965 to 
1979 there were regular considerations both of different 
structures for the Service, and alternatives to the 
essentially tax and Contribution based funding arrangement 
enacted in 1946. 
(28) Ramsden J, An Appetite for Power, 1998, London, 
HarperCollins, p. 401. 
(29) ibid., p. 402. 
(30) Tebbit, 1988, p. 94. 
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As discussed in Chapters 1 to 3, the Party's developing 
policy on the structural integration of the NHS was, in 
broad terms, part of an emerging political and NHS-
interests consensus, and therefore not a distincti vely 
radical policy. Proposing an alternative financing basis 
to taxation and Contributions would, however, have 
represented radical changes. 
In the period prior to 1970, both Balniel and Macmillan 
developed such ideas which were put to Heath, but secured 
no support. During the early years of the Heath Government, 
Joseph's interest resulted in the establishment of a civil 
service Working Party on NHS Finance but, as noted in 
Chapter 3, by the time its report was completed Joseph 
seemed to have decided not to pursue matters. 
By contrast, under Thatcher's leadership, as noted in 
Chapter 5, although the economically liberal-inclined 
Jenkin expressed dissatisfaction wi th existing funding 
arrangements and interest in alternatives, he seems not to 
have led any substantial work to explore possibilities. 
This could be seen as support for Blake's view that, from 
as early as 1965, policies could be considered from a 
different perspective. As noted in the Introduction and 
Chapter 1, however, consideration had been given to 
alternative financing possibilities during ministerial 
discussions, and in the Party officer-based PCFSS, well 
before Heath became Leader. To the author, the evidence 
suggests that the considerations given to alternative 
funding arrangements under Heath's leadership sprang more 
from the same practical concern - how to find ways of 
easing the pressure on the Exchequer for more NHS funding -
than from a distinct shift in political strategy or 
ideological cleavage. 
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The work put in hand in 1970 by Joseph may have had more 
of an ideological origin - for Joseph has clearly had some 
sympathy with economic liberalism since the mid 1960s. The 
fact that Joseph seemed to have decided not to pursue the 
issue after the WPNHSF reported suggests that, at this 
stage, any ideological wish for change was far from strong. 
The timing of work on what could, potentially, have been 
radical change in the form of the NHS thus seems to offer 
no very clear support to either what for convenience might 
be termed the Lowe/Behrens interpretation, or to the 
Blake/Ramsden one. 
In fact, as evidenced in Chapters 1 to 5, no proposals for 
change in financing arrangements became Party policy 
between 1964 and 1979. Does this call into question the 
common ground of the two interpretations, namely that at 
some stage before 1979 the poli tical strategy of "reluctant 
collectivism" came under challenge? 
Here, the answer has to be an unequivocal "no". Neither of 
the broad interpretations argues that, prior to 1979, those 
within the Conservative Party dissatisfied with its 
"reluctant collectivism" became sufficiently dominant as 
to be able to secure radical change in Party policy across 
the board. Behrens, for example, has suggested that policy 
change "was I imi ted by the consensus over the form of 
conversation in Conservative politics, by the existence of 
a consensus between Diehards and Ditchers in some policy 
fields and by the caution of Mrs Thatcher's Diehard 
leadership" (31). 
( 31) Behrens, 1 980, p. 5. 
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While all are agreed that there was change in respect of 
some key policies, that the financing arrangements of the 
NHS was not one of them in no way invalidates the broad 
interpretation of a modified overall political strategy. 
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